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Dan Wang: Silicon Valley Culture, London’s Building Crisis, and China’s Cultural Squeeze

April 21, 2026 Ben Yeoh

Dan Wang joins Ben Yeoh for a conversation about what different societies are good at, what they neglect, and what that reveals about culture, ambition, and power. Starting with Silicon Valley, Dan argues that tech has become thinner-skinned and less funny as harder-edged founder culture has replaced its more playful countercultural roots. That narrowing shows up beyond humour: San Francisco still has legacy cultural institutions, but newer tech wealth is often far less willing to support the arts unless it can see a direct return.

“You have to have a sense of which rules to break. If you break no rules ever in life, you will absolutely get nowhere.”

From there, the discussion opens out into a broader comparison of California, London, and China. London, in Dan’s view, is almost Silicon Valley’s opposite: culturally rich, socially sparkling, and full of serious artistic life, yet held back by pessimism and a deep inability to build.

“The UK has the housing prices of California and the per capita income of Mississippi State.”

 Ben pushes on whether Britain could reverse that decline if it fixed planning, housing, and energy bottlenecks. China, meanwhile, is presented as a place of extraordinary physical achievement but increasingly constrained cultural production, where censorship, weaker reading habits, and even food delivery systems are flattening parts of public life.

“The discussions on AI seem to have quasi-religious tones. Either this is going to be utopia or this is going to plunge us all straight into hell.”

They also explore why AI debate has taken on a quasi-religious tone in California, with utopian promises on one side and apocalyptic fears on the other, while more immediate problems such as propaganda, low-quality content, energy supply, and permitting constraints receive less attention. The second half of the episode turns more personal and literary: neurodiversity in Silicon Valley, cadet training and discipline, opera, Shakespeare, Tom Stoppard, writing craft, and the underrated practice of retyping great prose or reading plays aloud with friends.

“The immigrants are best able to appreciate what works and what works badly in every particular culture.”

It is a wide-ranging conversation about how people think, what institutions reward, and why culture matters more than technocrats often admit. 

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.


Contents

  • 00:21 Why Tech Lacks Humor

  • 02:09 Silicon Valley Arts Funding

  • 05:28 London Versus California

  • 08:31 China Culture Censorship

  • 12:56 Food Culture US China

  • 18:58 AI Utopia Versus Doom

  • 23:04 UK Building Energy Bottlenecks

  • 30:58 Fixing UK Planning Housing

  • 34:28 Neurodiversity In Silicon Valley

  • 37:04 Cadets Discipline Rule Breaking

  • 39:15 Modern Opera: Mozart. Verdi Debate

  • 42:04 American Shakespeare Picks

  • 45:31 Book Tour Reflections

  • 48:09 Retyping Great Writers

  • 52:56 Reading Plays Together

  • 58:29 Playwrights And Prose

  • 01:01:38 Overrated Underrated Round

  • 01:10:21 Advice For Your Twenties

Transcript (lightly edited, transcribed by LLM AI, so mistakes are very possible)

Ben: Hey everyone, I'm super excited to be speaking to Dan Wang. Dan has written an excellent bestselling book on China and America called Breakneck.

Dan, welcome.

Dan: Great to be here.

Ben: In your recent annual letter, you suggest it's nearly as dangerous to joke about the top Silicon Valley venture capitalist, as is to joke about a Chinese CCP party leader.

Why does Silicon Valley have no humor? And did it ever?

Dan: at one point it probably had a little bit of a sense of countercultural humor. In the days of Steve Wozniak perhaps Steve Jobs, there were slightly playful act personalities back in the eighties up until the nineties.

And then these much harder core nerds took over. Does Bill Gates have much of a sense of humor? Does Mark Zuckerberg have much of a sense of humor? Perhaps so in private but certainly not in public. And so I think that there is this progressively thinner skin where every generation of founders loses a little bit of humor and funny points.

And then they also shave off a little bit more of their skin. And I think that is really well represented now by Elon Musk, who maybe it's not his fault now he's trolled to insanity three times a day before breakfast by all of these crazy people on the internet in a platform that he controls.

I think that this is also, perhaps he is a little bit funny. He certainly thinks of himself as being very funny, but I don't think that there are many sparkling personalities in the tech world such that it is pretty difficult. And I've tried this exercise going up to tech friends and asking who is the funniest founder out there?

It's a pretty thin list of names.

Ben: And they started off in the hippie world. I guess that wasn't necessarily the tech bro. So it is interesting that they do seem to have lost their sense of humor. Also Silicon Valley. And the CCPs seem to me to be less involved in cultural production.

Standup comedy would be one thing, but it also seems to be the case in art and music with some exceptions. So for instance, Patrick Collinson of Stripe fame seems to be very interested in beauty, but do you sense this too, of overall cultural production? And is this narrowness a big problem for Silicon Valley or not really?

Dan: San Francisco has a certain amount of elite culture. And so I am thinking about the art museums. I'm thinking about the opera and the ballet where the old rich, the old money in San Francisco has given fairly generously to the symphony, the opera et cetera. The arts, which makes it look quite a lot more like New York City.

And there is some new money that is also involved in some of these pretty traditional art forms. But generally speaking it seems like these. New billionaires that have been created over, let's say the past 10 years, have become significantly less interested in funding the arts.

Broadly speaking the movie theaters, the indie movie theaters have been closing down in San Francisco. Downtown is generally a mess. There's very little foot traffic. And even the art museums are not necessarily doing super well. And so when you combine all of these things and you have the fact that Silicon Valley billionaires are much more eager to fund the next generation of technology than anything else which has been one of the great factors of Silicon Valley success that you had, the semiconductor people funding, the telecom, people funding the internet, people funding.

Now the AI people. And so I think that has generally been pretty positive. But when creatives go up to billionaires and ask for money for the arts, the billionaires are often asking for a return as if arts could ever be productive. As if the arts could ever be profitable almost anywhere. And so you cannot possibly generate a real return on the arts, whereas it seems like the rich people in New York and LA are quite a lot more forgiving of the fact that if they give money to a documentary filmmaker, they'll never see a scent back of it.

Ben: I think it, Silicon Valley seems to understate that intangible return, the sort of cultural reputational value, social capital, or however you would put it. So do you think if you were to add a cultural institution in San Francisco around Silicon Valley, that would be a good idea and what would it be?

Dan: I'm not sure if I could add a new cultural center. I think it is. It's hard to figure out what the right format is. Could it be something in visual arts? Could it be something in the theater? Perhaps. But I think that something has to grow, probably out of the tech world out of something that the tech world really embraces.

And the challenge is that I don't think that many of these tech people want to go to the opera except as an affectation. Or really see very many plays because the play going audience in the US is generally fairly smaller. Even in somewhat larger cities like Boston or dc or la.

There is a scene, but it is quite a lot more difficult to find than in a place like London. So here's my case to you Ben, that if we had to find the polar opposite in terms of culture to Silicon Valley, is it not London? In Silicon Valley, you speak to a lot of engineers and they don't necessarily have many jokes to tell as I've established.

They don't have much culture that they want to go to in London. It is much easier to find to chat with people where those conversations sparkle. And the plays and the classical music and the visual arts are completely off the charts for even I think for most Americans, even perhaps for a lot of New Yorkers, the cultural scene in London is really amazing.

And whereas the weather in the Bay Area is pretty, pretty perfect the weather in London is by default, fairly gloomy. So isn't London the opposite end of the world from California?

Ben: I think it's, I think that's almost correct. So London or the UK as well, you've said you've argued it's very good at clever sounding industries.

But the offshoot of that is maybe we're overweighted in journalism, also accounting and legal, but we're also overweighted in theater arts, visual arts, music and all of that. So it makes us extremely happy. Culturally rich and actually there's a lot of soft power cultural events. So even nearby there's Glastonbury, you've got the tennis and the rowing and the sporting events and all of those kinds of things as well as that soft cultural power.

On the other hand, we don't build anymore. We've got poorer. Millionaires are still leaving us, although actually non millionaires are still wanting to come to the uk. So I think a lot of Chinese millionaires are leaving China and going all over the place, but some of them are still coming to the UK so that's interesting.

On the other hand, And it also means that I think London in some ways has a little bit like the US some fixable problems because some of the stuff which is around there is more fixable. Then it would seem, but I'm interested. So if San Francisco has maybe this cultural problem, it'd be interesting whether we think that's broadly in some spots of America, and I wonder whether China also has some of these cultural problems as well.

So I'm not sure whether you find, I think in your letter you did say Beijing and Singapore were, Beijing and San Francisco are a little bit similar in that respect, but whether you think that is also a problem of narrowness across a lot of their Chinese cities.

Dan: Yeah there's also something else that Californians have that Londoners and British people do not have, and that is optimism.

And so I think that there is a little bit of this sense. Even among Brits are the first people to say that, yeah, they're all very cynical. There's not that much hope for the future. I find it a little bit odd that there is just this self-professed pessimism gloom within the national culture.

And I think that is probably not a healthy trait when everybody kind of jokes about it. I think I am a little bit more constructive, at least in a lot of parts of culture, in the US relative to China. Chinese culture such as it is, has been very severely squeezed by the censorship apparatus.

Very few art house films anymore. Not that much by way of very popular groundbreaking fiction. That, there's a lot of really creative short form videos and they can AI slop with the best of them. I think in terms of broader culture, I think that China has not done super well, not much in terms of journalism because that has been the part that has been strangled the most.

And so maybe some people are really impressed by dancing robots on really big bridges. But I'm not sure if that is going to be the sort of culture that you and I are very much drawn to. Now, you and I are quite different, but I think that Chinese cultural production has been pretty disappointing.

And I think in general fewer and fewer people read and read books in China these days. That's my sense that the book sales are really falling. At least in the US the book sales have been holding steady over the last few years. Now a lot more people are reading. Romantic and fairy smut, which is fine and whatever.

But I think that it is still pretty striking that book sales are holding up in the US where they're falling in China. So at a first approximation, people are just reading far less in China these days.

Ben: And I think if China does end up stumbling, it will be because they've tried to engineer on the social side, all of their physical engineering, which you described very well in your book, has been so successful.

But the social political engineering has been such a disaster. And I know you're very critical of the one child policy, but reading it over, I wonder whether we understate how catastrophic that could be for the medium term in China. So it'll be interesting to see where that holds.

And I do think you're right that actually Brits in general are a little bit pessimistic for those who've been around, but those who come to London. Immigrants first, second, even third generation, actually remain optimistic. And this is the kind of interesting thing about where they've left and they think of all the great parts of London and the uk and just to really perplex that Brits don't really value that as much.

And I find this is a little bit in Americans as well, they don't quite appreciate what they have yet. The immigrants who come and say this is amazing. Why don't you, why don't you appreciate it? And I'm also immigrant

Dan: immigrants are the best people to assess. I think they're the best people to appreciate local cultures.

The left I think generally is too critical of cultures and the right are too critical of the immigrants, whereas the immigrants are best able to appreciate what works and what works badly in every particular culture. But I do find it a little bit sad.

Immigrants arrive in the UK feeling quite optimistic and maybe that effect persists. But generally the people, the culture around them is trying to drag down their mood or that just happens that most people are, have a bad mood or over the longer term, that feels a little bit sad to me.

Ben: Yeah, I completely agree. I do think London's a little bit of a special exception of, versus the rest of the uk. But I do think that is the general vibe and that it's

Dan: more optimistic or less optimistic.

Ben: It's more optimistic. But then London isn't, probably half of London even something like that has English as a second language or a co language.

It's every immigrant, either first or second generation. So perhaps it's a little bit different and it has such strong agglomeration effects in London, which you really don't see in any other cities, which actually is a real problem for the UK versus even Germany or France.

But particularly versus the us I was in Nashville not too long ago, and Nashville can just go and do their own thing. They're a, I think they were half a million people when I saw them last time, which was maybe 15 years ago. And now they're almost a million person city and growing with their own culture and vibe, and they can stand alone in that.

Whereas a place like Leeds can't even put in a tram or a metro system. And all the best people from Leeds, not quite all, but a lot of them end up in London. So that's one of the UK specific issues. On the other hand, the thing about the immigrants coming in is that means that the London food scene has got, amazingly better over the last 10, 20 years, even the last two or three. I was interested, do you think the differing food cultures coming back to the US and China have anything to explain about how similar or different the US and China are? Obviously China has got quite a monumental headstart on the US which I don't think America will ever close up.

But maybe it might, and I would be interested in what you think the most underrated US food is and whether food cultures explain anything around the US and China differences.

Dan: China has a monumental lead on food production. Perhaps the only other arrival to Chinese cuisine is Indian cuisine.

Now I still prefer Chinese over Indian because I find that there is more variety and better use of better ways to prepare vegetables than Indian cuisine. But I think that China is already at the peak of various ways to prepare, whether these are vegetables and greens or duck and rice and almost anything else.

We care to name the Chinese who have perfected it. Perhaps the only exception is alcohol. They don't integrate alcohol quite as well into the food, but. I think that the Chinese have represented some sort of perfection. On the other hand, if you are in a state of near perfection, it is really hard to grow beyond that.

And I think that there is a little bit of a sense among some foodies in China that food culture in China has gotten just a few percentage points worse over the last five, 10 years. There is just much greater emphasis on these central commissaries to produce food outside of restaurants and then ship it into restaurants for them to essentially reheat.

And that has grown because people value speed over taste. There is just much more of a takeout culture because it's super, super easy to have food delivery. There's something, there's some figures now that the number of people working in food delivery just part-time in China could be north of 200 million people is what I saw in the Wall Street Journal because the job market is so bad.

So what could be really amazing for getting food is not so good for the job market and perhaps not so good for the cuisine itself because people are just so optimized for making food work well inside a box and a container that could be delivered in 25 minutes or less. And as China's grown richer people are more interested in different varieties of foods.

But I think that there has also been quite a lot more standardization within the foods as more chains have taken off as well. And given that the US is so far behind China there's tremendous room to grow. And over the last two decades in the last few years, I think that all sorts of food in the US has grown better.

There is even more of a migration culture into the US where, you know. A lot more Nigerians settle around the Houston area. There's all sorts of different varieties of people bringing their cuisines to the US. I think that Americans are learning to eat better themselves.

They have greater demand for seafood or fruits and the US also has, the US perhaps has very good recreations of let's say a Parisian croissant or anything else. It is just a little bit hard to get to. And so I think that the US has this dynamic churn even though it might perhaps never quite converge to Chinese levels of perfection.

Ben: Yeah, I agree. And I would probably add to that, that I've seemed to sense China because of this. Influenced modern tradition I guess, and the food influencer, they are now slightly cooking to how it looks on the plate over taste. Yeah. So obviously presentation is something. And so that has also maybe taken a couple of points down because they are so good at engineering, like you say, this central planning of food delivery.

That means that maybe the speed and efficiency's gone up, but also at the cost of, at the cost of taste. I also think maybe the most underrated American food for me is barbecue. So they've got this huge barbecue tradition in lots of different ways of doing it. And that seems also to me obviously influenced, but quite quite American.

But do you have an underrated American food?

Dan: I like barbecue, but I think that the challenge with barbecue is that you really should not have it multiple times in a row. Yeah. And for me, that is one metric for thinking about food. I have no hesitation about having Indian food multiple days weeks in a row.

The same goes for many other types of cuisines. If I eat barbecue twice in two days, I think that would be a little bit too much for me. I think that. Probably overrated is Californian cuisine. There has been so much of this emphasis on Californian cuisine, which started with Alice Waters and all sorts of other big chefs in Northern California.

To me that is not very distinctive if we wanted to look at another sort of cuisine. I haven't spent much time in l Louisiana, but I would really like to eat much more in New Orleans which seems to have a very good local cuisine. But just generally, I think what I would bet on is, immigrant cuisines in the US whether that is, the Austin food scene getting quite a lot better, whether that is the Nigerian food scene in Houston. I think that Chinese cuisine still has room to grow. In the US there's a lot of excellent Taiwanese in the, let's say the LA area.

There are all sorts of fantastic Chinese in the flushing area in Cupertino even. I'm getting better and better Chinese food, which is not too far away from where I am at Stanford University. And so I think that there is always room for growth in the US so long as we are still welcoming of people.

Ben: Yeah. Okay. I should move on from food, which we could probably, we should do a long chat just on food. I think we could do two or three hours on that. But I have to mention ai, which is all over everything. And you even mentioned it in your latest letter, and it's interesting when I hear Silicon Valley people or maybe Americans in general they all seem to either talk about existential risk of losing jobs or everything going completely wrong.

Or they talk about a tech utopia where AI solves everything from climate to poverty to manufacturing. And there doesn't seem to be a middle road discussion and maybe not even that much thinking of the kind of economic bottlenecks and things like that. What do you make of this, and do you sense this as well and do you think central planners have any edge in AI because of the energy supply chain and Americans are just too much focused on these kinds of really strange tail risks on either side.

Dan: It is a very strange thing in California. The discussions on AI seem to have quasi-religious tones. Either this is going to be utopia or this is going to plunge us all straight into hell and the machines are going to torture our minds for eternity. And you know what, if we just get a scenario in which which will be amazing in which productivity growth TFP growth goes on for 5% five percentage points for a very long time, I think that would be a pretty positive scenario.

But, when we talk about AI safety in California essentially what that means is how do we stop the machine God from torturing us for eternity rather than, oh how are people engaging with this very strange information ecosystem in which there's gonna be. A lot more slop and perhaps a more adversarial propaganda that is going to turn us all insane.

That to me feels like a very tangible sort of product, that project that we perhaps should discuss and tackle and try to solve. But this might be doing to teenagers. And, but instead, we can only talk about the antichrist. And that feels very strange to me. But tell us about the tenure of AI discussions in London.

Obviously London is one of the big AI hubs in the world. How do folks in London talk about it? Is it more the California variety or in, is it the variety of how do we control the harms and increase TFP?

Ben: I guess there's a little bit of both of that Californian variety and there's a little bit of the harm piece, particularly the bias piece and a little bit we've got a little bit of regulation or start up in terms of regulation in terms of as of now, are there biases?

Is it just gonna do utilitarian decision making? How do we incorporate other forms of thinking in that? But I would say there's another strand which kind of leans towards what I see in Asia, all to do with energy infrastructure and supply chain infrastructure, which slightly crosses over with. The climate conversation, which obviously is really diminished in America for other reasons, but there is this kind of very self-interested saying we've got a real problem if we don't have a supply chain.

If we can't build, we don't have energy infrastructure, and if this is gen, just basically a way of turning energy into some form of intelligence how do we deal with that? Which is this kind of more European wide issue of the fact that we can't build. We can definitely see that China seems to have a headstart in that and America is forming.

So that's the other part which kind of fills in London a little bit. And maybe that's because London is a little bit more connected to old world economies that I guess everyone except the US is underweighted technology versus some of these old world things. And that particularly in the last two or three months has started to come as a conversation, as people go, oh, this bottleneck seems to be these data centers and the energy.

And then they go why can't we produce the energy? And it's not that we don't have the technology as we don't seem to have the permits. We don't seem to have the regulatory things. And they're going, why is that? And why can China build like the equivalent of all of us? Domestic energy in six months or something like that.

And America had taken seven years just to build 10% of that. So those are the questions which are starting to come up, which is intersectional with that AI question. But is coming up with that on the supply chain? So maybe that's somewhere where central planners might have an edge because of all of that?

Dan: Yeah. Generally I think every year China builds about as much as one or two UK's worth of total energy every single year. And I used to collect these figures more actively, but I think that's the rough pace at which they are going. And it, it should, we expect that London can hold on to AI leadership in the longer term if it is impossible to build much more power and really difficult to build transmission lines and really difficult to build data centers because we take a look at some of these headlines around the uk.

The FT has recently written about the fact that home building in London has essentially collapsed. And I wrote this line, which is not quite right, but roughly accurate that the UK has the housing prices of California and the per capita income of Mississippi State. And the third runway for Heath Row, which has been planned for about 20 years now.

Yes. Yeah. It's supposed to cost 30 billion pounds. And so if we can't get the basics right, how can the UK really hold on to leadership for a pretty important technology?

Ben: I think on a 20 to 30 year view, unless we fix a couple of those things leadership will definitely lag. Maybe it's okay being, I think the uk depending on how you score, it's something like.

Number 10 as a kind of power, but slipped. So 10 years ago you probably could have said it was number eight or number nine. And in aggregate it's maybe slipped a place or two, it slipped less than Italy, somewhere like South Korea. Which metric are you

Dan: looking at?

Ben: Which next? You do a blend of things like soft power, GDP education and some of these things.

And if you aggregate it, there's a soft slipping of the uk. Some of it has slipped, more cultural powers probably have probably held on. And so I would see that continuing. But on the flip side, we have got some tail optionality. I wouldn't put it as too high probability, but some and maybe things will still have to get worse to look better because for instance.

If the country changes its mind on things like mini nuclear power or also particularly onshore wind. So we've got the planning for wind, not the interconnections and not the final planning. And actually we've got mini nuclear power SMR technology through British industry. So this is a thing 'cause it can come through some of our engineering, so it won't feel like, oh, we have to rely on foreign technology.

That is possible because you could put mini nukes next to smaller data centers and London could keep up. I'm not sure it will go through with this, but there's been a nuclear power review with, puts it as a possibility. So you really rely on that coming down on the cross curve. Otherwise I Do

Dan: Do you think politically and in terms of permitting people will accept having these mini nuclear reactors spread throughout the country?

Ben: I would say at the moment it's unlikely, but not zero. So we'll have to see where it goes. But there's enough places which are maybe far enough away from cities that it's possible. And also the miniaturization is getting smaller. And there's an argument for building British, there's a couple of British companies which could do that.

So I wouldn't give it a high probability, but I would definitely say it's more than, it's more than zero. I think America's own reassuring attempts are quite Trixie. And so this is where, oh, this is where China might actually have a lead if some of their other things go there.

But there are possibilities.

Dan: Tell me more about a British optimistic case about how they may be able to, instead of slipping through these ranks, how does it regain its position?

Ben: Oh, okay. I guess you would have to have some political consensus. I guess there is a technocratic consensus.

So the number one thing is I think we would need to try and unblock planning both domestically by building buildings. Which we could do. So it's just a legal policy coordination problem. It's not a technological problem. So that's the upside. But we haven't been prepared to burn our political capital to do that yet.

So we shall see. And then on the infrastructure side as well, so this would be building power, putting data centers next to things. So those two things I think are plausible. I also think we might get a one-off. Bonus in our health system because of weight loss medicines, GLP ones coming through.

So they'll be generic in 2031. And we are now seeing there's a lot of second order cost to chronic illness of which the UK isn't quite as bad as America, but it's not brilliant. And that is actually gonna be billions of both first order and second order savings. And if we can use those savings a little bit better, both in terms of making our NHS better and putting a little bit more investment within that and on blocking some of these more pro-growth elements, I think that is actually a possible fix because we've got the capabilities to build more.

And we've all got possibilities of infrastructure and we've got an agglomeration effect of London. Some of our second cities might continue to suffer. So I'm not sure on the UK side whether that is true, but as Americans tell me, the fact that Manchester's only two hours away on, on the train or two, two and a half hours, or even driving, they're like, that's just a suburb in America.

We would, we would drive there. They don't understand why Brits don't drive to like these centers of excellence in that same sort of way. So because it is solvable by political coordination I think there is. And then because there's still a lot of cultural soft power, you've still got finance here, although it's maybe not quite as great as New York or maybe equally as great as New York.

And you've got all of these things where you're second best, maybe not the very best. Biotech, some technology and the like. That still means that you're gonna be a really important non-US hub. And because you're at such a low, because of some of these regulatory issues, you can turn it around.

So that's the optimistic case.

Dan: And are you optimistic about London's agglomeration effects? If millionaires are leaving, is it still going to be a growing city that is growing in population and wealth?

Ben: I'm a little bit more neutral on this. I probably was more optimistic and that has down rated somewhat is not quite as bad as what I think the media has said.

Some are definitely living in millionaire status. But what is also happening is that although they're leaving in terms of permanent domicile, they still come here for three to six months of the year or a few weeks anyway. And particularly actually, if you are in the a hundred millionaire status, who often don't stay in one place that long, they're still passing through London somewhere between four to 12 weeks a year, which actually is enough if you're getting all of these other things going through.

So maybe they come to an auction event, maybe they go to Henley or to. Children go to Glastonbury or they do some of these other things, or they strike a deal. And then if you've got these other things right, they only have to be here a couple of days to sign some kind of check or something like that.

And we've got huge capabilities like around Cambridge, Oxford, there's lots of fields, there's lots of empty fields, which we could build on very quickly if the regulations allowed us to do that. And Cambridge is still only a 40 to 50 minute train ride from central London.

And then that literally is a suburb of the US so you could build out that whole corridor with labs and tech and all that type of thing. And you can get the flying millionaires to visit and you're still getting. The Middle East, some Russia, some China who are still doing business in London and actually in preference to America at the moment because of the politics of the situation.

So there's some hope still for London. I haven't given up my optimism,

Dan: I wanna believe Ben. But let's get building in London started first and then we can build out the corridors. Like why has it that the home building has completely collapsed in London when it is such an urgent thing that we have more homes.

Ben: So the primary reason is our planning system works on a political veto. Actually, this goes back, this is gonna get a little bit boring and technocratic, but post-war 1948 when we put in the British planning system, and you can compare this to France and Germany, which are built more in kind of similar things or even the Nordics.

Their house building is still about double R rates and have always been higher than the British rates. But essentially what happens in France, Germany, even the Netherlands, is once you've passed the planning rules and everyone's got some sort of zoning and guidance, you basically are allowed to build, no one can stop you.

So that has crept forward in all of those nations. But essentially if you pass the zoning and you meet the pattern book or whatever you can build in the uk, not only has our regulations got a little bit quite a lot worse, as has Germany and France. But even once you've passed all the technocratic, tick boxes, you can be called in either by your local politicians, or even worse, even if your local politicians don't call you in or even if they pass it, it can be pulled in by central government. And so your builders can never have a hundred percent certainty. And that is the core is the big difference between actually the British system and all the other systems which are built more.

And I think they didn't realize in 1948 this would be the case when they wrote the law. Any government who really wanted to do this could rip up that planning law and rezone much like Germany, France, or the Nordic countries. So you wouldn't have to go and do it somewhere like Brazil does it, where you wouldn't have any sort of planning and some of that and you could at least jumpstart those rates.

Then there were other issues to do with capital and we had a big fire disaster, so some of our building regulations got tighter and we didn't give it capital. But all of that is actually secondary to the fact that we've got a political veto. The only other way you could do it is you could convince the people doing political vetoes, which are essentially local residents, that it's in their best interest.

In order to do that, you could pay them off. So there are some things like street zones and things like that, where if you give them more money to allow them to build, that is also a possibility. I actually think that's a little bit harder. Some people think that would be easier, but either of those two things could get building going again.

Dan: But the law has been there for a while and there's been like a change, which is that there's basically no new homes in London. I understand that there was this disastrous fire and maybe capital is getting tougher, do you think that, let's say two years from now, that number will be quite a lot higher than it is today of new housing starts

Ben: Not in two years, not on current trajectory.

There is some stuff actually clogged up with our current government, which might pass, in which case that might unclog. I'm currently not too optimistic about that, but potentially after that, if people really sense okay, new young people really can't live where they want to live. And old people are a little bit more willing to give up the fact that they need buildings next to them and that Vata power, again, not high probability, but certainly more than zero.

That's what I would say in that. Anyway, moving on from building, perhaps I'll move on to a couple of other softer things. I have a question here. So someone we're both keen on as a mentor, Tyler Cowen, he once interviewed Temple Grandin in part on the ideas on neurodiversity. And I tend to see some neurodiverse at the head of some big US companies, arguably Microsoft, arguably Tesla, arguably Palantir and a bunch of others.

So there seems to be the silicon subculture which embraces this positive nerd culture. Do you think that explains anything about the US or Silicon Valley, maybe vis-a-vis China or anything out that, or I'm interested whether neurodiversity might be a key unlock for America.

Dan: Yeah, certainly it does feel like there is a lot of neurodiversity in Silicon Valley and not just among these people who make it to the top in terms of these companies, but also just in the rank and file. I think that many more narrow neurodiverse people manage to thrive in the San Francisco Bay area relative to a place like Washington DC or Boston or London or New York City for that matter.

So there is a little bit more of a reward for neurodiversity or at least tolerance for it. But I'm not sure whether it could constitute an unlock. Maybe this has already been unlocked, maybe there are some ways in which the people are able to, people just know that Silicon Valley is a good place for them.

On the other hand, Perhaps the reason that the neurodiverse can't necessarily make it in these East coast cities like DC or New York, is that people generally don't tolerate the neurodiverse very well. Maybe there's a reason that we call Washington, DC Hollywood for ugly people.

We don't have to focus on the ugly, it is like Hollywood, which feels like a much more popular contest from high school. So if maybe most people are intolerant of Neurodiverse, and maybe this is part of the reason that Silicon Valley just isn't very funny, then who's gonna win the neurodiverse?

Throwing their culture out into the rest of America? Or is the rest of America going to engulf Silicon Valley? I'm not sure.

Ben: Yeah, I'm not sure. I guess that's maybe more of a lever for China, not necessarily on neurodiversity, but if they could just loosen up, like embrace some more of their subcultures overall, I think that would be potentially a really big unlock for them.

Obviously that's probably the nightmare of central planners to let loose what your population actually thinks. Maybe turning to a few more personal thoughts. I was interested to pick up that you were a cadet, an army cadet and quite a successful one. So I was wondering what did being a cadet of the year teach you when you were growing up?

Dan: When I was growing up in Canada, I was part of the Royal Canadian Army Cadets and it was a tremendous fun for me. And this is essentially just a big after school program. This is not that much different with Boy Scouts, although we were handed real rifles to do target practice with.

And so that part is a little bit more interesting. And I remember having to go to these drill camps on a formal army basis to run around at 6:00 AM and do a lot of pushups. And so I think that I was definitely more fit in those days than I am today. And I think what the army Cadets Program really taught me was first, you have to have a sense of which rules to break.

If you break no rules ever in life you will absolutely get nowhere if you break the wrong rules. You might be tried for treason or whatever it is. And so you have to have a sense of which rules to break and being in that sort of a formalized system in which rank matters and hierarchy matters, but also moving ahead matters.

I think it is a good thing to have to think about which is the room for creativity. Otherwise I think that it is really good to be part of the Cadets program, just to know, learn a little bit of discipline and I'll learn how to, focus on having a long-term program and figuring out what's important.

And all of these are banal lessons which most of us should not know as an adult. But I, when I say most, there are still many of us who have never properly internalized a lot of these lessons. And so it was a major part of growing up for me to figure out what is important, how do we set priorities and how do we actually work towards them.

Ben: I think SBF should definitely have done that, maybe more effective altruists, but yeah, if SBF done, that would be in better

Dan: shape

Ben: For sure. Much better shape. What do you make of the operas of Philip Glass? Can any modern opera get close to Mozart?

Dan: I guess the only opera of Philip Glass that I've seen on video not live was which is his interpretation of.

The Egyptian Pharaoh. And I've only seen licks and selections of that particular opera. Now has Mozart been superseded? I would argue yes. And I think the peak of opera is represented by Wagner and Verdi. The German great and the Italian Great.

I would say it's mostly downhill from there. And one can identify these perfect in Mozart, but perhaps Mozart is a little bit too now. I see. And perfect. And you have these superior tones of a lot of Mozart, but. But you see a little bit more in Verdi and Wagner is just this total emotional conviction in which they, there is no doubt that the protagonists are feeling as they do, whereas there are some of these climactic scenes in Mozart, which.

Don't feel quite mature. If I'm thinking about something like the marriage of Firo in which the count of ama viva confronts the Countess over allegations of infidelity. And this is a comic opera in which the count is a fearful that the Countess has hidden the page Carino in her closet, and he is trying to identify and find that page this climactic confrontation actually sounds not that he doesn't quite have the conviction in order to not make this as apocalyptic, as it could be.

Whereas there is no doubt if this was in this opera, was in Verdi's hands, the music would be quite a lot more dramatic than faintly comical. There are some things that Mozart could have done maybe a little bit better. I note that the marriage of Figueroa is the first of his three great Italian operas.

Next came Don Giovanni and then came Cozy Tuite. I think that one of these things I wonder it would be, would've been wonderful if Mozart was able to study a little bit more the techniques of Wagner and Verdi and how would he have revised the marriage of Figueroa based on that.

And one of these tragedies is that right before Mozart died for reasons unclear he was supposed to be composing an opera based on King Lear. Imagine how wonderful it could have been to a c one of the c king Lear in the hands of Mozart.

Ben: Yeah, that would've been brilliant. And I agree, Mozart, like perhaps would've been firm or more dramatic would've been really interesting. I think you wrote in your last letter that King Lear is the most Chinese of Shakespeare plays. So I was interested in that comment, but also what do you think then is the most American of Shakespeare plays

Dan: maybe a Midsummer Night's dream speaking to you from California but to be a little bit less glib about the potential drug use there?

Ben: Yeah.

Dan: What could be a very American Shakespeare play? Have you given some thought to this? I'm curious about your review. I

Ben: put it down to two, which may be a little bit more on the nose, but. Being potentially at this point in time Julius Caesar or Corey Elis. So either you've got this tension between like singly an elite or not.

And strong man politics or not. Maybe those are on the nose, but yeah, whimsical, maybe something like Matsu Knight's Dream. I guess you could also make some sort of call for the trading part with the Merchant of Venice or something like that. But as of now, I think he would maybe go for something like Caesar.

Dan: Yeah. It is quite interesting that Steve Bannon in one of his many lives produced this. Was it a Lanis movie that starred? I am Anthony Hopkins.

Ben: I didn't realize that. I'd have to look that up.

Dan: One of these major film adaptations was produced by Steve Bannon, and I believe that he was.

Really obsessed with COIs in particular. Take a look. Take a look with this Anthony Hopkins production. Now, could it be something like McBath? Could it be something like Othello, probably not this. These are not sufficiently political. These are two people. But if we take Tyler seriously, I think that Shakespeare's peak was Henri as a unit.

Now, could that, does that have a contemporary relevance for the US today?

Ben: Yeah, I guess if you take it as a unit for sure it has, for sure. It has some, I'm not sure it's an exact mapping. But yes.

Dan: That's what, and King Lear might have some contemporary relevance for the US as well, which one of the interpretations I have of King Lear is that violence can really spiral and there is no limit to political chaos.

You can have a political figure not really be aware of what he's doing. And then a lot of other people are simply bewildered at what's going on. At least in the case of King Lear. You have these two Dukes, the Duke of cornball, who is married to Reagan. And then the duke of Albany who's married to the other sister, not Cordelia.

And the Duke of Albany seems to be the good guy. He's just bewildered about what is going on and at the very, and come to a census where he has a Cornwall is just a kind of brutal and evil and completely ruthless. And there, there is no limit to the sort of political spiraling of a collapse.

I'm not sure that describes contemporary America right now, but it might, and that's part of the scary part.

Ben: Yeah, and I guess maybe that also shows the similarity between China and America, that actually maybe kingly is also an American play. And particularly you could think about the relationships between the old and young within kingly also could apply to America and actually the politicians in America particularly getting elderly as well across the spectrum.

So it's interesting to think about it from that point of view. Okay. I was also interested in coming off all the book tours and all the many amazing podcasts that you did over last year. Having done all of that, is there anything that you might have changed your mind about in terms of what you've written in the book?

Or maybe not completely change your mind about it, but maybe overweight or underweight compared to when you first rated it?

Dan: I've learned that people can be a lot more kind than I expected, and I've learned that people can be a lot more mean than I expected. There's all of these tanky who love to roast my ass on Twitter, and I think that it is just, there's all this misreading of what I say.

There's nothing an author can do about that. People might say that. Oh, I have forgotten to say that America has been ruled by lawyers forever, but I do say that in my very first chapter that the US used to be a little bit more of an engineering state, which is why I was able to build.

But people either forget to read that part or pretend that I never wrote it. And these are one of these things that authors everywhere have to deal with. And that is just one of these taxes of being of writing that there is just a lot of malicious, creative misinterpretation of one's work.

Now, I don't feel like I have it especially bad relative to a lot of other authors. And it is fine. It doesn't bother me that much. And I also have learned that there is a lot of great interest in this topic. That there are a lot of people who are, who enjoyed this book, who tell me that they enjoyed this book and who are rooting for my success.

And I think that is also a very heartening thing to have. I am surprised that people are still asking me to do podcasts. Generally now I am happy to do podcasts only with people I already know and are friends with like you, Ben. And so all of that is quite positive.

I'm curious for your feedback on my conversation with Tyler. Do you think it worked? What, what did work and what didn't work?

Ben: I thought it was great and I thought you both really enjoyed yourselves and obviously Tyler's got a really large audience, so you did have to cover some of the topics in the book again, I guess in the first half.

But for me, the sort of second half where you both talk about more personal and perhaps esoteric things maybe like this, our conversation here today where we touch obviously on China, but not for the main thing I thought was really interesting and I loved you challenging on, I still haven't heard his list of popes in order which should be, which are the best popes or which not 'cause you could imagine, you can imagine to do that, but I thought it was a very it was a very good conversation.

And I think you mentioned in that one as well as in some of your podcasts that I think maybe you still do this, that you type out. Sentences or write out sentences for writers you admire. So actually I did this with some of your own work recently this week to see what that feels like.

And it was actually pretty good, I noticed. Sometimes you have a good, very good way of using a kind of trilon, a series of three things within your sentences and when you use it, unfortunately chat has made this something that we don't see as much anymore. But you've got a very good use of M Dash generally, and actually when you write that in the pause, it's interesting.

I actually wrote this out by hand because it's not as it's not as emphatic as a, as a.in your sentence, but it is this little dash. I always think of Emily Dickinson within it, but it does punctuate another point. Normally a few words. And then again, I did think that technique was interesting.

I last generally for poems, like writing out poems is really interesting because of where you have the slashes and ate, but I hadn't done it for essays or nonfiction, and I read plays out aloud. I think that's quite interesting. But do you still type out writers that you admire and you still think it's a good technique?

Dan: Not so much anymore, but I keep a running scrapbook of my favorite phrases. And when I sometimes pick up a very nice turn of phrase and either a book or a magazine or wherever else, I paste that in. And every so often I looked through my scrapbook and it. Find some new forms of syntax that I want to play with.

I think it is good that you picked up my tricho as I myself am a Trinitarian, so anything that goes in threes would be really good. Have you tried the exercise of trying to re type rewrite play and has that what has that exercise given you insight into?

Ben: Yes. I haven't done it.

Greatly I've done it particularly on Harold Pinta work and also for some bits of waiting for Gado. And this is because both of them are very interesting, and this is where it started. Essentially pauses and silences, which are quite hard to judge. But in the writing out, and then also when you say it, it does give you this real sense of ah within that pause and what's it be?

And it gives you a stronger sense of the rhythm of language. So writing it, in fact, I would suggest if you're doing this, you actually write it out by hand as well. It tends to be a little bit slower for people versus typing. And then also to speak it, I think for essays and other things, probably not speaking it, but for plays, which will eventually be a vocal form as well, that is quite an interesting write up.

And so you, you are writing the dialogue and then you'll speak it. And it gives you the sense of rhythm and also the pausing. And another thing that shows you both in Pinta actually and in great playwriting overall is punctuation and the use of punctuation. And actually we have some unusual punctuations which have developed over the last few decades, but we use a slash quite a lot as well as hyphens and on and on dashes.

And also this is to try and get overlapping sounds and rhythms. And you only pick that up really by trying to write it or also speak it which you don't. Even just listening or seeing it on the written page isn't quite the same. I'm not sure 'cause I don't really hear music in the same way.

Maybe some people would have the same when they can read sheet music and then also have to play it out or practice it out. But there is something within that. And I also think it's interesting 'cause a lot of art students will, they will have a phase where you just copy what old masters did you, even if you're doing life drawing, you will start out with that to just see, okay, this is what drawing a Michelangelo kind of feels like.

Even though in very modern art, obviously we don't do that, but from that roots. 'cause it does give you that, that sense of feeling. So I think it is an interesting creative practice.

Dan: Yeah, I mean I think it is still a kind of an underrated practice. The reason that I started with sheet music is because I used to be very into reading music and holding a score as I listened to a string quartet or something.

I remembered copying out, I believe it was a Mahler symphony, just like writing a page or two of that out. And you really see what the choices a composer made when you do something like that. And when you retype a story, an article, whatever it is of another writer, you really become much more hyper aware of the choices that they make of particular punctuation or adjectives or syntax.

And you have to start thinking a little bit more about what might you do in that scenario? And that is actually a really good exercise. And it doesn't, it feels surprisingly underrated of a thing to just get into the minds of other people. So this kind of inspires me to ask you.

I've never played, but I haven't really been a big part of my life, although last year I attended I think just two plays. There's a David Henry Huang play on called Yellow Face, which I saw on Broadway. I also saw this new production of Oscar Wilde's importance of being Earnest on the West End, which had this very camp production starring Stephen Fry as Rael the starches of the Victorian matrix.

And I'm thinking of getting into plays more, but is there some sort of analogy where instead of writing out a play can we scare up, let's say two, three other friends to just read out all of these parts and just read these things out and for pleasure? Do you think that is actually a good exercise or that doesn't really work?

Ben: No, it's a really good exercise. Let's do it. So particularly in pandemic times, that is actually what a lot of playwrights and actors ended up doing. So you do it across your favorite plays but it is also the one of the very earliest ways of work shopping your own work is to get people to read it out.

I do these performance lectures, so you like standup. Sometimes you just have to test it with a live audience because you've got this interaction. But certainly simply just reading it out and also reading it out as the parts of others could be can be really good. And I'm sure amongst our group we'll have some to do that.

And then you can do it also. You can go and watch the production or something like that. But yeah, it's definitely worth doing.

Dan: So let's say that I am on holiday next week with three other friends who are as interested in plays as I am. Probably Shakespeare is not the right answer.

But is there some, I don't know, stopper play or something else in which we should just read out the parts to each other? Is there a good kind of starter play if none of us are very familiar with plays to try to have this sort of fun?

Ben: Ooh, I, so with just three, it's interesting that I might start with four, four

Dan: people total.

Ben: I might start with Harold Pinter 'cause they've got really interesting pauses and they're a little bit simpler. And it's also the birth of a lot of. Where Modern Drama goes, or Samuel Beckett, I think I would do Pinter. But actually the one that you maybe do is now, and also 'cause I think it might be his greatest play, although has more characters, I don't think it really matters would be Tom Stoppard's Arcadia, maybe start with Rosen Krantz and Gilden Stern, which is his most philosophical play and actually needs less dramatization for it and has fewer characters.

Rosen Ks and Goldstein are dead, has a slight Shakespeare connotation, not really. And then do Arcadia 'cause Arcadia you get this multilayered time effect where if you are reading it out. And it's really funny and I think it will probably still prove to be as great as play. Yeah, that's why I suggest, what's

Dan: the appeal of Arcadia?

Ben: So Arcadia Whoof. I think it is just a very good reflection of humanity and thinking overall, but also has concepts of time and quantum physics, also chaos. Also maybe the complexity, and then inexplicably inexplicable, of human life. But also has overtones of this reverse of are there patterns?

Are there things which reverberate through time? Are there these narratives that we feel? And he packages up that really well. So not only touches on chaos theory, complexity and quantum ness. So the cutting edge of some science thoughts, which are not fully captured, but also has these characterizations of narrative and pattern and then puts through some of these other obscure things like the patterns of English gardens and French gardens and these other things that humans are grappling with and shows and shows some of that through time.

So I just think it's really neatly wrapped up. And obviously as he's recently died, it's probably the moment of that. So that's why I would highlight that. But it's actually quite quick to do. So Pinta plays are probably, some of them are only for an hour and a half, so you can definitely do that over an evening with some tea.

Arcadia's a little bit longer. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern [are Dead] I think is only about an hour and a half as well [Ed: actually runs 2 hours]. So you could do that quite quickly.

Dan: Let's say that the chaos and quantum and time are just a little bit too philosophical and complex for a starter group. Is there an easier stopper to play?

Ben: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead. It's okay. It is philosophical. Comedic as well. So in that sense it could actually be harder than Arcadia because Stoppard  is really good at explaining these concepts of chaos theory and butterfly flaps its wings and things like that. So in that sense, I don't think you will struggle whereas Rosenstein and Gilda and have some of these more philosophical overtones.

But structurally and character wise it is simpler. So that's potentially there, but you could just flick the first chapter or two, or sorry, scene or two. And that will give you a sense

Dan:What about Leopoldstadt ?

Ben: So I think I'll have to see it again. I liked it but I wondered whether the first showing may, or may not be definitive and I think maybe we need a little bit more time as it will prove to be his last great work, whether that will prove to be greater.

I still prefer some of the concepts on Arcadia. I. Your podcast dub obviously had a little bit more of a personal connotation. So I would like to, I would like to see it again. I should reread it actually to make that sense. Maybe actually there's a really good biography of him also by Ion e Lee, so maybe putting all of that together, it would give me a more complete sense.

I think it's interesting because playwrights in general, or I guess right in general, tend to lean a more complicated left, say I know it's more complicated than that, whereas Stoppard lent a more complicated and I would say that just because he was very interested in notions of freedom and liberalism because of where he of how he grew up.

So I think that makes it really interesting. And I do think playwriting is one of those things where even. If you're successful, say leftist or rightist. Most successful plays always have very strong and nuanced arguments arguing for the other side, whatever position you have. And in fact, for some of the greatest, you're not even sure within the play where the playwright's actual position might be.

So that's one of the reasons I still think performance is really interesting on that level. And reading it out you get to inhabit a character who might not think well, almost certainly doesn't think like yourself. And so though I think that is a really good way of inhabiting something else, which obviously fiction gives you performance, gives it to you in a very live manner which I think is one step up in importance.

Dan: Do playwrights tend to write distinctive pros in terms of essays? Can you tell who is a playwright based on their essays?

Ben: Oh, I don't know about that. Some playwrights have gone on to write. Quite interesting essays as well. I would have to think, my guess is maybe yes but I can't think offhand.

Maybe more interesting or equally as like some players, like Tom Stoppard famously wrote some very successful Hollywood stuff. Like I think Steven Spielberg used to ring Stop Pod up when he had a problem in his script and sometimes Stop Pod would say, I think that was fa, I can't remember what film it was some famous film and Stoppard said, no, I'm working on this small play.

And Spielberg says what? But this is a million dollar multi thingy hit. And Stoppard was like that, but I'm more interested in this. But I think that's quite interesting in some of those crossovers. But I have to think about the essay question. I'm not sure about that in terms of essayists.

Dan: I've been reading a little bit of this Auden collection of essays called The Dyer's Hand, and this is his only collected series of his essays. And I'm not sure that one can really tell that, oh, this is a poet. I don't know if when poets write essays in prose it, I'm not sure if it usually generally turns out necessarily very well.

I was also, I also read David Mamet's Was it Three Uses of the Knife? And I thought that was pretty good, but it didn't, I also didn't feel like I learned a ton from it. So maybe we should mostly stay in our lanes. But I am still curious if there is some sort of a distinctive training that they can bring into our pros Essay writing.

Ben: Yeah, I'm gonna think about that. I'm gonna, I'm gonna look at my bookshelf and see some of the essays, because I think of more of their memoirs, things like Edward Alby or something like that. But some of them have written some essays some have written quite interestingly about. Theater, although, and now I'm thinking about Peter Brooke and Empty Space, and that was a director writing about theater in general.

So I'm not, yeah, I'm not completely sure. Unanswered. Okay. Maybe we'll do a short last, final section and then some of the things that you're working on in any advice you have, but I guess in honor of Tyler Cowan, he doesn't do this so much anymore, but I thought we should do a short section of overrated, underrated in terms of the podcast.

There's some quick hits and some on some things so we can give this a go. Overrated or underrated US suburbs

Dan: correctly rated, I think correctly. I think that the suburban life, I think that this is, I recognize that this is the dream for a lot of families. Absolutely. To have a lot of space and then to be able to try a kids swimming pool. That's great. There is a lot more culinary diversity in suburbs because the rents tend to be cheaper.

And the people like Costco and those gigantic super stores. I like Costco myself. I don't mind visiting like once every two months or so to buy a lot of Kleenex tissues or something. I think that these things are quite fine. But let's not overdo our enthusiasm for them.

Ben: Yeah. Great for parents, I think. I still think they are too boring for teenagers, but Yes. I think Tyler likes the suburbs a lot though. Great. Hedge funds, overrated, underrated.

Dan: Overrated. These are compensation schemes masquerading as an asset class. And maybe you are more familiar with this data, but I remember reading a while ago that catch fund, quote unquote hedge fund performance has been pretty bad over the last couple of years.

They're not overperforming. And I think where the energy seems to be for a lot of smart people, they're going into these quant funds, and that seems to be where a lot of them are, where the action is. Hedge funds were never very well defined up until, after you moved on from long, short.

But so it feels like it's mostly a marketing category, right?

Ben: Very good for employees. Yeah. I'm not sure about it, I'm not sure about anyone else. Okay. We, I guess we briefly covered this, but I would say AI existential risk is overrated or underrated.

Dan: Maybe correctly rated may probably be overrated by all the Californians.

If we take this view that, okay maybe we will be tortured eternally in our minds by machine, God forever that seems pretty bad. I wouldn't like that. So maybe it's good that we have some people worrying about this. Maybe it is great that we have some people worrying about biotech security, but let's also worry about all of these other things, like what sorts of harms that this might be doing just to our minds every single day.

Ben: Yeah. I think that's the problem with a lot of these things. Yeah. The people really deep into it could probably do with thinking about some other things, but the people who've never thought about it at all could probably do with at least thinking about it a little bit. Okay. Overrated, underrated five year plans.

Dan: Overrated, the Chinese don't take this all that seriously anymore. Maybe the first two or three, five year plans were important. Right after the first the conclusion of the first five year plan felt that he was being excessively constrained and then he essentially did away with much of this concept.

So the gap between the first five year plan and the second five year plan, they didn't do this immediately afterwards because Mao hated them. I think that they are overrated. The Chinese have never paid that much attention to their own five year plans. I think something like this could be more centrally planned than high-speed rail?

High-speed rail arose in reaction to the global financial crisis, which was outside of the plan. So they built this enormous rail system without even planning for it. Yeah. And so that just shows, it's just this sort of aspirational marketing statement because they have to praise marks on his birthdays and sing the internationale to after the party congresses.

But this is actually not all that serious for, at least for the Chinese. Yeah. And if it's not that serious for the Communist Party, I can't imagine that being serious for anyone else.

Ben: Yeah. Mostly signaling. I think non-Chinese analysts are probably the people who read it the most. Okay.

Dan: It's worth reading.

It's an aspirational document.

Ben: Board games underrated or overrated. Yeah.

Dan: Correctly rated. I believe in the efficient market hypothesis. I think that most things are correctly rated. I

Ben: do.

Dan: And I like board games, but I have, it's been, I think, like years since it's really been part of my life.

I think a couple of board games can be great and perfect, but one doesn't need to keep learning new board games. And so in that sense it's not a very vital industry, just like opera. No, I think that it's good for some nerds. Maybe more people should hang out and play board games.

But people just should just find some way to be more social, whether that's to go to plays or to play some board games or just to go on dates more.

Ben: Yeah. I guess I mentioned it 'cause Silicon Valley doesn't have opera, but it does have more board games. But yeah, maybe correctly rated space exploration.

Underrated, overrated,

Dan: overrated. There's. Basically nothing out there within a reasonable timeframe. It's good to serve as an inspirational device. And I think that, maybe we should go find it. I think it is a scandal that there's very likely life within one of the moons of Jupiter and maybe of Saturn as well.

We're not even really trying that hard to go look for it. Now it's like right here within our solar system. What sorts of Moby Dicks lie within the moons of the Moon of Europa. So why don't we go, why don't we, why don't we go find Moby Dick?

Ben: Yeah. But then we've got a lot of problems on Earth as well, so yeah, I guess there's difficulties on that.

And last one then, venture capital. Do you think overall it's underrated or overrated?

Dan: Incorrectly rated. I think that it has definitely been a major factor in discovering the capital market ecosystem in general. What is venture capital exactly anymore? Maybe these are just marketing agencies with an insurance policy attached.

But I think that the general capital ecosystem has been pretty efficient in the US. But also people love to say that VCs don't work very hard, so maybe they also need to be working a little bit harder.

Ben: Yeah. Okay. That's very good. Yeah, I was interested in financial valuations and BC and the, in your letter you mentioned something you've talked about a little bit for looking at, for instance, the valuation of something like AppLovin, although it's actually fallen quite a lot since you wrote the letter. 

Dan: Really?

Ben: And you compare that to something like


Dan:, I hope it wasn't  because of me.

Ben: No it, there's been this whole revaluation of what software might mean, I think might even be down about 50% since you last wrote it. Wow. But it's still got a larger market cap than Xiaomi, although not by such an incredible amount or more, or something like BYD is maybe more well known for people in terms of EV makers.

But I was thinking that. When you think about it, maybe if you think about it purely in terms of capturing consumer surplus or wealth for the nation, certainly BYD and Xiaomi are doing better for their respective nations than Afin. But that's maybe what the financial shareholder equity people are looking at is that Apple vendor's better for the equity holders, but isn't adding so much more value to the United States.

And so that's part of this disconnect that we have with the financial market cap thing. And where is the actual value going? I think about this a lot in healthcare because actually within biopharma, a lot of the value actually goes into a. Into people, into patients who live longer and some value goes back to the biopharma, but not as much as you might have thought.

And certainly probably less than in, in tech companies. But that's partly because society demands that they might need to capture more of that value. And I think that's an interesting kind of tension between who, who is really getting the value from that.

What are you working on at the moment? Any current projects or any questions you are obsessed over?

Dan: There's two books on my shelf that I really want to read. One is a history of the Royal Navy, actually by a historian named NAM Rogers. It's called The Price of Victory.

This mega long history book and the Royal Navy has inspired a lot of excellent historians. Another is a novel:  Middle March. I'm deficient for being a bad California and not having read George Elliot and I'm also, I've also just picked up Dublin nurse. So I'm starting to read a little bit of the short stories of James' Choice, which are pretty charming and not as difficult as I imagined as something like Ulysses.

Ben: Great. And then the last question for a smart 20 something, deciding where to live and what to learn and what to do, what would be your advice for them?

Dan: I think that it is really important to be with ambitious people. I think that the default is to not be ambitious people. And certainly I've felt that my own ambition has ebbed as I've entered as I've crossed into the wrong side of 30.

Certainly, your ambition will get lower and lower, and so it is a good thing to have when you are younger. And this is, and it seems to me like some very ambitious people are in San Francisco as well as New York City. This is where I am a little bit more glum about London, where.

If the default national culture, it's just this cynicism and cleverness about people who are absent and then there it feels like a country in a national decline, even if London is delightful. I think that it is probably a good thing from a civilizational perspective not to be super cynical all of the time.

And so I have many friends in London. I love visiting. It is a superb city, but maybe it is also good to get some optimism and get some sun.

Ben: Yes. So raise your ambition and surround yourself with great people. I will make one further plea for London, although I do think we are a great museum like the rest of Europe.

Good to visit, but not. I think maybe so percentage wise, like we said, there is some doom and gloom here, but there are. Ambitious young people and then all were young, some are a little bit older and they are forming groups. So there's a big emergent venture cluster here. So this is Tyler Cowen’s venture philanthropy.

You've got British progress, you've got abundance for London. So you have got a cluster of young people who are there. There may be absolute numbers numbering in the hundreds and low thousands as opposed to tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands. But I still think you do have it here, partly 'cause of where the agglomeration effects are.

But I do think surrounding yourself, the people you surround yourself with, you tend to go, I think, what's the quote? If you want to run faster, you run with the antelopes. So if you want to be a fast antelope, you run with them some quote like that. That's the idea. And I think that has a lot of truth to that.

Dan: Antelopes may have to run really fast because they're being chased by lions. So I've put more emphasis on the lion rather than the herd. And having a bit more of a sense of threat is important too. And I think it is really good to prepare these lists of ambitions… just in case we have to medevac them into California at some point if the gloom pervades too deeply into their hearts.

Ben: Yes. Although the California's aren't they all going to New Zealand instead? So maybe we'll come round full circle.

Dan: Okay. That's right. Just a global tour of the angles here.

Ben: Yeah. Great. With that, Dan, thank you very much.

Dan: Thank you very much. This was a lot of fun. I'm glad that I got to hear more of your thoughts, especially on place.


In Arts, Podcast, Life, Politics, Writing Tags Dan Wang, Ben Yeoh Chats, Silicon Valley, London, China, AI, tech culture, culture, housing, planning, infrastructure, censorship, urbanism, ambition, writing, Shakespeare, opera, food culture, neurodiversity, politics

Kanjun Qiu: AI, metascience, institutional knowledge, trauma models, creativity and dance | Podcast

January 17, 2023 Ben Yeoh

Kanjun is co-founder and CEO of Generally Intelligent, an AI research company. She works on metascience ideas often with Michael Nielsen, a previous podcast guest. She’s a VC investor and co-hosts her own podcast for Generally Intelligent. She is part of building the Neighborhood, which is intergenerational campus in a square mile of central San Francisco. Generally Intelligent (as of podcast date ) are looking for great talent looking to work on AI.

We get a little nerdy on the podcast but we cover AI thinking, fears on rogue AI, and the breakthroughs of Chat AI. We discuss some of her latest ideas in meta science based on the work she has done with Michael Nielsen (previous podcast here) and what are the important questions we should be looking at.

We chat about the challenge of old institutions,  the value of dance and creativity and why her friends use “to kanjun” as a verb.

We cover her ideas on models of trauma and why EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy) and cognitive therapies might work.

We discuss why dinosaurs didn’t develop more.

We chat around “what is meaning” and “what is the structure of knowledge”, what are the strengths and weakness of old institutions; culture vs knowledge vs history  and other confusing questions.

Kanjun gives her advice on how to think about dance (dance like you are moving through molasses).

Dance is inside of you. It just needs to be unlocked.

We play underrated/overrated on:  having agency, city planning, death of institutions, innovation agencies, high frequency trading; diversity

Kanjun thinks on how capitalism might want to be augmented and what excites Kanjun about AI and complex systems.

Kanjun asks me questions and I offer my critique on Effective Altruism. (Although Tyler Cowen more recently (link here Dec 2022) and philosopher Larry Temkin (podcast link here mid 2022) have deeper comments on this.

This is quirky long form conversation on a range of fascinating topics.

Available wherever you get podcasts. Video above and transcript below.

PODCAST INFO

  • Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/3gJTSuo

  • Spotify: https://sptfy.com/benyeoh

  • Anchor: https://anchor.fm/benjamin-yeoh

Transcript (only lightly edited)

I am super excited to be speaking to Kanjun Qiu. Kanjun is co-founder and CEO of Generally Intelligent, an AI research company. She works on meta science ideas often with Michael Nielsen, a previous podcast guest. She's a VC investor and co-host her own podcast for Generally Intelligent. She's part of building the Neighborhood which is an intergenerational campus in the square mile of central San Francisco. And she is all round amazing. Kanjun, welcome.


Kanjun (00:30):

Thank you. I'm really excited to be here.


Ben (00:33):

Everyone is talking about OpenAI's, chatbot, ChatGPT. The bot has some major flaws but can also produce some amazing writing and code. You can add on top of that the recent advances in AI art generation also via open AI or stable diffusion. And then other more technical advances such as DeepMind and protein folding and the like. I'd be interested what do you make of the current state of AI? Where do you see perhaps AI language going and where does Generally Intelligent and its own mission fit into this ecosystem?


Kanjun (01:10):

Yeah. It's a good time to be asking this question because I think when I first started Generally Intelligent with Josh, my co-founder, a few years ago we definitely didn't expect things to go this fast. I mean, we expected things to go quite fast. But I think this is faster in terms of progress than we've ever seen. It's really exciting and a little bit scary. We can get into the safety stuff later. But I think ChatGPT is something we've kind of roughly known would be coming for a while. But what's really remarkable about it is that you change the interface from something that's a freeform, unconstrained, humans have to prompt into an interface that's a chat interface and suddenly tons of people figure out how to do much more creative things.


Something I've been thinking about is like the Xerox PARC component of AI where we have all of this interesting development in capability. So one question is, "Okay, what are the interfaces that might allow humans to be able to get a lot more out of even existing models?" In terms of where models are going, I think-- At Generally Intelligent, we work on building general purpose agents that can be safely deployed in the real world. I think we kind of timed it well. We think we will have general purpose agents that can be hopefully safely deployed in the real world in the not too distant future.


So I can go into kind of our focus really is about studying generalization and reinforcement learning and how these models are able to generalize. And whether we can get a better, clearer theoretical understanding of how to construct these models in a way that is more predictive. Like, can we know ahead of time given this training data, these parameters, this training procedure, this type of model that you'll end up with a model that has these behaviors? So that really is the kind of hope. It’s that we can get to something that is more controllable. It's kind of like building bridges or nuclear power plants. Neither of these things is exactly safe, but we've made them safe because we understand how they work. So I think the same thing has to be true of neural networks.


Ben (03:38):

And so for a person outside the tech world or even outside the AI world, what do you think is most misunderstood about where we are with AI? So one impression I have is what you alluded to; it has gone a lot quicker than expected. Another element we can segue into the sort of rogue powerful AI, the so-called alignment problem on safety which I think the person in the street is generally not something which comes across their minds. And obviously there's a lot of strange and detailed technical elements to some of this. But I'd be interested in what you think is perhaps most misunderstood when you speak to the person in the street.


Kanjun (04:18):

I have a few. One is we tend to use words that we use to describe humans in order to describe AI. For example, the word 'understand.' So when I talk about whether or not a human understands something, I'm kind of referring to a mental process in their head that I have some sense of like, “It happens in my head too." So I have some model of what's going on in their head. A lot of people they say, "Oh, these models are just statistical. They don't really understand anything." In some sense that's true. Certainly they're not understanding in the way that humans are understanding. They don't have the same mental process in their head as we have in our head. But I think that is maybe foolish to expect these models to have the same mental processes and to say, "Okay, unless they have the same mental processes as humans, they can't be intelligent or capable and be able to do things that humans can do." So I think just being careful about using human descriptors to describe these models as a way to say, "They can't do X because they're not like humans in X." What else is misunderstood?


I think on the flip side some people say, "Oh, we already have something that's general. Everything is solved." I think that's probably not true. It seems like as we scale up models that we get a lot more capabilities for free. I think if you ask any researcher in the field, there are few results remaining towards something that's a lot more general.


Ben (06:08):

That makes a lot of sense. I think that initial observation you make about how we humanize things has been quite a human trend for a long time. So we humanize trees and we have already done the whole religions and cultures around that. So I can understand why we would do it with AI. But perhaps it's the same mistake to think that trees are like humans. It could be a similar type of thing. How worried are you about the alignment problem and rogue AI? AI safety is how real a thing that we should be working on? There's some people who are kind of dedicating their whole careers to it and others who seem quite blasé and just say, "Look, this is seemingly a human construct." Is there a small but real risk or is it overstated?


Kanjun (07:00):

I think the risk is that we don't know. I don't know, none of us really know how these models are going to evolve, what kind of capabilities they're going to express. The issue with complex systems-- and I would say neural network is a complex system, is that they end up with emergent behavior. So will they end up with behavior where they're trying to deceive us at some point? Maybe. It's hard to say, "No, absolutely they're not going to do that." So you can kind of construct the problem in ways where you can study whether or not they're likely to end up having that behavior. And I think it's really good for people to study.


Ben (07:42):

I guess that makes sense because I'm never quite sure how much we really understand the brain itself. Like maybe below 50%, maybe even as little as 10 or 20%. I'm going to segue into something which I've been reading. Some work that you've done and something which isn't very well understood in the world which I guess is around trauma or anxiety. I'm interested in neural networks and how the brain thinks of it because we don't really understand it. I'm particularly interested in this technique called EMDR which works on eye movement and it essentially seems to have a reprogramming effect. It stands for Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy. If you look at controlled trials, it really seems to work for some people. Not everyone, but actually pretty good results in trauma and things like that. Quite a lot of neuroscience, we don't really know how it works. So I'd be interested in what you think AI or neural networks or this has perhaps told us about trauma or anxiety or the brain, and maybe vice versa in terms of maybe some learnings or thoughts you have about how it might be helpful or not in this kind of area.


Kanjun (09:01):

Yeah. So get ready for the rabbit hole. I have a bunch of thoughts on trauma. I think maybe the kind of core idea is-- and I'll write an essay on this at some point. This idea that trauma is overfitting and therapy is actually a process of retraining. So let me give some examples. I've done a ton of therapy on myself, I think. I grew up in China. I moved here when I was six by myself. My parents had moved here when I was much younger. I had a lot of abandonment issues that resulted in all sorts of weird behaviors that were not well suited to my current environment. Those behaviors were rooted in fear. I think basically young children copy a lot of beliefs from our caretakers, and in particular we copy beliefs where our caretakers are scared.


The theory behind social copying like this is that copying is a really efficient pre-filter on potential beliefs or potential behaviors because presumably other people around you have those beliefs and behaviors because they're adaptive. That's kind of one theory why we copy so much. So we copy all of this into our brains and so now we have all these fears that our parents and grandparents and family have. I had internalized a lot of those fears. We call something trauma for really two reasons. One is something that seems really bad happened. That's kind of the medical term of trauma. But I want to use trauma to refer to this other phenomenon where we call it trauma when it doesn't seem like it's well suited to our daily life or our current life.


So post-traumatic stress disorder is a trauma and PTSD is fine if you're at war. You do actually want to be super jumpy and really careful about whether or not a shell is coming. But then you migrate back into the real world which is out of the data distribution of the environment you were just in and now you're out of distribution. So you've been overfit to the previous environment-- and I'm abusing some terms here, but now you're not generalizing to this new environment that you're in. I think this is true of most people. We don't actually generalize that well from childhood to adulthood. We freeze a lot of these old beliefs because they're adaptive and in an environment that is much more dangerous than our current environment that worked really well. But our current life, this environment is quite safe and having these fears is actually not very useful and causes a lot of maladaptive behavior. And so trauma is overfitting.

So therapy is retraining. I think what I've observed in therapy is that there are really three processes going on. There is the process of activating or accessing a network; a sub network of some sort. There's the process of giving it new training data from your current life and then there's the process of updating it. So actually having that memory reconsolidation process happen. It seems to me that all therapy techniques are good at one to three of these three elements of retraining. So EMDR as you mentioned is actually quite good at all three. I think that's part of why it's so effective. It's that with EMDR, you are flicking your eyes back and forth or you're doing this bilateral tapping where you're tapping different sides of your body. Somehow that seems to reduce fear response so that you can more easily access a network.


EMDR I would say the places where it's not as effective is in giving your mind new training data from your modern day. Your therapist actually has to prompt you to do that. So if you're working with a therapist who doesn't understand this frame of, "Okay, now you need to see how this old memory is not adaptive and you can update it." If your therapist is not doing that, if they're not giving you training data from your modern day then you may not see updating. And so that might be why. I've done EMDR on a lot of people and it seems fairly consistently if you do show them the training data and their modern life is good, then they'll update.


Ben (13:23):

This is fascinating to know and also that's a sort of learning that you get from understanding ideas of neural networks and training data. It might in some ways bring us closer to some animal behavior type model. But I hadn't heard it articulated that way and also makes sense of why some of these things may fail or not.


Kanjun (13:44):

I kind of have this whole theory of why therapies work or don't work because I've experimented so much on myself and designed new techniques combining existing ones because they're not all good at all three things. So cognitive behavioral therapy is fantastic at getting new training data from your modern day because it's asking you things like, "What are the costs of what you're doing or what are the costs of that belief?" So it's basically a data accumulation mechanism. You can acquire more data using CBT procedures. But it's not very good at accessing these very old beliefs. The kind of complaint about CBT is that it often works at the surface level where it's actually really hard to get to these deep old beliefs. And then it's pretty good at helping you update. Has a bunch of different methods to help you update.


Like, you write down on the costs, you look at the list of costs, you implement habits into your life, et cetera. So that's particularly good for getting training data but it's not good for access. Now you look at something like Internal Family Systems where you're talking to different parts inside your body and these different parts are kind of-- The way I think about it is they're like old memories that are stored. IFS is really good for access. The whole point is that you're accessing some of these parts and able to go into them, but it's not very good at getting training data from your modern day. So often people do IFS, they go into those parts and if they're not prompted properly or they haven't prepared their conscious mind with new beliefs from today, then they'll just believe whatever that part is believing. They'll believe like, "Oh, I'm three years old and I'm really scared and it's good to be scared." And you're like, "Well actually no. You're not three years old anymore." You kind of have to bring them out of that purposefully.


So combining IFS and CBT or somatic therapy and CBT, these are effective methods. It makes a therapy method much more effective. I think this framework actually makes therapy debuggable. So if a person is for some reason not able to update a situation that they're feeling frustrated by you can kind of say, "Okay, well is the problem in access? Is it in training data or is it in updating?" There are techniques that you can combine to get all three to happen. Then to your point about neural networks and how that influence the mind, I think basically both neural networks and the mind are learning systems. And learning systems-- like modeling systems have some shared properties. So overfitting is one of them.


Ben (16:33):

That's amazing. So you definitely have to write that as an essay. It sounds like you should actually have a whole new startup investigating that. You may not get to AGI, but you solved the therapy problem which seems to me almost as great.


Kanjun (16:50):

Actually, I think an important part of safety is figuring out what values to align to. So understanding humans is an important part of that.


Ben (16:59):

Exactly. It leads me to think that... Do you think animals go through trauma then? Some form?



Kanjun (17:06):

Almost certainly. Yeah. So you'll see some dogs were abused when they were young or by a previous owner and then now they're really jumpy even though they're with a new owner. So these learning systems update very conservatively in humans and living creatures which makes sense because the real world is fairly unforgiving. If you update too quickly, then you might die.


Ben (17:32):

Sure. So this is the paired learning response. It's really strong. Okay. So a slight left field pivot then is, do you think dinosaurs felt trauma?


Kanjun (17:44):

Almost certainly. Again, it's a learning system. Unless dinosaurs never learned anything new, that's plausible, but unlikely.


Ben (17:56):

That's quite a good one because you have a question on your website which you posed which I guess we have no answer, which is they existed for 165 million years or so, give or take, and they did not seem to advance to the levels that we seem to advance to. But obviously they seemed to felt trauma and they have some of these learning mechanisms. I guess we can just extend this to other animals which have been around for a long time. Maybe you could do mammals like rats or you could do insects as well. What's your current thinking on this?


Kanjun (18:30):

So the question is basically-- I was reading a lot about dinosaurs and I was like, "Why is it that for hundreds of millions of years we had these creatures that evolved a little bit but didn't seem to improve dramatically or change dramatically? And then versus in the last like 1 million years or 2 million years on earth, we have had this crazy exponential change in the nature of intelligence of animals on this planet. Is there something that causes this kind of change in evolution?” My current best hypothesis is environment constraints force evolution of new skills or capabilities. So basically you want to be in an environment where intelligence is rewarded. If the environment is too abundant-- which at that time there was a lot of oxygen in the air. Maybe it was very abundant in terms of an environment, in terms of food. If the environment's too abundant, there's no benefit to being smarter. And so here now today, the environment's not as abundant-- I think, we think. I'm not sure, no one knows. But if that were true, then constraints, maybe.


Ben (19:46):

Yeah. Okay. I like that theory. I got one slightly downstream for that which is dinosaurs didn't have hands as much. I think the second thing which comes alongside is language. And that didn't develop. But why didn't those things develop? There is some evidence or there’s some theories that the human animal or something like that was forced to-- for instance in ice ages or when there was scarcity-- to develop these things to survive. Therefore that would happen with a bit of luck. So they kind of intertwine. I guess the follow one from that though is I was pondering when you go back just a little bit in time I guess on this time scale to the Romans and the Greeks, why did they not invent more advances than we have today? They certainly seem to have some of the capabilities-- and they did invent some things like Roman cement which we still can't seem to copy which seems to be a really good material.


But they didn't invent some of those things. You can see this is going to segue into meta science at a point because they also didn't invent some things which didn't really need other types of technology. The one I always think about is the randomized control trial. So you test one arm and you test another arm and you compare them. That didn't need any extra science and certainly they had seemingly the capabilities of it. In fact, you could have gone back 2000 years earlier and they would've had the capabilities of that. But it didn't develop, or maybe it did and it just didn't hold which is also kind of interesting. Have you ever thought about that? Why did Greek and...


Kanjun (21:28):

Yeah. I thought about it. Quite a lot.


Ben (21:31):

Is that essentially a meta science question? Because some of these ideas like randomized control trial or how they did it wasn't holding and so it didn't transmit.




Kanjun (21:41):

Right. So I'll talk about randomized control trials first and then we can go to the tie to evolution. So I think randomized control trials, the reason we have them now is because we have the statistics, the mathematical foundation to be able to evaluate these two groups. Are they actually the same or not the same? I tried this trial. I randomized one is the control group and one is the test group. Did the test group outperform the control group? There are a lot of statistical techniques that are needed to really understand that question. So I could see that maybe they would have done randomized control trials for really small effects a long time ago, but that maybe it's not very deterministic. You get some people in this scoop, it works and some people in this other group, it works. Then they might throw up their arms and be like, "I don't know what to conclude about this." So I could see the reason RCTs didn't exist before is because we didn't have the mathematical foundation to be able to look at the results and say something about it and get information out of it. And I think that's true.


Ben (22:50):

Geometry which I find a lot harder, but maybe that's just me. Euclid invented geometry which seems to be quite harder than the stats behind certain RCTs. But it's true. They hadn't seemingly invented the stats. But I'm not sure- Like the ability to see that.


Kanjun (23:11):

Trigonometry doesn't build on so many other fields of mathematics whereas statistics does. But I kind of back to the question of, "Why did Romans and Greeks not-- their civilization didn't accumulate in the way that ours does technologically?" I think it actually comes back to this process of variation and selection which is true in evolution and also true in science. So in evolution we were just talking about constraints. I think the reason why constraints are interesting is because in evolution you're varying, you're doing a lot of variation. Then what the constraints do is they enable selection. The tougher the constraints are, the narrower the selection is. In science at that time in the Roman and Greek era, maybe a way that people thought about knowledge is that knowledge maybe came more from authorities.


There is not this idea of evidence being a thing. So it was not until the royal society in the 1600s, I think, that they had this model; nullius in verba, which means take no one's word for it. Which means that before that model, people took other people's word for it. So people weren't varying and evaluating ideas and they weren't able to test and select new ideas to adopt as a culture. So the church had some top-down ideas-- many of which were wrong, and so no one was able to change them. But now we have this process of science is quite remarkable. In the ideas of science we can-- Any grad student if they're more correct than a Nobel Prize winner, the field actually acknowledges that they're more correct. So this is quite a remarkable thing to be able to have the ideas change not from the establishment, the authority, but from the outside; from people with no authority at all.


Ben (25:22):

It can take them some time but it does eventually happen. I think about ulcers and how they figured that out, but they weren't believed for some time. But eventually the science does seem to win out which like you mentioned is a kind of remarkable thing.


Kanjun (25:40):

Actually, in some fields it happens really quickly. Like in physics, there's this idea of superconductivity where Brian Josephson was this 22 year old and he had published this work on Superconductivity. John Bardeen who's the only person who has ever won two Nobel prizes said like, "No, you're totally wrong." People pretty quickly realized Bardeen was wrong and Josephson, the 22 year old was right. And the physics community pretty quickly, I think, came to this conclusion. So it's not true in all communities. Some communities rely a bit little bit more on authority, but happens sometimes.


Ben (26:21):

Isn't that true about-- was it Linus Pauling and DNA as well?


Kanjun (26:24):

Right. Pauling was wrong.


Ben (26:27):

He was wrong and he admitted it quite quickly and so did the community. And said, "Look, this is obviously right." So I think that's true as well. You speaking about the fields of mathematics in ancient Greek and all of these other fields leads me to something. So I've just been reading it in the last couple of days and I believe you were part of this conversation as well as actually a ChatGPT. And that was Michael Nielsen's recent notes on the ideas of fields or communities as a unit of advancing progress or thinking about progress. I thought this was a really interesting idea. This is reflecting on the fact that you said stats has to build on quite a lot of other fields, whereas some fields may just develop out of not quite nowhere, but may not have to build on so many other things.


I think of this in creative literature art fields and performing art fields. To what extent are you building on what goes before or to what extent do you take from a whole sideways field and make a kind of new field of it? It seems to me that actually that is one interesting way of thinking about how advanced we are, and that actually now that any individual human will find it very difficult to even have a surface knowledge of all of the fields, and certainly not an in-depth knowledge of maybe more than 5, 10 or 20 of which something like an AI could start to do. So I was interested in what you think about fields as a unit and therefore AI or some development putting these fields together to then create new fields, is maybe one of the key questions that we should look at.


Kanjun (28:12):

Yeah. I'm actually quite confused about the-- I think the underlying question here is kind of like, "What is the structure of knowledge? Or something like that. There's this one model of knowledge as being a thing that is like a tower block. You've got some blocks at the bottom and then you put some... This is not a good analogy. There's maybe a better analogy. Like a computer program where you're calling a lot of previous functions. So like you have a function that calls another function, and that function calls an older function, and that function calls an older function, and each of those functions is like a discovery. So there's that model where by definition, the outermost function is dependent on all of these discoveries that came before it and can't be simplified. It has to call all of these preexisting functions. That's one model, but that model is not really true.


It often feels like when an idea is first developed in a new field, the person who developed it actually doesn't understand it as well as the people who follow them. So I think there was a Feynman quote that talked about how like-- or maybe a Hamming quote that talked about, "Einstein didn't understand his own ideas as well as the people who came after him." There's this kind of reconsolidation process where the understanding is simplified and it may be simplified even more. So it's no longer true that this function is dependent on all the previous discoveries. In fact, you might end up with a new fresh function that doesn't depend on any other previous discoveries and that still captures all of the information. So it's actually not clear to me that humans can't-- in some fields at least, that humans can't understand everything. Maybe the reason we can't understand it yet is because it's not yet simplified to its final form.


Ben (30:18):

I guess that might be true because I'm going to segue from creative arts as well, and that does seem to be true in creative arts. Although it's argued about, the very simplified precis is that you might have a play or a poem or whatever it is. The audience or later artists make much more of that creative work than the original creator. The original creator has obviously their view and vision and have that. But actually those who come after make it even so much more than what it was. It's actually out of the original creator's hands, and particularly once time has passed-- I guess you can think about this in Shakespeare today. Obviously, he had a view and we don't quite know what his view was on all of his work. But it has been taken to another level by so many more artists and creators. And actually, I think arguably is greater today than it was in his own time because of that. And actually that feels-- although it's still argued about, quite well established within art. That your creation is not just your own and that the very greatest creations become bigger than what the actual original creator think and might be interpreted more deeply than what the original creator can even think. Therefore, you actually aim [inaudible 31:30] who at the peak of their art will often slightly step away from commenting on what they think their art is because they realize that their answer may not be the best answer and actually might narrow the interpretation of what that might be by imposing this idea that the author knows best.


Kanjun (31:50):

That's really interesting. I'm really curious about this process. So here's what's happening. In your view, what's happening-- let's take Shakespeare. These people who have built upon it, is it that they've kind of added additional meaning to what-- They're interpreting it in different ways. And so a single sentence if you read it yourself might only have a little bit of meaning, but if you read it in the context of everyone else's interpretations, it has a lot more meaning. Is it that they've added more meaning? Or is it that the people who come after have found simplifying patterns in his work that mimic this reconsolidation process in science that I was talking about of ideas. What is it that's making it richer?


Ben (32:36):

So actually for the most complex work it's both elements. And I would actually add a third to segue into something like cave art. So cave art, we find new... Obviously, we don't actually even know the original creators of that art, whether they even viewed it as art. But obviously we find patterns now. So young children put their hands in the mud or in wet cement. And so we riff on the now of the culture and then obviously we will add our own meaning into what we see how in the now. Then because so many people have commented on cave art and made their own mud art and a kind of, I guess, a meta art sense from that, it's also made the whole field richer. So you've definitely got those elements and it added together. Then you've got people who draw on those various things to then create more meta pieces.


So it definitely builds that way as well as wide. I'm only thinking out loud. I'm sure there must be more, particularly in something as rich as Shakespeare because it then becomes so pivotal to other things and actually might segue into things like culture. So it's now a key element in how British people think about themselves. If it wasn't for Shakespeare, we wouldn't think the way we do, I'm pretty sure. Obviously that would be arguable. There's probably a PhD in that. And even, there are words and catchphrases from Shakespeare's plays which now have gone into different nations' vernaculars which didn't exist beforehand, but have also made alive something which was already there. But actually crystallized it potentially in a simplifying form or in some form that people get, "Yes, that is what that was about and that's what that phrase means."


Kanjun (34:28):

That's really interesting. Yeah. This is another thing I'm quite confused about which is, "What is meaning?" I think an interesting thought experiment that my co-founder, Josh, gave is. "Let's look up at the sky, pick any star, and let's imagine that a hundred thousand years from now humans or some descendant of humans live on that star." Now, we have two scenarios. In one scenario, they have no memory of earth or where they came from. They don't know how they ended up on that star, but they're there and they don't know anything about their history. In the other scenario they look up on the night sky and they point at earth and say, "Hey..." I mean, maybe they can't see Earth, but in this general direction. Like, "Hey, that's where we came from." There's like some merchant on that star that's like, "I know that my distant distant ancestors came from Earth." In one of those scenarios it feels like there's a lot more meaning. That merchant feels a lot deeper sense of meaning than in the other scenario where they're kind of disconnected from where they came from. I don't really understand why. Somehow meaning is tied to this sense of context and history and kind of where things came from and why they are the way they are. But I don't know what it is.


Ben (35:50):

I can't answer the why. I kind of almost obviously, or if I had, I would've made some genius breakthrough in the human condition, I guess. But it is definitely true. So you think about money or cultural symbolisms or particularly art. But say in your example of the star. Say I said, "Oh, I went onto the internet the other day and I sold Kanjun that star or one of these internet star nomination things and 10 million ancestors later, Kanjun's ancestors arrived on the star which supposedly she owned." Again, you would've imbued that with so much more meaning. Except in today's day and age, what does it mean selling someone a piece of paper saying, "You sponsored such and such a star?" There is no ownership in our legal culture of what that star might be.


That's actually why I am not so worried about what some people are worried about in terms of some aspects of AI generated art because-- I don't know what the portion is, but some significant portion of art is the value is in the so-called the eye of the beholder. So the meaning we give it and its time and place and things, and that's part of its value. Obviously that's part of the value in the techniques and everything which went into it which is obviously going to be different in AI art. But there's definitely this part that humans bring. This kind of human value part which is not seemingly part of the physics natural laws, but seems to be part of the human natural laws.


Kanjun (37:21):

Yeah.


Ben (37:22):

That's leads me to think then, what do you think out of all of the things you are confused about, interested in. What do you think are the most important questions in science or meta science that we should be seeking to understand at the moment?


Kanjun (37:38):

We wrote a whole essay on that.


Ben (37:43):

Glad you noticed.


Kanjun (37:47):

Yeah. Talking about the essay, I want to come back to this idea of meaning later because maybe we can riff on it.


Ben (37:52):

Yeah. Essay back to meaning. Something might...


Kanjun (37:57):

So talking about the meta science essay, originally some of the questions that motivated us were questions like, "Why is it that a refunder says they want to do high reward research and yet they end up doing relatively low risk incremental work; a kind of funding low risk incremental work? What is causing that?" Clearly there's an intention to do something different and yet every new funder kind of gets sucked back in into the existing ecosystem. They don't diverge very much from the existing processes and norms and results. So why? That's so weird, right? Isn't it weird that you try to do something totally different and you end up being exactly the same? In many fields that's not true. In art, if I try to do something totally different, presumably at some point I'll ended up with something totally different.


So that really was the beginning of us trying to understand like, "What is going on here? Why is it that we can't fund things in totally different ways?" There are lots of different kind of ideas expressed in the essay, but one of the ideas is this idea that the space of social processes of science is very underexplored in that most funders have very similar social processes to existing funders. Even if you start a new funder, you might still have peer review, you might still approve grants based on you don't anonymize the names or anything. You approve grants based on how good other people think those grants are. You approve them based on how successful they seem like they might be.


Michael in his head already had a giant list that I started to add to of potentially totally different programs that you could run as a funder. For example, high variance funding. You only fund things where the peer reviewers really disagree with each other or funding an open source institute. So this is something that typically wouldn't be considered science. But if you're a funder, you could fund a whole institute that's working on open source projects and that is an important infrastructure for science. I think at some point we talked about like a traveling institute of scientists where you go around the world... A young genius immigration program where you immigrate people into the country, find people across the world who seem like they might be really capable in some particular way. So it was like, "This is infinite." We just kept going. And so we were like, "Okay, well that's interesting." Eventually we found a frame for this which is the beginning of the essay which is, “Let's say you come across some aliens and they do science. Would those aliens have discovered mathematics?” Seems likely. “Would they have discovered atoms?” Unless we're totally wrong about atoms, seems likely. “But would they have PhD programs or tenure or...?”

Ben (41:21):

And have randomized controlled trials.


Kanjun (41:23):

They might have randomized controlled trials or we may discover that actually... One thing about RCT... Sorry, go ahead.


Ben (41:31):

We haven't discovered it.


Kanjun (41:34):

Well, one thing about RCTs that's interesting is that we only do RCTs in situations. We don't do RCTs in physics because we can understand mechanistically why the phenomenon is happening. We only do RCTs in situations where the situation is so complex we've kind of given up on mechanistically how to explain the result. And so we just kind of divide into two different camps and see which one is more probabilistically likely, which to me... Maybe it is a method that we'll always have because there are some things that are always beyond our understanding. But to me it's very unsatisfying.


Ben (42:16):

Yeah. I hadn't heard it described like that, but you're right. Complex sciences, biological sciences; anything to do with humans, so social sciences, that's true. I will try and say, so what do you think is the best idea? Or you can do both. What was the worst idea in your meta science paper? Because maybe that's the one we should go for on the grounds that actually it should be a lottery and you don't know. You might say there was also failure audit, 10 year insurance, you had your traveling scientists, you had long short prizes, anti-portfolio, interdisciplinary institute, you had the funder as detector, and you had a variety more. What's the thing which you just think was probably Michael's like, "Oh, that's just really awful but we should just keep it in there because you never know. It might be right." Or the otherwise like, "This is mine and this should be right at the top because the best idea in it." What do you think?



Kanjun (43:10):

Maybe I'll answer a slightly different question which is like, "What are the most interesting ideas?" And then...


Ben (43:19):

Or you could go, what's the most high risk idea? What's the idea most unlikely that anyone's going to go for, but probably is the one they want to try?


Kanjun (43:27):

Well, all of the ideas are a little bit out there. I think the most interesting ideas are a little bit less about the funding programs because those programs are just given as examples of underlying generating functions. What's much more interesting is looking at the generating functions. So we have this general idea of latent potential. As a funder you're assuming that you-- When you allocate money, you can give it to people where there's latent potential; where their potential is not yet unlocked by another funder or another way of doing discovery. So your goal should be to find latent potential. I think this is actually a relatively new idea. Most funders don't think about their job as finding latent potential. Just like in finance, your job is finding edge.


Also as a funder, your job is finding edge. You shouldn't be allocating more money. And it's not very effective, I guess, to allocate more money just where everyone is allocating money. So this idea of latent potential is kind of this core idea. Then we have all of these-- The way we got to a lot of this part of the essay is that we were trying to understand, “What are different ways of excavating latent potential? How do you find it?” So the anti-portfolio idea, for example, came from Bessemer Venture Partners, which has on their website a list of all of the great ideas that they missed. If a funder had a list of all the great ideas that they missed, the theory about latent potential here is that there's something in the incentives or motivation of the program manager or the people making the funding decisions that maybe is overly risk averse or doesn't have a feedback loop and there's latent potential in that feedback loop and in shifting that incentive structure.


I think maybe another idea that is on the list or we don't have is a Noble Prize for funders. Kind of gets at a similar generator of latent potential which is changing the way that the program manager is behaving. There's a totally different way of thinking about latent potential which is around how you might construct new fields or how might we 10x the rate of field production. So that is a question that generates a lot of potential program ideas. The community's idea maybe is one of them. I used to run this big group house and one idea I had was like, "What if you started lots of group houses and funded lots of group houses and just got interesting people to live in them?" You end up with these interesting communities where maybe that would increase the rate of field production. Or another thing is maybe there's a field shutdown process where at some point the field feels too incremental and you have to shuffle people into a different field. So you get cross-disciplinary work as well as this kind of death of fields and maybe that would result in new fields. There are lots of ideas for like, “Okay, if you think about this question, you'll end up with lots of different ideas.”


Ben (46:48):

Well, people should definitely read the essay, or rather, I like to say open source book.


Kanjun (46:53):

Right.


Ben (46:54):

I'm going to riff on two of those things. So one you mentioned laterally and we might come back to the Neighborhood idea as well. I think that's really interesting because surely what 10, 20, 30, 50, maybe even 80% of the value in universities is the social capital of bringing people together. Why not recreate that and see what happens? The other one you said is about investing edge because that's really interesting in financial markets. There is this school of thought where you should try and identify where you have skill and then play where you have skill and don't play where you don't have skill. This is true of a lot of sport and other games. Therefore even if you are lucky, it will have been viewed as a mistake if you played where you didn't have skill. And actually if you won, that is also judged to be a mistake. Whereas if you have skill and you played a good bet and it didn't go your way-- which markets happens a lot-- that is actually the correct process because you played where you had skill. Where you had edge, the edge didn't come off. I think this is very true of funders. They probably have idiosyncratic skill because it's a social science, but they probably do have that and then they should play to that and not where they feel they don't. I think that's a really...




Kanjun (48:14):

Every funder is started by a different person and that person has different networks, et cetera. So I think their edge could be different. They could end up investing in really different programs but they don't. Another idea that we don't talk about that much in the essay is this idea of institutional antibodies. So another reason why-- and this is the entire second part of the essay. It’s about kind of bottlenecks to change. “Why does change not happen? We have all these program ideas. We just came up with a hundred of them off the top of our heads. Why doesn't anyone do them? That's so strange." That really got into the second question of like, "Okay, well actually there are a lot of bottlenecks and one is institutional antibodies where you try to do something different and existing institutions actually lump asked you for it.” They really don't like that. There are reasons for it. One is maybe they feel threatened. Maybe Harvard feels threatened by a new funding institution. I think Harvard said something really negative about the Thiel Fellowship when it first came down because it was a threat. And by definition, if someone's finding edge somewhere else and it's a little bit competitive, it will be somewhat of a threat to some existing powerful institution.


Ben (49:29):

Don't we call those type of things-- So you call them antibodies. But it strikes me that what we're really talking about or what a layman might think about is culture or at least part of that culture. There's something interesting about institutions which have a very long history about the culture that they develop. I know you're very interested in institutions and culture broadly. So I guess my question is, is that one of the problems about old institutions is the way that culture has ossified whether it's competition or not. And therefore you need new institutions or maybe new arms of old institutions. And maybe you could potentially look at through the lens of, or you might want to comment on the culture that maybe you are trying to build at your firm or in startups in general because that seems to be potentially one of the competitive edges that startups have. It's that they don't have to deal with a legacy culture of whatever that might be. Except there's this observation that old institutions seemingly have this problem, this bottleneck which you see in funders. .


You can see in a lot of old institutions and in fact in startup language. Jeff Bezos calls companies on that. They’re two companies. He wants to be a day one company and he says, "You're day two company, you’re dead." That's another way of saying dead's probably slightly overused. But it's saying that your culture and everything is ossified and you can't do all of these things that you want to do for innovation startup. But it strikes me that that seemed to be a very human thing. On the other hand, cultural and institutional knowledge when you take the long cycle of history has been incredibly valuable for making progress, at least up until this point. So I'm not entirely sure that something about it has been preserved for very good reasons. So yeah, your thoughts on culture.


Kanjun (51:18):

A lot of thoughts on this. Okay, there are a few categories of thoughts. One is an idea of old institutions that's overfitting. Second is, I think the phenomenon of institutional antibodies is speaking to actually something broader than culture. The way I think about culture is culture is a set of beliefs held by the people in that culture, and it is also reinforced by a set of systems. So kind of just going back to the point of institution-- I think there was a third thing that you talked about around-- I forgot. Maybe we should cut out the...


Ben (52:11):

The history of culture also being important for traditional knowledge as well on that flip side. But knowledge over time.


Kanjun (52:20):

That's right. So knowledge versus culture and history. So I'll talk about the institutional antibodies thing first. I think that goes beyond just the beliefs. I think that's actually more about the competitive system dynamic. So it's about the broader ecosystem of institutions and what happens when there's a competitive dynamic in general. So whenever there's a competitive dynamic you're kind of taking away the power of an existing institution and that institution's going to retaliate because they're old. And part of why they're old and still exist is because they have some kind of power. So I think that's actually more of an institutional is an organism and that organism is being threatened and less about the culture of that institution in particular.


I think there are some environments like the startup environment-- and we were inspired a lot by the startup environment where threats happen all the time and the existing institutions retaliate but it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter that much. There are some mechanisms in place like antitrust that prevent existing institutions from retaliating too much. So some ecosystems of institutions like a startup ecosystem is relatively healthy because new institutions form all the time and old ones die when they need to die, and they don't die when they don't need to die, and you have kind of this outside party that enforces antitrust laws. So that's one way to-- That's kind of addressing the institutional antibodies is broader than the culture of the institution.

But now if we talk about institutional culture. I think your question is something like, "Why is it that existing institutions can't implement new ideas? Like the Harvard, Harvard can't implement the Thiel Fellowship." I think it's because basically these two institutions have beliefs that are directly in conflict with each other. So that's one reason why the existing institution can't do it. So Thiel Fellowship says, "University/ College is not useful for some people." And Harvard says, "I am a college, you should come. It's clearly useful for you.” They have this core underlying belief that just can't coexist. So in this case, it's really hard for those two beliefs to exist under the same institution unless you have two really different cultures.


Ben (55:04):

I get that. But Harvard, I guess could do a failure audit or a ten year insurance or high variance funding which also seems to be a bottleneck in this culture. But I can see sometimes you just can't take it on because it's not part of your set beliefs.


Kanjun (55:19):

Yeah. I think Harvard could do a lot of these other things. We'd love for them to do those things. We just feel like people have not been very imaginative in the types of things that they could try.


Ben (55:30):

Why do you think we've lacked imagination?


Kanjun (55:34):

I think it's not very safe.


Ben (55:38):

I guess that hearts back to culture. I understand your point about antibodies of maybe being wider, but I do wonder about this culture thing. You're not safe to have maverick ideas. Maybe they're maverick, maybe they're not even maverick. I'm jumping around, but I guess that leads me to think how you create a positive maverick then if you've got institutional antibodies as a problem. Maybe you've also got culture as a problem, although maybe you've got these new institutions. And you might-- I cut you off before thinking about the knowledge question as well. You can return to that one as well.

Kanjun (56:14):

That's okay. We'll come back to that one. So this problem of safety I think is really interesting both from an institutional perspective and an individual perspective. So humans, if we feel unsafe as individuals we won't take risks generally. There's some survival instinct that prevents us from doing that. Institutions, I think a lot of funders don't feel safe because their funding is coming from some outside party. It's coming from the government or it's coming from someone who's wealthy or someone else who wants to see success. They want to see that their funding is going to a good place. So as someone who runs a funding institution I would need to be like, "Okay, I need to be able to show success because I'm not the source of this funding." But if you see funders run by the high network individual-- For example, the Arnold Foundation who funded Brian Nozick, who started the Center for Open Science which we also talk about in the second part of our essay. Brian was rejected by the NSF-NIH. Literally everyone, I guess NSF, literally everyone rejected him for years until the Arnold Foundation found him.


And I think part of why Arnold Foundation was able to do something strange or fund something strange is because John Arnold was involved in it and he was the supplier of all the money so he felt very safe. When I interact with funders of different types where the source of their money is held by the decision makers versus not held by the decision makers, they actually end up behaving in really different ways. When a funder's money is held by the decision maker, then the funder takes a lot more risk because they feel safer. They can spend their own money however they want. They have no one to report to.


Ben (58:10):

That's really interesting. So slightly adjacent to that would suggest that you might believe in all of the work done on psychological safety which is work in teams. Google sponsored it for Amy Evan's work. So this idea that when you're feeling safe you will point out bad decisions and also venture more riskier, audible decisions. And when you're not, you don't point out something which you think is obviously bad because you're worried it sounds stupid. And also you don't take more risks in new ideas because you're just feeling not safe in your team.


Kanjun (58:42):

Yeah. I think psychological safety is really useful in situations where you want higher variants. You want people to take risks. And you may actually not want it in situations where you don't want people to take risks.


Ben (58:54):

Maybe. Although they also point out stupid things you're doing. So it's not just the risk side. That adds to your point. You've been doing it for 10 years and you get a new member of the team like, "Well, they've been doing it for 10 years," but obviously this way is better and then they don't suggest it. Somehow they think it's better. Another thing then is I observe a strong streak of creativity in your work and life. There's setting up a Neighborhood...


Kanjun (59:22):

Sorry, we haven't talked about knowledge yet.


Ben (59:25):

Okay. Let's go on knowledge and then we'll go-- Maybe knowledge into creativity is a good way of going. So holding knowledge...


Kanjun (59:30):

Okay. Yeah, we can do that.


Ben (59:32):

Holding knowledge on an institutional level. Or let's hold knowledge in and then see where this goes as well. So strong streak creativity in your life. Setting up the Neighborhood you obviously had feelings before. I really wanted to talk about all of the dancing as well. The dancing comes in because I was going loop back to somewhere early in the conversation about meaning and value because I think dancing has that. Actually, dancing might be quite a good example because there's also knowledge held in dances. The way that we dance and that talent is also developed through time. Actually, we can segue, sometimes institutions hold onto that knowledge although sometimes it's groups and community groups. I think of things like, I guess Brazilian dance or Capoeira which held in a community and then has come out. Maybe not exactly a dance though, although you could call that. So how important is creativity? And you can talk about knowledge and institutions as well.




Kanjun (01:00:37):

Yeah. I guess to answer that question directly, I think for me, creativity drives basically everything I do. I only realized this a few years ago. I never really identified as creative personally. I had a really close group of friends in high school and a few years ago talking to one of them I was like, "I think I might be a creative person." And he was like, "Duh." Everyone knew that. It was really obvious. I was like, "That's strange." But anyway, I think like...


Ben (01:01:11):

All of those people understand you better than you understand yourself.


Kanjun (01:01:19):

Yeah. I guess it points to how powerful stories of yourself can be and how limiting they are. I believe in human creativity and the potential for like if we can unlock human creativity, then there's this extraordinary potential in humanity. I think that's why I'm so interested in artificial intelligence. It seems to me like fire or like electricity. One of the greatest tools for unlocking human creativity that we've ever encountered. So I think all of my projects; AI, working on meta science, the Neighborhood, the fund, the podcast, it's all about human potential and understanding human potential, unlocking human potential. Can we set up systems and excavate ideas that can unlock human potential?


I guess to your point of knowledge, there's something about knowledge I'm very confused about which is I don't understand really... It seems like institutions, there's like a benefit from institutions and cultures holding old knowledge and then there's a point at which it's not useful in many situations to hold that knowledge. So institutions like Harvard might have really outdated knowledge or beliefs that they're holding. And so this is why I was like, "Maybe there's an analogy to overfitting where times have changed and you actually should be dropping some of your beliefs.” But I'm also confused because it seems actually good for some institutions to hold the belief of, “Universities are good” because they're good for some people and good for other universities, other institutions like the Thiel Fellowship or New Science which is a new funder out here, to hold the belief that universities are not useful because they're not useful for some people.


So now you have institutions that hold different beliefs, cultures that hold different beliefs, and so you get a lot more variants or diversity and you're able to 'service' many more people because different beliefs, different institutions are a good fit for different people. But I'm kind of confused about this dynamic of like, "What causes an institution to grow?" Based on this beliefs like, "How come the Thiel Fellowship is still so small?" I'm sure there are more people that could service-- I don't know. I'm a bit puzzled about this relationship between knowledge and culture and diversity.


Ben (01:04:01):

Sure. So my reflection on that is that's because that form of knowledge is actually much closer to art than we would like to acknowledge. And so as we are riffing on earlier, art has a time in place and culture and can be interpreted by one set of group and people in time and place and one. And actually just adjacent to that in another country or another time or another thing, they can interpret that very same piece very differently. Plausibly both getting a lot of value from it, or one group could get one value or one less value. But because we pretend to ourselves that knowledge is closer to that physical natural science, like you said, the physics, like how the atom works. Well, actually institutional knowledge is not like how the atom works. To your point, I don't think the alien would view the same way like Thiel Fellowships or Harvard.


To the alien it might be, "Well, you might do it that way or you might not do it." It's not like the atom would be. Therefore it is closer to art than all of the complexities around art. That's probably why you need a randomized controlled trial to ascertain it. But even though I actually think it would give you a false read because as time changes and as people change, actually the value of that will also change which is why it riffs back to your earlier thing about creativity and art. It seems to me to be a lot closer to that, but I'm not sure.


Kanjun (01:05:21):

That's really interesting. Yeah, this idea that the beliefs expressed in art are dependent on particular things in order to be effective or useful or meaningful. So they're dependent on how everyone else is interacting with each other; some of the other norms and beliefs that exist. You can't take a belief fully out of context because it's part of this dependent system of beliefs and behaviors.


Ben (01:05:49):

Correct. And therefore that's the same of institutional like that. I'm going to finish off on the creativity and the dance element because I'd be interested to know what you think non-dancers do not understand about people who dance.

Kanjun (01:06:10):

I guess I was a non-dancer until college. Then I started doing competitive Ballroom dance which is a very structured dance style. That was very comforting to me because before doing Ballroom I was like, "I can't dance. I'm super clumsy." I'm still super clumsy. I don't have any spatial awareness. I'm not paying attention. I'm always in my head. So Ballroom was this really interesting way of getting to understand the connection with a partner and with my body and with the floor and with the air, the space around me, in an environment that felt like I wasn't just failing the entire time and doing a bad job. I think there's something interesting here about non-dancers where a lot of people say, "I can't dance."


It I think is more because of this lack of positive feedback, this feedback cycle where people are not getting any positive feedback for their attempt to dance. So then they end up with this belief that they can't dance. So for me, I did Ballroom first and then after 2012, I started to strip away some of the structure of Ballroom. I got tired of it and I was like, "I really want to do something where I can be a lot more expressive and still have this partner connection because that adds so much complexity to the dance. But where I can make things up or improv or try new things, discover new things." And so slowly got into first, West Coast Swing and then Fusion. Fusion is this really interesting partner dance style where it's literally what it says; it's fusion of all styles. You're just making things up the entire time and just combining contact improv, with ballroom, with swing, with all of these different styles and making up new styles all the time.


It's basically kind of like constructivist dance with a partner to music; constructivist movement with a partner to music and I love that. Some people come to Fusion and they say, "I'm not very good at it. How do you get good?" I do think that the structured training of Ballroom and this understanding of connection and how to hold my body and how to connect my body to itself was really helpful. I guess maybe a piece of advice I give people for dance or like new dancers is an easy way to hack this sense of connection is to imagine that you are moving through molasses. So air is no longer air, it's molasses, and it's very, very viscous. And now you're basically always pushing against some force that's pushing back. This actually basically imitates a lot of this sense of internal connection that you get in dance when you've done dance for a long time.


Ben (01:09:22):

Wow. That's really fascinating. So think of it like molasses or I guess like those slow Tai chi movement dances. And also that if you are a non-dancer and you think you can't dance, that's obviously false in some fundamental way. I guess I reflect every three or four year old can dance in some form. Therefore it's not something you must lose the ability to. You must somehow decide that. I've learned a lot.


Kanjun (01:09:53):

Dance is inside of you. It just needs to be unlocked.


Ben (01:09:57):

And somehow I'm not quite sure. But the fusion dance seems to me a kind of long loop analogy to general intelligence. This idea you mixing a lot of things, it's kind of everything that it is, but it helps with structure and you are forming new things in real time with a chat partner or the environment or everything that you are. Obviously that's a very human thing, but somehow in this whole conversation it seems to me a distant cousin of what we were talking about on the connections of all of these other types of things.


Kanjun (01:10:30):

That's actually really interesting because in AI we often talk about-- So if you're training an AI system in some simulated environment, we often talk about multi-agent simulations. So you want multiple AIs in the environment. Why do you want multi-agent simulations? Well, some people say, "Okay, well, you get maybe interesting emergent behavior." But I think that's actually much less interesting. What other agents cause is more diverse set of data, outcomes in the environment. So the environment is static and other agents are modifying it. So you're much more likely to encounter new states of the environment when other agents are modifying it than not. So I don't like dancing by myself because I kind of get stuck in local minima of movement. Whereas if there's somebody else then they're always introducing new states of the environment that caused me to have to figure out how to react in new ways and discover new things about myself and my own sense of movement. I do think there is this parallel to multi-agent simulations.


Ben (01:11:34):

It seems to me to draw another maybe tenuous parallel, that friction or dance between two entities, either in dance or something else seems to be more likely to create this new field or a field where we don't even know it's a field because you've had a new novel interaction within dance. Well, plausibly you do it enough times and people like it. That's actually a new dance form. At that moment in time no one would thought it was a new dance form because it was the first time it ever happened between those parties. And if that analogy holds, that would be other AI agents or whatever making those new fields to stay form.


Kanjun (01:12:08):

Yeah, that's interesting.


Ben (01:12:12):

So how about we play a short version of underrated, overrated and then you can talk about a couple of your current projects and things. So you can make a comment, you can pass, you could just say underrated, overrated. We have some of these things. Underrated or overrated having agency?


Kanjun (01:12:36):

Depends on what environment you're in. I think vastly underrated in the vast majority of the world. Slightly overrated in the rationality community. Speaking as someone who is very close to it. I met my co-founder at a rationality workshop. What agency is kind of the underlying description of human capability? I think of it as like, "What is our ability to change the world from one state to any arbitrary state?" The farther away that state is, the more agency we have or something like that.


Ben (01:13:15):

I could definitely see that. It's like whenever I meet a long-termist or something like that, I definitely think they overrate existential risks, but that's probably because everyone else underrates existential risks. So you're probably meeting somewhere in the middle. Although on that one, that's why I can never quite get my head around the totality of EA or effective altruism because they seem to just have so little weight on art and creativity which just cannot jive this no world view even though they try and make exceptions for it. So they vastly underrate it, but might mean I erect it a little bit. Okay, next one, city planning; overrated, underrated?


Kanjun (01:13:55):

Dramatically underrated. I think all cities should be raised except for some and then built from scratch.

Ben (01:14:02):

Would it be from a centralized planner or would you somehow let-- I guess you could call it a kind of market forces or people choose where to be? How much zoning would you there from, I guess, nothing to everything. Are you just in the middle?


Kanjun (01:14:19):

Yeah, I would basically... Okay, maybe not raise cities. I live in San Francisco which is the most frustrating city in the world. A good friend of mine studied zoning in lots of different cities. My vote would be basically almost no zoning. Tokyo is one of the most interesting cities in the world partly because it's zoning laws are very, very loose. So basically anyone can build anything anywhere. It's not fully true, but people have a lot of agency over what they're able to do with their space and so you see this really crazy stuff; really interesting outgrowths. To me, Tokyo is one of the most beautiful places on earth. It's kind of this melting pot of humanity in a way or where people really can express themselves in the environment.


I think San Francisco is the opposite of that. Everyone's expression is completely shut down because you're not allowed to do anything. So I wouldn't do central planning necessarily, but maybe a little bit of it. And much narrower streets, human scale, planning human scale cities. I think we can actually probably convert existing cities if there were enough motivation into much more human scale cities where we build onto the roads, or on the roads we have like parks and restaurants and pop-up shops and things like that.


Ben (01:15:47):

Yeah. So I can see that. And San Francisco is ridiculous like that, isn't it? It must be one of the highest GDP per capita places like in the world with maybe five other places. But one quirky thing about Tokyo which I'm sure you know is that-- or in fact Japanese planning in general is they think about their buildings only with 30 to 80 year lifespans. So because of that, actually this idea of renewal-- And you think of that because you think of the really old temples and wooden buildings which obviously lasted a thousand or even 2000 years. But actually those are the exceptions.


Kanjun (01:16:22):

The Shinto temple also gets replaced. So that's just really interesting. I think actually this is a very underrated thing which is death. In the western culture we really underrate death. Institutions should die. It's part of why we have all these problems in science because institutions can't die. Buildings should die.


Ben (01:16:42):

For those listening actually, before the 12th of January 2023, my next performance lecture is all about death. That actually in the modern day society we don't really talk about it enough. Whereas even going back just 50 years, but certainly fifty hundred, two hundred years, the death of everything-- whether it's buildings, institutions or particularly people, was a much talked about thing.


Kanjun (01:17:08):

Actually, I just made a connection which is I think there are lots of things with tradeoffs. So longevity versus death has very clear tradeoffs. Similarly, institutional history versus brand new institution with no knowledge has very clear tradeoffs. So just wanted to make that point of there are different parts in the space that you can choose with different tradeoffs.


Ben (01:17:32):

Yeah. I hadn't thought of them as the opposite, but that's exactly right in what we talked about in terms of institutions, death and renewal and all of that. Okay. Underrated, overrated; a couple more left. Innovation labs-- I think we're thinking ARPA or here in the UK we now have ARIA. Underrated or overrated ideas; innovation agencies?


Kanjun (01:08:00):

Probably neutrally rated. It's not really rated. They're useful and they're not that useful if you don't do new things.


Ben (01:18:14):

Okay. Very good. All right, last two. High frequency trading or in particular high frequency trading algorithms?



Kanjun (01:18:24):

That's hilarious. I guess the context is I was a high frequency trader in college and to pay for college. We'd always tell people... People are like, "What's the purpose? Are you doing something good for the world?" Everybody in high frequency trading says, "We're providing liquidity to the markets. That's the answer. That's the good that we're doing in the world.” So I think probably that purpose is overrated from within the community. I think most likely we should have much less high frequency trading.


Ben (01:18:59):

This is interesting because there's a debate within business market economists. So one of the functions of markets supposedly is to find prices or whatever the correct price is. And they have no idea why we need so many trades to try and actually find out what the correct price is because you don't need that in a lot of other forms of markets. But you seem to need it in stocks. There is also a debate as to whether high frequency trading actually provides liquidity or not. But if it funded your college, then in some ways must be massively underrated because it has allowed you the second or third order to produce all of this other amazing stuff. So that is a bet. Definitely what should have taken if you had that validity. Okay, last one is, I guess broad ranging is diversity in tech or in any domain. But I guess I'm interested in diversity in technology as it always comes up.


Kanjun (01:19:58):

What exactly do you mean by diversity?


Ben (01:20:02):

So you can't clarify. I'm probably thinking of people diversity but you could take it further. And I guess riffing back on our tradeoffs is this idea of lots of different things obviously being good for ideas and other things versus narrow focus which potentially might allow you to go faster on one thing. But you could take the kind of women in tech answer on any domain as well. Or you could take it broadly.


Kanjun (01:20:32):

Yeah. I think probably diversity in general is underrated, I suspect in Silicon Valley style cultures. The Silicon Valley style culture is very maximizing and capitalism in general is rather maximizing. So I think there're probably lots of things that don't get funded or don't get done even though they might be really interesting or useful. So the arts I think are a good example where there's not very much art here for that. I think for that reason it's very maximizing, it's very utilitarian. People are like, "Why do art?"


Ben (01:21:12):

[Inaudible 01:21:12] In San Francisco. There can be great people as well but not that much into art. In fact, I was reading just recently. Julian Gough wrote the end narrative in the original Minecraft but supposedly didn't sign any contracts and has now made that open source or essentially creative commons license. He has this whole long post on this riff about he has nothing against the people who did try and make him sign contracts but that was a capitalist system. And his system, his art, they clash in these very interesting ways for when you want to make or create things, whether you're talking about financial capital or if you want to use finance speak; these other bits of capital, social capital, intellectual relationship, human and all of those type of things.


Kanjun (01:22:04):

That's really interesting. I'll definitely read that. There are a lot of clashes and I like capitalism. It's very good at an important thing which-- this idea is Michael's-- which is aligning what is true with what is good with power. When those things are misaligned, you end up with very corrupt states. In capitalism it actually goes moderately well, but also it has a lot of tradeoffs. I wonder if there exist actually much better systems once we have more intelligence to be able to align things that can have a lot more diversity of ideas and types of things that people can be doing in addition to aligning what is true, what is good, and power. So maybe aligning what is true, what is good, power, and beauty; something like that. That beauty piece is definitely missing.


Ben (01:23:01):

Yeah, that's the next system obviously. My day job's obviously well within the capitalist system as well. I spoke with an earlier podcast someone called Jacob Soll, Jake Soll, who traced the history of ideas. That the early capitalists like Adam Smith traced a lot of their thought back to Cicero; these Romans and groups. But actually early capitalists, one of the ways that they thought about the world, one was an industrialized sort of world and that state and governments were also meant to make and create markets. But they also had this aligning the good and the incentive. I remember actually Amartya Sen has this anecdote or analogy for how he thought the early capitalists work. And that's if you are being chased down the street by someone who wants to knife you for your money or because you look wrong, and you suddenly throw a lot of money in the air behind you and they stop and they go for the money instead.

So it is actually meant to align people to something which is actually aligned for the greater good. So it's actually a moral cause. So the early capitalists actually thought it saved us from our basal nature to do something which you could align from incentives. I had never really heard that. Then I went to read back some of these early capitalists and back to Cicero and it is seemingly true, at least my interpretation of what they were saying, thinking then that that's that. We've evolved it to this state. So it's interesting that to your point, it will likely evolve again and how it evolved for these things is still very open.


Kanjun (01:24:38):

I think that's really interesting. How are we doing? Are we doing okay on time? I can do a slight diversion?


Ben (01:24:46):

Go for your divergent thing.


Kanjun (01:24:49):

Okay. I think this is really interesting in that capitalism has successfully aligned us toward satisfying people's desires and wants and somewhat away from our basal nature. Violence has decreased a lot. There are goals to go forth that are not tribe against tribe kind of goals. It actually feels like we're pretty ripe for some kind of transformation because AI is getting better really fast. If you were to ask a question like this, it's getting better way faster than most people in the world see. I think people can see ChatGPT and see all its flaws, but ChatGPT is just the tip of the iceberg of even research that we've done already. So there's still a ton of low hanging fruit in terms of the capabilities. So I think all of this stuff will happen faster than we think it will. And maybe that means a system like capitalism needs to be augmented somehow.


Ben (01:25:57)

That's an agree for me. So I actually work a lot in biological sciences and I bore everyone. I don't have technical details because I'm not really a coder. But what DeepMind have done with protein folding in biological and computational biology, and actually this is-- I mean there are a couple of generations in. But it's early journeys. It is so mind boggling having studied it 10, 20 years ago. This is the equivalent of magic or a form of magic. It seems that far away. Therefore the downstream effects are just very hard for us to imagine because even people in the field can only just start imagining it and what it would do. In something related to your point, typically we've had to use control trials because we don't really know. This is like some of the beginnings of actually we might start to understand-- and we've got a linking of the biological mechanisms of something. So it's not that we're at zero. But between zero and a hundred, we're closer to 10 or 20 than we are to a hundred for sure. You can just see on the edges of where I have domain expertise that these things are just opening up in ways which just is very hard to imagine and therefore I think could be both very exciting and scary at the same time. Riffing on the capitalism...


Kanjun (01:27:17):

Really one quick thing there which is one of the things I'm most excited about AI. Most people talk about automation and kind of doing what people are doing. That's maybe interesting, but I'm most interested in systems that are able to monitor very complex systems. Because they're interacting with the economy or with all of the people, the model can interact with all of these people simultaneously. It's building up some model of the system that we can then interpret and inspect. That might lead us to a much deeper understanding mechanistically of how human complex systems work in the way that outfolds. Allows us to better understand mechanistically how protein folding works. But you were going to say riffing on capitalism.


Ben (01:28:00):

I'm going to riff on that and I'll come back to capitalism. Are you most interested in human systems like markets and social stuff, or things like weather systems or other complex physical phenomena or essentially both because you think they will probably apply to both?


Kanjun (01:28:16):

More human systems. I think weather and other systems like that we can evaluate and measure using instruments. We can measure how good the weather is somewhere and then we can make better algorithms and collect more data. That doesn't require as much 'intelligence.' But what's interesting about human systems is that humans are full agents that need to be modeled. You need to model both the human agent and also somehow take what they're saying, communicating in language, and turn it into some something useful. That's just huge amounts of data. So you need something that's able to understand linguistically all of that data and maybe beyond linguistically like, "What is their body language, et cetera?" And then turn it into some useful behavior. I think for a system to be able to do that it needs to actually have a pretty good model of not just individual humans. but also groups of humans interacting with each other. And I think that kind of model is a really interesting model to inspect from the perspective of like, "How does a complex human system work? How does an institution or a culture work?" I can imagine deploying some AI chat bot within an institution. If it's actually learning from the people inside of it, then it will end up learning a lot of things about this institution. It would be really fascinating to inspect what is the fingerprint of this institution versus this other institution.


Ben (01:29:39):

Yeah. And because group behavior is different from the individual behavior, it is this uniquely or very interesting place to assess that.


Kanjun (01:29:48):

Exactly. Also you can think about democracy. Democracy is an algorithm that has really terrible inputs right now. It's just binary for every person. We use that terrible input because it's the highest resolution that we could reasonably aggregate from people so far. But AI systems, maybe that doesn't have to be true. It doesn't have to be the highest resolution.


Ben (01:30:11):

That's the best worst system we have or something. What is the quote? "Democracy's really bad. It's just better than anything else we have" or something like that.


Kanjun (01:30:21):

Right, right. Exactly.


Ben (01:30:23):

Okay. One final riff on the capitalism and then I'll ask you on your current projects and advice. If you go back to the seventeen hundreds and eighteen hundreds-- at least my reading of it, you had thinkers like Malthus who basically thought, “We could never really get rich as a large population.” And if you looked at the preceding thousand, 2000, 4,000, 10,000 years of human history, you would've broadly agreed with them which many people did that. There was seemingly these kind of limits whether they were physical limits and all of these others.


And then we essentially had the industrial revolution. You can talk about corporate labs, innovation, corporate forms, industrialization, energy, technology, innovation which seemed to break the Malthusian trap. And so we are at least in aggregate really wealthy in a way that the person in 1850 or 1800 or even 1900 would've been completely astonished by. This seems like magic. But on the other hand, I think they would be very surprised. In fact, my reading of what they were writing about at the time is they were very surprised that we cannot be splitting the pie better. So they would basically say, "There's no way we could have grown this pie this big." They would just be like, "That's incredible. What did you guys do? That's like magic."


But on the other hand is like, "How dumb could you be that you could grow this pie but you haven't-- You've got more than enough but there's no way that you can split it? Surely splitting it was the easier problem and growing it was the hard problem.” That's really interesting. You read the work and you go like, "Wow, they just thought the really difficult thing was growing the pie. They thought splitting the pie was just going to be really easy." Well, when you have it and you have all of these things like, "Oh, when we're really wealthy no one will work or they'll split it, all that." It seems to be the reverse is that-- and we see with AI will come. It looks like we are going to be rich in whatever form we are, at least in aggregate. But splitting the pie we have not got any closer really. I mean maybe at the edges, some ideas, welfare states, some insurance and all of that. But it's nowhere near what the thinking the 1850 thought we would get. But they had no belief that we would ever get this wealthy.


I find that's a really interesting dichotomy about how we got it wrong. So I think we probably got everything wrong in the future. But I always think this about capitalism is they didn't think they would be this rich, but they just didn't think we'd be this stupid in terms of splitting the pie. It's just incredible.


Kanjun (01:32:58):

I think this is a really big and important problem especially when it comes to AI being deployed. I want to kind of harken back to our points about death which is there was a study about how if you increase the estate tax to basically a hundred percent or even like 95%, then a lot of our incoming inequality problems would be solved. This is quite interesting. One hypothesis that they had is that basically accumulation effects are what result in the wealth gap, not necessarily what you're able to get in a single generation. Once you accumulate a lot of that wealth, get rich fund investment, it's a little bit harder to lose than it is to just get from scratch. And once your rate of increase gets much higher than someone could ever make in their day or lifetime, now you're just accumulating wealth at a much higher rate than anyone could even gain it when they start from zero. So yeah, I think this point of death or estate tax or-- Maybe hypothesis here would be something part of the reason why it's not actually about splitting the pie. It's about disrupting accumulation here. It's not a pie, it's actually...

Ben (01:34:24):

The pies that you continuously make because obviously the analogy falls down. But you're true in that.


Kanjun (01:34:29):

The pies that are always growing; self-growing pies.


Ben (01:34:34):

Great. Like, “We’ve invented self-growing pies, magic, but we haven't...” And so there is something on that because in the UK and Britain, the landowners have been rich for a very, very long time. Land is still basically the majority of Britain's wealth which is very weird. So for a thousand years they've been one of the richest people and that has not had the renewal, whereas actually most other long-dated families, technology or merchants or whatever have gone through and you see that. But actually the landowners have not because it's an accumulated wealth which you don't give up. Okay. So one last cheeky question and then finish. We had a slightly cheeky question from Twitter about how you can use your name as a verb. I have seen on your website that you can use it definitely kind of as a noun because you have kanjectures of which we talked about a couple. But do you also see yourself as a verb to action; so “kanjun” as well as have kanjectures?


Kanjun (01:35:36):

So this question's from Aram, one of my best friends who was my housemate for many years. The joke is that I love to steal people's food. People's food is much tastier when it's someone else's food than it's my food. So often I'll go out with friends, I won't order very much, and I'll just steal food from them. So Aram coined the term too can-june, which means to steal someone's food. However, there's another thing that I do which is whenever I talk to somebody-- and you didn't encounter it that much here although you would have if we had more time to riff. I kind of intensely question them about things; like trying to understand them. Like, "Why did you make these decisions? Why do you think this? What do you think about this?" So also too can-june means-- this is like my default state encountering anyone-- means to basically intensely question someone about their life and their thoughts. So it can mean either; take your pick.



Ben (01:36:44):

That's great. So actually that's two verbs and a noun. I will riff back to our earlier thing and posit that's because food from somebody else's plate has more meaning to you than food from your own.


Kanjun (01:37:00):

I love it. Yes.


Ben (01:37:02):

The calories are obviously the same. The value to it is more. I don't often do this. I'm open, you can ask me a question if you would like to ask me a question.


Kanjun (01:37:15):

Oh, I asked you some questions, but I have lots of questions about your relationship to art. I'm really curious how your reaction to-- The culture I'm in, in Silicon Valley, EA, and there's maybe a non-value of neural art. I'm really curious from your perspective as somebody who's a playwright and who clearly art is very important to. Why do you think that there's this disvaluing of art and what do you think are the things that are lost in a culture like this?


Ben (01:37:54):

So in my view, this stems quite clearly from a utilitarian led thinking which you can trace to both Peter Singer all the way back to John Bentham. And then you can also see it in the work of Derek Parfit who was viewed as one of the greatest living British-- actually global philosophers. He died a few years ago. But it was actually an encoder of his work, “Reasons and Persons.” So to put a long answer short is their shortcut for this is something which you'll know, but for listeners that you get round to expected utility theory or expected value. So this is a shortcut for trying to value something, particularly stocks or cost benefit or things with cash flows and things that you can count.


There are a lot of paradoxes which don't work for expected value. The classic one is Petersburg Paradox. But things like when you have a 51/49 bet. 51 you get a lot of value, but 49 you lose everything. Let's say you destroy the world or you double the value of the world and you play it for long enough and you're going to destroy the world. Strict expected value basically tells you to play this game. And that is because there's a lot of things which you can't put into an expected value calculation. Now, the so-called in my view, fudge for this in expected utility which can work for some things, is that you have this idea of utility which you then try to fudge the value to bring it closer back to humanness. But this is really hard for us to do. And actually mostly we fail to do it except in very simple cases.


Then even in complex cases where you can then take some idea of what humans might think, it's not clear that there's a consensus. So a classic one from healthcare economics is it's very expensive to save a preterm baby. It costs somewhere like half a million to a million dollars or more. Whereas you could spend that in saving the life of a diabetic which only costs maybe $20,000 or $30,000. In first order expected value you always save the diabetic. Then you kind of think about utilities, "Oh, maybe there's more life to something like the baby and the society" and you can try and fudge it. Or you can ask people and you find that the person in the street, the majority say, "No, we should save some babies." And so that's just one way of getting this kind of dispart which doesn't play into expected value.


But because expected value is such a core way of how their thinking has grown up, they can't do things which are hard to measure. Or to our point, things like art or creativity which is not only hard to measure, potentially impossible, but is also not time and variance. So moves across time, people, space, and culture. And because that doesn't fit into that framework-- and I guess some of them do get there if they think really hard about it or they do fudges or they might think of themselves as slightly pluralist. It really doesn't fit into that framework and therefore all of that falls down. Therefore when you had enough time to do expected value over malaria nets, you definitely can't do it over art. And then the second order effects which are just really hard to do about the power of art, you just can't put into your calculations. Yet they seem to be at really crucial tipping points for the world.


So two or three examples. Maybe it's emergent behavior talking about that. Greta, is that emergent behavior or not. But for instance, the white Texan lawyer for Martin Luther King Jr became a lawyer for minority rights because he listened to Louis Armstrong play jazz and he said, "I've heard genius in a black man. The only thing I know is that I need to fight for equality." He's on the record of saying that. That's the interesting formative power of art. You think of something like...


Kanjun (01:42:01):

Art is like a way to see the humanity in anyone else.

Ben (01:42:05):

Exactly that. And all of these important social progress points you had an artistic narrative which changed the system or made the system better. Some of that goes to our deepest myths. I call them myths because they're things that are true only because humans believe them to be true. Like money. The tree doesn't care about money. The dog doesn't care about money. The alien probably wouldn't care about money depending on whether we had to interact. Humans only care about money because we've made that. So that's one of our greatest myths. And essentially that's an act of creativity. In fact, that's kind of an act of art which is across that and humanity. Because that doesn't fit into expected value theory very well with some soft order pluralism, they can't get it so easily and therefore it fails by the wayside. But that's why you then get these critiques outside about how they don't understand the system. They do obviously understand the power story and art and things, but because you can't really weigh it up between individual stories, they tend not to really invest in it very much. So that's an answer to that. But I feel fairly certain that seems to be the roots of it. And when I speak to a lot of EAs that seems to be true. If you read their influential philosophy, that also seems to be true.


Kanjun (01:43:27):

Yeah, I think that's true. Peter Singer explicitly says funding the arts is not as good as saving lives in different countries. One thing that I think I've been puzzled by is this question of measurement. Michael and I think -- One of the things we talked a lot about is funders trying to measure research results and how that results in short-term incremental decisions. And I think measurement is actually-- It's something that I deal with a lot in my day-to-day life. I used to run a startup. Startups are all about measurement because it's all about short-term. But running a research lab, I can't measure anything. There's very little stuff that I can measure. So I've had to completely change my perspective on measurement.


So I think there's this really interesting point about utilitarianism. Startup founders can be utilitarian because actually they're not losing that much when they are super measurement oriented. But when you're doing research or you're in the arts or you're trying to do real long term change in world countries, then actually things are really hard to measure. The problem is that when I talk to an EA-- I would consider myself somewhat EA in terms of being interested in the philosophy but also finding some things quite problematic. But if I were to talk to an EA they would say something like, "Well, the issue is that your utility function just hasn't captured all of the things that you're missing." There was a time when I thought, "Yeah that seems true. We should be able to capture other things in the utility function." But now I'm at a point where I'm wondering, "Actually, that may not be true at all. Actually, some of these things may not be measurable. Maybe not for a very, very long time.” So actually using expected utility as a framework is just going to lead to the wrong actions. It's going to lead to non-optimal actions in the long term. So I think your point about art is super interesting. Old me would've said, "Okay, can you count art in the utility function?" The now me is like...


Ben (01:45:37):

And they believe you can. I think I'm arguing cannot. So what's the phrase? "Not everything that can be counted counts and then not everything that counts can be counted either." I have got quite a long podcast with a philosopher called Larry Temkin who has this critique on EA. It is for those listening, a little bit nerdy and it does go on for three hours. But his main point is that his work on moral philosophy and something called the transitivity or intransitivity problem shows that the axioms behind expected utility theory do not hold. They do not hold for moral choices. So they hold for maths; obviously three is bigger than two, two is bigger than one, three will always be bigger than one. And it holds for heights. So it holds for maths, it does not hold for social or moral reasoning.


He has a 500 page book to explain all of this, but you can get it as read. And when he first posited it a lot of people thought, "Hmm, that doesn't seem to be right because that's crazy." And now actually there's a majority of thinkers who actually think this is true. Therefore my point of view is if this is right and it seems like it is right. If one of the fundamental axioms cannot hold, then you have to use it with caution. Doesn't mean it can be a useful tool, it's obviously a useful tool. But to apply it to all moral reasoning you need to do with caution and it seems to be not potentially with a much caution. Early in the year Larry Temkin explains this in actually his book. It's very interesting reading about that if anyone wants to go back and listen to that.


Kanjun (01:47:24):

That's really interesting. I'll definitely listen to it.


Ben (01:47:27):

Yeah. I'll send you the link. Alright, so let's end on-- You could also feel free to ask me another question. But current projects that you are working on that you might want to mention. I think we have mentioned quite a lot of them. You could also offer any advice that you have either for startups; could be what you're looking for in startups, women founders or your own journey or something in AI. So yeah, current projects and any thoughts or advice you have.


Kanjun (01:47:58):

What would you like for me to give advice on? Advice is always very personal.


Ben (01:48:06):

Okay. So let's do advice on if you are thinking about working in AI or as a startup, what you should be looking to do? Because you already gave me really good [inaudible 01:48:17].


Kanjun (01:48:21):

Join Generally Intelligent.


Ben (01:48:23):

Yeah. Okay. So that's number one. You are hiring. If you're interested in that you should look them up on the website and you should go and join them. But maybe you are abroad so that might be tricky for you. So if you're not going to go and hire at Generally Intelligent, what's the next best thing?


Kanjun (01:48:41):

We also hire remote engineers.


Ben (01:48:45):

Other best thing. If you want to work on AGI, join Kanjun.


Kanjun (01:48:51):

That's right.


Ben (01:48:53):

So that's that.


Kanjun (01:48:55):

What else?


Ben (01:48:58):

Well, you can maybe look at current projects.


Kanjun (01:49:01):

My current projects?


Ben (01:49:02):

Or advice.


Kanjun (01:49:04):

Sure. Yeah. I guess I can briefly talk about current projects. So Generally Intelligent, we've already talked about-- Well, we are hiring and we're very interested in inspecting systems to get a deeper understanding of what's going on and using that to figure out can we get good guarantees around robustness, safety, et cetera, as capabilities increase. Other projects-- I guess if you're a startup founder I have a fund to investing folks called Outside Capital. We do a fair amount of AI investment or if you're interested in investing in a fund. What else?


Ben (01:49:49):

You want to talk about the Neighborhood at all?


Kanjun (01:49:52):

Maybe. It's not something I advertise too much. But the Neighborhood is a really fun project. The reason why we ended up doing it-- Jason Benn, my former housemate and coworker is the one driving most of it. I'm just helping him. We used to have this house called The Archive and it was a great house. I think it changed our lives in really important ways. Maybe this is the piece of advice I would give which is something like you really become the people around you. I really become the people around me. The like five people I spend the most time with. I think choosing those people very carefully is quite important. For me, I've chosen them in particular ways such that they are people I really look up to and would want to become more like because people tend to internalize the beliefs and the limitations of the people around them.


So I want people around me who are expanding my idea of what I can be capable of and not reducing it. So The Archive was a 25 person house that I co-ran for five years. One of the big things-- Michael actually made this comment that The Archive seems like a self-actualization machine. Like someone comes in and a year later they are just much more actualized. I think that was a really interesting thing that we did culturally accidentally just because of the people that we were. We were really trying to understand how do we become better versions of ourselves and discover what our potential could be. I think very seriously asking that question and having people around us asking those questions was really transformative. We shut down The Archive in the middle of Covid.


The Neighborhood is like a scaled up more sustainable for 30 somethings version of it where essentially we want something that is like a university campus for modern adult living where you can have your best friends around you and have this lively intellectual culture that we found at The Archive. And kind of live in an area in a city where you just run into people that you know and want to be around. So in the Neighborhood-- I live at the southern tip of it. I run into a lot of people which is really interesting and have spontaneous interactions in a way that in a normal city I wouldn't have.


Ben (01:52:26):

That's amazing. I really think that's an underrated thing. I wish in my twenties I was walking distance with my close friends and that. The only piece of advice listening to that is I would design it if it's at all possible-- and might not be-- to take you all the way to end of life. So when you're 60, 70, and you are 80 that would be great.


Kanjun (01:52:50):

That is the goal. We'll see what kind of institutions we need to build. In a lot of ways we're constructing a new type of institution, a new way of living. It's not really centralized. It's like a set of decentralized institutions. So we're planning schools and then eventually there will be like end of life type of things when you're growing older, when you want to leave a legacy, et cetera.


Ben (01:53:15):

Mini town within the town. Well, that's great. That advice sounds really great. So choose your friends carefully.


Kanjun (01:53:26):

Yes.


Ben (01:53:27):

And with that, Kanjun, thank you very much.


Kanjun (01:53:30):

Thank you. This is super fun.

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