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Peter Gray: Transforming education, play, self-directed learning, parenting | Podcast

November 1, 2024 Ben Yeoh

Peter Gray is a psychologist and author of Free to Learn. For many years, he has been studying play. He keeps a substack here. 

Gray discusses his perspective on the ideal education system, which he believes should be a bottom-up movement rather than a top-down imposition. He emphasizes the importance of self-directed education where children have the freedom to follow their curiosity and interests. Gray explains how traditional schooling stifles curiosity and playfulness, and traces the historical roots of the current education system. He also highlights the sociopolitical factors that have contributed to the decline of children's mental health, arguing against the popular notion that social media is the primary cause. Additionally, the conversation touches on the impact of economic inequality on parenting styles and child freedom. Gray shares his current projects, including initiatives aimed at encouraging more free play in schools and educating pediatricians on the importance of play, while offering practical advice for parents to support their children's independence and curiosity.

"If offered the opportunity to redesign the entire educational system as a top-down thing, me being the czar of education and telling everybody else what they should do, I would decline the offer...it really has to emerge from the bottom up."


"Education works best when the people being educated are in charge of it... Children are biologically designed to learn through exploration, through play."

"Our school system suppresses curiosity and playfulness...the two primary biological educative drives in children."


"Ask your child: 'What would you like to do that you haven’t done before that might be a little bit frightening but that you’d really like to try?' It’s how children build courage and how parents build trust."

Watch above or on YouTube, or listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods.

Transcript and contents below.


Contents

  • 00:19 Redesigning the Education System

  • 01:41 The Role of Curiosity and Play in Learning

  • 05:55 Historical Context of Traditional Schooling

  • 08:26 Children's Rights and Freedom Over Time

  • 12:11 Cultural Shifts and Parental Concerns

  • 15:28 Impact of Economic Inequality on Parenting

  • 18:53 Rise of Stranger Danger and Overprotectiveness

  • 28:14 Common Core and the Mental Health Crisis

  • 38:28 The Evolution of Reading and Technology

  • 41:17 Balancing Screen Time and Real Life

  • 43:12 Reflections on 'Free to Learn'

  • 45:07 Evolutionary Psychology and Its Impact

  • 50:28 Advice for a Fulfilling Retirement

  • 01:00:04 Creative Processes and Inspirations

  • 01:05:45 Current Projects and Parenting Advice

Transcript (This has been AI assisted so mistakes are possible)

Ben: Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to the psychologist Peter Gray. He is the author of Free to Learn and an inspiration to those interested in self directed education. Peter, welcome. 

Peter: I'm very happy to be here. 

Ben: If you could redesign the entire education system, what would it look like to you?

Peter: First of all, let me say that I would if offered the opportunity to redesign the entire educational system as a top down thing, me being the czar of education and telling everybody else what they should do, I would decline the offer. I think that, I think it has to be a bottom up movement.

No educational system is going to work. unless the families believe in it and want it. So I think that the way that the educational, I'll get to your question, to the intent of your question in a moment, but I think that the educational system, it really has to emerge from the bottom up.

My ideal would not be a single educational system. It would be the many opportunities for learning many different ways of learning, many different and where families would have options of what to do. Some families would homeschool, some families would get together with other families and create little parent co ops.

Some families would would opt for something different. But my own beliefs, of course, are that education works best. When the people being educated are in charge of it, that when the children, if we're talking about children, when children are making their own choices about what it is that they're doing and learning children are really biologically designed to learn through through exploration through play.

They're born highly curious. That curiosity leads them to want to understand the world around them. And they're born with this strong drive to play and play in many different ways and play is how children develop skills so that it's, if instead of the question, how would I design it for everybody?

What I would try to encourage everybody would be to create for their children or for the children that they would like to. draw into it opportunities for self directed education. This is what I've been involved in for a long time, where the children have many learning opportunities. There is all sorts of tools for learning available to them, where there are adults who can help them if they want help and whatever it is they're interested in, but where children are really free to follow to develop and follow their own interests.

That's really the education That I that I believe. I think that the first, that the years of life that we call sort of the school years, especially the early school years, up onto maybe the mid, up as far as maybe the mid teenage years, are really times for exploration, for discovery, figuring out who you are, what you like to do.

And what kind of life you would like to have once you're an adult we're not giving children an opportunity to do that now because we keep them busy all the time. We keep them busy with school work, which is mostly irrelevant to them and with with extracurricular activities outside of school. We don't give them much chance to really, I even asked the question, who am I and what do I like to do?

Though that's what children really need much more opportunity for. 

Ben: And why do you think traditional schooling, let's call it that, stifles curiosity and motivation so much? Is it simply because we've set them this curriculum and we fill it with all You know, our ideas, which might not be their ideas, or is there some particularly strong lines of evidence that you think that why traditional schooling seems to stifle so many children in terms of this curiosity, motivation, and those kind of things?

Peter: Yes both of those are correct. The, first of all, why does it stifle? Of course it does. You can't curiosity. is disruptive in the typical school. You can't have, the child who wants to explore things is disruptive in the classroom. You can't have, you can't have 30 kids in the classroom.

You can't even have 10 in the classroom. And expect them all to be interested in the same thing at the same time. They're all curious about the same thing. Curiosity doesn't work that way. You've got to, if you're going to have a, have an educational system in which you, in which children can explore based on their curiosity, you have to expect everybody to be doing different things.

You can't expect, you can't have order in the classroom, where everybody's sitting in seats and everybody's doing, and you also can't have certain, Expectations that everybody's going to learn the same things at the same time that just can't happen. And of course, curiosity is destroyed. So is playfulness.

Because if you're playful, that's that gets you into trouble in school. That's just so so our school system. So the two primary biological educative drives in children are curiosity and playfulness. This is nature's way of educating children and schools just have to shut them off. You can't run a school in our traditional way.

It has to be an entirely different concept of a school. But a somewhat, more historical answer to this is the original purpose of schools was precisely to shut off curiosity and play. The school, the schools that we have today, the western type schools that we have today, which are now all over the world, really started in the 17th century, even somewhat before in response to the Protestant Reformation, where the belief was that we need to educate children so they can read the Bible and so they will be obedient.

And so the schools were designed primarily in Prussia the German state of Prussia, to educate them. to suppress children's spontaneous ways of learning, deliberately to suppress that, that it was believed at that time that children were born sinful, and that things that they did themselves would be sinful and harmful, and that the primary thing that children needed to learn is to is to be obedient to authority.

And so schools develop deliberately to suppress children's own endeavors and get them to obey to authority, to the school master, as they were called at that time. And so a school system developed that for that purpose and we've still got that same school system. Nobody that I know who goes into teaching says, I'm going into teaching so I can suppress curiosity and so that I can inhibit playfulness and so I can indoctrinate children.

Nobody says that. But. Every teacher who goes into the traditional school system is going into a system that was designed for that purpose. And no matter what the teachers say they're doing or want to do, they are suppressing curiosity and they are indoctrinating. They may not be indoctrinating them in the Bible anymore, but they're indoctrinating them in whatever the curriculum is.

Because it the school system is not designed for questioning, for critical thought, for for people having really different ideas. It's designed for uniformity and it's designed for learning a particular curriculum, whatever that curriculum is. 

Ben: And do you think children have more rights today than or fewer rights, if you trace it back, historically children were allowed to work.

Then they were looking too long hours. We decided, Oh, that might not be such a great thing. But then rather than giving them more time to play we put them in an education system. And then there seems to be over history, talk about 50, a hundred years a kind of. tension between giving children more rights and more say in what they do and less rights or less ability to move around and go out and play or take their own transport and things.

How do you think that's evolved? What do you think we should be doing about it? And do you think children have more or less rights and should we be giving them more understanding of that? 

Peter: That's a really good question. So there's some ways. And there's some ways in which children right now have more rights than they have in at least in Western history, in modern Western history, they have more rights in the home to talk back to their parents to eat what they choose to eat rather than what their parents tell them they have to eat, to dress the way they want to dress.

We're even talking about the rights of children to change their gender if they want to do that, right? These are rights that were not present when I was a child as much as they are today. Certainly not present 150 years ago as much as they are today. On the other hand children in the past certainly when I was a child and before that weren't watched all the time.

We had certain kind of restrictions in the home, but we spent a lot of time outside of the home with other kids, playing, exploring, doing things that kids have always done. And there, children were free. And now we're not allowing that nearly as much as in the past. That's been largely cut off. Children are not free, at least in the United States, to just go out and play on their own and with other children, without adults there guarding them, protecting them, telling what to do, and so on and so forth.

So in that respect, children have far fewer rights. They have, as one author who's looked at the history of this put up, children have more personal rights in the home than they did before, but far less freedom outside of the home than they ever have had before. It's also the case that the school system over time, certainly since the years when I was in school many decades ago, has become far more time consuming.

And far more restrictive of what you can do within the school than it used to be. So school has become less free than it used to be. We used to have much more time for recess. We used to have a long lunch hour. We had shorter school days. And in elementary school, we didn't have homework. So when I was a kid, school was not as oppressive.

It was not as big a deal in children's lives as it is today. So that's the in the long run, in the very long run of human history. We were probably freest, children were probably freest when, back when we were hunter gatherers. The studies that have been done of hunter gatherer cultures that have survived into the 20th century at least, and studied in the 20th century children have amazing amount of freedom compared to children in any modern day society other than the hunter gatherer culture.

Ben: Yeah, I recall when I was 12, I took my first solo plane trip and now I think about it and speak to people are amazed that a 12 year old would take a solo plane trip and it wasn't a big deal. And I think there must be multiple causes of this decline of play or the the freedom or the agency that we give children.

What do you think are the major ones around it? Do you think it's just a cultural shift, the sort of media narrative and these institutions and structures? And if it is that, is it something which is going to be really difficult to reverse? 

Peter: Yeah, I think it is going to be difficult to reverse. First of all, regarding your solo plane trip, I, my son His first solo plane trip.

He, when he was 12 years old, he told his mother and me that he wanted to go to to, to England. He had been playing Dungeons and Dragons and he was really interested in castles and Neither his mother or I at that point had ever been overseas. He knew we were sticking the mud so we weren't going to go.

And so he planned, this was before the internet, this was in 1980 he planned his own trip he, and he announced to us that, and he said that he was going to go and he said, don't worry about the money. I'll earn the money, which he did. He was working, he worked in a restaurant first washing dishes, and then they put him on the line ticket.

At 12 years old and he earned his own money for this trip. He figured the whole trip out by himself at 12 years old. I believe he was 13 by the time he left. He claims he was 12. We've had a discussion about it, but I would have to look up the actual dates. But I think he had, I think he had barely turned 13 at the time.

I think he left after May 25th, which would have been his birthday. So that so that was, now that, at that time even then, that raised some eyebrows. But it wasn't, People wouldn't have regarded his mother and me as negligent. They wouldn't have put us in jail for allowing that to happen, right?

Today, they might. The airline probably wouldn't have allowed him on, unless there were guarantees he was going to be met. And on top of this, he was a child who's, Type 1 diabetes. So he, it needs to monitor his own insulin and all of this kind of stuff. No, I wouldn't do that today. Not because I wouldn't trust the child to do it, but because it would be so against the cultural grain.

So even since 1980, there has been a huge change in the way the culture looks at this kind of thing. So I think that the change in the culture has come from a variety of causes. It is interesting that In the United States, the biggest shift occurred in the 1980s. Some of this was building up gradually before, but the biggest shift in thinking about this occurred in the decade between 1980 and 1990.

And there are several things that happened in the United States that I think all contributed to this. One of them was was the election of Ronald Reagan as president and the and and a legislature that was with Reagan. And what happened beginning in the 1980s is that the economy changed dramatically in the United States.

Such that the gap between the rich and poor increased and has been increasing ever since. There's a lot of research that shows that when the gap between rich and poor is great, when you lose the kind of of safety net that occurs when government provides supports for people who are poor.

When you lose the safety of labor unions, which were more or less destroyed during the Reagan era, and when you begin to greatly decrease the taxes on the wealthy, and therefore have to cut back on safety measures for the poor. Suddenly now, parents become far more concerned about whether their children are going to make it financially or not.

Back when I was a kid, parents weren't that worried about that. I grew up in a working class family, and neither of my parents at that time had gone to college. My uncles, with one exception, were not college educated. They all had. decent jobs. They all could support a family. They could own a home.

They could even own a little cottage out in the country, and without, and it, and the ed, that this educational achievement was far less of a big deal. Then with these changes, people began to worry. And we also began, there were also other changes that occurred that, For a variety of reasons, some of those working class jobs went away.

People began to think that the way that I can make sure. that my child, or at least increase the chances that my child will succeed as an adult, is to make sure that my child is well educated, that they do all the right things in order to prepare themselves in what suddenly now is seen as a very competitive world.

We didn't see it as so competitive, and so there's actually research that shows cross culturally That in countries where the gap between rich and poor is great, parents are far more controlling of their children, far more concerned that they do the quote right thing educationally, far less likely to simply let them have leisure time and explore and all of these kinds of things.

than in countries where the gap between rich and poor is less. So for example, in the Scandinavian countries, Finland, for example, the, there the gap between rich and poor is far less than in the United States. And children are afforded much more individual freedom there than they are in the United States.

There's actually graphs showing that if you plot on one axis, the degree of economic inequality. And on another axis, parents attitudes about parenting and put it on a kind of controlling versus permissive spectrum, as you go out towards more and more economic inequality, you go towards more and more controlling, less and less permissiveness.

So I think that was part of it. In addition to that. In 1979 and then again in 1981, there were very much publicized cases of a young boy being kidnapped, in one case murdered, in the other case lost, never recovered. In both cases, if I remember correctly, there were six year old boys apparently snatched away by a stranger.

And suddenly we now had warnings about stranger danger. People were, you would hear in the United States in the 1980s, public service announcements, do you know where your child is now? And so the concern about watching your child all the time, because they might be snatched away. Now this is, was then an extraordinarily rare crime.

That's why it was so newsworthy. It's still extraordinarily rare. It almost never happens. But people began to become afraid of that. And that became a reason not to let your child out of sight. And that reason has even grown over time even for this irrational reason that, there's this tiny little probability, little chance that your child might be snatched away by a stranger.

It almost never occurs. But people think it occurs frequently because of the way it's publicized. So that, that, that played a role. And then there's one other thing that happened in the 1980s, also at the direction of Ronald Reagan, which was the a book that a federal analysis of our school system, which concluded, in fact, this was a foregone conclusion based on who was chosen to work on this study and write this book, that our school system has become too lax we are not keeping up with other countries, particularly not keeping up with the Southeast Asian countries educationally, and we're going to fall behind.

And so this book was published and that became then that initiated a new way of thinking what then was regarded as a reformation in schools, which was the opposite of the kind of reformation I would be wanting. More and more classes, more and more testing, less and less freedom of teachers to do what they wanted.

And then that ultimately became incorporated into the No Child Left Behind Act and then Common Core. Which greatly restricted what teachers could do in the classroom. So school became ever more rigid, ever more controlled by top down by a curriculum. So all of those kinds of changes, I think, are, have led to the system that is leading children to suffer so much today.


Ben: I hadn't put together the politics of it or the emphasis that Reagan had on, the individual and the ability or opportunity for jobs and that type of thing, as well as say, the stranger danger and articles on school. It's interesting because for instance, in Finland, you don't go to school until five or seven, even it would be, you could easily just go and no one would blink and in some cultures like in japan They make a big deal of the first time you could go to the shops yourself, which you might do at three four Three or four or something like that and have this you know that from the cross cultural and in the uk we had a big splash again with a missing child Maddie, I believe a daughter, which again became very salient, but to your point, the statistics of it are extremely rare, much more likely for all sorts of other incidents than that.

But I guess that brings us to the point today that parents fear that they will be bad parents, or, even there might be some legal act against them if they take their children out of school, if they feel that the school's not working for them and that type of Atmosphere or even within school just to try and give children perhaps more agency Around how they would live their lives even within the school system What would you say to parents who feel that they might be bad parents or what we can do?

Around letting children have a bit more agency in play 

Peter: Yes yeah, you make a good point that, so it has now become a moral imperative that you and in some degree legal imperative, not actually written in law, but treated as if it were written in law, about always minding your child, always watching your child the One of the things that's happened is that social child protective services in most states have a requirement that if somebody calls the police or calls the hotline and says there's a child out there not being watched by an adult, that they have to investigate.

And so a lot of parents who allow their child out in the way that. All parents would have and, decades ago have had this experience of social services showing, social protected, child protective services showing up at their home. If you're white and middle class or above, you will fight it in court and almost die.

essentially always win or win even before it have to go to court. But if you are black and poor, the statistics are there's a pretty good chance that they would take your child away. So people have become vigilant for that reason, even over their children, even if they know that it would be good for their child to go out and do these things on their own.

It would be developmentally appropriate. It would be valuable. The child would enjoy the child would grow from it. So people are afraid for that reason. And then in addition to that, it has really become it has become such a norm and it's been present for so long that people begin to feel that if you're not watching your child all the time, and if you're not there to teach your child and direct your child, that you're not a good parent, you're a bad parent.

And of course nobody wants to be a bad parent and even people who intellectually understand this, it would be perfectly safe for my eight year old, nine year old child to go play in the park by themselves without me. And they're perfectly responsible, they could do that. Even they, And even if they're not so concerned that some neighbor is going to call, but most people are concerned about that.

But even despite that, they might not do it because there's something in their head that says everybody around me says this would make me a bad parent. Maybe it would make me a bad parent. You don't necessarily think it through that way. But we automatically believe if we're not doing what other people do, Is there something wrong with us?

Is there something, we're all creatures of norms. That's part of being a human being. And if we're not behaving like other people are behaving, we begin, not only are we worried that other people are going to question us and criticize us, but we begin to question ourselves and criticize ourselves about that.

So absolutely. What can we do? I try to whenever I speak to parents and when I write articles and books to him towards parents, I really try to talk about all the what are the myths here and what are the things you can do? And given the constraints, what can you do in our society today?

Without that would give your child more freedom, more opportunity to play more control over their own lives, more more possibility that they can grow up with a growing sense of independence and responsibility and therefore become competent, mentally healthy adults. So the and there are things parents can do.

Ben: So you touched on mental health. And there's a lot of concern, in the media about mental health in children, although some of that might be due to more awareness and diagnosis and the like, and some of it might be a trend. I think you've argued for this connection between the decline in free play and the rise in things like anxiety and depression amongst young people.

We've had others more recently, hate who's made a lot of a kind of social media hypothesis, although there's been some pushback from that and some articles in nature. And I think you've been a little bit skeptical about whether the evidence is around that. I guess there's also a complication as maybe if you're if you have too much screen time, you're not out playing in the park, then again screen time might be one of the times when you are able now to get together with your like minded peers and hang out because you're not allowed to hang out elsewhere.

So you might as well hang out digitally. I've seen great adventures in things like Minecraft worlds or chat groups and things like that. So I'd be interested in your view as to whether there is, how strong the phenomena are. of concern about mental health in children is and perhaps the weighting that you would put on a decline in play arguments for it versus say social media hypothesis and the like.

Peter: I think it is primarily the decline in play, the increased toxicity of school, the way we do school and and and the decline generally of opportunities for children to do things independently. It's not just play. Play, I define as an independent activity. If it's controlled by adults, it's not play.

But other independent things, like just traveling around the neighborhood by yourself, getting places by yourself, doing what you did at age 12 and what my son did at age 12 or 13. Those kinds of things. Yeah. We don't even allow kids to go, downtown by themselves at age 12 anymore, in this country.

So that's, so all of that is, of course, that is going to make kids, that's going to stunt children's mental development. Now, in terms of the, in my mind, the best measure of the decline of the, of the decline of mental health is probably suicide rate, even though that's just the tip of the iceberg of suffering.

because it's a solid number that the way that you measure anxiety and depression, you're right, could possibly be changed in terms of people's willingness to report it, to admit it and so on and so forth. But the suicide rate is by 1990 was already about five times what it was in the 1950s for teenagers.

and it peaked in the 1990s. There's actually, let me spend a couple minutes on this because it, this also gets to the difference between what Jonathan Haidt believes and what I believe about this. Between 1950 and 1990, you had an upward slope of suicide rates. To the degree that we can, we have data on Based on assessments of anxiety and depression, those also were upper sloping.

Reached a peak, interestingly, in 1990. That was the peak. That peak was as high as it is today. We're not higher today than we were in 1990 on any measure of mental problems among young people. Fight ignores that totally. So that was all before the internet. That was all before most families had computers in their homes.

We had all, we had already been changing the nature of schooling. We had already been depriving children of free play and a lot of the freedoms that they had before by 1990. Then. What's interesting, and I only began talking about this recently, I tended to ignore it as everybody else did, things got better for a while.

Between 1990 and 2000, suicide rate went down. So did depression and anxiety, to the degree that we have reasonable measures of those things, went down. Not to 1950s levels, but went down by about a third of the way down. Then leveled off between 2000 and 2010. Now, why did they go down? The only answer I can come up with is they went down because of the internet.

It went down because we had by 1990, we had pretty much prevented kids from interacting with one another, playing, exploring, but now they had a new way to do it. They had a new way of doing it. They had they figured out how to use these computers before most adults did. Once that but by the time by the mid 1950s, by the mid 1990s, most families with teenagers had computers with an Internet connection.

They were playing games with one another. They were playing multiplayer video games. They were communicating with one another. They had also some kind of expertise that many adults didn't have. You would go into department stores in the mid 1990s to the computer section, and there would be a teenager there explaining how these machines worked.

So suddenly, kids found a new way to communicate. They gained a new kind of status in a sense, because they had figured this stuff out and I think that's why it went down. It didn't go back because this didn't, this was not as good as what kids had before back in the 1950s, when you could just go out and play and explore and do all these interesting things outdoors as well.

But this was better than what you had in the 1990s. Then So then the question is, why did it start going back up again? Beginning around 2010, it started going back up again, and we're now back at 1990s levels on all of this. We're not above it, but we're back at 1990s levels. We've still got the internet.

We've still got video games. What happened to bring it back up? And it's not that suddenly we're allowing children more freedom. I, my explanation for it, and I've written some blog posts about this. I'm currently writing a book that deals with this. But the, my explanation, Is common core.

This is when this increase, by the way, despite what height says in the book, did not occur worldwide , this increase in it did not occur throughout Europe. It just did not occur. I've looked at the data, it didn't occur there, . The suicide rate has been flat there. It was flat in Canada, it was flat in the whole EU suicide rates.

And as. probably the most reliable measure, did not increase among teens between 2010 And and 2020, which is usually the decade that Haidt is looking at so why did it increase in the United States and not those other places? Those other places, they have the internet, they have social media, they're not deprived of these things.

They're on it as much as our kids are, but they're not suffering in the same rate. Why not? It's because the suffering is not because of being on the internet. It's because the suffering is because we've done too much. What we've done with our schools, their schools changed dramatically with the onset of Common Core in the United States.

There's no question about that. Every study that's been done in which teenagers themselves are asked about what is it is the source of your anxiety and depression. Every study shows that the answer they give you far and away more than any other answer is school. And beginning after 2010, beginning with Common Core, really beginning around 2013 when most states had Common Core, that answer became even more common than it was before.

So just to give you an example of the American Psychological Association did a study in 2013 called Stress in America. They do this study every year with adults, but every once in a while they include teenagers. 2013, they included teenagers. They found that teenagers, by their measure, were the most stressed out people in the country.

And when they asked what the source of stress was, 83 percent cited school. Nothing else came close. You could list more than one thing, but nothing else came close. The same study that was done four years earlier, when they asked teens that question, it was something like 50 percent said it was school. So it jumps from 50 percent to 83 percent saying school is what's stressing me out.

I think that, and that, that was the time, and there were also by, at that time, by 2013, there were many more kids who said they were feeling stressed, they were feeling anxious, and so on, that was true. So Hyatt and some others show this curve, they don't show the fact that things were going down before that, or that we were just as high before, they show this curve and they say what else could it be?

This is when cell phones came into being. And my answer is something else happened at that same time. And that's this dramatic change in school. 

Ben: That's fascinating. I haven't heard that as well articulated and I look forward to reading your book on it. I wonder if there's any data then on depression rates or suicide rates in those who are at self directed places or homeschool, unschooled.

Because there's probably a large enough sample in the U. S. now. Of that, maybe even in the UK, because there's a reasonable home education part, and maybe that would provide some evidence for you. It also leads me to think that means that you're probably less worried than, say, the media would suggest on how children are using screen time.

And would you basically say that, that you could just let them be? And is that from any age, or is maybe nine or ten a little bit too young to have unrestricted screen time? Again, just let children be let them have agency. They can maybe suffer the consequences of a sleepless night. Maybe they'll learn from that.

Are you generally less worried about screen time or is there still an opportunity cost for these other kinds of play, which would be maybe similar to what hunter gatherers or others do have more outdoor play and or does it matter less as long as it's an independent child chosen activity, 

Peter: So I think one thing, if we want kids to be on screens more, we have to let them be outdoors more.

We have to allow them other options. And what that means is not putting them into adult directed sports. That's not play, that's just more like school. That means really allowing them to be kids, allowing them. So in self directed learning centers, kids are allowed to be on screens as much as they want.

And they are on screens a fair amount. Why wouldn't they be? It's the biggest tool we have today. It's a bit, it's a major educational tool but they're also outdoors a lot. They're also playing outdoors. They're doing a lot of things because they can. They've got a big menu and most of them are taking use of it.

Now, there's always been some kids, even when I was a kid in the 1950s, there's some kids, we call them nerds, right? They're indoor people. Back in my day, they spent all their time reading. Why would they read? Why would they want to read instead of go out fishing with me? I couldn't figure that out.

There's still some people given a choice. They want to be on the computer all the time, so that's the but so there's their individual differences. And we've now had this round long enough to know that those who are on the computer all the time, they can learn all. They go on to find lives, they go on to a whole variety of lives.

Many of them become computer technicians or computer specialists of one sort or video game designers, but they don't all do. Some of them go on to become anything they want to be. They develop skills, they build competence. The computer, these computer games are extraordinarily complex and difficult.

They're, they build your intelligence in ways that you can apply in all sorts of ways. So I'm not that worried about it. I do think, here's what I do think, especially for young children. So back when I was a kid in the 1950s, concerning going outdoors, doing things outdoors, parents understood that there are dangers.

And they taught us about the dangers. They taught us safety rules look both ways before you cross the street. If if somebody stops in a car and offers you candy to get into the car, go away. If they try to pull you in, scream at the top of your voice. We were all, Spirits weren't naive, they were, they knew there were some dangers out there.

The risks were pretty small about the stranger thing, but the risk was there and they taught us what to do. There was also general advice, generally speaking, especially if you're going to be out late at night, be with a friend, don't go by yourself, there's safety in numbers. There were these kinds of things taught to us.

I think. We also need to teach young people about safety on the internet. There are dangers on the internet, including the danger of just getting sucked into it and spending too much time, wasting your time more than even you would really want to do. So instructions in time management, how to control your time.

I also think it's appropriate to have certain rules about, I wouldn't take, I think it would be terrible idea to take away the cell phone. It's the most powerful tool we've got, educational tool. It's also a safety tool. If you, if something happens to you, you've got that in your pocket, you can call your parents or you can call 911.

Why take that away? But, There are safety things about it, don't, just like you don't, if somebody offers you candy to get into the car, if somebody meets you on the internet and wants to meet you and you don't know them, don't do it. These are common sensing. Most kids beyond the age of about 13 understand this or about the age of 15 understand more so today than in the past.

They're pretty savvy about this kind of stuff, but there may be some who aren't. Yeah. There are also times in places where none of us adults as well as children should Should allow ourselves to get on our screens like at the dinner table. Let's all put our computers away So let's all put our cell phones away so we can be with one another at dinner don't I think it's good advice to anybody who's tempted to keep their phone on at night to just not take it into the bedroom, keep it outside of the bedroom because it might keep you awake.

You might not, you might hear it pop. You might hear a little ding and be an irresistibly wanna answer it. It's going to keep you up at night. Don't do that. So keep it out of the bedroom. Yeah. If you are involved, if you're going to a place where you're having a meeting with other people, like you or I would be very rude right now if we picked up our cell phone and started checking our email or our social media contacts.

What a rude thing to do. So don't take it to meetings where you're talking, where you're supposed to be there talking to other people. I think it's perfectly appropriate in school settings where you're going to have a discussion about something and you're all supposed to be present to say, park your I also think summer camps would be quite legitimate to say this is a camping experience where we are learning about being present in physically with one another and being outdoors.

And the smartphone is a distraction from that. So no smartphones during camping period. I think those are all legitimate things to do. To do but taking a smartphone away from a child of any age is taking away the most valuable Tool we have in our modern society. 

Ben: Yeah, that makes a lot of sense give them rules and principles you know the advice that you'd want to give anyone including ourselves but don't take away don't take away the actual tool.

Your book free to learn I think it's over a decade old. I was wondering in those years or even from looking all the way back. Do you still feel the core ideas are as important now as ever? I get this feeling as yes. And has anything changed over that time when you would put more emphasis on something now than you would have done previously?

Have you changed your mind about anything? 

Peter: I haven't changed my mind about any of it. The, As I've explained, if anything, the school system has become worse than what I was describing there, and I might have, if I were to do a revision of the book, I might put more emphasis on the harm of of schooling as we do it now, and especially of, especially since Common Core.

Common Core was just beginning to come into effect at that time, and so I didn't really have that data. But on all the other things things have gotten worse. I would have also, however, which I didn't do in that book, talked about the, I did in that book say that, people who are worried about about the internet and online activity, I did say this has been, if anything, the saving grace rather than the cause of the problem.

I would even emphasize that now more than I did that now that I have really looked at the data showing. That things improved, meant improved for kids during this, that decade between the time that we had, we began that most kids now had online access and the time when common core took effect, we had actually improvement in children's mental health.

I didn't talk about that at all in free to learn. That'll be a big topic in my next book. One of a number of big topics in my next book. 

Ben: Yeah, I think we're all very quick to jump on risks, but not so much on the opportunities, which are more slow moving. I guess in terms of your writing as well, you wrote one of the first psychology textbooks.

I looked up, I think the first edition was maybe around 1991 and you introduced concepts of, evolutionary or evolutionary psychology of the time. And I was just thinking about the influence that had on also your work on hunter gatherer societies and learning. And I think you're still updating or maybe that textbook is being updated, but I was wondering over that period of time, what do you think has changed in core psychology ideas?

And I don't know, why were we so late to thinking about evolutionary psychology? And do you think it's still influential in our thinking today? 

Peter: That's a good question. So at the time, so when I was, it would have really been in the 1980s that I was writing the first edition of the textbook.

And you're right, I think it probably came out in 1991. I subsequently revised it for six more editions over many years. And then the book was taken over by somebody else to revise who did two more editions of it. So it's currently in its eighth edition. It's been around for a long time. But at the time that I was writing it the idea of bringing an evolutionary approach to psychology, there was a lot of stigma about that idea.

There were a lot of negativity about it. I think that Nazi Germany put in everybody's minds a bad taste. about thinking about human beings from a genetic biological perspective, because in some sense that was the essential rationale of Nazism. And it was also an argument. It was an argument. There were arguments at that time based on kind of pseudo evolutionary thinking, pseudo biological thinking about racial superiority of whites over blacks, about the superiority of males over females.

There was a kind of There was a kind of general and some of the books from an evolutionary perspective at that time fed into that belief. So the kind of belief that distinctions between men and women, for example, are biologically ingrained and men are going to be dominant and women are meant to be mothers and domestic.

These kinds of. Things graded quite understandably on people. And so it gave the whole idea of looking at human behavior, talking about it in terms of evolved tendencies, gave it a bad name. And feminism was coming into its core, and the feminists at that time were adamantly opposed to biological theories about human beings, at least some of them were.

I had the advantage, and I think this was very clever on the part of the publishing company, of assigning an editor to me, who was not only a very experienced editor, but also was an ardent feminist. And I had to, in order to, in order I made it a goal. Anything that go, went into the book I had the right.

They were very clear. I could put whatever I wanted in the book. The editor was there really for, to help me. And I took that quite literally. I said to myself, if I can't, convince Phyllis, my editor, that this is real science, that this is legitimate, that this is, and that this is not something that's harming women then it's okay to go in.

And I think the book came out far better because I took that on. I didn't want to make the mistake of presenting Things that were biases that were came from a particular way of thinking. So this was also a time when really the evolutionary approach was just beginning. And so my textbook, my introductory psychology textbook was the first introductory psychology book really to bring an evolutionary perspective to bear in a real way.

Into the book and run it all the way through the book. I think it helped change psychology I think a lot of people who then became professors of psychology had learned about psychology as freshmen in with my book And I think it played a role not necessarily the major role, but it played a role in the evolution of psychology as a science to be more accepting of an evolutionary perspective about human behavior 

Ben: That's brilliant.

And it helped you retire or semi retire in your in your fifties. I say semi retire because you went on to do tons of other stuff as as well. I'd be interested perhaps a couple of things is for those who might be thinking about retirement, you seem to really enjoyed it and you've been doing lots of things.

What advice do you or thoughts do you have about retirement? People using their leisure time. I think you put a survey out also on your sub stack. I very much recommend listeners to check out the sub stack. But yeah what do you think people should be doing with their leisure time? And should we be looking to retire earlier?

Perhaps not all of us have got royalties from a textbook to rely on. But this thinking about how you've enjoyed retirement and what to do with our time. 

Peter: Yes. For me, it was a very wise decision. I, I did it for several reasons. I was far from typical retirement age. Professors tend to stay on forever.

Sometimes the administration wants to get rid of them and it's hard to get rid of them when you've got tenure, but some I was far from retirement age from typical retirement age, but I had already been teaching for 30 years. I had been chair of the department for a small portion of that time.

I was often involved in administrative responsibilities and I was And as much as I enjoyed some aspects of teaching, there were, as you might guess from my book, Free to Learn, there were other aspects of teaching and grading and so on that I was beginning to not enjoy and not really believe in any longer.

And I, and I certainly wasn't interested in becoming a dean or working on more administrative ways at the university. And I did, because the book made enough money I was set enough for retirement. I didn't have to worry about giving, maintaining that salary. And also, frankly, the university changed a little bit.

The the, I think people, I think that the spirit of kind of collegialism changed and this was not just at Boston College. This was everywhere. The, it became more driven by, universities wanted everybody to get grants and to get grants, you needed to publish a certain amount of research and people began to publish research just for the sake of publishing research to get grants.

And no longer were people spending, one of the great, leisure things about being a professor is just, like having long lunches with your colleagues and talking about ideas and people weren't doing that anymore. Here's the downside of the computer. They were eating their lunch in front of their computer, right?

Catching up on their email, maybe communicating with their colleagues on the other side of the world, whether rather than their colleagues down the hall. And so there was less of a kind of collegial environment that I had always enjoyed at Boston College. So that was another reason. And then finally, this is a personal thing, but my first wife died around that time.

And I began to realize life doesn't go on forever. And I really want to be sure that I'm spending every day doing what I most want to do and not wasting time doing things that I think are not. near the top of my list of what I want to do. And among other things I wanted to start writing for the general public I wanted to do.

And the research I had in mind doing didn't require that I be in an institutional setting. Although I could have continued to do it at Boston college if I needed to do it in an institutional setting. So all of that played into it. And And it was a great decision for me. What I can say, and I've told people repeatedly every day I wake up and say, whatever I do today, it's because I want to do it.

There's nothing that I have to do except like maybe wash yesterday's dishes. But the but in terms of the great bulk of my time, it's, it is in a certain definition play because it's my choice to do it. Or not to do it. I have, as a consequence, been able to do much more research much more writing than I could when I was when I was a full time, full professor at Boston College.

And I also have time for creating a great garden, for bicycling. I'm big into bicycling, kayaking, cross country skiing. I'm 80 years old and I think that the fact that I retired when I was in my 50s, which gave me time to, For leisure time and X and doing things outdoors that I enjoy doing. And I think it's been great for my health.

So it was a great decision for me. Now. I can't tell other people that it would be a great decision for them. But I can say if you're thinking of it and if you, if there are things you would like to do that, you don't have time to do it. And if you can afford to retire. Retiring early, I think, is a great idea.

That sounds excellent. There are some people who retire and they don't know what to do. 

Ben: You picked up on your own thing in your life. I I followed someone called Bernie DeKoven, who was someone who was all into, I guess we call it adult play, but it isn't. Like that, it's what, what you allude to, it's about independence, it's about agency, it's about fun, it's not about competitiveness, play, which you might think about, but all this playfulness and that comes into a lot of, I think, creativity and artwork.

I was thinking then if you had anything you would have said to perhaps your younger self, I don't know, your 16 year old self or your 21 year old self, or maybe speaking to a 16 year old today with all of this life experience that you have is there anything you would have particularly Advised your younger self.

It sounds like you know retire as early as you can sounds like a good piece of advice Or make sure like you say make sure every day you're trying to do things that you really want to do is there anything you would have thought 

Peter: you know, that's a really good question. I think that it's hard when somebody is fairly happy with their life which I am, it's hard to say that I would have changed something when I was younger, because if I had changed something when I was younger, I might not be who I am now.

So it's a little hard to say that. It's a little hard to say that for sure. I do think that, I do think that I do think that, like many people, throughout my younger years, I was too concerned about other people's judgments. And I think I restrained myself in a lot of ways. I think I'm not the only person who does that by any means.

We're all that way. I tend to be a little bit more that way than many other people. And I think that It was maybe too important to me that people like me all the time. And I think that was constraining on my life. I think I've gradually somewhat overcome that with time. But I think that, I think what I would say to young people today, but it's a different world today than the one I grew up in, is that is don't worry so much.

About school . Don't worry so much about that, because now I've been studying the, I've been studying now people who don't go to school who are self involved in self-directed education, either as homeschoolers following the following, the method of unschooling where they're pursuing their own interests or going to a school.

Like the school, my son went to Bury Valley. where you can follow your, and I see they're doing very well in life and they're discovering their passions. They're going into things that they enjoy. I think if I had opportunities like that, it might have, I might've gotten into what I ultimately got into quicker.

I went through a conventional school. I went to graduate school not really knowing what I wanted to do. I went to graduate school primarily as an alternative to going to Vietnam. I, and at that time you could still get a student deferment. And then by the time that was no longer case, I was married and had a child and had a deferment for that reason.

I didn't go into, I didn't go on to graduate school because I had a particular intellectual passion. I hadn't really developed an intellectual passion at that point. I was interested in a lot of things, but I wasn't passionate about them. And I ended up being a brain researcher, studying the brains of rats and mice and bindings of hormones.

And I did competent work. And I found it somewhat interesting but it wasn't passionate for me and I never was fully into it. I never felt it was really all that important. It wasn't until much later after I was already a professor at Boston College doing that kind of work that I then got interested in child development and that really was interesting to me.

Now the roots of that interest came were really present long before, but I never followed those roots of that interest. I followed what seemed to be a more conventional, safe path of brain research. I I got into a very, happened to who knows why into a fair, very selective university working with Top people who are doing brain research, and I felt boy, I really achieved that, and it was more like, because I could do it, I had to do it, with as opposed to, this is really what I want to do.

And so I think that, this is almost sounds trite because people say it at graduation speeches all the time, follow your passion. But to follow your passions, you have to discover what they are, which means you've got to have time to play and explore. And I, and although I had much more time than most kids have today, I wish I had even more time.

For that and had the opportunity To then by the time I was of college age to really know what it was I wanted in life and would have pursued it in a more direct fashion got into it earlier on 

Ben: That sounds like excellent advice. Don't worry too much about school and don't worry about too much about what other people think as long as you get on with it, that's great.

Okay coming to our last. Couple of questions then You what I had is around your own creative process, you write quite prolifically on your sub stack. You used to keep a blog kind of blog posts before you've also done research. Are you a sort of have to write two or three hours?

a day? Do you write more morning or night? Does it just come to you? You obviously spend a lot of time outdoors as well so you have all of these activities I guess does your walking activity outdoors spark the thoughts that you're having and where do your ideas come from? I just, everyone seems to have different creative processes, so I'd be very interested in how yours come about and how your writing in active day is.

Peter: Yeah, I think that so because my it would be different if I were writing fiction. Sometimes I wish I were writing fiction I could just make stuff up But since I am writing I'm trying to write I'm trying to present to people What we know about? or at least what we have good reasons to believe because of research evidence.

So I spend a lot, I spend more time reading research and doing library research than I do in actual writing, sitting down and writing. So I spend a lot of time in front of my computer. I used to spend a lot of time in the library. Now, fortunately, I can sit in front of my computer and get all the information that way, download articles from the library or from the internet.

So I spend a lot of time doing library research. I spend a certain amount of time doing still empirical research, but it's empirical research that doesn't require being in a laboratory survey research and so on. And but I also do spend writing. Interestingly has never been easy for me and maybe that's why I'm attracted to it.

Who knows when I was in school, I always got A's in math. Math was simple for me, but I never really was that interested in math. Writing was more of a challenge. Reading was more of a challenge. I was a late reader, and here I am, a life of mostly reading and writing. The and it's still a challenge.

I'm writing is and I have to go over and over. I try to make it look in my blog posts and and substack posts. I try to make it look as if it's coming easy and spontaneous, but that's the result of a lot of going over and over for the most part. So the other thing that I think helps in terms of the creative aspect is taking time off from it.

So when I'm out bicycling, which I spend at least three hours on average every day outside, is that an exaggeration? I don't think so. If I were really to average it out at least two hours every day outdoors. I have a habit of going for a 15 mile bicycle ride every morning as part of my routine. When I'm on my bicycle or when I'm kayaking or doing cross country skiing whenever we have snow on the ground in the winter, these kind of rhythmic activities in my mind is very free.

I very often come up with with ideas that hadn't come to me before. I, it's like the back of my mind, even though I'm not consciously thinking about it, is working on this and suddenly this new insight. sprouts into my mind. This is not unique for me. There's actually research showing that people have these kinds of insights when they have been working on some problem to be solved, some general area, and now they take a break from it.

And then suddenly some insight comes to them about what they had been working on before. I think the brain, I think there is a sense in which the unconscious mind continues to work on the things that your conscious mind had been working on before. And it's often in those instances that you come up with what we call insights, come up with a novel way of looking at what you have just been struggling with consciously before.

And so I think that's Part of it I really I really think that it, I believe this is part of the way the human mind works, that everybody who's involved, whether you're in, whether you're a writer, whether it's a fiction writer, whether you're a scientist, if you're involved in things that involve You know, a mental process that involves some sense of creativity combined with knowledge that breaks from what you're doing are really important and the kind of break that's best, at least for me, and I would guess for other people, is the kind of break where You're taking a break.

You're doing something that's refreshing and your body is involved in it, but your mind is not focused on that new thing. Your mind is running free. You're enjoying the scenery. You're enjoying the snow. You're enjoying the physical activity, but your mind is not. consciously occupied in a focused way on some new issue so that, so for example, playing chess would not be a good break for me to come up with insights about my writing, whereas bicycle riding would be a good place for that to happen.

Ben: Yeah, that sounds excellent. I recall reading, there's a Japanese author Murakami talked about it, running and thoughts, and I remember the, probably apocryphal, but the little anecdote, I think, is it Archimedes about his eureka, eureka moment in a bath, or it does stretch back. Yes 

Okay, great.

So final kind of double question, maybe for you one was, did you want to highlight any current projects that you're working on? So we have the Substack blog and your, you, seems to be some ideas writing in your book. And then maybe you want to give us any parting advice particularly I guess to parents and family about what your kind of work says for them.

So it maybe touches on your current projects, but current projects and any final parenting advice. 

Peter: So one, one current project I'm working on is what I'm, what I've been calling the Pediatrics Initiative. I'm, I've I've come to the belief that if the world is going to change on the things that I think they should change on, if parents are going to come to realize that their children need more free play and.

and and freedom in general outdoor freedom, independent activities. They have to hear it from their pediatricians. Pediatric, parents listen to their kids pediatricians and they visit them, at least once a year, all the way sometimes into the teenage years. And my wife initially convinced me of this.

She's an OBGYN and and so I've been working with the, with people at the National Institute for Play, which I've become involved with on developing information for pediatricians about the value of play, which they can then, in their well child visits with, clients, they can then talk about this value of play and even prescribe play to the kids with the parents permission standing there.

And so that's something I'm working on. We've developed a nice brochure to give out. If there are any pediatricians in your, and you're listening to the podcast get in touch with the National Institute for Play and you can get some of this material. We're also sharing this with psychologists who, psychiatrists and psychologists who work with.

Parents were sharing it with schools. I've been working with for some time with the non profit organization, Let Grow, which I was one of the founders with a lot along with Lenore Skenazy and Jonathan Haidt years ago bringing more play into schools. And we're involved with that. I designed a research study looking at the effects of these interventions, where children have an hour of absolute free play at school, age mixed play, and what consequences does this have for the kids and for the school climate, and so on.

I've been, that's some, so those are a couple research projects I'm involved in. And as I mentioned, I'm working on a new book. My working title for the book is Restoring Childhood. I believe that over time we've been gradually taking what is natural childhood away from children. And we need, if we're going to have healthy children, we need to bring childhood back to them.

And so that's what the book is about primarily.


Ben: Last question would be on any parenting advice or advice for families it sounds like that's the whole theme of our podcast is essentially bringing play back to children not being not being so worried, giving them more agency but any final advice maybe as to the principles there and how we can actually put that into action.

Peter: Let me, I could go on for two hours talking about that, but let me say that if I were to make one suggestion that, that isn't exactly what I've already said, as we've talked so far, is that, If you're a parent, it would be a good idea to ask your child this. So what is it that you might like to do that you haven't done before that might be might even be a little bit frightening to you, but you would really like to do it?

And then to have a talk, discussion with that child, with your child about that. And then think about whether you would let your child do that. So maybe your child, so this is a way of counteracting our tendency to restrict our children's activities. This is a way of saying, not imposing, not telling the child to do this or that, but finding out what the child would like to do.

that the child currently isn't doing, maybe because you haven't allowed a child to do it, maybe because the child just assumes you wouldn't allow them to do it, maybe because the child has been over, so overprotected that they haven't even thought about what they really might want to do. But you're raising that question, and Maybe even make a list of things he would like to do.

Part of the and so this is actually something that we are also doing through schools, where teachers are Asking that question. And then they tell the, then they tell the child you have to negotiate with your parents about doing what it is you want to do. And then you can report back to the school class.

We call this the let grow intervention is one of our interventions in schools and it works brilliantly, but it also could work at the. parent level, doesn't have to be a teacher, the parent who says my child really maybe needs more adventures that they're not getting. Let me talk to my child about this, what they would like to do, and then let me think about whether I feel comfortable with them doing it or not.

And maybe it could be even a whole list of things. There's a lot of evidence that this is how children build courage by doing things that they might be a little afraid of and realizing they can do it. And it's also how parents build trust in their kids by realizing, seeing that their parents, that the kids do these things.

And that it makes them happier and makes them stronger to do these things. Why not? One of the things that reinforces this, we did another little research project that I was involved in during the period of lockdown during COVID was a survey of many families about how they were adapting to this lockdown period when they weren't going to school, they were shut at home, all these extracurricular activities that kids were involved in were no longer being held.

And how were, what were kids doing? And we asked both the kids and parents several thousand over the course of two months that we surveyed. And what we learned is that at first the kids were quite bored, they didn't know what to do. But they mostly learned, they mostly figured out interesting things to do.

And parents were surprised that many of the kids wanted to do things that the parent never would have believed. Cook a meal, learn how to cook because here they were at home and they, and the parents were delighted in some cases to with what the kids came up with on their own. And in, in this let grow project that I've just described, sometimes kids say, sometimes they say, I really want to be able to ride my bicycle by myself to my friend's house, those kinds of things, which I would expect they would say, but sometimes they say things like, I would like to.

Cook a meal. I would like to know how to bake a pie. I would like to, and to then be able to do it by myself. Some of these things that we almost used to take for granted, of course kids would learn to do that. We'd want them to learn to do that. Some of these are things that parents are actually not providing their kids the opportunity to do, and they may not even realize the kids want to do it.

So that question of what, At talking with your kids about what they would really like to do that is and what they would like to, maybe they would need some help at the beginning, but ultimately to be able to do it independently. 

Ben: That sounds excellent advice. And what would you like to do? And it sounds to me like it should extend definitely to children, but maybe to all of us, that should be a question we should.

Peter: That's a really good point. 

Ben: And maybe and that's the thing it's like actually what's relevant for children is actually normally relevant for everyone or vice versa and maybe more people will end up wanting to do solo travel perhaps as young as 12, but maybe for all of us, but that sounds excellent advice to question.

What is it? We would really like to do so. With that Peter Gray. Thank you very much. 

Peter: Thank you very much. It's been fun.


In Podcast, Life, Science, Arts Tags Peter Gray, Education, parenting, play, psychology

Garrett Graff: Aliens, Mysteries of UFOs, Watergate, 9/11, Government trust | Podcast

February 14, 2024 Ben Yeoh

Garrett Graff, a writer and historian who specializes in 'near history', discusses his book, 'UFO', about the US government's search for alien life. He touches upon how we often misunderstand UFO sightings, suggesting they could be due to a mix of physical anomalies and governmental or adversary secret flight technologies. Graff also shares his belief in the possibility of alien civilizations, arguing probabilities suggest the existence of life outside Earth. He then relates UFO conspiracies to a societal mistrust in government and institutions, tying it back to events like the Watergate scandal. Graff finally introduces his forthcoming oral history book on D-Day, emphasizing how his work emphasizes explaining and organizing complex events in an understandable and comprehensive way.

"When people ask 'do UFOs?'...That's not actually the question that they mean. The question that they really mean is, 'are we alone?' Because the truth of the matter is of course UFOs exist. All a UFO is an unidentified flying object, and there are things out there that we don't know what they are. Whether those are extraterrestrial is a very different question and potentially unrelated to the question of, are there extraterrestrials."

Transcript and podcast recording below. 
Contents:

  • 00:31 Exploring the Mysteries of UFOs

  • 03:05 The Probability of Alien Life

  • 06:21 The Government's Role in UFO Research

  • 19:03 The Impact of Conspiracy Theories

  • 29:40 The Connection Between UFOs and Politics

  • 33:28 The Importance of Trust in Government

  • 47:21 The Writing Process and Future Projects

Podcast wherever you get podcasts or links below. Video above or on YouTube. Transcript follows below.

PODCAST INFO

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  • All links:  https://pod.link/1562738506


Transcript (this is AI assisted and errors are possible)

Ben: Hey everybody, I'm super excited to be speaking to Garrett Graff. Garrett is a writer and historian. His latest book is UFO, about the US government's search for alien life. Previous award winning work includes Watergate, exploring the political scandal, The Only Plane in the Sky, which is an oral history of 9/11, and Raven Rock, about US government plans to survive existential threats.

Garrett, welcome. 

Garrett: Thanks so much for having me. It's great to see you. 

Ben: In your latest book you weave the machinery of government The search for extraterrestrial life and the mysteries of unexplained flying objects. What do you think was most misunderstood in what you learned? 

Garrett: Oh, that's a good question. I think, to me, there were a couple of things that stood out.

One is the possibility, when people hear UFO, we immediately leap to think extraterrestrial. And part of the challenge is, UFOs probably don't have one answer or one solution. It is probably a mix of physical objects that we don't understand currently. Some of it is our own government's secret flight development efforts.

Some of it is adversary government's secret flight development efforts. And then, some of it is almost certainly phenomenon that we do not yet understand. Meteorological, atmospheric astronomical phenomenon that we don't yet understand. When people ask do UFOs? Which is the question. that a lot of people start with when they hear something like, oh, you're working on a book about UFOs.

That's not actually the question that they mean. That the question that they really mean is, are we alone? Because the truth of the matter is of course UFOs exist. All a UFO is an unidentified Flying object, and there are things out there that we don't know what they are whether those are extraterrestrial is a very different question and potentially unrelated to the question of, are there extraterrestrials which I think is like part of the question.

When I spend some time in the book attempting to untangle because it is simultaneously possible that there are alien civilizations, life and intelligent life all across the universe and that all of it or most of it is too far away for us to ever know or have Meaningful contact with or might just not overlap with us and our civilization at this precise moment in the history of the universe, which is something that we can talk about, too.

Garrett: But One of the biggest revolutions that I try to capture in this book is the idea that the math is very much now on the side of the aliens. That we, as late as the 1990s, did not realize that there was a single planet outside of our own solar system. And we now believe that there are effectively planets orbiting every star in the universe.

And as we've come to understand the scale and size and scope of the universe, we've come to understand that number is on the order of magnitude of one sextillion of those planets might be habitable. Which is to say they fall into what scientists call the Goldilocks zone. They're not too hot, not too cold.

They could support water. They could support an atmosphere. They could support life as we recognize it. There's a whole other question, by the way, of what life could look like that we wouldn't recognize it, that we wouldn't be able to identify the characteristics of a planet that could support intelligent life or life That we would not recognize, that would not be carbon based, oxygen breathing life.

And there's a lot of interesting science around, what that could be as well. But that, to me A lot of what this book was, and a lot of what this research process was attempting to untangle all of these different threads. That people start with this question of, are UFOs real? Which is the wrong question to start with, and then breaking that down into what the right questions are to ask, and what the individual pieces of those answers end up being.

Ben: That was very clear in the book, that you had these two threads. One was Alien life outside of the planet and the other was these unexplained objects, as you say, which have on the surface, quite a mundane definition. So do you think for the, starting with the mundane ones and you listed all the likely explanations.

physical phenomena we don't understand yet government plans and the like. It seems that most of those you're tilting to having essentially a mundane explanation. Would you say that's correct? So like over 90 percent of them you think will maybe, may be mundane. Whereas also for the aliens, things out of this world, you're essentially saying the balance of probabilities, sextillion, I can't quite remember how many zeros that is, but it's a lot.

It's 15 or 20 zeros after a one, just on the balance of probabilities. Even if you put very low chances, you're going to have something, but also with those distances from the lifespan that humans might be around, if you say, draw it to how long dinosaurs been around, we might never meet any of that alien life because it's too.

Too far for distance travels. Do I have those two threads correct in terms of the arguments you're weaving into the book? 

Garrett: Absolutely. And what I think you see is this challenge that normally scientists and journalists and historians try to treat these two threads differently. They poo the like wacky conspiracy UFO people here on earth and then talk about the like serious astronomers doing serious science work on the search for extraterrestrial intelligence out across the universe. And the truth of the matter, of course, is that these threads are not unrelated. And so my book really tried to weave these two stories together.

In part because for very obvious reasons, a big part of the question of are aliens visiting Earth is are aliens out there at all? And what's interesting as you get into it is Even the scientists who are dubious about UFOs being extraterrestrials don't necessarily argue that aliens don't visit Earth.

Carl Sagan in the 20th century, probably the most famous astronomer of the 20th century, was simultaneously the lead skeptic that UFOs represented extraterrestrial visitors and also simultaneously the lead proponent of the search for extraterrestrial intelligence SETI across the universe. And his argument was that statistically, when you look at the percentage of planets and the probabilities of intelligent life arising et cetera, et cetera, The vastness of interstellar space.

You would expect aliens and other intelligent civilizations to visit earth about every hundred thousand or 200, 000 years. So his argument wasn't that aliens don't come here. It's that the thing that you saw last Tuesday night out your window is unlikely, statistically, to be the one day that the aliens stopped by in the last 200, 000 years.

Because Sagan's argument, the argument of a lot of the scientists who work on SETI is that our civilization is too new and too insignificant for anyone to care about, even if We exist and that alien, we have this like wonderfully human centric vision of us being worthy of other intelligent civilizations wanting to cross interstellar space to come visit us either out of friendship or because they want to invade us and harvest our organs for food or energy, what have you.

Whereas aliens are probably much more likely to treat Earth much like we would treat a rest area on the Jersey Turnpike, which is a stopover on the way from one interesting place to another. And that one of the things that we probably misunderstand is how first contact would actually exist.

Hollywood has given us over the decades, really three scenarios for our first contact with an alien civilization. And they are all very clear, unambiguous and earth focused. So you have the independence day flying saucer over the white house. Take me to your leader version. You have the Jodie Foster contact radio message from outer space version.

And then you have the E. T. Stranded Lone Traveler version. The much more likely scenario is that we will first encounter or detect effectively a piece of space trash. We will see a piece of a defunct spaceship or old space probe or some piece of wreckage floating through our solar system and know that it doesn't come from us.

But not know who it comes from. Harvard astronomy chair, Avi Loeb talks about this as the equivalent of the like empty plastic bag blowing through our cosmic backyard. That doesn't come from our Walmart. Like whose Walmart does that come from? And that the, we're going to be left with this puzzle of, where does this.

Is this civilization still around? Is this friend or foe? Where was this located when it launched, when it started? And it's possible, by the way, that we've actually already detected that. There was this In 2017 scientists belatedly detected a Interstellar object moving through our solar system that they named Oumuamua.

And we know very little about Oumuamua because we had missed it until it was already on its way out of the solar system. So we have this like far off trailing and deteriorating set of data about it, but it had pretty weird characteristics and we know that it came from outside of our our our solar system and galaxy we don't really know where it came from.

And some scientists, including that Harvard astronomy chair, Avi Loeb have speculated that it might have been a piece of wreckage of a spaceship or a space probe and that it's characteristics mimic what we would expect the characteristics of a. Light sail to be which is a object that scientists here on earth are just in the early stages of developing, but are the way that they this incredibly thin, incredibly wide.

Object that would be able to be powered basically by light from the sun or a laser that you could speed up, that you could get going pretty quickly and that maybe a muamua was some incredibly old light sail from some other civilization. And that one of the challenges of this is our technology just isn't that good.

One of the things as you, we begin to think about how and when and where we might detect. Other intelligent life or pieces of that space wreckage or probes from other planets, if they're not coming here, is that we don't actually have a piece of technology on Earth right now that could detect it.

And so I think A probe or spacecraft moving through our solar system at a fraction of the speed of light that, you would expect that any intelligent civilization that had mastered the vastness of interstellar space would have figured out a way. to move at a fraction of the speed of light.

And right now we don't have the technology to detect those objects. And one of the weirdest outcomes, one of the weirdest thought experiments of this is our solar system could be being passed by Interstellar spacecraft and space probes on a daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, once a decade, once a century.

Level and we wouldn't have any idea. Like we wouldn't know if aliens were actually just flying by earth right now. And we just didn't, we just weren't detecting them. And 

I was just saying, we only invented the radio not too long ago, 

and that ends up being a lot of the the science of these questions is coming to understand that, we're just a really young civilization in a pretty young and average planet.

Around a pretty average star located in the outer suburbs of a pretty ordinary Milky Way galaxy. And that, humanity is, on the order of a few 10, 000 years old. Certainly our level of technology for, space travel is like less than a century old. And our planet is about four and a half billion years old in a 14 billion year old universe.

And that the James Webb space telescope in the last couple of years is on an almost daily basis. It's transforming our understanding of the universe's size, scale, scope, and formation. And it has detected galaxies and stars that began to form as little as 300 million years ago. After the beginning of the universe.

And one of the weirdest aspects of this is the possibility that, again, life could be very common across the history of the universe and intelligent life common across the history of the universe. And that we are functionally alone right now. That, you could have had a billion year civilization.

Something that was far more advanced than anything we could possibly imagine. That could have risen and fallen. Perhaps a couple that have risen and fallen over the course of a billion years. across the history of the universe that we have still missed by several billion years. That came and went before our solar system ever began to, gather out of dust in the first place.

Ben: I really got that sense from the book that, that what, there was so much that we don't understand and we've only just Beginning to glimpse and the way you explain it is really well is that sort of my own, I hadn't thought about it too much, but I essentially the probability that there is some sort of intelligent life out there seems to have really risen amongst people who look like it.

People would say maybe 80, 90 percent chance this is true, whether they visited Earth is much smaller, but not zero. That was the interesting thing that maybe 1 percent or something above 0, 1 to 5 percent over some time, like not necessarily when humans have been about, like you say, what, would that be your sense of the probabilities?

And then I'm interested in exploring something you mentioned, which is a sort of segue, which is another theme through the book, these elements of conspiracy and also where governments or actually any organizations, but governments are really bad. Dealing with things that they don't that they know they don't know the machinery of government seems to be Really bad with dealing with uncertainty and conspiracies.

I guess are a sort of adjacency to that we see but is that my sense of where the probabilities have got to and what do you think about how Governments have essentially tried to cover up what they don't know, but it seems to be almost like an incompetence. We don't want to be seen not to know type of thing rather than anything malicious.

Garrett: Absolutely. There are three questions there that I will try to answer in turn. One being the probabilities across the universe. The second being the the government cover up. And then the third being the adjacent conspiracies. So the yes, I think The Easiest way to think about this is we're just too new to really have any understanding of what the likelihood of life around us could be or intelligent life around us could be and when the SETI field started spread.

Spread. 1950s, 1960s, the, one of the pioneers in that Frank Drake came up with this what is now probably the most famous equation in SETI, which is called the Drake equation. And it lays out the variables of calculating how many planets are, how many planets there are, how many.

What percentage of those planets might be habitable? What percentage of those? Planets that are habitable, does life develop, what percentage of planets that are habitable, where life developed, does intelligent life develop and on. But the most important variable in the equation is what scientists call L, the length of time an intelligent civilization exists.

And L is the whole ball game, which is. If the length of time of an intelligent civilization is in the tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years, then we are functionally alone in the universe. If L is a million or hundreds of millions or a billion years, our universe might team with life.

If you look at humanity as a as your test case we're in that tens of thousands of range and there are a lot of reasons looking around the world, right where we are in the winter of 2024 to think that like humanity probably doesn't get another 10, 000 years. Like we, We might not get like another 150 or 200 years based on, the trajectory of, climate change and AI and technology and nuclear war and, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah.

There's also a big part of that equation, by the way, that is also it's not just how long a civilization lasts, but how long a civilization lasts that remains curious about its place in the universe. There's a sort of dark dystopian path in the years ahead for Earth where Humanity survives, but is, effectively so poisoned by a combination of misinformation and A.

I. And societal collapse that we just lose interest in exploring whether there's life out there in the rest of the universe. So that's the answer to the first question. So then you get to this question of. Is the government covering up its knowledge of extraterrestrials?

And I think that there's a lot of evidence to believe that the U. S. Government or governments anywhere in the world really are not covering up meaningful knowledge of extraterrestrials or what people intelligences. And, my most basic reasoning for that is I've covered national security for 20 years.

I come at this not as a lifelong ufologist who grew up on Star Trek and the X Files and read sci fi novels. I come at this as someone whose, previous books are about the Cold war and cyber security and counterterrorism and american presidency and you know I doubt government conspiracies mostly because They presuppose a level of competence, strategy, and forethought that is not on display in the rest of the work that government bureaucracies tend to do on a day to day basis.

And, I'm happy to talk more about that if you want. But that is not to say, though, that the government is not covering up It's knowledge and understanding of UFOs. The U S government governments all around the world are absolutely covering up their knowledge of UFOs. It's just not there for the reasons that people generally think part of this is there are two very obvious cloaks of secrecy that surround a lot of this subject.

One is what the, a lot of what the public thinks are UFOs. Are the government's own secret test projects. A huge percentage of public UFO sightings in the 1950s were the U2 spy plane which was a UFO. It was a, if you were a commercial pilot flying across the United States and you looked up and saw the U2 above you.

It was a plane that didn't look like anything that we knew planes to look like it, that flying at an altitude that planes were not known to fly and flying at speeds. Planes were not known to fly in the decades since you've had the same experience with the SR 71, the a 12 ox cart, the stealth fighter, the stealth bomber, and all of that stuff is still going on today.

You've got new secret drone projects. The U. S. government's, U. S. Air Force's new generation B 21 stealth bomber just had its inaugural flight test in November. These programs are still going on, and the government doesn't really tell us what they all are. Now, there's a second layer of this, which is, it's not just our government.

Some chunk of these UFO sightings are advanced adversary technology being tested against us. That's Chinese drones, Russian drones, Iranian drones. There's a lot to those technologies that we do not currently understand. About our adversaries capabilities. And one of the things that the Pentagon has talked about is in its renewed effort to understand UFOs and, what the government now calls UAPs, unidentified anomalous phenomenon.

It identified a heretofore unknown. Transmedium Chinese drone, which is to say a Chinese drone that came out of the water and transitioned to flight, which was a technology that the U. S. government did not understand that China possessed. The government gets real squirrely talking about what its sensors And radars and surveillance networks detect and don't detect and what it understands about those adversary technologies.

So big, some sizable percentage of our, what the public thinks are UFOs, the U S government may have a better understanding of, in terms of what a, what might be, revolutionary. Technologies around You know our adversaries so then you get to the last part of your question which is the conspiracies around the government cover up.

And this was actually to me one of the biggest surprises of the book, which is, as you mentioned when you were introducing me. The book before this for me was my previous book was a history of Watergate and the scandal around Richard Nixon's presidency in the 1970s. And in a very weird way, the second half of this book on UFOs ends up being a sequel to a book about Watergate, because what it ends up being about is a The collapse of trust in government institutions, the collapse in faith in institutions, the collapse of agreed upon trust and truth that the U.

S. in particular, but societies around the world, underwent in the wake of the Pentagon Papers, Vietnam, Watergate, the Church Committee, the Pike Committee. And this recognition, the government can lie to you. And where you see that actually first take place in the U S in our politics is in the 1970s and eighties around UFOs.

And there is this series of revelations and conspiracies in the 1980s, some self proclaimed whistleblowers coming forward and some, quote unquote new evidence about things like the Roswell crash that come forward in the 1970s and 80s. that plant for the first time the idea of what we would now call and recognize as the deep state in the American political tradition.

This shadowy cabal of, professional government operatives working at cross purposes with elected officials and the American public, that there's like a hidden government inside our hidden government and that they this idea first exists in the context of UFOs in the 1980s.

The, those figures in some cases go on to become the founding members of the far right. conservative fringe in the 1980s and 1990s, including very specifically one guy named Bill Cooper, who is one of these UFO whistleblowers in the 1980s. He says that he's a, intelligence officer who's seen evidence of, the government's dealings with alien civilizations goes on to become one of the nation's most popular, real far right fringe talk radio hosts of the 1990s, up there with with the Rush Limbaugh's of the country, helps to inspire through his conspiratorial view of the world.

Tim McVeigh, who goes on to bomb the Oklahoma City Federal Building and carry out, the worst domestic terror attack in U. S. history. And also inspires and becomes the mentor, really, to a young Austin, Texas public access host named Alex Jones. Alex Jones, of course, becomes the founder of the 9 11 conspiracy.

myths, what we now call 9 11 truthers and that it's really Alex Jones who carries this forward into a new generation and, picks up the idea of the deep state and really carries it forward into the Trump era. And in a very weird and twisted way that I think most Americans don't realize and I certainly didn't realize until I was working on researching this book, I think you don't get January 6th.

And the big lie and the attempt to steal the election without the foundation that was laid intellectually by the UFO conspiracies of the 1980s and 90s and that this really ends up being This weird journey through 40 years of American conspiracies. And yet ends up in something that really threatens, starts with UFOs and then, threatens to upend American democracy in 2020.

Ben: That's really where the truth just seems larger than the fiction. And that's one of the remarkable things I picked up on the book in that second half is this, the stories we tell ourselves are so important, the narratives to get to where we are and these events. And I was wondering, reflecting back on that thread that you get from Watergate to today through these conspiracy theories.

Theories of which aliens is a big chunk. Is that one of the lessons we need to take away from political scandals and Watergate and the like? That when we harm trust in government and trust in our institutions, it allows These conspiracies, these tailways of thinkings to occur, and then they have all of these second and third order effects, which are just really hard to go through because they're going on their own narratives and putting the two books and the works together.

It seems to me there's that and that it seems to recur at least in modern. History, we've had this little bit of recurrence and where we are in trust in government Therefore and trust in institutions is potentially a more important thing to be worried about is that one of your takeaways from watergate?

Or was that is there something else that I should pick up on?

Garrett: Yeah, I think you're right. I think that there's you know to me the shame of watergate the Is You know, the way that it has, it poisoned a generation of politics that followed and caused or at least accelerated that collapse of trust in government institutions.

I think part of the challenge also, when you get into the conspiracies around UFOs, coming back to, what is my working theory, which is that the government is not covering up meaningful knowledge of of contact with extraterrestrials or non human intelligences, NHIs. You addressed a little bit in your original question to me, which is, it's really hard for governments and bureaucracies to say, I don't know.

And, I think in many ways the government is just as puzzled about the reality of UFOs as anyone else. Now the government, for the reasons that we talked about, advanced technology tests. Advanced sensor systems. It knows more than the average public. But it doesn't know what all ufos are and across 80 years of history there has been a stubbornly small percentage of public UFO reports that also puzzle the government.

In the earlier days, that was about 20 percent of public sightings the government couldn't solve. Today, with better technology and better data, that number hovers closer to 2%, 5%. Of public UFO sightings that also puzzle the government. Those, of course, are the only, to me, interesting UFO sightings, are the ones that actually puzzle the government.

Humans are incredibly terrible witnesses. for UFOs. A vast percentage of UFO sightings are things like the planet Venus, which is just a really bright star in the night sky. Or, in the modern era, a lot of UFO sightings end up being starlink satellites, which are bright and array themselves in weird lines in the sky, in ways that, people get alarmed about when they see them.

But, we know what those are once, once they're reported and, can untangle them. So the question to me is always what are the things that actually puzzle the government? And, the Pentagon office that works on this right now says it's about 2 percent in the, in, in this particular moment.

But it's really hard for a bureaucracy, particularly in a country like the United States, where we spend, 60 billion a year on intelligence and, round numbers, a trillion dollars a year on national defense and homeland security, to come out and say, there's some weird stuff out there that we don't really know what it is, flying around in our airspace.

And, that's a really unsatisfying answer. And it's one that bureaucrats don't like to provide to their bosses. And I think the problem is that's actually the best answer, which is the government doesn't really know. And one of the pieces of evidence that I point to in the book is what, to me, was the moment that I got interested in writing this book, which is since 2017, there has been a radical shift in the way That people in Washington talk about UFOs and you have begun to see serious people talk seriously about UFOs.

And it began in 2017 with a series of blockbuster reports from the New York Times and Politico that both laid out the details of a. then unknown government UFO study program by the Pentagon, by the Defense Intelligence Agency. And then a series of puzzling encounters across many years by Navy fighter pilots, Navy aviators, who had encountered craft or objects that behaved in ways that they could not explain.

And that they did not believe the U. S. had technology to match. And that there was video that backed up those Navy pilots testimony that the Pentagon eventually released. There's a series of videos that are called the Tic Tac video and the gimbal and the FLIR. And on them, there are these objects that sort of move in weird ways or appear to move in weird ways.

And you began to see some congressional attention around this. It's actually an issue that has remained pretty bipartisan heavy in terms of getting attention from both panic from Democrats and Republicans in places like the Senate Intelligence Committee around trying to push the government towards greater levels of transparency about what it does know about UFOs.

And that there was a specific moment for me when, again, we began 2020, John Brennan gave an interview to a DC journalist named Tyler Cowen. John Brennan had just wrapped up the better part of a decade as President Obama's CIA Director and Homeland Security Advisor. He was a career intelligence officer.

I've covered him. I've interviewed him. He's a very serious guy. And he'd spent the better part of a decade atop the U. S. intelligence committee, or U. S. intelligence community. And he said in this very weird, tortured syntax, effectively, there's some weird stuff out there, we don't know what it is, and some might say that this phenomenon could constitute what some might recognize as a new form of life.

It's a really weird sentence. And also, to me, stuck out because I figured there can't be that many things that puzzle someone like John Brennan. Like, when John Brennan woke up in the morning as CIA director or White House Homeland Security advisor, Any question that occurred to him, there was a massive intelligence apparatus that would go out there and try to answer it.

Analysts and undercover operatives and intelligence officers and satellites and signals intelligence intercept networks. If John Brennan woke up and said, tell me what Ben had for breakfast. Last Tuesday, like there's probably a reporting system and surveillance system that could come up with what that answer is, by the end of the day.

And so if John Brennan is leaving office at the end of his entire career, at the end of these eight years as CIA director and Homeland Security advisor, and he's saying, man, this UFO thing, it's really puzzling and I don't know what it is. And I don't think we know what it is. That felt to me like something that was worth diving into and trying to better understand.

Ben: That's fascinating. 

When I put all of your work together, reading your books, one of the things which stood out about you then taking the 9 11 oral testimony was that was based on primary evidence, people's actual truths. And you were writing it. writing it down. And so that almost strikes us in comparison to some of these other conspiracy things as well.

And I was stuck in Manhattan over 9 11 and one of the things I remembered very much was the smell and the visceral feeling and you get that in a lot of the oral testimony. Do you see that as your work as a modern historian taking this? You looked at You've looked at government, you've looked at conspiracy, you've looked at this, and then you've also taken primary evidence and the truth.

Is there something that you think people might not appreciate around the oral testimony in 9 11 and how you see that in your overall work? 

Garrett: Yeah, it's a great question. The way that I talk about my work and the subjects that I write on books wise is that I mostly do near history. Things that are just old enough that they're not current events anymore and are slipping from memory into history, but are new enough that there's research that hasn't been mined, archives that haven't been mined and that is recent enough that, We probably misunderstand it.

A big part of my work is basically like returning to these things, 10, years later that have this, popular mythology built up around them and then trying to put together all that we have learned. Since that event, to better understand what that event actually was when it was happening.

Because, journalism is, as famously said, is, the rough first draft of history. But it generally gets things pretty wrong as more details come out. And that we better understand, motivations and and even in some cases, basic facts, only as documents are declassified or memoirs come out years later kind of thing.

And so I generally try to choose topics that have a Modern salience that and then tried to help us help use that history to explain why we are, why America is, why the world is the way that it is today based on our understanding of how this history went down. What drew me back to Watergate.

Was covering Donald Trump and covering the investigations around Donald Trump and, wondering what was it like the last time America confronted a corrupt and criminal president in office, and how did it work, and how did the system function, and what really happened in and around the White House as that was going on.

Which, we've really only come to understand Watergate really in the last 10 or 15 years. That the Watergate that Americans thought that they were living through in the 1970s turns out to be, just this like incredibly narrow slice of what was going on beneath the surface and the motivations and the personalities and the players who were involved in all of these events as they transpired.

Ben: Yeah, it's very hard to know when you're living in the moment or very near moment, what are the actual forces and truth around it. So my final kind of trio of questions then would be when you alluded to that is, do you have anything around your writing process that you'd like to share, whether it's either unique or just how you do it?

Are you a morning writer, afternoon writer? You obviously do a lot of deep research and it's interesting you're interested in this near history. But do you just, does it all just come out after the research? And as a segue to that, are there any current projects you'd want to, you'd want to hint at?

And the last one would be if you had any I guess it's life advice or writing advice around how people should think about the world or what you've learned in general. So writing process. Into into those final thoughts. 

Garrett: Yeah, so I try I generally try to describe my career as explanatory journalism which to me is really distinct from Like investigative journalism, like I am not someone who has a particular skill in you know sussing out the document that like no one has ever seen before or you know getting the testimony of some secret source that no one has ever talked to before.

The thing that I do is the like hoovering up of an enormous body of research and then trying to organize it and explain these events and stories and histories in, oh, the most clear and most comprehensive way that anyone has yet tried to do. And, that was really what my Watergate journey was, which is, here's a, story that is one of the most covered subjects of all time.

And yet it has been covered in all of these narrow slivers and individual memoirs or, time limited books. And, now let's collect all of that work over 50 years and tell the story. In a more comprehensive way and a more clear way than anyone has ever tried to do before. That was, in many ways the same thing I was trying to do with UFO, which is, here's a subject that has an enormous body of primary sources behind it, but that no one in a long time has tried to sit down and explain and organize in a Clear.

And I would like to think objective and open-minded way. You know that probably a lot. I think a lot of the challenge of the literature around UFOs is almost everyone comes to writing about it with a very clear agenda at the start. Either you are a total believer. And are writing something to convince others that aliens are visiting.

Or you're a total skeptic and are trying to write, a grand debunking. And, I think if people read the UFO book, what they'll see is, I'm not trying to do either. And I think that the truth is probably somewhere in the middle, that UFOs probably don't constitute alien visits, but aliens probably exist, and there is something real to UFOs that we don't know what it is, and the answers to which could end up being just as world transforming and Fascinating and revelatory As if the answer was aliens, that it, we could really see our understanding of the world transformed just by solving the mystery of UFOs.

Now I just finished actually my next book, which comes out in June of this year and will be published both in the U. S. and the U. K. In, in June, that is going back to my oral history work, and it is an oral history of D Day. And June 6th of course, is the 80th anniversary of D Day. And this is a moment when the generation of D Day veterans is really passing from the earth.

And this book tries to in a very classic me way,

capture This incredibly broad set of voices and participants in that day, American, British, Canadian, German, French Polish Norwegian Kiwis, Australians, all sorts of different perspectives of that day. And and tell that day in a very comprehensive and definitive way using the voices of the participants themselves.

So you can't quite see my office floor here, but I am surrounded by two foot tall stacks of D Day histories and memoirs and military reports. And it's about a hundred and fifty or two hundred books on my floor here. And I went through another couple thousand oral histories in archives in the U. S. and Canada and U. K. And the sort of final bit of your question about how I work is what I do is I take all of this research and then I write these like incredibly long first drafts and then basically, Over some period of time, really whittle them down to the essence of the story as best I can.

And so the D Day oral history. I started in August and September with a first draft that was about 1. 5 million words and then whittled it down to the, 166, 000 words that it will end up being published around. And went through that vast draft and ended up cutting, basically nine out of every 10 words out of the book to get it down to, the essence of the story as best I could.

Ben: That's amazing. So I very much look forward to that. So that will be mid this year, June, 2024 book on D Day. And a reminder, latest book also on UFOs. Book on Watergate and the oral history on 9 11, The Only Plane in the Sky. That was a really excellent conversation and I thank you very much.

Garrett: Absolutely a pleasure. Thanks so much for having me.

In Life, Politics, Science Tags Aliens, UFOs, Watergate, 9/11, Trust, Garrett Graff

Hannah Ritchie: sustainability, progress, Not The End of the World | Podcast

January 26, 2024 Ben Yeoh

In this in-depth conversation, data scientist and researcher Hannah Ritchie delves into key insights from her new book 'Not The End of The World', which challenges the pervasive idea that human society is doomed due to environmental degradation. She explores various environmental problems, including climate change and plastic pollution, and emphasizes the potential for progress in tackling these critical issues. Hannah also discusses the essential role of technology and outlines the importance of lifting people out of poverty as a measure against climate change. Her argument centers around the balance of environmental change and human impact in achieving a sustainable planet. Furthermore, she provides advice on dealing with climate anxiety, career progression, and essential work ethics. Transcript and podcast recording below or link here.

Approach: Hannah's work is primarily driven by data, focusing on the interplay between sustainability, climate change, and patterns of global development. Her new book, "Not the End of the World," addresses one of the most significant challenges of our time - environmental sustainability. 

In the book, Hannah dispels a range of myths associated with environmental issues. She counters the prevailing narrative which claims we are doomed and there's nothing left to do about our environmental crisis. Instead, she believes we can change the narrative and become the first generation to build a sustainable planet.

Tackling Climate Change:   

Hannah's optimism for combating climate change stems from the significant strides made in technology, especially renewable energy technologies. These technologies are no longer mere futuristic imaginings. They are realistic, economical, and deployable on a large scale. 

However, she acknowledges the difficulty of the task at hand. The world is on track for 2 and a half to 3 degrees of warming which puts us in challenging terrain. We need rapid technological change coupled with significant societal transformation to alter our trajectory. 

Addressing Biodiversity Loss: 

Biodiversity loss, according to Hannah, is among the most challenging problems explored in her book. The manifestation of this crisis is nuanced as it involves intricate geo-political and economic dynamics. While technology can help, solving the biodiversity crisis will require simultaneous action on many fronts, from controlling deforestation to addressing climate change and overfishing. 

The Question of Plastics: 

Plastics are universally ubiquitous, presenting a significant sustainability challenge, especially concerning disposal. The key lies in addressing waste management infrastructures in low-middle-income countries where plastic waste management is weak. 

Moving Forward:

The path to sustainability is riddled with challenges. Two significant policy levers that Hannah identifies are transitioning to electric vehicles and investing in electricity grids. Electric vehicles can play a crucial role in reducing environmental impact, and improvements to electricity grids have the potential to facilitate the swift build-out of renewable technology.

Small, rich nations, despite their less significant carbon footprint, must lead the charge in driving innovations and creating technological spillovers used by other countries. 

“I think one of the best antidotes to too anxiety is to get involved in stuff. I think one of the worst feelings is feeling like you're helpless and there's nothing you can do and nothing works. I think actually getting actively involved in stuff that moves us forward can alleviate some of the anxiety.”

I think I would advise people like taking the initiative, whether it's a blog or a project or whatever you're interested in is like having some online presence where people can see what you're up to. And I think often like spontaneous opportunities come from that, like someone willing to fund you might stumble on your work and really like it and back you. So I think that would be a main piece of advice is to start putting yourself out there. It's also how you learn. I look back on my old writings and they make me cringe. They seem really bad, but I think that's just how you develop the skills. And I think it's really useful to learn in public rather than learning in private.

Transcript is below.

  • 00:23 Debunking Environmental Myths

  • 01:29 Sustainability: A Dual Perspective

  • 03:43 Population and Degrowth: A Skeptical View

  • 07:47 Technological Optimism vs Realism

  • 09:34 The Dangers of Doomsday Narratives

  • 12:50 Climate Change: Challenges and Solutions

  • 15:27 The Role of Technology in Sustainability

  • 17:44 Addressing Biodiversity Loss

  • 25:07 The Plastic Problem: A Practical Approach

  • 28:58 Investing in Conservation and Restoration

  • 36:15 The Challenges of Heat Pumps

  • 37:10 The Potential of Meat Alternatives

  • 37:46 The Writing Process and Charity Contributions

  • 38:23 The Importance of Lifting People Out of Poverty

  • 40:35 The Writing Process and Research

  • 45:10 The Importance of Transition Metals in Technology

  • 45:40 The Role of Small, Richer Nations in Climate Change

  • 45:53 The Controversies and Challenges of Cobalt

  • 01:03:15 The Future of Energy Transition

  • 01:04:09 Advice for Dealing with Climate Anxiety and Career Paths

Podcast wherever you get podcasts or links below. Video above or on YouTube. above or on YouTube. Transcript follows below.

PODCAST INFO

  • Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/3gJTSuo

  • Spotify: https://sptfy.com/benyeoh

  • Anchor: https://anchor.fm/benjamin-yeoh

  • All links:  https://pod.link/1562738506


Hannah Ritchie Transcript

(Note this has been automated and errors are possible)

Ben: Hey everyone, I'm super excited to be speaking to Hannah Ritchie. Hannah is a data scientist and lead researcher at World in Data. She keeps a substack at Sustainability by Numbers and Hannah has a new book out, Not the End of the World, how we can be the first generation to build a sustainable planet.

Hannah, welcome.

Hannah: Thanks so much for having me.

Ben: What do you think was the biggest myth or piece of misinformation you discovered in your research?

Hannah: I think the biggest myth that I'm trying to combat in the book is that this message that seems to be coming through more strongly now, which is that we're doomed and there's nothing we can do about it.

I feel like, especially in the, in the book, I tackle seven different big environmental problems, but I think everyone tends to focus on the climate one. And I think in the climate one, I think we're like very quickly tipped from like this kind of part denial that we're facing a big problem.

Like we've somehow done a 180 into like now a big prominent message is, it's too late. We're doomed. There's nothing we can do about it. And I think what I'm really trying to push back on in the book is that I just don't think that's true. Like I think. There's a massive, we have a massive problem in terms of climate, it's very serious.

But I think there are solutions coming through now, so I think at a point in time when we need to be moving most quickly and have the most action, my concern is that people turn away because they think this is an unsolvable problem. So I think that's the overarching like big myth I want to try and combat in the book.

Ben: And in the book, you argue that the present time today might be the first time that we can both grow human flourishing and diminish our environmental impact. And you're quite clear that sustainability really has two parts to it in the sense that there's forward looking, and we want to sustain future generations and the future planet.

But actually, you've got to think about current generation as well, which is poverty as well as climate and the like. What's your evidence or argument for why that might be so today?

Hannah: Yeah, so I think when we think about sustainability, like I'm from an environmental background, so we think of this, often think of this forward looking of, we want to protect the environment for future generations and other species.

I think our ancestors like did achieve that. Like they, did have overall quite a very low environmental impact. But I think the challenge there is that often like human wellbeing or human metrics were not great. So if you take an example of child mortality, like for a lot of human history, like around half of children wouldn't reach adulthood.

Now, what we've seen over the last few centuries is the scales on that have tipped, right? So we've made amazing progress on many of these human well being metrics, like extreme poverty, child mortality, maternal mortality, life expectancy the list goes on. And of course, the world is still very unequal today, so it's not like we're done with this human progress lens but things have got much, much better.

Now, they've got much better. to a large part to the detriment of the environment. So we've, burned fossil fuels for energy, we've expanded farmland often at the cost of forests and wild habitat. So we're now putting lots and lots of environmental pressure on the planet. Now what, where we are today.

I think it's now possible that we continue human progress, so we continue to make progress on all of these marine metrics, while also reducing our environmental impact at the same time. And I think a big driver of that is that we now have the technologies to switch away from fossil fuels, to switch away from using lots of land for farming, and I think we're now in quite a unique opportunity, a unique position to do that, where I think these things are no longer incompatible.

Ben: And the book seems to be fairly skeptical on the idea of depopulation. So this is the idea that we should have fewer people to solve the problem. And also relatively skeptical on degrowth, which sort of follows that humans should grow and consume less to be more environmentally sustainable. Although there's some sort of overlap in some of the ideas, like food waste.

You could easily call a degrowth idea, although you might solve it technologically. Would you explain why you've come to the conclusion that population is not depopulation is not going to be the solution and why you may a little bit skeptical of the degrowth idea?

Hannah: I think a big part of this is.

So I think if you look at, if you take the population example global population growth rates peaked a long time ago. They're actually falling. Like I think people still have this impression that the world population is growing exponentially and it's not. Population growth is slowing quite quickly and we expect that.

The latest UN projections are that by the 2080s global population will peak. So we're going to see much, much slower population growth. And that's because we fertility rates across the world have dramatically declined. Now the question in there is, should you try to drive that down much faster?

I think one point is no, we shouldn't do that through coercive. policies. And then the other lens is, do you invest in women's education? Do you invest in women's rights to contraceptives, to employment opportunities? All of, we know that all of these things tends to reduce fertility rates, especially in low income countries.

Now my argument there is, yeah, we should do that. We should just do that because that's a good thing to do. I think the putting the climate lens on it. doesn't make sense. Because if you're looking at where fertility rates in the world are still high, they're generally in the poorest countries.

And the poorest countries have very low CO2 emissions. The population numbers in these countries actually don't make a massive difference to a global CO2 emissions. And then if you take it at a broader level Even if you were to see really rapid drops in fertility rates across the entire world, I still don't think it would massively shift CO2 emissions on the timescales that we're talking about.

We're talking about addressing this in decades, and I think demographic change tends to be much longer term. I think on the degrowth thing, I think, I think the intuition for this makes sense. Like CO2 emissions have been really tightly coupled to GDP over history. As you get richer, you use more energy and we were getting that energy from fossil fuels.

Therefore we had higher CO2 emissions. Now why I'm not, or why I'm very skeptical of it as well. One is that. I don't think we can have global de growth because we still have billions of people living in poverty and I think it's well within their rights to move out of that and I think a de growth global strategy would basically leave them there.

And then the question is in rich countries, should we shrink our economies a bit? I think they are the biggest challenge for me, is political. Like I just don't see Any leader standing up and getting political support for this, so like we could spend the next 10 to 20 years trying to get this enacted, but, I'd rather just spend that time trying to decarbonize, because we know that can work, whereas I think on a de growth strategy.

Like I just don't see it happening on the timescales by which we need to solve this problem. But it's true that, like in my book, like I, I outline a range of good behavior changes that in some sense would reduce resource use. Like I'm, like I advocate quite strongly that a big environmental impact is meat consumption.

Is degrowth strategy? I don't know. I would like to see less food waste, so sometimes maybe some of the behavioural changes we need are somewhat in line with degrowth strategies, but I think specifically going on with a message of, we would like degrowth, I just don't think will actually work politically.

Sure,

Ben: and you give the example of your brother. Eating a impossible burger or one of the alternative burgers. And if you can't tell the difference, and I guess Bill Gates has this with his argument as well, the green premium, if it's basically zero, then you transition, like you transition with any technology.

I read that you didn't really think of yourself as a techno optimist, more of a techno realist, or sometimes heard it as a techno pragmatist. Is there anything about your views which you think distinguish that? And I'm interested also in some of those intersects such in fact, we heard this from Chris Stark, who's on the podcast, who said, you should just call climate jobs.

And, intersectionality with healthcare, you can also just call them jobs or intervention. And there, there is a little bit. Of that so I think that's the sort of theme. But I was wondering why you wouldn't call yourself a techno optimist and more of a techno realist.

Hannah: Yeah, so I think where I distinguish that is that I'm very bullish on technology, like even if, so even if you were to go for degrowth you still need massive deployments globally of renewable technologies, transport technologies, like you still, there's still a massive technological lens that even if you reduced energy demand where I see myself as a techno realist is that I'm just really yeah. bullish on many of the technologies that we have, like solar, wind, batteries, electric vehicles. I think there's a range of technologies there that aren't like high in the sky. They're like very realistic. Like they're becoming really economical. You can deploy these technologies very quickly.

So that's where I think like a lot of my optimism lies. This isn't a technology that seems very realistic to me. I think there's probably like another. segment of the population that are like more, like way more optimistic on like really dramatic technological change, which like some of these technologies I'm like a little bit skeptical of at the moment, but I'm very like hell bent on, the technologies that we have now that are good, that are scalable, that are cheap, like we just need to build them very quickly.

Ben: I see, yep, that makes sense to me. The book was perhaps a touch more critical of the Doomsday narrative than perhaps I was expecting. Obviously, the argument is that it was unhelpful, and I think it can be really unhelpful to people to one of the things you mentioned, which is you get from animal behavior, you see this learned helplessness.

If you think you can't do anything you stop doing anything. But you argue further that actually they might be dragging back people who are doing something. I was interested to see why you've come to that view or whether there's more nuance to where the Doomsday narrative is.

Hannah: Yeah, I think I think one thing is to clarify what I mean by doomstir.

It's not people that think it's a big problem or it's really silly because I think all of that, like I think the impacts of climate change could be really catastrophic. It's not about that. It's more about this message that I see coming through, which is, we're doomed. It's too late. There's nothing we can do about it.

And I think that's a, I see it and I speak to climate scientists where they are also noticing a real uptick in this where, we used to spend a lot of our time. Pushing back like climate denialism and we spend as much time if not more pushing back on people saying, we're doomed and there's nothing we can do.

And that's, that's not, that's completely out of line with the science and I just don't think it's helpful. I think it's unhelpful for several reasons. I think I think it was really damaging for many people's mental health. Like I get a lot of young people that get in touch and they're really in a dark place and they're often in a dark place because, and they'll send links to like some blog or some YouTube video where this is the message.

And this is not the message coming from mainstream climate science. This is people taking that message and extrapolating it way further than it actually should be. So I think damaging mental health is one thing. But I also think that Yeah, I think it's just not helpful when there's so many people trying to work on solutions, trying to push forward, to continually get the message of you're wasting your time, there's nothing you can do about it.

To me that just leads to inaction.

Ben: And I think you made the argument that it damages the science which you quite make quite forcefully, and I can see this all around obviously there's a scientific method and there's all of this, but anything which actually is going to damage that further plays into the hands of deniers, and actually at a meta level, Impacts all sorts of things where science is useful.

That's vaccines, healthcare, all sorts of these other things do you think that's true? And if anything, do you think that might be getting worse with that or what's your impressions? Yeah, I think it

Hannah: is true. I think Often there are really exaggerated claims and they're often said with the phrase in front of it, the science says, and then they say a statement that's not what the science says.

And I think these voices often get a really big platform and I think it is damaging to science. I think one thing is that if you continuously say, it's only X years until disaster, X years until disaster, once that period of time passes and the world hasn't ended, then scientists look stupid because people expect that this is what scientists said and it wasn't what they say.

So I think this deadline framing is often really unhelpful. And then I think in some sense, yeah, it does push. Push people away that would have been really engaged in the topic because they see these messages and they seem so far fetched that it's impossible for them to engage.

Ben: And so if you did have a magic wand and you could do perhaps one or two policy levers, so let's put this at the big systematic level do you have one or two policy thoughts that you particularly favor?

Hannah: I think that, I think a big one. I think if you look at where countries have actually made a lot of progress, it tends to be on electricity. So the UK, for example, like we've actually done a pretty good job of getting coal out of the electricity mix, like it's basically gone when in the past most of our electricity was coming from coal.

And I think for many countries they are making progress on that. I think one sector that's really made zero progress is transport. So we've made, in the UK, we've made basically no Progress on transport for decades. So to me, like a big policy lever there would be trying to bring forward the deadline or giving support for people from moving from petrol cars to electric vehicles.

I think a big The issue there is that when someone buys a car, they have it for 15 years or so. So that's 15 years of emissions from a petrol or diesel car locked in. So I think on transport we need to be moving much faster. And then another big policy lever

it would be something around the speed of building electricity grids. Like I think on electricity there's a range. Of issues that are getting in the way. I think one is just, and this is going to be probably pretty boring for people, but just like permitting, like getting a permit to build renewables or getting a grid connection, like getting a grid connection, like people would never think about.

You know how to get a good connection or the time it takes to get a good connection. So we actually have loads of renewables basically waiting to go on the grid. They just can't get a good connection. So I think there's like lots of what sounds like really boring stuff but really essential stuff on just providing the infrastructure and the setup to actually for stuff to actually get built and get plugged in.

I think this is this decade in particular, we need to build these technologies very quickly. And I think there's currently some barriers really getting in the way of that.

Ben: Yeah, the planning issue, there's actually lots of wind farms ready to go in terms of, they can be deployed, but there's planning and political economy things around that.

Transport's one heat pump sometimes comes up. Maybe we will get to that as well. A couple more and then a high level before diving into a couple sections in your book. Do you have a favorite visualization? Or graph that you like. Could be one of yours, could be one of the others. I know you're inspired by a lot of Hans Rosling's, which people have been.

And I know people in the visual data world really hate pie charts. So I'm always very intrigued how that's come about. But do you have either a favorite visualization or way of visualization that you'd like to share?

Hannah: I think I'll actually pick one that doesn't have data in it, but I think is just really core to the framing of the book.

And, just like really core to like most global problems that we face. And it's a Venn diagram that Max Roser, who I work with at Our Own Data Drew, and it's a basically it's about being able to hold three thoughts in your head at the same time and it's a Venn diagram of three different circles and in one it's that the world is still awful.

So on all of the problems, even the human metric problems, but especially also on the environmental problems, we're not in a good position like the world is still awful, but the world is much better on many of these metrics we have made. Progress. And the final circle is the world can be much better.

And I think it's really important to be able to hold all three of these thoughts in your head at the same time. I think many people get stuck on the world is awful. And they can't see that in many ways we've made progress. And they can't see any way by which we can make more progress. Equally, their people get stuck in the world is much better.

So then they become complacent and they just assume we can just sit back and progress will continue when it won't. And the key is that you use all of these, or you use the understanding that there's still problems to solve, combined with the fact that we can actually tackle problems in order to get the third circle, which is that the world can be much better.

So I think for me, I think that's just a really important summary of all the stuff I tackle in the book, but in general, all of the big problems that we face.

Ben: I really like towards the end of the book although you were inspired by someone else with the arrows, we referred to earlier about people who are pointing roughly in the same direction should consider themselves on the same team as opposed to people who are pointing in a different direction.

And I feel that applies to a lot, but it particularly applies to the climate. And I hadn't seen visualized as much. So in the book you. speak about quite a few sectors, climate, biodiversity, food and the like. So maybe we touch a pull of theirs. And I guess climate's on the mind of everyone. So we could maybe start that.

And perhaps your framing of that was quite a good way of doing it about what has been good and what the challenges are. But perhaps through the lens of climate, again, why do you think that we are in a position to be more sustainable and what gives you hope?

Hannah: On the world is awful bit, the bad news is that the world is currently on track for two and a half to three degrees of warming.

Now that's well above, our climate targets and it's a really bad position to be in. Like this, the impacts there will be really severe. So the trajectory we're on at the moment is completely unacceptable and we need to bend that curve. I think on the frame of the world is much better. I think we are.

actually on a better trajectory than we were 10 years ago. Like we were often talking about four or five degrees of warming and we're talking about less than that now. And why I'm cautiously optimistic on climate or where I think a big change is that the climate problem is that humans need energy for development and historically our only sources of energy were wood or fossil fuels.

And there was no way of. Producing low carbon energy in an economical way. And this was still the case even like 10, 15 years ago, right? If you were looking at solar or wind or batteries or EVs, like they were way more expensive than fossil fuels. There was just no way that the world was going to deploy these technologies.

What we've seen now is a really dramatic decline in the cost of these technologies, such that there's no longer this, trade off between, do you reduce CO2 emissions or do you provide people with energy? Like you can provide low carbon energy in a cheap way. And actually the cost of these technologies is still falling.

Like solar like continues to be all of our expectations. And in terms of prices, but also in terms of how quickly we are deploying them. So there's this kind of trope of the International Energy Agency and many other agencies, they, they come up with forecasts of like how much solar will grow.

And year after year after year, like they consistently underestimate the growth in solar. Like you would think that they would just for a year say we're just going to go like wildly overshoot. So we have a chance, but no, they still undershoot every single time. So I think many of these technologies are completely defying our expectations.

And I think what's really important about these is that these technologies do not necessarily scale linearly. I think it's, I think you become quite pessimistic if you look at where we're today and just draw a line out from where we are in a kind of linear fashion. But that's not really how these technologies work.

They tend to follow what we call an S curve, where initially growth is very slow, but then you reach a point where the, you can get very fast growth. And I think on many of these technologies, countries are now starting to hit that inflection point where they really do accelerate.

So I think that's why I'm cautiously optimistic on climate. I think because our need to address climate is now aligning with people's like short term economic needs. I think in the past it's been really hard to convince people, you should just have higher energy bills or or yeah, you should move to a much more expensive electric car or a much more expensive heat pump.

That's just not going to work. Like you need these two things to align. And I think we're very quickly getting to the case where they are aligning. Yeah, I always think about

Ben: it as ideally you want cheap energy, green energy, and I guess in today's world secure energy, and they are in a much better place than before, although obviously we have a long way to go.

When I was reading your chapter on food and the like I hadn't been aware that we were perhaps close to peak fertilizer use. That there's some arguments that maybe might increase a little bit, but it's not going to be the trend that we had before. And intersectional, I hadn't realized that maybe in terms of farming land, we may be approaching peak farmland.

And I was aware that forests had Restored in some countries, although not all over the world, but actually the restoration was probably faster or it looked better than I thought. So I guess with the same sort of framework, how are you thinking about food and the deforestation land piece in terms of what's going and what's not going so well?

Yeah. So

Hannah: again, historically. The only way to really increase food production was to use more land, right? For a long time we just got really low crop yields, and they just weren't increasing. Now, over the last century, and over, in particular, over the last 50 years we've seen crop yields across the world rocket, like doubling, tripling, quadrupling, like a really significant increase in crop yields.

Now what that means is you can grow much more food using much less land. So we can produce food very productively. Now I think the caveat to that is that often there's like some trade off there okay, you can maybe get higher yields with less land, but you will use more fertilizers or pesticides or all of these inputs, as a substitute for one for the other.

But I think what we've also seen is that I think we are now learning to produce food. Using less fertilizer, not no fertilizer. But we are learning to use fertilizer much more efficiently. And I actually think our potential to do that in the future is even greater. Like I think the range of technologies by which we can use fertilizer much more smartly, like for example, like you can use.

drones to see map out where on the field actually needs the nutrients, whereas before you would just spread it on everywhere. So I think there is actually the potential to, to reduce fertilizer use. I'm, yeah, I put a question mark over the peak in the book because I don't think we're at a definitive peak, but we're certainly seeing much slower rates of growth than we were like a decade or two ago.

Defore like so on, on the land use piece croplands across the world are still expanding. And I think that's the cause for concern. They are still expanding and we are still seeing like very high deforestation rates. Now I think there's two dimensions to that. I think one on the solution side is just continuing to increase productivity.

Of farmlands, which will save land again. And I think another big one there is also dietary change, like the leading driver of deforestation is cattle ranching. And just in general, meat can meat production uses much more land than plant based foods. So I think there's two dimensions to that.

One is we need just much more productive agriculture, but I think we also need to see significant dietary shifts. If we're to, Okay. To not only stop deforestation, but I think we have the potential to massively reduce the amount of land we're using for agriculture. And that would be able to restore forests, that would be able to restore wild habitats but it would need a significant shift in global diets.

Ben: The story I heard on fertilizer maybe it was a world in data or a tweet or an essay, has a sort of elliptical sense, is that there's is Haber-Bosch. But one of the reasons that they worked so hard on the fertilizer problem is that they'd experienced severe famine in their childhood. And so because of that, they were determined never to see that famine happen again.

And so that sparked the innovation which led to that. And I wonder whether there's a little bit of that now, that of the innovation that we need to spark, because we don't want to see these type of things happening again. issue of plastics, which you raise you're admit or appreciate that actually plastics have a lot of use.

There can be a really useful material and that probably some in the climate movement might underrate them a little bit, but there's obviously the problem on waste and all of that, the like. So I was interested how you went about researching that and what your kind of conclusions were in terms of plastic and plastic waste.

Hannah: Yeah, so I think there's a couple of angles to the plastic. I think one that's becoming much, getting much more attention now, but is a very open and unanswered question, is microplastics and impacts on human health. I'm very clear in the book I, I, if we want to stop plastics I don't have the solution for that.

And I think whether we want to stop using plastics also depends on If there is actually an impact on human health from microplastics, there's a range of stuff. There's just an endless range of studies saying, there's X amount of microplastics in your water and then your food and like we know microplastics are everywhere, but the open question is Do they have an impact on human health?

And what is that impact? And I think that's a really open, but like really important question. But the problem I tackle in the book is like more focused on like plastic pollution flowing into rivers and flowing into the ocean. And for that, for me, that's a much more practical problem.

That is actually a problem that like, with just some like reasonable amount of investment you could solve, and you could actually probably solve it quite quickly. It's less of a problem of plastic use and it's more a problem of waste management. Around, so estimates that are around half a percent of the world's plastic waste ends up in the ocean, and it ends up in the ocean because after people have use the plastic and dispose of it, there isn't sufficient waste management infrastructure to store it safely.

Now most plastic waste that's flowing into rivers and oceans tends to come from middle to low income countries, and that's because plastic use has massively increased as people have got richer, but waste management infrastructure hasn't kept up. Now there's a, in some sense, a quite a simple solution to that, which is just build waste management.

The problem there is it's quite expensive and not necessarily really high on the priority list. But even just la just putting it in a secure landfill is better than it leaking out into the environment. So you don't even need really really efficient recycling facilities or incineration facilities, even just a really secure landfill would go a long way here.

So that's one element to the problem is just like massively improving waste management. There are like more like techier solutions. So I cover in the book Boyan Slat who launched like the ocean cleanup. Project and their initial project was to get plastic that's already in the ocean out of the ocean So not necessarily stopping it going in but like dragging up the stuff that's already in there But they've also now launched what they call like the interceptor, which is basically the they basically put machinery at the mouth of rivers to stop and gather the plastic that would otherwise flow into the ocean.

Now technically you could put all of these in all of the major rivers that emit plastics and in some sense that would tackle the problem, but I think you would Rather do it by massively increasing waste management infrastructure and in these countries

Ben: That he has some very impressive pictures of the cleanup in the rivers, particularly the rivers in a lot of those places going So yeah, very impressive, but a bit open on the microplastics question another part of the book which I thought was somewhat open was on Essentially biodiversity or the potential for mass extinction, and I guess we sometimes see headlines with all we're losing all of the insects and we've had a lot of these massive extinction events.

It wasn't perhaps quite as bad as some of those headlines but you do seem to leave a couple of open questions in the book in terms of where we're heading. What were your thinking on the mass extinction risk and the biodiversity challenge.

Hannah: Yeah, I think biodiversity loss is probably like the hardest problem in the book and the, where I'm probably like most pessimistic.

I think biodiversity in general is very hard to measure and also really hard to communicate. Like I think the, one of the statistics you referred to comes from like the living planet index, where they try to summarize what's happening to the world life into a single number. And often that numbers misinterpreted and it's not actually what people assume it is.

So know. The numbers, I think it's 69 percent now they basically measure the population change across like thousands and thousands of different wildlife populations and then they calculate like the average change. No, that then is reported as. The average decline across the different populations is 69%, but people interpret that as 69 percent of populations have gone extinct, or we've lost 69 percent of the world's wildlife, and that's not how that metric should be interpreted.

So I think just in general, measuring and communicating such a varied range of biodiversity is very difficult. But I think when you look at rates of biodiversity losses is a question of, are we in the midst of the sixth mass extinction? Now mass extinction has quite a specific definition, which is that you basically lose 75 percent of species within, it's called a like short timeframe, but it's 2 million years or something, but it's like geologically short timescale, but for us, obviously very long.

Now if you look at the rates by which we are. Our animals are going extinct, mostly because of human pressure they are actually going extinct at a faster rate than they were in each of the five previous mass extinctions. So you'd go on the basis of that yeah, we're in the midst of a sixth mass extinction.

I think where I differentiate from that perspective is that, we would need to carry on with that rate of loss for a really long time before we would hit a mass extinction. And I have some faith that We can be, we can stop that and we just won't continue this really consistently high rate of loss.

So I think, yeah, on biodiversity, the signs are very worrying, but I think there are reasons for cautious hope that we can tackle it. I think what's key to it is being able to tackle basically all of the other problems in the book. I think we often biodiversity loss is often framed as like death by a thousand cuts so we need to tackle we need to tackle direct exploitation of animals.

We also need to address deforestation agricultural land expansion, climate change, overfishing, like I think there are a range of environmental problems that we need to solve and only then will we actually be able to get a grip on biodiversity loss.

Ben: I saw a film about a person who's trying to bring back the woolly mammoth.

I didn't know quite how I felt about it. I actually felt fairly positive on the plant and fauna that I think bringing back a lot of plants and things. The idea of bringing back the woolly mammoth, I think also because it could help the tundra and there's a kind of climate systems piece.

But I think that type of thing gets critiqued quite a lot within those who think we have hopium and techno optimism. On the other hand, I also did think that sort of technology and things might be useful in some, rewilding and reintroducing in some ways are adjacent to that type of thinking about what can we do?

Humans have caused the problems. Maybe humans are going to. Have the solutions what do you think about bringing back the woolly mammoth or some sort of those sort of technologies? I guess this is mostly on biodiversity, but it's intersectional with some of these types of things

Hannah: Yeah, I think it would be cool.

I think i'm a bit skeptical about the Tundra benefits and I think i'm a bit skeptical of that like i've seen arguments about like methane and being able to manage these environments better, I think I'd mostly just be in favor because it would be cool but I think they are like less on a like bringing back extinct species.

I think the, there are actually like pretty positive conservation stories, like for example across Europe or North America where we've managed to massively restore populations that were really on the brink. of extinction for example, in Europe, there are like a range of like really significant mammal species that we're doing really poorly.

And actually with rewilding, with reintroduction efforts, with conservation efforts, we've mass managed to massively increase the populations of these species. So I'm probably more in favor of investing. investing and protecting the species we have and trying to restore the species we still have left rather than trying to restore extinct species.

I don't know how much money is pouring into that. If it's non significant, then I think it's quite cool. But if it's like actively taking away money that would otherwise be spent on conserving existing species, then I'd be in favor of that.

Ben: The talking about money, that's a good segue to one thought I had, which is, therefore, if you had a billion dollars, actually, let's make it larger, because actually, in the grand scheme of things, a billion doesn't go very far.

If you had a hundred billion dollars, what would you do with that? And perhaps an adjacent question to that, because it might not all be climate related, but do you have a favorite charity or a favorite non profit, apart from World in Data, which we should obviously support, certainly at the meta level, because without the data, we don't know where we're going at all.

But what would you support if you had a hundred billion? So I guess this would make you like Bill Gates, but yeah, how would you think about

Hannah: that? I

think one key area where I might invest a significant sum is in cultivated meat space, I think that I think energy is already getting, we still need massive investments in energy, but I think overall, like there's more money flowing in that direction. And I actually, I'm much more optimistic about the energy transition than I am about like the food transition.

I think food systems in general, create a range of. pretty large environmental problems. I think dietary change away from me is like really key to us alleviating a lot of that pressure. And I think at the moment progress on that is going very slowly. Like diets are just not shifting very quickly at all.

Even though we actually have a range of like really Or what I think are really good meat substitutes on the market, like I think the Impossible Burger is really good, Beyond Meat's really good, I think there are really tasty stuff on there. But I think for a lot of people, I think they will just want to eat meat and they will only move away from meat from a farm in the field if there's almost like a direct substitute.

So I'm, I have a little bit of Hope and lab grown meat to be able to do that and move that transition forward So I think I would definitely invest like a significant sum there

maybe No, maybe a bit local. Maybe I agree with your earlier comment on heat pumps. Like I think for Renewable technologies, I think for batteries, I think for electric vehicles, they're getting very close to price parity, even up, upfront cost. And I think they will continue to, the prices will continue to fall.

On heat pumps, I think like upfront costs is still like a massive issue. So I'd probably invest a lot on that. I don't think it would go very far at the global level. So I'd probably have to just give it to Scotland or the UK. But I think for a lot of people, yeah, upfront cost of heat pumps is. is still a big challenge.

Ben: We could do a lot of learnings with heat pumps as well, because I think maybe you could use heat pumps from water sources and rivers. And part of the political economy skills issue is, I'm not sure if you've met Many Scottish engineers, but they're quite skeptical of heat pumps because they're really used to installing gas boilers.

And although actually in Scandinavia and even Germany, it's not a problem. They just think they're not reliable. They don't really know how to install them and there isn't this kind of mass adoption. So you need a lot of heat pump engineers as well as the coordination. Yeah, I think that's viable. And meet alternatives.

Yeah, for sure. I think we need a tasty alternative ribeye steak. I think if they crack the ribeye steak, because they're there on the burger, but if they really crack the steak, they did it. And then you need someone like I don't know, Arnold Schwarzenegger to be your front, maybe Schwarzenegger with a Kardashian or something like that.

So you've got the kind of pan I guess that's the sort of celebrity signal change or something that you will need to provide that adoption. But yeah you're going to say a third one with your a hundred billion. No, I

Hannah: think that was my 100 bow and spears.

Ben: It's all gone. Great.

So when you were writing the book, I was interested, did you have a particular writing process, or a process that you have when you think about data and how you want to visualize it, or how you go about researching? Are you a kind of write in a three hour burst kind of person, or do you write all day, or how do you come about your writing process or research

Hannah: process?

Yeah, I'm going to answer that, but I'm going to go back to the charity question. Oh yes, we didn't answer that one. Yeah, so I think I think I, so I took the giving what we can pledge where I give like a 10 percent of my income to effective charities. Now I think like being in the environmental space, like I think you'd assume that I would just give them to environmental charities, but actually I think like a, I hope what people take from the book is that I think the Human, poverty standard of living part of the equation is just as important as the environmental bit.

And I think especially when we're thinking about stuff like climate change, like one of the biggest ways to mitigate impacts of climate change is just to lift people out of poverty and to progress human development. Like those at biggest risk of climate change are typically the poorest in the world, but they just don't have resources to adapt.

So I think it's like equally. Viable to, to give money to just overall like global development charities. And I think that is just equally as useful as environmental charities. So I give a significant amount to like global health funds and in particular the Against Malaria Foundation which has like quite consistently came out as like one of the most effective ways to spend a pound or a dollar.

So yeah, I think that's, I think that's, a useful way to think about this, where do you give your money that I think the we need to keep in balance one the environmental change, but also the human impact lens. And I think it's just equally as valuable to just try to lift people out of poverty as a measure against climate change as deploying renewable energy.

Yeah, and I think

Ben: that's one of your themes is that actually we can work on many things at once and that's okay, maybe not the same person because the same person isn't going to be doing all of this but across that and that's okay too, but also that we should be thoughtful about it so I think you mentioned give well as well, which looks at, Assessing the effectiveness of charities, again, there are many different sort of options, but if you are want to give, you might want to just give a little bit intentionally.

So I thought that was a really strong theme, because there's so many things that we need to solve across so many dimensions, that you can just choose the thing which suits you when you're doing something. And you might want to do something else, because you might want to work on health, or you might want to work on your art, and you might want to work on all of these other things, which are important too.

And that. Pluralistic value within your book came across and was a nice theme. But maybe circling back to the writing

Hannah: process question. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So I, I loved writing the book. Like I really enjoyed it. I think I just really like writing in general. I think. Part of what I enjoy is one, having a question and doing a lot of work to figure out the answer for myself that's just really fun to me, and then on the end I have to tell everyone what I found, which is the writing bit.

But I do, I really enjoy writing. I think it helps me develop my thinking. I think I use writing to, to get my thoughts in line, to work through stuff I maybe don't understand. I think that's a really effective way to understand do you actually understand what you're talking about?

So I, I loved writing. I would My routine is that I would get up really early in the morning, like it was really calm, like no one was expecting me to reply to emails, no one was expecting me on Slack, or, so I felt really peaceful really early in the morning, and I'd just sit and write for like several hours.

I'd probably write for two to three hours. I think actually, I'm skeptical that if I had more time to write, I would make more progress. I think after two to three hours of really intense focused writing, I think you're done. I think you would start to, or at least I would start to really wane after that.

So I would do that really early in the morning, and then I still had my normal job around data and other stuff. So I'd do that for the rest of the day. But it was like, I tried to like, keep a really like rigorous routine. It's very easy to like skip a day and then skip another day and then skip another day.

So I tried to just take it like really rigorous, like day by day. And I got there in the end and I didn't really have a last minute rush that, that you might have if you like keep putting it off and off.

Ben: I was that almost. every day, five or six times a week, that you'd do the two, three hour stretch in the morning, or was it not quite, or was it

Hannah: every day?

No, it was pretty much every day. I would sometimes take a Saturday off away from writing, but yeah, no, it was pretty much every day.

Ben: Excellent. There is one theme with that. Some people say that actually one thing which links creatives and writers is to have all sorts of different routines and they write at all hours of the day.

Some write at night, some write in the morning, some write at lunch. But the theme is they all write and they all write consistently no matter maybe it's an hour, maybe it's five and it's really regular. It's almost every day or. at least on a very regular basis. So that's interesting to see that it that it echoes with your process.

Was there anything you found really surprising or maybe you had a conception which went then the other way? You talk about some of the kind of typical misconceptions, but it seemed a bit counterintuitive. But I was wondering if there was anything that you came across either about how you thought, Oh, I would be writing like this and it didn't turn out that way.

Or maybe something when you did the deeper research it's Oh, this isn't exactly how I thought it was going to be.

Hannah: I think on the research front, I think the re, it was a build up of research I'd done our own data over six or seven years or so. So I think in terms of like hardcore research for the book, I think a lot of that was already done.

It was about how do I distill this? Every environmental problem gets one chapter and I could have written a whole book on each problem. So I think the challenge was how do I distill this into a really. Simple, but nuanced narrative by which people can understand the nature of the problem and understand the really key solutions.

So I think the shrinking everything down into to a much smaller package was really difficult. And I think as a, what I always find difficult is like as a scientist or kind of academically minded person, like you, you really want to provide every single caveat. And we often do that because we think we're writing for our peers in our given field.

So when I'm writing about, I don't know, something specific on climate change, the temptation is to write to other climate researchers and put loads of detail in and show that you know all of the caveats and all of the assumptions. But that's not who the book is for. I'm not writing the book for climate scientists.

I'm writing it for a very general audience, which means that you have to let go of a lot of the intricacies and the caveats and try to write it in a simple and accessible way while also sticking to the truth and the science. And I think that balance is quite. Yeah,

Ben: and I think you've done really well in achieving it.

I think I read an anecdote about Stephen Hawking, the physicist. I don't know if it's true or not, but he was told for every equation he put into his book, his audience would halve. So in the end, he was only allowed one equation in the whole of the book because he didn't want to halve the audience. So there is.

There is something to that I wanted to touch on two or three things which kind of run adjacent to the book But comes across in your on in your sub stack two or three questions that you answer there. Because it often comes up in conversation Although some are a little bit niche, but I think really important So one was around the controversies or the challenges and opportunities on cobalt Another was on transition metals In general, and the third was around this argument that perhaps smaller.

Richer nations don't have to do so much because they're not such a large slice of the greenhouse gas pie today. What have they got to do with the problem? I put all three together in case you want to dwell on it in the back of your mind. But maybe starting with Cobalt, because I think that it's really interesting.

So one is that Cobalt is in a lot of technology we have. So particularly. batteries, EV batteries, but anyone who's got a smartphone has got cobalt within that. And a lot of the cobalt comes from the DRC. So people might know that as the Congo, which has a lot of issues. It's really poor geopolitically unstable.

But a lot of people because of that poverty mining is actually a really useful source of. I think the majority, or a huge percentage of people in the Congo, you probably know in DRC, live on less than 2 a day or something like that. But it's obviously an important transition metal and we can talk about transition metals in general.

On your thinking around copper, what did you discover and how do you think about the challenges around that?

Hannah: Yeah, so as you say, cobalt has been like a key material in lithium ion batteries, which is generally like all of the batteries on your smartphones, your laptops, like all of the batteries we tend to think about are generally lithium ion.

And that's been the case for decades. I think what's changed is that, yeah, we are now going to massive, need a lot more batteries. Like we're going to need batteries for just energy storage, but in particular for electric vehicles. So that's going to significantly increase. Cobalt demand. Now, as you say most of the world's cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo, where a large share of the population are living on like less than $2 a day, like the international poverty line.

And and especially in the artisanal so like informal mining sector there working conditions are really poor, like they've got. Like high rates of child labor, working conditions are like really poor, like there's very little regard for safety, like it's really poor and exploitive working conditions and they get paid very little.

Like they may bring them a bit above the poverty line, but it's not like they're like making really good money. That's why often. Families have to use kids in the mines because they can't afford to send them to school or they need income because income is so low. So it's a really bad human rights issue.

Now on the question of where we're going and the energy transition of that, is that actually surprisingly I could see a future where we actually just don't use cobalt in electric vehicle batteries. Now, Tesla, for example, has already started moving away from traditional lithium ion with cobalt. So they're now, a lot of their vehicles have shifted to lithium ion phosphate, which does not have cobalt.

And I wouldn't be surprised if many other manufacturers move in the same direction. So you could actually see that just EVs just don't have any cobalt in them. I think there's a broader question of, is that actually the best outcome for the DRC? Now people just do rely on that income to get them slightly above the poverty line, and if you take that away, they might fall below the poverty line.

So from an economic perspective, it's not necessarily beneficial for the DRC if we move away from cobalt and EV batteries. At the same time, we shouldn't accept that working conditions are really bad. I think the optimal outcome there would be that One of the poorest countries in the world actually gains significantly economically from a transition metal that the world really needs and you can provide a better income for workers.

You can provide like better working standards. But my fear is that the technological change of just switching to a different battery type is actually easier than confronting like pretty hard governance and political issues. So I think on that, I think actually we will probably just move. To batteries that don't have cobalt.

And I

Ben: think you had a blog discussing whether there aren't enough transition metals in general, and your answer, I think was short term. Yes, but medium term, there was perhaps a little bit of a question mark. What's your thinking around that? So I guess this is lithium. There do seem to be quite a lot of lithium, but there's copper, there's cobalt, there's rare earth metals.

There's quite a lot of transition metals and this kind of issue about what we use or what we don't use. How are you thinking about that now?

Hannah: Yeah, so we will, as we transition, we'll need a much broader range of transition metals. I think there's the question of will we have enough? And I think if you're talking about like absolute quantities of minerals in 2050, I think many organizations that study this say yes.

So like the International Energy Agency or Bloomberg, New Energy Finance or the Economic Transitions Commission or Payne Institute, like they seem. All generally comes to the conclusion that in absolute amounts, yeah, we have enough in longer range scenarios. I think the, some of the bottlenecks could come in the kind of medium term, where it often takes a long time to get permitting and infrastructure there to open a new mine.

And we will just need to open new mines if we're going to meet demand. So the challenge is in 2030 will we have enough? Mines open and supply that's sufficient to meet demand. And if we want to do that, we need to be opening up mines now, because like often the lead time is like seven years.

I think the medium term bottlenecks, there's a potential to, to hit some roadblocks there. I think the impact would be on higher prices, like I think in general you'd just see a higher price if they, you started to hit supply dema supply constraints. I think the there are various changes that make this like a little bit hard to predict.

I think markets actually respond pretty well to scarcity by, one, either just really finding more minerals. Like I think for many of these minerals we just haven't really looked for them and I think we'll just find more. But often in the short term, like cobalt if prices go up we're actually quite good at substituting for a different material that's more abundant.

So for example, in copper when copper prices are high often you'll switch to aluminum, which is not as good a material for conductivity, but, if it's cheaper it will get used instead. So I think it's quite hard to definitively Pinpoint, this is what the market will be in 2030 because I think actually technologies can adjust quite well to scarcity.

Ben: Excellent. And then the last question in the sort of sub stack series was one I hear sometimes speaking to some people, they say we seem to be such a small part of the problem when you look at absolute share of emissions today, should we be the first with sort of the first move at disadvantage?

Oh, China and Indonesia or Russia? Name some country aren't doing their bit. Why do we face in UK, Belgium, or something like that? A richer nation has a has an issue. And you wrote about this subject. What are your arguments here? And is it still the same as

Hannah: when you made them?

Yeah, I think it's still the same. Yeah, I hear the argument often in the UK that, we met around, 1 percent of the world's emissions. Now, if you just for trade, so take into account the goods that we import, it's like 1. 5%. But it's still less than 2%, so people will say it's so insignificant.

Like, why are we working so hard on this? I think there are, like, several core arguments. I think one is a moral one. And some people have told me like, just don't make the moral one because some people don't want to hear about your morals. I think there's just a moral one of historically we have contributed a lot to this problem.

We've gained a lot of economic prosperity through burning fossil fuels. Now, I don't criticize my ancestors, Yes, there's fears ago for doing that, but like it's just the reality that we're in a position where we have a high standard of living because we've burned fossil fuels. So I think there's this like moral lens to us taking action.

I think there's just a a very clear. Mathematical one, where if you break down the world's emissions, around a third comes from China. So just under a third comes from China. Another third comes from countries that emit more than 2 percent each. So you might call them like other big emitters, but then the final third.

Actually comes from countries that emit less than 2%. So they are all countries that would, you could use the excuse, we're too small, what we do doesn't matter. But if they all say that, then you miss like a third of the world's emissions. So it's very clear that, we can't, it just cannot work if countries with small emissions all say we're not going to do anything about this.

I think the other big Part of this, especially for rich countries, is one, we need to get domestic emissions to zero as quickly as we can. But I think they can also play a much bigger role when you think about technological change and driving innovations that other countries can use. As we mentioned earlier I think what's really key for me is that these low carbon technologies are cheap, right?

For middle and low income countries to deploy them, they need to be cheap. They need to be much cheaper than fossil fuels. Now, for me, there's a big focus for rich countries to deploy these technologies early even if they're a bit more expensive, to invest in R& D and deploy them such that they pull down the cost for other countries, so that India's not faced with a dilemma of, do they burn coal or do they burn coal?

Use solar because solar is so cheap that they wouldn't even think about burning coal. So I think that for me is a really core argument for why I think small emitters, but in particularly rich small emitters can have a much, much bigger role than just, that 1 percent would suggest.

Yeah, I think the

Ben: moral argument is important. And if you look back in long history on things where you've had transitional social transition, such as slavery, women's rights, the moral argument came before the economic argument on that. And I think you're right, that technological spillover from lead countries is really important.

We had that with say HIV, HIV drugs go to Africa, partly because of moral argument and partly because of the technological spillover that yes, they were invented in rich nations first. And so yes, rich nations benefited. For the first 10 years, but now the world benefits. And I think a lot of people have that as something which makes sense.

Great. So we'll do a short section of underrated, overrated, and then wrap up with current projects and maybe any advice you have. So you can pass, you can do underrated, overrated, or a short comment or however. So underrated, overrated, carbon offsets.

Hannah: Overrated. Overrated. Yeah, most of them are scams.

Ben: Very fair. Most of them are scams and we should work on decarbonizing first. Okay. Overrated, underrated nuclear power?

Hannah: For me underrated I know it's often not popular but I think yeah. I think it could play like a, an essential role in our future low carbon energy system. I don't think, if you look at trends, like I don't think it will grow really quickly.

It won't grow anywhere near the rates of solar and wind now, although you could have argued like a few decades ago, it was growing really quickly, but I think if you want to build a. Reliable grid. I think in some countries nuclear could play an important role and specifically we need to keep our existing nuclear power stations open.

Don't shut them and burn coal instead.

Ben: That seems very fair. Okay overrated or underrated? Utilitarianism.

Hannah: I'm neutral.

Ben: Neutral. Fair enough. Carbon tax.

Hannah: That's a tricky one because I can't gauge what public perception is. Probably underrated.

Ben: So in general, the public. don't like it which is why it struggled but economists really love it. Political economists less so it's interesting it comes about. I do think actually, as we're referring back to transport, it's interesting that for some sector challenges, although a carbon price really helps and the price part helps, you can actually get a sector decarbonization strategy, which doesn't rely on a tax.

So although actually doing things but for instance, at the extreme, if you said we have to convert to EVs by whichever year and raise your standards and help people along that way, you can do that without having to do a tax. Because generally people are quite skeptical about a tax, even where you have this kind of tax and make it progressive by giving back some sort of dividend.

A general population seem to be somewhat skeptical even without the technicals, but There's arguments either

Hannah: way. Is it just that people don't like taxes?

Ben: Yeah, it's partly that they don't like taxes, but they partly don't like the fact that It taxes essentially poor people more right and that also that there isn't a In some cases there isn't a really good substitute.

So when you tax, it'd be really good. It's a little bit like our example with copper and aluminum. You can move to the aluminum, but with energy, particularly for poor people, they can't move to anything else, really. So they might be able to reduce their consumption a little bit, but a lot of them are already, they're not the ones who are over consuming.

It's actually the people who can afford to pay. The other argument is that the signal on those who can afford to pay is still quite powerful. But there's

Hannah: Put some Sure, but you could have a redistribution, right? You could tax and then redistribute to the lowest incomes.

Ben: Yes, so you can, the dividend. It still doesn't seem to be popular, although that would be that would be progressive. So implementation issues political economy issues. But yes, in theory, that's what the economists like. And actually in the U. S., both the left leaning and the right leaning economists got together and wrote, I think there's a 2000 of them said, this was the idea but it didn't manage to go through.

Political economy.

Hannah: Overrated by economists, maybe underrated by the public.

Ben: Yeah, exactly. I think that's probably, I think that's probably right. And I think actually that's probably right on that sort of charitable giving type stuff, or even with utilitarianism. So people who think about cost benefit analysis a lot, think about it too much because they think that's the only thing which really counts.

But the average person who doesn't think about it at all, could just do with a little bit more thinking about about how they could do it. At least

Hannah: I think that's why I was neutral on the utilitarianism because I think, it has very I mentioned like the against malaria foundation and the like, how far does your dollar go, but I think leans into that.

But I think most people don't necessarily think in that way.

Ben: Yeah, exactly. And then when you get to the extreme, you get all of these issues and say, if you only. We obviously came up with a pluralistic thing, but say if you only valued human life and not, say, art or anything at all, then you have a lot of people and you have no art.

No one wants to live in that world at the extreme ends. So it's one of those things, which has all of these kind of fancy paradoxes with that. Great. Okay. And the last one on overrated, underrated Edinburgh. Oh, underrated. Yeah. What do you love about your city or what's most misunderstood?

Hannah: I think it's underrated for people that have never been, I think like I've spoke to those people that have been to Edinburgh and like they love it and I think it's really beautiful.

Yeah, it's just a really beautiful city. Like it's pretty cold. So I would suggest coming in summer, even Scottish summers are not really summer for most people in the world. Yeah, it's really beautiful. Very varied people are, like, super friendly just tons of history it's managed to preserve a lot of its historical roots really well.

I think the downside is that often when you try to preserve historical stuff, it comes with really poor building standards and renovations. So I remember as a student living in old Edinburgh flats where you can't. get rid of the leaky windows because they're part of the cultural heritage.

So I think that's like part of the downsides of it. But yeah, I think Edinburgh is a really

Ben: beautiful city. And do you feel you are in a big enough, say, innovation or human capital cluster, as the economists might say that you've got enough spillover of ideas that it's a large enough cluster there?

Because I guess people talk about Silicon Valley or the London Triangle and these type of things. Edinburgh's got a few things that it's obviously quite beautiful, but some people might argue, oh, is it too small to have these kind of impacts?

Hannah: It's much I used to live in London, and it's much smaller and there's much less of it than in London.

Yeah, so in some sense, I think I'm probably missing a little bit out on the London hub building. But I think for me the trade offs were worth it, and now a lot of the stuff you can now do online.

Ben: No, exactly. Great. And to finish up any other current projects or future projects that you'd like to mention?

Obviously the book will probably take up quite a lot of this year and all of your work on a world in data, but is there anything else you'd like to mention?

Hannah: Yeah. Yeah. So currently just doing loads of stuff on the book. I would have to say like doing like press stuff is like not my favorite thing to do.

So I'm like really looking forward to getting back to doing like research and writing. Yeah. Like looking forward to getting stuck in again at our own data research. And then again, I think a big focus for me is going to be like. Again, like energy transition stuff, like I feel, again, I feel like this is like such a critical decade for us to move on this.

And I think there's like still lots of, and sometimes growing misinformation about many of the solutions. And I think there is the potential risk that it holds us back and slows us down. So I'm keen to just continue doing a lot more on these big questions about. The speed of transition, the cost, the minerals, the land, like all of these very valid but open questions that people have and try to put like good information out there.

Excellent.

Ben: And then finally, do you have any particular life advice for people? So that might be people who want to work in climate or some thoughts about how you end up as a independent researcher or a writer or anything you'd like to share in terms of life advice.

Hannah: Yeah, in general, a big part of my book is trying to push back against a little bit the, Doomsday thinking and actually reaching out to people that are like really struggling with climate anxiety stuff.

And I've definitely been there and I've, I'm like, I still struggle with climate anxiety and what the future will look like. But I think what I hope comes through in the book and my advice would be to try to come, try to combine that with a sense of cautious optimism that we can tackle it and we can build solutions.

I think one of the best antidotes to. To anxiety is to get involved in stuff. I think one of the worst feelings is feeling like you're helpless and there's nothing you can do and nothing works. I think actually getting actively involved in stuff that moves us forward can alleviate some of the anxiety.

I think in terms of, I think it's hard on career stuff, I think it's hard to give concrete advice because I feel like my path is not really being linear or straightforward, like I never really knew what was coming next. So I think part of it is just being Trying to create a large surface area by putting yourself out there.

I think I've got the blog and even before I started Our World in Data, I had a blog. And I actually think it was really useful for me Getting to work with Max in our own data because he could see that I was actively writing, I was interested in these topics, I was putting my stuff out there and I think if you don't have any of that online presence and you're like trying to get involved in a project or work with someone, I think if they can't see evidence That you're doing that stuff already I think it's really to your detriment.

So I think I would advise people like taking the initiative, whether it's a blog or a project or whatever you're interested in is like having some online presence where people can see what you're up to. And I think often like spontaneous opportunities come from that, like someone willing to fund you might stumble on your work and really like it and back you. So I think that would be a main piece of advice is to start putting yourself out there. It's also how you learn. I look back on my old writings and they make me cringe. They seem really bad, but I think that's just how you develop the skills. And I think it's really useful to learn in public rather than learning in private.

Ben: Excellent. So that's by doing something you can feel less anxious and speak to people and build in public as a way for learning for yourself but as a way, as a signal for everyone else out there as well. Now that seems to me like excellent advice. So just a reminder for everyone. Hannah's new book is not the end of the world and which I highly recommend.

And Hannah, thank you very much. Thanks so much.

In Arts, Life, Science Tags Hannah Ritchie, Sustainability, Not The End of the World, climate, technology

Patrick House: neuroscience, understanding consciousness | Podcast

March 28, 2023 Ben Yeoh

Patrick House is a neuroscientist and writer. His research focused on the neuroscience of free will and  in particular how mind-control parasites altered a rat’s behaviour.

We once had a long chat on the rainy streets of Glasgow. This chat – which I may not fully recall – involved speaking on what consciousness is, and touched on his work on mind-control bugs.

He’s written a collection of essays: Nineteen Ways of Looking at Consciousness on what we really don’t understand about consciousness.

“Consider different translations of a poem: Each has something relevant to say, but none can entirely capture the essence. House repeatedly returns to a case in which a woman was undergoing brain surgery to address epilepsy. At one point, the surgeons touched a part of the brain that made her laugh. Did this indicate that emotional responses are simply an aspect of the physical matter inside our skulls?” (Short Kirkus Review)

We had a long chat on this. I asked him:

About dreaming in colour 

Whether lucid dreaming is real?

What he meant by: "If I were asked to create, from scratch and under duress, a universal mechanism for passing consciousness from parent to child, I would probably come up with something a bit like grafting a plant." ?

Memory in childhood

What he finds the most terrifying result in neuroscience

What translating poetry has in common with understanding consciousness 

Whether animals have consciousness 

What he thinks of AI and why he no longer plays Go

Patrick asks me if I would write a play only for robots.

We end on Patrick’s advice:

“My suggestion is to have phenomenological date night with whoever you're interested in the world and ask what their dreams are really like and if it's in images or what inside of their head is really like and see if you get anything, see if you solve any conflict.”

It was lovely long form chat about consciousness and the mind.

Listen below (or wherever you listen to pods) or on video (above or on YouTube) and the transcript is below.

PODCAST INFO

  • Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/3gJTSuo

  • Spotify: https://sptfy.com/benyeoh

  • Anchor: https://anchor.fm/benjamin-yeoh


Transcript (only lightly edited)

Ben

Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to Patrick House. In alphabetical order, Patrick is a neuroscientist and a writer. His recent book is Nineteen Ways of Looking at Consciousness, which is a fascinating look at what we don't understand and may never understand about consciousness. So, Patrick, welcome.

Patrick

Thank you. Thank you very much.

Ben (00:26):

We met in Glasgow a while ago. I recall a stimulating conversation on a windy night on a street corner, and I recall our chat with happiness and satisfaction although I do not remember the exact details. What do you think that it means that I recall our chat with happiness and it was a kind of experience, but I don't really remember any of it?

Patrick (00:51):

I love that. Just straight to meta right away, I love it. So one thing it means is-- I mean, there's this truism, right? There's this kind of aphorism that people often remember the way someone makes you feel, but not what they've said. So you're kind of asking like, "What is that about? Is there really physiology there? Is there a real true reason for that?" I think there's this funny thing where there's a different way in which memories get tagged. And so when I say tagged, I mean like-- A very simple way you might think about this would be like-- I don't know if you have a Mac, I think Windows allows you to do this too. You can kind of color code your folders.



You can add little like silly arbitrary colored labels to things; post-it notes are good at this. Anyone who's read a book, you see these academic books and they're full of these tiny, thin little-- especially if they're in law school or medical school they're studying these-- tiny, thin little color coded tabs. I don't think it's too much of a stretch to say memory scientists and memory neuroscientists are desperately trying to figure out for at least the last a hundred years how the brain figures out how to color code, how to code its experiences between lived experiences. So let's just think about, for example, the kinds of categories of things that you might wish to remember. 



So for example, you might wish to remember something that happened to you. You might wish to remember a story that was told to you by a friend, but it was something that happened to that friend. You might wish to remember a piece of fiction you saw in a movie theater. You might wish to remember a piece of non-fiction, a documentary you saw in a movie theater. You might wish to remember a dream. You might wish to remember the difference between the dream and you recalling the dream. You might wish to remember when you tell a story about something that happened to you in your childhood and your sister or brother then says, "Actually, that happened to me." And then you have to update your memory to be like, "Oh, shoot, did I misremember that autobiographical moment and did it actually happen to someone else?"



Paul Bloom; he's a researcher, cognitive scientist at Yale. He told me the story once-- I was interviewing him-- about how he went back to his high school reunion and he told a story about jumping off of a cliff to one of his friends that he hadn't seen in 40 years. And the friend just kind of stood there silently shocked and responded, "That happened to me. That didn't happen to you." But he credited it to his friend being such a good storyteller that when you're listening to him telling the story about jumping off a cliff it's like you're there. So with respect to our moment in Glasgow, it's this funny thing where some part of your brain is remembering everything that has ever happened to you. When I say that-- so I actually say that in the book. And what I mean by that is even if you're anesthetized, your body is still experiencing things and there's a kind of physical memory that comes along with that. Every single day that you wake up and you're slightly better at a thing you did yesterday, that means that your brain has physically reconfigured itself somehow to be better at the thing.



That doesn't mean it necessarily can remember the thing better. It means that the motor skill, the tactile skill-- Let's say it's just like making bread at home. You're better at it as you do it, as you experience it more and more. And you might not be able to say exactly why. You cannot necessarily replay in your head every single time you try to make bread and every single time you succeeded or fail. But still you get better at it. So what that means is that the brain is really, truly paying attention to everything that has ever happened to you. It comes up with this coded and abstract version of learning and experience, but fundamentally, nothing is going to waste; no experience is going to waste. So I would say in actual direct answer to your question, it didn't really matter the exact content that you can't recall it word for word. I can't recall it either word for word.



But there's a lot going on in any different social interaction. And really what you were probably doing is thinking of some sort of social judgment of like, "Do I...?" We were meeting hundreds of people at this conference and it's like, "Do I or do I not wish to remember this moment as positive or negative and therefore just more likely to engage in conversation with that person in the future?” So it's still social learning in a way. You might not have invited me onto this to share this moment with you if you didn't remember like, "Gosh, I remember something interesting from that moment, but I don't remember what."

Ben (06:07):

Yeah, exactly.

Patrick (06:08):

And here we are.



Ben (06:09):

And here we are. Actually, and that recalls me that because I'm pretty sure my parents give me anecdotes of-- and all parents do this-- of when you were two or three or one or four or five. And I think that I create the memory based on their storytelling and not my actual recall of when I was two, three, four, or five because I actually think particularly at two, your recall is pretty fuzzy. But who knows? Maybe I had that recall and the stories that I hear later sharpen out that part of the brain or that part of recall. So I think that's really true.

Patrick (06:48):

Just to that, there's a lovely study, ironically-- I hope I remember it correctly. But there's a lovely study about memory in kids where I think like three to five, they had language, but they still were learning some rules. Three to six years old range where they had two sets go to the zoo with the parents. In one set they had instructed their parents to always talk and always describe, "Say that that's a leopard. Leopard comes from Africa, comes from here." So the parent was always talking. Then they had the other group, the parent was explicitly told to say nothing and the kid had to keep talking. The kid had to be like, "Leopard, yellow, spot," whatever language it was able to. The parents just sat there and let the kid tell the story.



Then they weeks later asked the kids in a laboratory room, "What was the zoo like? Tell me about the zoo. Remember you went to the zoo a couple weeks ago. Tell me how that was." And the kids where their parents told the story just kind of retold the parents' version of the story. They kind of remembered what was said and just retold it. There was a lot of similarity between their retelling and what the parents had said versus the kids that were allowed to do the speaking freeform. They told it from their point of view and it was from their perspective rather than from the parents. So there's a very interesting way in which storytelling... Storytelling is like the heartbeat of culture, but there's a sense in which it's impinging on your own experience. If someone else is trying to tell you the story of theirs as you're trying to experience something, there's a sense in which it overwrites your own abilities.

Ben (08:42)

Yeah. That's really fascinating. We're definitely going to come to storytelling and dreams. But riffing on our first question then, it does lead me to think, "What does it mean to be if I say that I am very sad or I am happy?" I just wonder how are we interpreting that and how do I think like, "Oh, I was happy about that" conversation. What does that really mean, do you think?

Patrick (09:10):

So it's this funny thing in science sometimes like... The single document that has set science the most behind I think is the thesaurus. A bunch of people thought I was going to say something different. It's the thesaurus, and the reason is because it tricks us into thinking things are opposites. It tricks us into thinking that sad is the opposite of happy, that hate is the opposite of love. But it's not. So there's this great study on an fMRI study where they were brain imaging people on hate; they wanted the emotion of hate. And the question is, "How do you get someone to feel hate wrapped in a sarcophagus fMRI tube? How do you induce hate in them?" And so they had to ask them before the study, "Who are some people that you hate?" Like 90% of the people would choose an ex-lover or a former spouse or a bully who turned on them or something where... What it turns out to be is actually someone they used to love. That's how to create some of the strongest kinds of hate that we have. So this idea that they're the opposite is not quite as clean and simple.



The idea that happy and sad are in opposition or in direct opposition is also not quite as simple. The thesaurus has ruined things. So for example-- I don't give too much credit to etymology. But the etymology for sad is sat, which is the same root as satisfied. So to be sad is to be satisfied, right? It's this interesting twist I think on the concept which is like you'd think of satisfaction as the ultimate form of joy. But actually for some kind of person, for someone who maybe likes stimulation or excitement or likes new things, to be satisfied-- Purgatory is supposed to be the worst form of hell. Or like in Dante's little setup, I think he at one point describes purgatory as the worst kind of punishment. It's not even the ninth level or whatever when you're frozen solid. So I think of the little people wandering around purgatory as immensely satisfied, but they have nothing to do and it's the worst.



Even in my personal research, my PhD research, we had to deal with it. It was all on this kind of, "How to make mice love cats or how to make mice attracted to cats?" It was this whole mind control parasite thing. We could go into it if you'd like. But basically, one of the things we had to truly confront was, "Is attraction to something the opposite of being afraid in a mouse?" So when we see a mouse run towards a cat, is it running towards the cat because it now has gained an attraction to the cat, it has now gained an affiliation, it has now gained a desire to go that way? Or if you eliminate fear, is there just a basic sense in which you explore? We can't ask the mouse and so we spent years on this philosophical question like, "What is the opposite of fear? If you eliminate fear, what do you get?" And so this idea that you have a pleasant memory of that time on the Scottish corner, it could just be that you felt comfortable or like there was no... It was a lovely weekend. We were meeting lots of people and maybe you just had a cessation of all unpleasant feelings and your memory is kind of warmingly remembering it.

Ben (13:21):

I can definitely see that. And this idea of being satisfied is the hell for a headiness. Then also the absence of things; negative art, liminal, all of that type of thing. You could see that the kind of trite aphorism of bravery not necessarily being the absence of fear. What are these things when you take away the negative, what do you get? But I do recall something about our conversation which you alluded to because you spoke to me on cats and more specifically about how parasites can change the behavior of host rats. And this was specifically on that is actually relatively rare in mammals. You see it in other things. That these rats suddenly who are generally fearful of cats, or let's say they seem to avoid cats or avoid cat odors now run toward cat odors because of that. I guess that's the kind of a root cause of where you explore a lot of these consciousness and things like that. So I don't know. What's most misunderstood about rats and cats and odor and mind control and how does that lead us into consciousness?



Patrick (14:28):

It's funny because I now imagine myself hearing... So back to the first question, I'm now reliving this thing that I lived and I was supposed to have experience but kind of through your eyes of it. And now I'm imagining myself as some sort of Pied Piper. But instead of with trails of rats behind me, I just have trails of stories about my PhD which was about rats behind me. I'm still singing the same kind of egoistic song though. So I did my PhD in neuroscience at Stanford University under Robert Sapolsky. The thing we were just kind of interested in is we had heard rumors-- Well, there were scientific papers published on this. But when I say rumors, what I mean very specifically is like as a scientist, you wait until something is confirmed at multiple labs across the world and there's lots and lots and lots of pieces of evidence all pointing at something like, "Oh, you know what? That might be a fact."



So there had been this preliminary evidence; that's the scientific definition of rumor. There's preliminary evidence and very strong evidence-- There's a wonderful scientist out of Oxford, John Webster; had discovered this fascinating phenomenon, which is that rats that were infected with this parasite seemed to be more likely to be in areas that had cats and cat urine and the smell of cats. So just straight up as a biologist even if you knew nothing else, you would find this interesting because trying to overwrite a very natural rodent fear. So rodents are extraordinarily afraid of cats. They have an innate fear of the smell of a cat, of any feline urine and any feline presence. They've been having this kind of predation prey war for hundreds of thousands; millions of years.



So a mouse or rat born generations removed from ever experiencing a cat will still be afraid of a cat and they'll run away. So just as a straight scientist, the thing you're interested in there is, "What is the mechanism by which they overwrite that fear behavior in the brain?" Because there are parasites in the brain. So that's an interesting clue that maybe it's doing something to the areas it kind of infects. The reason that it's interesting is because we humans, we do good work, but we don't really know what happens when someone is afraid. We don't really know what happens in the brain when someone is happy or sad or afraid or not afraid or love or hates someone. We have a bunch of metaphors and guesses and some good data, but we don't really know.



And this idea that this tiny single cell maybe knew more than we did. Maybe this tiny little parasite was able to go to the right spot and flip the right switch. That's fascinating because then we can learn more about fear and we can learn more about why a vast majority of anxiety and PTSD and various human ailments and conditions can be attributed to chronic fear. And if maybe this parasite is good at lessening the fear in rodents, maybe it can give us a clue into a trigger in a human. Then we can dial that down from 11 to like a six. So anyway, it also turned out that the parasite can only sexually reproduce in cats. It's lifecycle for some arbitrary evolutionary reason can only complete itself; sexually reproduce in a cat.



So the really compelling thing that John Webster kind of threw out into the world was, "Hey guys, hey everybody, look at this. What if this parasite is intentionally manipulating the mouse and the rat so that it's more likely to get eaten by a cat so that the parasite can finish its life cycle?" And now this is kind of a thing that people have heard of. HBO's Prestige Sunday night drama, The Last of Us is about mind control parasites. This has been a trope in science fiction for a very long time. Resident Evil; the video game and movie. The premise of that is some mind control gone awry. So my PhD work was in fact kind of giving it to mice and testing where it went in their brain and the first possible mechanistic explanation for how this parasite is manipulating this behavior.



It turned out to be a really cool little-- Again, I'm going to use 'rumor' also to describe my own work because as a scientist you want to be good like that; consistent. So there's a rumor. So there's preliminary evidence that-- Basically I found that if you take a male rat and expose it to a female rat you can trace what that pathway looks like in the brain. We're speaking a little bit after Valentine's Day. It's in the air, right? It's like a love circuit. Like it's literally if there's an estrous female rat (so that rat is in heat)-- we don't know that word in human land because for some reason, we are the only mammals that do not have seasonal mating. It's fascinating.



There's a few domesticated animals where it's been domesticated out of them. But if someone's trying to ask any question about what makes humans special, one of the weirdest things is that we do not have seasonal mating. We're the only mammal that does not. Anyway, there's this thing you do if you expose a male rat to a female rat and you can look in their brain, then you can expose a male rat to a cat and look in their brain. Both of these behaviors basically start with a smell and then they end with an extraordinarily rapid behavior. The preliminary evidence that we found is that when you look at an infected animal, infected rodent that has this parasite, it looks like the other pathway is also active. The one that's supposed to be for the female, the one that's supposed to be loved, the one that's supposed to be for sexual attraction appears to be more active in the infected animals. 



So the idea is maybe that's why we're seeing that behavior. The parasite gets into the brain, mucks with things, and then the rat or mouse smells a cat. But really it's tricked into thinking that maybe there's a female rat on the other side of the cat. That really got me started on questioning like, "What is...?" To me, this is the heart of free will. This is the heart of preferences. Why do you like the things that you say you like? Can you be tricked into liking things that you're not supposed to like? These little rats are being tricked into liking this cat which then eats it. 



I ended up from that kind of getting really interested in fraudulent emotions or fraudulent ways of thinking about things because I feel like the rodent has been tricked. It's attraction to the cat is a fraud. I kind of took that into a bunch of different things. I think the concept of elegance is a fraud. I think are the stories we tell ourselves about why we do things, it's mostly a fraud. So I wrote this book, Nineteen Ways of Looking at Consciousness specifically because I found a moment that I think someone was behaving fraudulently and I wanted to focus on that moment in the same way I would focus on the moment of a mouse behaving fraudulently at one moment.

Ben (22:28):

I'm glad you say that because that is my reading of your work as well. I would express it as the parasite is tricking the rat somehow or tricking the mind of the rat or maybe tricking the brain of the rat. It seems to be that humans, our mind tricks ourselves. Or maybe it's more accurate to say that our brain tricks our mind or something like that over and over again. Although I think in some respects, I think fraudulent is right, although sometimes I think of it as more of a myth. So we create our own myths and that's why it's stories. Because yes, sometimes it is fraudulent, but sometimes it's kind of almost mythical. It's neutral. You could take it for ill or you could take it for bad because we've just created this myth. And some of these myths are very human. Like I've already said in some ways, law is a myth, money is a myth, religion is a myth in the sense that they are only powerful because other humans believe them to be powerful. They're like systematic mind tricks in that sense. Not to do them down because they're kind of our reality of that.



Is that a kind of incorrect interpretation of how some of your chapters are? They're all sort of different, but they all seem to be various versions of tricks. My overall conclusion was that you are arguing in some sense that we really don't understand how consciousness is, how it's come about or what it might be. And further, I think you made that argument and the analogy I guess is with the translation, the Elliot Weinberger piece, that the limits of language or the limits of our own seeing insider might mean that we never know, or that it's impossible or that at least the limits of language are there. So passing that comment out is, is it all about mind tricking ourselves and is that the right message to take about how we may not understand what consciousness is?




Patrick (24:25):

Yeah, I couldn't be too direct in the way that I kind of framed or introduced the book. But fundamentally, I'm like a mind control parasite guy. I think I say that in the book but I don't really say what I mean by that. What I do mean by that is that I ask one level deeper or I'm interested in one level deeper than what the brain purports to tell you is true or the brain purports to tell you is happening because there's a lot of evidence that the mind is tricking us. It might actually be in order to create consciousness, consciousness itself must be fraudulent, must be a simplified version of what's going on. You might not be able to ever separate them. So maybe this is a good time to actually tell the story a little bit because people might be like, "What the hell is... What does Elliot Weinberger have to do with anything? What kind of brain is lying to itself and what are we talking about here?"



So I actually got asked to give... In San Francisco there's a California Academy of Sciences. I'm glad I gave that whole preamble about cats and rats because it's relevant now. One year on Halloween they were like, "Hey, you studied this wild wacky Halloween thing, scary zombie thing. Would you give a talk on Halloween about monsters? That's the theme, monsters." And I was like, "Absolutely. Sure, I'll give that talk." And then I said, "But can I talk about whatever I want?" And they said yes. I made a switch to them. I did not talk about mind control parasites at all. I talked about the study that this paper, that my book is about because I find it the most terrifying paper in all of neuroscience. This whole zombie mind control stuff is nothing.



The most terrifying result in all of neuroscience is the paper, which is the seed root of the book that I wrote. So it's in the mid-nineties there's this teenage girl-- I call her Anna in the book. But it's like that initial thing. She's AK in the paper, but I give her a name and she has epilepsy. So she goes into the hospital-- this took place in Los Angeles. She went into the hospital and the neurosurgeon was like, "Okay, this is great, but we can't find the spot of your epilepsy. We don't know where it starts." It was bad enough that no drugs were working, nothing was working and she needed to fix it because it was getting very dangerous. So the surgeon said, "Look, the best thing we can do here is we drill holes in your skull and we implant electrodes. Those electrodes are kind of like seismic monitoring stations so they will be able to detect wherever the seizure happens because you have 19 of them or 12 or whatever. We'll be able to know instantly if you have a seizure while we are watching. We'll be able to know exactly where it started from and then we can go in and we can take out--" literally they would have to take out a piece of her brain. "Take out the tiniest piece of the brain possible, a few neurons maybe, probably a few hundred thousand. But the rounding error. And then the seizures will stop. If you take out the source, the seizures will stop."



So the thing is when you do this, you can implant the electrodes into the spots in the brain and then the person-- You can't tell them when to have a seizure. It's a random event-- or it's not random, but it's a hard to predict event. So you just kind of have to sit there waiting and it sometimes takes weeks. So they're laying in the hospital bed and they're awake and they're asleep and they're awake and they're asleep. There's no pain because the brain doesn't feel pain. So they're just sitting there talking. The surgeon personally told me that whenever this happens, he sees this as like neurosciences Large Hadron Collider. Every patient he gets where he's able to have them awake and conscious with these electrodes in their brain, and you're just waiting and listening. But you can say, "Hey, while we're here, do you mind if we do a few very easy experiments on you?” These electrodes can both listen and they can also stimulate.



So stimulate is just they shoot out electrical current and they can actually stimulate the part of the brain that they're in. So this girl had an electrode in the part of her brain called the supplementary motor area. It's just kind of a thing that induces a bunch of motion, movements. They pushed the little button-- I actually watched the video. He's pushing a button and kind of turning a dial like this is spinal tap. He turns it a little bit and she just kind of has this feeling of mirth or a little bit of smiley. He turns it up and up and up and up and eventually he turns it up to 11, figuratively. And she cannot stop laughing. She's almost convulsing. She can't speak. She's just laughing hysterically. Everyone in the room starts to laugh. You as you're watching the video, you can't help but laugh. She's not just laughing. It's like she's heard the funniest thing she's ever heard in her entire life. Her whole body is connected to like a braided hair of these electrodes coming out of her head. It's connected to multimillion dollar scary machines. She's just throwing herself around the bed and she can't stop laughing.



So the surgeons are like, "Whoa, whoa, whoa, that's too much. Hold on. Let's dial it back down." And they start to do an experiment on this where they actually don't tell her when they turn the dial on and they have her do various things. They have her read some books, they have her look at pictures, they tell her some stories, they have her tell stories, and then they'll secretly turn the dial on and off. It turns out that when she doesn't know that they've turned the dial on and she laughed, they then ask her, "Why did you laugh?" This is the question. I don't know with inflation what it is, but this is the 64,000 dollar question. "Why did she laugh?" This is like with the mouse and the rats. Like, "Why are you attracted to the cat? Why do you do anything you do? Why are you sad? Why are you happy? Why, why, why?” Asked her why, she laugh and she says, "Oh, because the picture of the horse is funny. Oh, because I'm holding a fork. Aren't forks funny? Because the doctor just told a joke. Oh, because you guys are just so funny standing there;" all these different reasons.



Her brain immediately came up with a reason. Her brain never once said, "I don't know." Even though it was electrically stimulated by the surgeon, her brain never once said, "Actually that doesn't make sense that I laughed. According to the deterministic laws of the universe, I should not have laughed there because nothing in front of me is funny." She laughed and then came up with the explanation after the fact. And each one was kind of plausible. The doctor did not tell a joke. They were not funny. The fork is not funny. But there were things in the room. They were reasonable answers. They weren't off the wall answers. So I find that that's the fraud; that's fraudulent. You can argue it, but fundamentally that's a fraudulent explanation. That's called confabulation in the psychological literature.



The part that I found so interesting-- So first there's that which is the mind control part. I don't care if it's a tiny parasite or an electrode. If someone is behaving in a way that is abnormal and they don't understand why and they lie about why or confabulate why, that's fascinating to me because that's the heart of will. But then there's something really, really interesting that happens. This is almost an extremely long answer to your very first question because alongside the laughter, she also said she felt joy and mirth. It wasn't just the laughter, it was the subjective emotion of joy came with it. So that means a few really deep things because it means that you can have a fraudulent laugh but maybe still get the benefits from it. Or the laughing itself is the subjective experience, is the emotion perhaps. We don't know. This is more raising questions than answering them. And so to me, that single study is everything. I agree with the surgeon; that is neuroscience’s Large Hadron Collider. That's our Hindi boson moment. That's our tiny little fleeting blip of anomaly that we can infer the beginning of the universe probably. We don't get many of those. In neuroscience, stuff is hard. We don't even know what anything is. We've never cured a single anything.



That's kind of why I got interested. And so the book Nineteen Ways of Looking at Consciousness is telling that moment, telling that story nineteen different ways as if you believed in a current modern theory. The reason Elliot Weinberger came up is because the book, the title-- and the concept I stole. That's fine, we can do that. I stole the idea from Nineteen Ways of Looking at Wang Wei, which is a book by Elliot Weinberger, edited by Elliot Weinberger, which are just nineteen different translations of a single four line poem; Deer Park by the Chinese poet, Wang Wei. I've loved that book. Someone gave it to me as an undergraduate and I just have loved that book. It's short, it' just 19 different poems. That's it; the translation. You just see so much beauty in the fact that none of the translations say the same thing. The Chinese character, the written characters, the written diagrams have different-- You can have sometimes the opposite meaning with the same one. And so different poets have taken that to be different things. I just think there's no better way to describe the difficulty of studying consciousness than that tiny book of poems, The Nineteen Ways of looking at Wang Wei because it's like you think you can understand your mind maybe as best you can, but you're going to have trouble understanding someone else's mind. It's a translation problem.

Ben (35:15):

Yeah. I have so much to say about that. That's utterly fascinating. So I read that book of poems also when I was 20 and it was very influential in me in the sense that multiple meanings-- you have an ideogram which means both blue and green or can mean both happy and sad at the same time. So impossible to actually translate in language, but yes. And then that leads me to three other on the fly observations or thoughts. So maybe you can comment on that. There is a practice within acting or theater work which I do which comes down to two phrases. One is inside out acting and outside in acting. So inside out is these actors who do these character things then they think, "Oh, how he's going to think about when he goes to buy a milk. And if I think like this, this is what you're going to do." So this characterization, there's a certain class of actor who does that from character and then they create these great characters from thinking about these questions.



Then there's a whole school of things which is outside in though, which is if I dress like this type of person I think should be. So if I dress like a clown, I become a clown. And actually there's a whole school of thought where you see that and you see it and from the outside, it is exactly like that. You can actually get to brilliant characterization from both sets of techniques to this end thing which the audience or person can see. I thought there was a lot of analogies on that when I was hearing what you say, even in the creative process. It also led me to remember-- I probably misremember ironies of one neuroscience experiment. Maybe I was told this kind of like, "It's the neuroscientist guide to dating," which I don't really advise or suggest. But the experiment was really around the fact that if you went out on a date and you did something which was kind of moderately arousing or exciting like going on a fairground ride or something like that on your date, you would do it and then you would say, "These feelings that I felt or whatever I was thinking was because of the fairground ride." And because it was very close, you interpreted in that and you didn't necessarily really transfer it or think about it in terms of the person you were with.



But if you somehow managed to set up the meeting so that you had done something or either party had done something moderately arousing or exciting, so they were kind of in a more aroused brain state or more aroused physiological state which they kind of measured, but it was long enough that you kind of forgot or your brain didn't causally say, "Oh, it's because of the fairground ride which happened a little while ago." What seems to happen is that when you go on the date, you attribute your better state to use your word fraudulently to the other person and you're much more likely to have a happy and successful date and go on something. But it wasn't necessarily anything to do with the person. I can't remember how they controlled it and stuff. In your language, this is only preliminary evidence of something.



But the story told seemed quite convincing that you were misrepresenting or fraudulently or just associating these kind of states or brain states. And when the brain couldn't immediately link it to the probably causal physiological state, it linked it to, "Well the only other thing around here is this person. So it must be that I really like this person and therefore that is love." Therefore I thought it was the neuroscientist guide to love. It kind of seems like these are all good examples of what you write about in the book and the impossibility maybe of understanding inside someone else's mind. And then the impossibility or the way that we think of the world is maybe a purposeful fraud.

Patrick (39:07):

Yeah, I was imagining if I wrote the sequel, Another Neuroscientist Guide to Love and I would just say like, "Well it's just a mind control fraud. This isn't real." So to that point though there's-- I actually forgot. I was trying to think of the term. I think it's like Alsace-Lorraine. Is that a food dish? Is that a culinary dish?



Ben (39:34):

I think that's close to it. Yeah.

Patrick (39:36):

There's some phenomenon in psychology. This is like one-on-one Wikipedia entry. I just don't remember. Where basically a psychologist went out for dinner with his wife-- I'm kind of enjoying intentionally misremembering some of these things because I don't know if it was his wife, I have no idea. I'm just adding for the flourish-- Where a psychologist goes out and he goes to dinner and then the opera, and then he got food poisoning from the dinner. I think it was Alsace-Lorraine; I don't know what that is. But if that was the dish and then he gets sick and he realizes, what's so interesting is exactly to the heart of your question. Like, "Do we kind of randomly or fleetingly associate a feeling with anything that happens around it?" Or does the brain kind of parcel out, can it carve out different experiences and be like, "Well, one is more likely to cause the other, one is more likely to be associated."



So his profound observation was that he got nauseous and food poisoning and he did not attribute it to the opera. He could still go to opera, but he could never have Alsace-Lorraine, the meal again. And what was so interesting is that it actually makes more sense that the thing closer to it would have-- The opera was after dinner. Why did the opera not create the conditioning? So now this is no longer a rumor, this is no longer preliminary evidence. A huge body of work has established that nausea and food-based stimuli are more likely to be linked. So what you eat as mammals, we're much more likely to link a bad feeling to what you eat than a bad feeling to a random experience; than a person made you feel. So that you're a little more accurate in your learning about the world. The next time you don't want to eat that food. Next time you don't want to eat the poisoned apple on the tree.



Whereas social observations and social interactions kind of fit in a different category. So you might, for example, if you feel deep dread in anxiety or feel like you got picked on or something, you would not associate that with the food. You would remember that and associate that with the person you interacted with outside the opera or something like that. So our brain is not just a dumb association machine. We do have these kind of fascinating built in rules which we don't have access to. That's the thing. What you said earlier about law and economics and various different things is just kind of myths we're telling ourselves. We don't have the source code to our behavior. We don't know what all the rules are. We don't have our constitution. We don't have our amendments. If you were to describe a modern human, modern homo sapiens in terms of legal documents, our constitution was written 3.5 billion years ago by a single cell and we've just been amending it. It's just a series of amendments. But we still have that same goddamn founding document. There's still some originalists out there that insist we have all the problems that that single cell had.

Ben (43:03):

Certainly the problems that the rat has.

Patrick (43:05):

Yeah. We've inherited all of the legacy issues. Look at the side effects of any-- Walk into a pharmacy or Apothecary-- I'm in Europe, so Apothecary, and you just look at the list of side effects. That's your data, right? That's your data. That biology is messy is all hell. Everything we have has just a litany of side effects. There's no good clean way of interacting with a biological system because it's like-- Imagine a Lego set. Imagine if in 1960 Lego stopped making new pieces and there were just 20 pieces and everything you had to build from then on was just based on those 20 original pieces. That's kind of what we are. We're just the amino acid version of that.



People get astounded. They're like, "Oh my god! Did you know the stomach has serotonin receptors? So that must mean it can think or your gut has a brain." It's like, "No it doesn't.” It's just like there's a few Lego pieces and your big toe has neurons. It doesn't mean it's goddamn sentient; it's just a big toe. Then cockroaches have octopamine which is a very close analog to dopamine. They use it to spring their legs when they're jumping. That doesn't mean that they are addicted to slot machines like we are when we need our dopamine. I find a lot of the analogy can get twisted and the similarity that a lot of biological systems have, people give a lot of meaning and weight to that; like our stomach has serotonin just because our brain also has serotonin. But it's not that the stomach is interesting, it's that the brain is more like the stomach than the stomach is like the brain.

Ben (45:05):

Yeah. And like you said, the brain doesn't have pain receptors. Does that mean we don't actually feel pain? Not so. It's all of that. 

Patrick (45:18):

Comedy's all about timing. It'll be less relevant if I come back with this later. I get so annoyed when people talk about the gut being a thinking thing. They say, "Never trust your gut to do anything except dissolve something quickly." That's precisely what you should. It all happens. Everything that you've ever done and paid attention to-- Like gut feeling if you get into the elevator and someone's creeping you out, that's happening with your cerebellum which is in the back bottom part of your brain, above your spinal cord. It contains like 50 billion neurons. It's one of the most evolutionarily beautiful conserved mammalian structures. It's metabolically expensive. It's hugely interesting. It has kept track of everything that has ever happened to you and it gives you like a slight little warning sensation in your gut. That doesn't mean your gut is doing the thinking, it's your cerebellum. Trust your cerebellum. But it's less catchy to say trust your cerebellum.

Ben (46:14):

There you go. And I can tell you I am laughing because I believe that to be true and also because it's got good comic timing because it has come off another rift that we were talking about. But deconstructing it like that doesn't make it seem actually that funny, and it is. We're now laughing together without any little stimulating things. I have one experiment that I was going to run by you before because I do want to also think about time and sleep dreams and actually also AI and open AI and maybe poetry, if we get to it. But there was one kind of on the neuroscience thing. I'm not sure they can repeat it now, maybe they can. So it was more with monkeys. Long story short, they got monkeys addicted to a very hard drug. I think it was maybe heroin or cocaine. And they learned that if you press pedal lever number one, you got the cocaine and so they got addicted and this is pretty much all they could do.



But then they were also taught separately that lever number two will shut off access to lever number one. So they learned both of these things and then they ran the experiment. What ended up happening is that the monkeys would press lever number one because they were addicted to wanting the cocaine, but they would also press lever number two because they wanted to shut it off. To me, this kind of embodied-- and I'm being really intrigued by this result. And people have got different things. I think it has been replicated to some extent and now there's a little bit more ethical concerns because it was a little bit of time ago. But that there are different systems or these different buckets in the brain which sort of, I guess know or act differently in terms of how they learn and they remember. They are at odds with one another. What do you think of this?

Patrick (48:14):

So I'm not familiar with the study. Back to that point where I said the source is the least scientific document in the world. Why do you say they're opposite?

Ben (48:28):

Well, I guess they're not. Opposite is probably the wrong word. As in one seems to try and cancel out the other in that sense that they're opposite.

Patrick (48:37):

But it's still possible they're maximizing for some sort of joy or they're...

Ben (48:42):

Quite completely. Oh yeah. Well, I think welfare is ...

Patrick (48:44):

In combination they could be, yeah.

Ben (48:47):

Yeah. If you think about it in terms of welfare and trying to maybe more objective, this is what you'd want to do. This is where the analogy is because if you can do so, there's obvious-- Okay, I'm going to make up the story. But the story would be they realize that the cocaine is not good for them and they have another mechanism over the long term of shutting that off. But they're also trained there's a very difficult impulse to fight against. So you can't help but have one impulse, one learned mechanism. You could call it almost associative which is so strongly learned that it's a habit which is really hard to break, but they have something more instrumental or longer term or something other where they realize if they can shut off that mechanism, it will be really good for them.



So there's all of this thing about orbitofrontal or prefrontal context and long-term thinking. This is the part which if you blow it out, you find it's really hard to make those longer term thinking decisions or maybe more complex attention type thinking even though we have these shorter term, more associative and these other things. I was just thinking. It's like, "Well, the brain has learnt certain things which seem to be the nausea and food things and it's got these other mechanisms to try and think about some of these other aspects." But you could definitely. The story I think we weave is that actually we are trying to maximize long-term welfare and these are two mechanisms you can more broadly see. I think that is one of the explanations for it.

Patrick (50:15):

Well, I mean maybe the monkey is trying to write a book. While I was writing this book my levers were different. So I have this thing. I have this time safe at home and when I want to write, I set it usually for 12 or 24 hours depending on how much I can tell I want to hit lever number one which is the internet, which is my phone and the internet. I'll take it and I'll take my phone and I'll take the power cord to my internet router and I'll put them in a time safe for 12 or 24 hours and I'll print out all the things I want to read first. It was one of the most effective tools I had for actually getting a book fully written.



I would love to hope and believe that I could intrinsically just say, "Don't use your phone, don't check your text, don't go on the internet." But I can't. I need a structural hurdle-- and not just a hurdle. I need a structural wall. My behavior, if I had like a CCTV camera around that time safe I would sometimes pace it. I would pace it in circles waiting and I would think like, "All right, well, how strong is it really? I could probably break it if I dropped it from a really high..." You know how Eagles break turtle shells. They pick them up really high and drop them on rock. I'm like, "I could probably break this safe."



Somewhat annoyingly, the information for how to break the safe is probably on the internet. I couldn't find it. But what am I doing there? Fundamentally, what am I doing there? I'm pushing both levers. I'm creating the external structure to deny myself but also allowing myself the pleasure. I don't get rid of my phone. I allow it to be in my life and control other parts of my life. So to the point that I made about the trickiness of describing things as what appear to be simple opposites, is like I'm doing it because I'm still maximizing for something else. So what appears to be anti-lever one behavior is really just I want to enjoy lever one more in the future.



So I have this thing where I have smoked tobacco and cigarettes. Kind of started in grad school and occasionally, I will still smoke a cigarette. But I don't want to. I gave myself 100 more in my life. I only have a hundred more and I keep track of each one. I don't know when it'll happen and I think I have like 79 left. Each one, I enjoy now. Instead of thinking about it like a terrible thing, I've given myself a finite amount. So I've created the lever two structure and I've been kind of like, "I just want to slowly taper off over the course of my life and then once I get to zero, I'll never have another one." So to me it's kind of-- It's like I'm a pianist hitting both of the levers at the same time.



I'm like, "I want everything. I want both things. How dare you try to take my addiction away from me and how dare you try to take my lack of addiction away from me?” I'm trying desperately to maintain control as if I'm on a crashing plane and the flight control is the voice in my ear saying, "You can have a hundred more. That'll be fine." So addiction is hard. Addiction is a complicated, weird thing. I'm maximizing by virtue of retaining an intrinsic reward and requiring the-- or kind of creating the outside structure which hinders that; that's lever two. This is my interpretation. But I'm allowing myself to not neither be controlled by it, nor lose the joy that I do associate with it.

Ben (54:39):

Yeah. That resonates a lot with me. I switch off the Wi-Fi when I try and do writing as well. And yeah, addiction is complicated and we have all of those mechanisms. There's also when you get addicted-- I think I'll pivot away from this. But you can get addicted and have it resonate with place. So this is the interesting things where if you take lots of morphine-- So if you're end of life in a hospice and you're having to escalate the dose and then you change rooms, you can actually lower your dose because you build up tolerance or actually you can also have it the other way or sensitivity and it can be linked to place and time and feeling and emotion and things like that. 



So maybe the last one directly on consciousness although I suspect everything is connected, is you wrote-- I'm going to quote your own words at you now. "If I were asked to create from scratch an under duress, a universal mechanism for passing consciousness from parent to child, I would probably come up with something a bit like grafting a plant." I realize your whole book is sort of thinking about this. But I've been dwelling on that sentence quite a lot. So I'd be interested in how you would say, "Why is it like grafting a plant?"

Patrick (56:08):

Yeah. Very intentionally the first word of the book is, 'If." I'm not kidding. I was like, "That's going to be the first word of the book." In part because I think a large part of what consciousness is, the way that we get to it is through counterfactual imagining of things. It's so funny because I like... So I write for New Yorker and various different popular science places; Pop Psych 101, Journalism 101. It's now considered a truism that you're not allowed to start an article with a thought experiment because nobody likes to be challenged in the beginning. I've been told this over and over and over. Part of it was like my rebellious response to that to be like, "Oh yeah, here's your thought experiment." But it's also because the human mind is just a nested series of Russian thought experiments. It's a bunch of counterfactual if statements.



But it's mostly the fact that-- Neuroscientists as a field, we ask extremely difficult questions about certain kinds of learning and how information gets maximization of entropy within the brain, how information travels from one region to another and all these fancy questions. But some of the basic questions are still shockingly profoundly unanswered. And not because the answer is interesting, but literally the very fact that it could be a question is interesting. So for example, every night we shut off the hell is that, and then a tiny, smaller, forgetful version of us which doesn't really have a body and can kind of float and has very strange thoughts-- Or do they have thoughts? Does your dream self have an inner monologue? I'm not even sure.



Then we just kind of wake up again the next day. It's extraordinarily strange because it's a control condition for consciousness. What it means is that in order to feel like it is like to be something that is conscious, you don't need to be behaving at all. You can be completely shut down and some weird amalgamation of some half or part of your brain can conjure its own version which has a full enrich experience with your friends in it. Where the hell do they come? Your friends are just in it and they have voices that are not your voice? Are you kidding me? We can reproduce these things just through activity alone. So that is still a mystery to me.



Number two, we can just make new ones? We can just without knowing how or why, two people can get together and 10 months later a new one is made? This is profoundly strange. This is bizarre in a way that I feel like we just take for granted. I was thinking, “I'm 39. My more stable friends have started to have babies.” It's just every single time completely and utterly mysterious and profound to me that consciousness kind of-- if you think about consciousness as the thing-- So I sometimes think that consciousness itself is potentially subject to natural selection and evolution. Not just the being that we are, the body that we are, but actually the mind itself might be changed through the process of generational transfer which means that it needs a mechanism by which it goes from one generation to the other.



I don't know if you recognize the cadence of my tone here, but this is also how I talk about cats. I say the parasite has to get from one cat to another cat and it uses the mouse as an intermediate host. So the consciousness version of that is consciousness has to get from one mind to another mind, and it uses a speck and a single cell to get from one host to the next host. How does it go through a single cell? I don't get it. I don't even remotely get it. How do we make a new one? Because it means that it just grows from its own rules. For me, the only thing that makes sense would be you have consciousness in one creature. 



And then when I say it's a bit like grafting a plant, what I mean by that opening sentence is like-- Well, obviously you go in and you scoop out a piece and you go and you put it in your backyard and you grow it. But you need that original seed. How else could you do it without a seed? But consciousness doesn't have a fucking seed. Excuse my... I don't know where it comes from; not French. Consciousness doesn't have a seed. It just can regrow? I'm just continually profoundly bothered by that.

Ben (01:01:30):

I never heard that. That's really fascinating that actually the mind or consciousness is selective. And having heard that for the first time, I was speaking to someone who thinks about what they call cognitive economics and this why we dream, why we have fantasies. His idea is that the projection of the future self is a very valuable incentive. That's why we can sit and have a daydream and find that really pleasurable. Well, what happened? Nothing happened. It was all in all in our mind. Why did that come about? But combining that thought or that idea with the idea that whatever that is coming about consciousness, then maybe there's also trying to self-select or evolution to make sure it keeps going on which does raise the question, "How on earth did it come about in the first place?" So that's question or thought number one. Thought number two, perhaps a tiny bit easier but completely unknowable is, "Why then do you think we dream at all?"



So my son says he lucid dreams and I think I believe him. But who knows? Who knows what goes on in other people's dreams? So whatever is lucid dreaming. I have all of these questions about, "Do you smell in dream? Do you have colors in dream? Do you think in images and words? Do you hear music?” All of which is like all higgledy piggledy depending on who you ask and where you ask them, which is infinitely fascinating. But yeah, so maybe why do you think?

Patrick (01:03:03):

Even that simple sentence like, "Oh, well, I have these questions. Do you smell in dreams? Are they in color?" People have different answers. Why is it the case that there isn't just one kind of human brain? Why is everybody goddamn different? Why do some people dream in color and some people don't? Why do some people have mental images on the inside of their head and some people don't? There's no explanation, there's no theory of consciousness out there that even remotely begins to address the variation. So I think about it when I say consciousness itself might have variation through natural selection. What did Darwin do? Darwin just went around and looked at some finch beaks-- I'm simplifying things-- Went around and looked at some finch beaks and was like, "Oh, variation. This is interesting." And there was a theory of geology at the time which allowed to play tectonics. Then through observation of difference alone, a theory popped out.



We don't even have anything close to a catalog of human conscious variation, but in speaking to people, it seems to be extraordinarily variant. And just something as simple as dreaming, some people don't dream in color. Ask them, just ask your partner. Some people have never had that kind of phenomenological date with their partner where they ask them like, "What is it like on the inside of your head?" You might find that the person you've been sleeping next to for the last 50 years doesn't dream in color and every time you've talked about things, you are completely and utterly talking past each other.



So it's funny you say your son has spoken about lucid dreaming, but then you kind of believe him. I didn't believe in lucid dreaming for a very long time in the same way, I don't really understand hypnosis. I don't really believe that. How's that possible? I just kind of didn't. I thought it was one of those things that people were maybe confabulating or in their storytelling, they're getting it interestingly wrong or. It could be easily be they're having a normal dream, but when they remember it, it feels like they have agency; all kinds of things. The brain is a fraudulent liar; you can't always trust it.



But there was an absolutely insane study recently which completely and utterly changed my mind and I now believe it to be a thing. I now believe it to be true. The study was a sleep lab out of University of Wisconsin-Madison, Giulio Tononi. He's a sleep researcher and a brilliant consciousness scholar. But he had this study where-- So during REM sleep (stage of sleep where the eyes are moving around, rapid eye movement), you can actually shine an infrared light and look through the eyelid and see the eyes moving. You can do this and it kind of seems to track with what people report from their dreams. So for example, you can wake someone up really quickly if their eyes are looking back and forth really rapidly. They wake them up-- this is in the case reports, this is no literature. And then you say, "What was happening? Right now what was just happening?" They'll be like, "Oh, I was at a tennis match watching a tennis match." The eyes track with the kind of behavior of the dream.



The interesting question would be, "Okay, all these jokesters which say they can lucid dream, let's catch them in their lie. Let's tell them in this world, in the real world. Let's say, "All right, when you lucid dream, I want you to do this for me. Move your eyes up, down, up, down, left, right, left, right, and then I'll know you're lucid dreaming. And then do me a favor. Count to 10. Just count to 10 in your lucid dream, and then do it again. Up, down, up, down, left, right, left, right." It's kind of like a konami code. I don't know if you remember this from like Nintendo; a little code you enter. And people could do it in their lucid dream. When they stated they could lucid dream, they did it. And then they counted to 10. There was some variation. It wasn't perfectly 10, but we're not perfect. If I asked you to count to 10 right now, you'd be off a little bit. It's absolutely insane. They were able to communicate up to the sleep researchers in the sky using just their eye movements. So sometimes when I'm having a bad day or something, I'll be like, "I'll just move my eyes up down, up, down, left, front, left, right just in case there's another level" because maybe there's another level.

Ben (01:07:35):

It's a secret code. I haven't quite got the combination right. But if I get it right, is a good day, it's going to come.

Patrick (01:07:40):

Yeah. Well, I just want the sleep researchers in the other one sky to know that I'm paying attention. To me that's profound evidence that it's real.

Ben (01:07:55):

I suspect it's sort of real. It wouldn't be a hundred percent, but like you say, maybe don't trust the brain. It seems to be never trust the brain in any event. Because I do sometimes, and a lot of people I've asked to report it, have that falling through the air sensation and then waking up thing, and then you wake up when your hot things and you say, "Oh my, I was falling." And then you wake up because it was that. It's often on the verge of when you go to sleep you have this. From time to time-- maybe it's no more than two or three times a year or once a year or something it happens and it feels really real. And I feel that that falling and it thinks, and it seems to me that's not too far away from a lucid dream although a little bit different.



Maybe think about sleep and dreaming and whether it's conserved and that thing on consciousness. Do you think dolphins have consciousness and what is going on when dolphins sleep then? I mean, it seems most mammals do some form of sleeping; at least what it seems to be when you do electrical brain and maybe half the brain is only sleeping and maybe only sleeping for 15 seconds, blah, blah, blah. So it's slightly disputed whether all mammals sleep, but a big bunch of them do. What's going on when they sleep? Are they dreaming? Do they have consciousness?

Patrick (01:09:09):

I think they obviously have consciousness. I think they definitely do. I think the way to know-- and this is extremely scientific, is you take a pair of snorkel goggles and you go down to Belize and you jump off a boat, and then the dolphins will just... Like, it's just obvious. That's the best I have. They're just looking at you and they're smart as hell and they know exactly what's happening.

Ben (01:09:39):

I had the same looking into the eyes of an orangutan. It wasn't dolphins.

Patrick (01:09:46):

Yeah, it's just kind of obvious. So I'm here in Vienna, Austria right now, and I got invited to witness or to go to-- They have a Kea cognition lab. So Kea is a New Zealand bird which just got the honorific of the world's smartest bird. I think it stole it from a crow or something; the New Caledonian crow. Anyway, stole it. I walked into the pen. They have a cage out of the Austrian, gorgeous, and there's like 30 of them. I got the same feeling I did when I was underwater playing with dolphins. There was a sublime intelligence in their movements, in their mannerisms. The human brain is really good at theory of mind. We jump into other people's minds. Adult imagination is-- People say kids are creative you should embrace your inner childhood. Kids are idiots. They're not creative. They're just randomly seeing imaginary friends and things.



We use our imagination as adults like experts to infer at a dinner party what everyone is thinking and what they might want. That is our imagination. That is way better than anything kids can do. And we use it to infer other minds. I say that only to say we're tuned to this. It can go wrong when everyone thinks these language robots are sentient, which they're not, obviously; that's a mistake. But I have never felt more uncanny intelligence than when surrounded by a pod of dolphins in the water or in this bird lab here in Austria last week. It felt like I was in a room of toddlers. They were so obviously curious and smart and intelligent, it was wild. I had never felt that feeling before.

Ben (01:11:53):

Definitively consciousness. Therefore I think if we believe that, I'm going to say I think they dream and I think they dream in their sleep. Whatever dreams are.

Patrick (01:12:06):

Well, I think the burden of proof. So there's a funny thing also in science where sometimes... You know in like law, you have evidentiary standards and then once someone's convicted, there's a burden to undo or there's all kinds of burdens of proof that you kind of layer top each other. For some reason, the burden of proof seems to have fallen on people to argue that animals are conscious. I wish to flip that burden of proof and say like, "No, actually. You have to prove to me they're not because there's so much reason to believe that they are. I can almost just sit back and wait for someone to prove to me they're not. I don't know how to wrap my mind around it.

Ben (01:12:51):

I think that's real. Thinking about you on Theory of Mind, I was just observing that maybe adults do it because they're really just trying to get really good at flirting. So that's why we have to pass...

Patrick (01:13:02):

To pass their consciousness from one host to another through a single cell.



Ben (01:13:04):

Yeah, exactly. So that's why we really, really need to know that well. And then thinking about animals and... It just seemed they probably do consciousness and dreaming. And therefore maybe because you have worked-- I think you were a contractor with open AI writing some stuff for them while they were blind and maybe around the time of GPT-2 two and now we're at three, three and a half and we're going to go 4, 5, 6. I recently heard an argument from I think Tyler Cowen, but I have heard it from other people that essentially these AI bots or language things-- So a lot of people are fearing this kind of rogue AI from a rogue consciousness. And the argument kind of goes if we don't really know where consciousness has come from and stuff.



But if you look at all of its evolutionary things, and we have it in animals and stuff, it just seems to be in a completely world removed. So at least how we are thinking of consciousness is not going to occur through AI or language bots. There might be other things that they're very clever at doing and tasks and stuff that. But at least on the question of consciousness and therefore potentially on the question of rogue AI or some people call it AI Alignment or the singularity and the science fiction or whatever it is, is just really, really farfetched. There might be other things you're worried about like nuclear weapons can be really dangerous just in the hands of humans. You don't need to give it into the hands of rogue bots which might be that.



But with all of our discussion and things like that, it seems to me that maybe-- I'm not very certain, but it does seem to me that consciousness won't come from that sort of software-led thing. Or is that just not right. What's your experience of seeing an inside glimpse into language bots, how they are, how they develop and your experience with open AI?

Patrick (01:15:01):

Is it possible that on the street corner in Glasgow I was telling a story about how I haven't played a game of go since AlphaGo because it sapped all the joy out of the experience? I'm getting Deja Vu.

Ben (01:15:18):

I think maybe. I'm getting a little bit of this. I definitely feel we talked about games and chess and how chess was bounded and is all go and Backgammon and the differences between Pico and all of that. So I think we did. We must have talked about getting that because this is it. I hadn't remembered that until now and now we have resurrected it from our consciousness.

Patrick (01:15:39):

Yeah, because I played Go. So the board game Go, I had been playing that almost every day in my adult life on average of once per day. And when DeepMind made AlphaGo and they beat it, there was a really interesting response. I had a really interesting response which is like, I just stopped playing. I didn't care anymore. They had sapped away one of my great and favorite hobbies. The funny thing is like, "Well, why would I stop?" It was because knowing that a robot could do it in a non-conscious way, in a non-intelligent way, ruined the game for me. It ruined the beauty of it. It ruined what I had held to be like an aesthetic.



I used to think that there was a part of Go that required aesthetic understanding of the pieces and the moves and the positions in the same way that a ballet dancer... To me, it was as much of an affront as like... To enjoy ballet, to enjoy opera, to enjoy art, I feel like you have to have an aesthetic sense. You have to be able to listen and watch and things like that. I thought that was true for Go also, I thought you had to be good at it. I thought you had to have an aesthetic sense. And then when they were like, "No, we can be the best professional in the world," something got ruined. And so my great fear is not AGI taking all our jobs or anything. My great fear is AI ruining all of our hobbies. Now that ChatGPT can write well-- I'm a writer now. I've moved out of my life from neuroscientists to-- I'm still thinking about consciousness, but more as a philosopher. And if ChatGPT can write philosophy and consciousness and fiction, now I'm like, "Goddamn it, get out of my hobbies. What am I going to do? What do I have left?" I have nothing left.



Ben (01:17:52):

I think you're going to be okay for two reasons. We have no evidence behind them whatsoever. So the first reason is I felt similarly the first time I picked up a digital camera, I had done a lot of photography in 1919; the late 1990s. I spent hundreds of hours in the dark room, analog, all of that. The first time I picked up a digital camera, I don't think I took another image for months. Maybe even I suspect years. And I've never used the camera thing on my phone for quite some time; for unbelievably a long amount of time where people's like, "Why did I dislike this digital thing?" It's not this analog thing I grew up with. But over time I have come to appreciate a different facet of it.



And within creative arts, my explanation for this is number two. So now I do take some image, although actually it's not the same as my work in the nineties. I think of myself much more of a theater writer and things like that than a visual artist. But I think there is a share of art or writing, which is the share that you have in the reader or the person who's seeing your work. You really definitely see this in theater arts because most theater arts is not complete unless you have an audience. There's sort of some exceptions but without an audience, you can't actually make theater because the audience completes it for you. Maybe this is like one of those weird koans or stuff. But if you perform in front of nothing that is not actually mostly considered theater, right? I don't know what you did. You were in a rehearsal, you did something else. It's only complete when you have an audience.



And you can then see, "Oh, that's true." In some ways a piece of art is only complete when you have a viewer. Writing is only complete when you have a reader. And you look at art for instance, cave art from thousands of years ago where going back to consciousness of things, we must have really no idea. We cannot substantiate anything at all what those people and cultures were doing when they were making what we now consider art. Maybe they didn't even consider it art or whatever it is. But we can look at those and we can create all of these myths-- maybe they're tricks-- around what it means to us today, what it might have meant for them then. All of the pleasure from photography, from Go, from whatever it is, we can recreate it if we trick our minds-- Maybe don't trick our minds because all our minds tricks to it.



So I think where you have generative art, generative writing and the like, there will be some stuff which at a surface level will meet the surface needs of what we want creatively or whatever it means to be human and consciousness. But this element which is the receiver's end are part of consciousness or brain which is that will is inherent in this part of creativity. Now, we can change our minds about it. So if Go no longer has joy for you, you have pricked your mind both ways into thinking that. But actually it's on your receiving end and so you can trick your mind differently in the same way that we can look at this art. Artists play with this going back to Duchamp's urinal toilet and saying, "Okay, we'll put it, and then this is art." So what it is, is a function of where we are. But that is why at least in in this aspect of it, I am maybe not as fearful as AI as some of my other creative friends. And they flip flop because of the power of the receiving angle. So that's my information.



Patrick (01:21:46):

Let's focus on the theater side for a small moment. I once interviewed a woman who was making robotic ballet dancers. So I was researching the concept of elegance for another project and there was something about ballet. When people say things are elegant they often use as their canonical example, ballet dancers. So I found it really interesting to ask, "If someone's making robotic ballet dancers, could they be elegant?" And the woman's answer was, "Well, it's trivially easy to make a robot who can stand on point for as long as you want it to. You just design it to stand on point." When the Bolshoi opening and happens and someone stands on point for some amount of time and they get 23 curtain calls and a standing ovation, why do we give it to the person and not the robot in that condition? Why would people not necessarily applaud to the robots version of performance but they would to the human? And I feel there's something about the pain that is required. The known pain outside of the constraint of the human body and the assumed amount of practice it takes. They knew it took decades. They knew this person has been devoting their entire life to doing this thing, which is totally unnatural, which is outside the normal bounds of human mobility.



But if you make the robot do it and it's designed to do it, it's designed to mimic human aesthetic peak. It's designed to mimic human peak performance. But in an aesthetic way and it's trivial easy, you're not going to applaud it. So what I was thinking about is the kind of idea of a robotic actor. So I've been kind of nominally on book tour and in one, I give a lecture and an actress was in the audience at one of the New York events. She came up to me and it was about laughter. So I was telling the story of the book about how to laugh and how this is a fraudulent laugh. And she's like, "You know what's really funny? As an actor I'm professionally trained to laugh; to fake laughing, to laugh on command, on cue."



Her thought, which I had found extraordinarily beautiful was that-- So she had two points. One, that maybe the robot the best they will ever do. Let's say that they can become ballet dancer, let's say that they can show emotion, let's say that they can speak as if they have interiority and consciousness and everything. Fundamentally all they will ever be doing is acting. Their ceiling is acting because they're still always imitating, they're still always not feeling the thing. It's a performance rather than the thing in and of itself. I don't really know what to make of that. I still ponder it every single day. I'm trying to think about it. I found it really beautiful.



But the other thing she said was that when she remembers an acting laugh-- So she goes back in her memory, the theme of this conversation. And then she remembers joy even though it was a fake laugh, even though it was an acting laugh. Maybe to be good at acting is too be able to fake it so severely that in your memory you can't tell the difference between a real one and a made up one or a professionally done one. So how does that work? You're a theatre writer, how does that work with respect to emotions and your memory of emotions on the stage versus in real life? Do people remember emotions differently? Would you perform a play for only robots? Would you write a play if only robots were in the audience?

Ben (01:25:53):

Okay, so several observations on that. So one on the laugh and emotion. So some actors will use sad thoughts from their life and also physical manifestations of how we often feel sad. So the breathing and things to trigger crying on command; the same for laughter. So they're drawing on lived experience to recreate another experience and that's a very common technique. So we talk about outside in and insight out. It does live as a sort of truth in them. So I do think it's not the actual experience of it as on their time, but it's like a form of dream or where it is, it's a recreation of that, which leads me into the second observation about the power of human performance, particularly live performance.



There's a phrase that some of us use within theater arts called shared experience. This is the concept that when humans can feel-- call it theory of mind or whatever it is-- that we can think in someone else's shoes or go through someone else's experience, or even when you're with other audience that you might be going through the same experience as the human next to you, that becomes extraordinarily powerful within our minds. We fool ourselves to think, or maybe we do that in the most powerful experiences, we are actually all in that moment sharing exactly the same thing or maybe almost exactly the same thing, or we're going through a similar emotion or we've culturally relearn to that. So when the ballet dancer makes that leap, there is a combined intake of breath, or you also see it in a combined silence.



How is it a thousand people are silence in this moment waiting for that cut to drop or waiting for that character, that actor to say something? It's because we are got a combined experience. Maybe that's where group hysteria comes from. Maybe that's where crowd and mob behavior also comes from and it's an emergent behavior of that. But I think you can see-- I expect this has been studied. I've not read the studies on it. But that I think is certainly true. My then personal observation is one of the reasons why live performance or theater can both reach heights more powerful than cinema, but tends to also be more painful than cinema is because you have that shared experience with live actors in front of you as well as a live audience. And then on top of that, you know there is this possibility that something will go wrong, that it's valuable, that it's human. That something will happen, it'll be off script or it'll be a moment or there's something different about this, which of course the robot never has. And so you lose that aspect of it.



But it's also why the shared experience part-- and I'm sure you've done it and some of us have done it. When you sit through for whatever reason, a performance, maybe it's a standup act; it is just not funny for whatever reason, or the performance is just painful because it's not a good story or it's a story you heard a thousand times. The pain of seeing a bad performance is so painful and that's why people actually put off a theater. You can ask them why. It's like, "Oh, I went to this bad piece again and I can never do that again." Because that shared experience-- the actor knows it's bad, you know it's bad, everyone knows it's bad. Why are we sitting here having this shared experience about this? Oh no, we can never do it again which is a little bit more diffuse in cinema. So although you can do bad tv, it's not as painful.



Bad theater is like one of the most painful experiences ever. But it's the same for the shared experience on the way up. And that is actually why also robots I think are never going to be as satisfying, even all the technicality. And then the other last aspect is, is because of the embodied meaning of that. So the embodied meaning of that particular passage or that particular jump or that particular music, we have given it a cumulative humanity reason. And in that shared moment with a shared culture or a background, we can probably all be ascribing a similar meaning at that point in time. And robots do not come with that or as least of yet and I don't think they will with that accumulated meaning of it.



So going back to the cave art, there is an accumulated meaning on that because we sense a shared humanity which we do not at least as yet share with robots. We might get there if we have some sort of hybrid AI and we start to evolve ourselves. So we have maybe more robotic components, we might feel that. But I don't think it is of the moment. So shared experience, accumulated embodied measurement and knowledge and of that. So I would probably never write for a robotic audience. There might be something kind of meta about it. So you might write it because other humans would be interested in what it is that we would observe when actors observe looking at the robots. But there's actually the human element, not really the robot element.

Patrick (01:31:07):

Even if they laugh at the right times and they nodded at the right times and they looked at their phone at the right time when they were bored.

Ben (01:31:14):

Because there would be no mistakes. It's the wrong way around. You might make a mistake, but the audience is not ever going to make a mistake. I mean, never say no. If you want to give me a million dollars I'll do it for you. I've got other incentives.

Patrick (01:31:30):

That was fascinating what you just said. So the audience is capable of making mistakes also in their perception of...? So that's part of the shared humanity or the shared risk?

Ben (01:31:43):

Yeah. So that's the joke because it's like, "Oh my god, the audience laughed in the wrong place." And then you realize, "Well actually no, it isn't in the wrong place. Maybe it's the right place. Oh my god, I haven't interpreted my own piece of writing correctly because I thought this bit was really funny and nobody laughs and I thought this bit was really rubbish and I was going to cut it. But it actually is really brilliant." And so that then has this whole line of things that the writer doesn't necessarily know the beauty of their own piece, who owns that piece and stuff. And so why is it that you write the line and you thought everyone is going to find this so funny and no one did? And then, "This is really not a good line." And then they do. So obviously who is correct? The audience is not wrong in that sense because the audience is having this experience. Although you then get some interesting conflicts. Conflicts is too strong a word. Well, you can sometimes see that some part of the audience is thinking one thing, one part of the audience is thinking another thing. So this is where some people laugh and some people don't.



So you don't always have that shared experience. It's a mixed shared experience which is kind of interesting as well. And audience members pick that up. So we know it's like, "Oh, you laughed at that. I know why you thought that was funny, but really that isn't funny and that's why I'm not laughing." You can see that dynamic going round. I mean, it's much more obvious when you have these cues like laughter or silence and stuff. And so you see this is why the standup comic process is often you do small gigs and you test out your material because you don't actually really know what's going to be funny or what's going to work until you find it in a live audience and then so you play with that so it becomes a working piece of R&D. Because the audience is giving you this feedback of like, "Well, I thought that joke was really funny, but only two people laugh so obviously not. Either they're wrong or I'm wrong."

Patrick (01:33:24):

I would expect a professional comedian-- It's true. They do workshop; the workshop with the material. But then I'm trying to think of writers. So I would expect a professional comedian to have an internal module or a self which was a listener of comedy. I would expect a music composer to have an internal ability to imagine what it would be like to listen to this. I would expect a writer to have an inner reader; to be able to listen or read or find funny their own work. And what you're kind of saying is no matter how good you are at coming up with an internal version of it, a fake listener, a fake reader, a fake audience member, it's still not good enough.

Ben (01:34:14):

Correct.

Patrick (01:34:15):

It's still not the same thing as having actual people. There's a limit to what you can imagine.

Ben (01:34:19):

Yeah. That would be my assertion and I really believe that to be true. Now, the better you are or the more practiced you are, you can get that maybe 90% there on your first go say. But even there, what I think you normally do is you draft and redraft. So you drafted it and redraft it in your imaginary audience or whatever you've done. You've done it so many times and you're doing it so quickly you're just getting up the curb. But even then, I think all of the professional creators will tell you, you test it in front of an audience and what you expect is not necessarily how it goes. And this is it. Even authors think about it as their own work. They go, "You know what? I think book number three is really by far my best work. But no one really thinks that. They think it's book number five. What do they know? Book number five, I dashed it off in an hour and it's just not there." You see that. So this is the audience share and the reader share, and it's to do with culture and time and place and comedy which might work in one city, might also work in another city. Really good comedians can bend to that as well. Really good writers can do that and all of that. But that is it. There are some of it I think it's a cousin thinking to what is consciousness or what is shared consciousness? "Are there emergent properties of the crowd?" I think there are some evidence of that. Or is it just all social learning? Some of that is social learning, but who's doing the social learning while it seems to be our brains? So I do think there is all on some of that.

Patrick (01:35:54):

I just came up with a new fear. Now I have my greatest fear for the encroachment of the robot. I've been writing popular non-fiction for 15 years and I've worked with a ton of editors. And I've also in science, you work with editors. I feel like I have an internal-- I have to what you said to your point gained an ability through all this exposure. I have a little internal way of reading my own work. After I type it, I can then say, "Okay, what would the editor do here?" And then I have through experience a kind of ability to see the page from the editor's point of view and be like, "All right, David, take this paragraph and put it at the front." And this has made me a better writer easily." I've incorporated the skillsets of-- It's kind of like in basketball you steal some moves from people around you and now you've gained a larger skillset of moves you can do. They used it against you and then you take it and now you can use it.



Now here's my fear. Robot editors, if you work with them for long enough-- Let's say they get good. Let's say that they get as good at writing as they're go where you still write and you still try to go along with them, but you use them as a tool. People use chess robots to train, people use go robots to train now because they're better and you learn from them and you learn new techniques and you learn new ways of approaching it. Now, let's take that and put it into writing. Imagine a robotic editor who every time I write something, the robot editor would be like, "Well, I think you should-- This is a nice beat. Let's stretch it out a bit and put..." They do story editing. And then I slowly start to use this over the course of a decade. And then even worse than Battlestar Galactica, even worse than some sort of hybrid machine parts. I now every time I write think, "What would the robot editor think?" And then that just becomes assimilated into the kind of writer that I am and you cannot remove it. It just becomes part of me to mentally imagine what would the robot do here? And then it's over. Then humanity's just over. That's my new fear

Ben (01:38:22):

I think there's a kernel of truth to that. And I think the AI could well end up training the human to some extent with that. My distant analogy to that is dogs train humans pretty well. We think humans train dogs, but you could think actually the dog has been really successful in training the human. It sits and we give it treats because it does these things. There's even a more distant thing. If you think about domesticated wheat and you think of it from the wheat's point of view, it's far more successful depending on what you think it. Does wheat even have a consciousness? Probably. I don't think so. But wheat domesticated humans, humans did not domesticate wheat and now wheat is the predominant plant wherever. So I do think there is this interaction with everything that we interact. We train it, it does train us. So I think that is true.



But I think this fear of the taking over, I don't think necessarily that is necessarily true. There's also perhaps your aim. Maybe if you're going to rewrite the thing which is the New York Times opinion piece or that long form bit in the Atlantic, which is the kind of thing that this Atlantic audience wants to read, there might be a touch of that where the AI has figured out that sort of audience or things for that. For something that's just a little bit more rote and stuff which what we think of as a bit of creative perhaps comes a touch more rote. But there actually is still a huge bunch of things where I don't think it will be able to do that. Again, I've already said because of the reader's half and the audience's half.



And then there might be things which are just really quirky. So I think one of the greatest American poets is a poet called Charles Reznikoff. One of his greatest pieces of work; he has two really big pieces. One is called testimony which is based on court testimonies based on Holocaust and the other on trials in the 1800s often to do with slavery. He makes poems out of those. I think probably only a few thousand people have ever read his work and will probably maybe ever read his work. But it's extremely powerful in a second order effects on what it is. And although this is a more personal view, there is a lot of other people who think he is probably one of the greatest American poets of the last hundred years. And I think that power of writing where it doesn't necessarily have to appeal to 5 billion people like K-Pop might do, will also still be really powerful. But it might not be the metric of either money or how many people read you, but that's always been the case within art and a different strand of that. Okay. So maybe last couple of questions would be current projects that you're working on. I get the impression that sleep and dreaming is important.

Patrick (01:41:13):

Yeah. I'm in Vienna to kind of try to come up with a next book or think a little bit more about sleep and dreams. Again, what I said a bit earlier, I get mystified very easily I guess maybe. I think the appropriate response to learning about the human brain is awe and nothing else. So I generally find myself with these moments of awe. I'm trying to figure out what the purpose of dreaming is. So that's kind of why I came to Vienna. Like, "Why do we need the conscious part of the dream when we go to sleep?" If it's for something, if it's for good, if it's for learning, if it's for-- there's all kinds of theories about why we do.



None of the theories really allows for, or none of the theories that I know of really explain why it is the case that we have to be conscious for little bits and pieces of it. Why couldn't that exact same kind of surrealist nonsense happen and we just aren't aware of it? Why? So I'm here for that. I'm trying to figure that out as I deal with my own kind of insomnia. It's pretty meta. I came here because it's cold and I sleep better in the cold. I sleep best when I'm frigid. I think I’m meant to be a hibernating bear and I'm just deprived of years and years of hibernation.

Ben (01:42:44);

Go cold, go north. Yeah.

Patrick (01:42:46):

So basically I'm entering into torpor as I think about dreams as I try desperately to have them.

Ben (01:42:54):

Go into hibernation, great. And then the last question is-- I guess I often ask this. Do you have any advice for others; life advice or thoughts? Or in reflecting on this conversation, I might turn that around on, what are the questions that you think people in this area who might be interested-- What are the questions do you think they should work on? So one of the questions obviously is why we dream, what is consciousness? But any advice for those thinking about writing or neuroscience or what do you think are the most important questions we might be working on or should work on?

Patrick (01:43:36):

There's a tricky thing with neuro... Paul Bloom, I mentioned him earlier; Yale professor studies cognitive science in kids; he's a psychologist. So he had a bunch of kids and he studies cognition and psychology in kids and someone asked him, "Given everything you know, you're a professor at Yale, you've been doing this for decades about child rearing and psychology. How did that change how you raised your kids?" And he said, "Not at all." I think I'm remembering this right. But he's like, "Maybe I have some better understanding of how to triage what is factual and what is not." But fundamentally, nothing he knows changed how he raised his kids even though he studies the thing.



To me, this is like a sad reflection on how useful neuroscience is, which is not at all. There's a bunch of theories and there's books and there are all the kinds of genres and sections in the bookstore. Anything that actually worked had to do with like someone changing their diet or various forms of proxy therapy. That's basically all that works. It's the most useful interventions neuroscience has ever come up with it. We didn't even come up with them. So I do think there's one way to be useful as a neuroscientist which is to ask your partner; romantic, otherwise, friends, people that you surround yourself with at any given time-- Take an entire evening, have phenomenological date night where you actually ask them what it's like on the inside of their head. "Do they dream in color? Do they..." Ask them to imagine a sunset and describe it when they close their eyes.



There's some people that are aphantasia and have zero mental imagery on the inside of their head. There's some people that are hyperphantagic that when they close their eyes, they effectively see a sunset with just as much richness as if their eyes were open and actually seeing the sunset. Those two people can be married for 40 years and they talk about, "Oh, do you want to go see the sunset?" Or they'll say, "Hey, can we go out?" Let's imagine this hypothetical married couple and one of them is hyperphantagic and one of them is aphantagic. The aphantagic one who cannot conjure the image of a sunset, cannot conjure in his or her mind the beauty of art or anything because it's blank in there asks their partner, "Hey, the sun is about to set. Could we go up to the back porch and watch it?" And the partner who's hyperphantagic who can just close their eyes and see the sunset goes, "I'm kind of tired. Let's not do that."



And let's say there's animosity that then builds right in their relationship because of this. Because there seems to be this mismatch in interest and, "Why doesn't he ever go outside and watch the sunset with me? It's so beautiful. "Fundamentally, those people need to have a conversation where they realize that the person who can't see gets infinite joy out of witnessing the thing. It's the thing itself. And that the person who can close their eyes and imagine it vividly can get infinite joy sitting on a couch with their eyes closed, doing nothing. So what appears to be laziness might be something different and what appears to be a mismatch in interpersonal preference might just be about a phenomenological difference on the inside of their head. If the person suddenly knew that their partner was aphantagic and that their partner couldn't see anything and they need to experience the thing to experience it-- they can't close their eyes and imagine it. They would say, "Oh my God, of course we can go watch the sunset every goddamn night. I didn't know you can't watch the sunset in your head." To me it's a movie that just plays and it's like an HD movie.



So I would guess that a huge percentage of interpersonal-- the things we ascribe to personality differences or liking certain people or liking certain things or motivation to do things. I would guess that a large part of it is just differences in what's happening on the inside of your head. Language is very difficult. Maybe my new career is phenomenological relationship counselor where I just charge people. I do marital counseling, but I only talk about... I do like visual imagery questionnaires and something like that. My suggestion is to have phenomenological date night with whoever you're interested in the world and ask what their dreams are really like and if it's in images or what inside of their head is really like and see if you get anything, see if you solve any conflict.

Ben (01:48:37):

That seems to be really great advice. I've heard you because you had this story of someone who didn't see images and wanted to see your image all the time because they couldn't imagine you. I think that's really true. And that recalls, I had a maths teacher in high school who discovered late on that they really believe they have their red-green vision. Red-green cones are reversed because most people find the greens of forests really relaxing and he finds the greens of forest really angry. He really reckons that the colors are reversed. And actually he's now evidence for this which is the way we've learned about it. You have this in color blindness and things. This is literally what you thought was red and I thought was red is not red for you because actually your physical cones in your eyes are actually different. It happens in a small percentage, but actually a much larger percentage than you might have thought. So that sounds like really good advice to me. Actually ask the other person what they think and maybe what's going inside their brain is not what you think it is.

Patrick (01:49:45):

"Why the hell did you get me green roses for Valentine's Day?"

Ben (01:49:50):

Yeah, exactly. Well on that note, the book is “Nineteen Ways of Looking At Consciousness.” Patrick, thank you very much.

Patrick (01:49:59):

Of course. Thank you.

In Podcast, Life, Science Tags Patrick House, Podcast, Neuroscience, consciousness, Writing

Kanjun Qiu: AI, metascience, institutional knowledge, trauma models, creativity and dance | Podcast

January 17, 2023 Ben Yeoh

Kanjun is co-founder and CEO of Generally Intelligent, an AI research company. She works on metascience ideas often with Michael Nielsen, a previous podcast guest. She’s a VC investor and co-hosts her own podcast for Generally Intelligent. She is part of building the Neighborhood, which is intergenerational campus in a square mile of central San Francisco. Generally Intelligent (as of podcast date ) are looking for great talent looking to work on AI.

We get a little nerdy on the podcast but we cover AI thinking, fears on rogue AI, and the breakthroughs of Chat AI. We discuss some of her latest ideas in meta science based on the work she has done with Michael Nielsen (previous podcast here) and what are the important questions we should be looking at.

We chat about the challenge of old institutions,  the value of dance and creativity and why her friends use “to kanjun” as a verb.

We cover her ideas on models of trauma and why EMDR (Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy) and cognitive therapies might work.

We discuss why dinosaurs didn’t develop more.

We chat around “what is meaning” and “what is the structure of knowledge”, what are the strengths and weakness of old institutions; culture vs knowledge vs history  and other confusing questions.

Kanjun gives her advice on how to think about dance (dance like you are moving through molasses).

Dance is inside of you. It just needs to be unlocked.

We play underrated/overrated on:  having agency, city planning, death of institutions, innovation agencies, high frequency trading; diversity

Kanjun thinks on how capitalism might want to be augmented and what excites Kanjun about AI and complex systems.

Kanjun asks me questions and I offer my critique on Effective Altruism. (Although Tyler Cowen more recently (link here Dec 2022) and philosopher Larry Temkin (podcast link here mid 2022) have deeper comments on this.

This is quirky long form conversation on a range of fascinating topics.

Available wherever you get podcasts. Video above and transcript below.

PODCAST INFO

  • Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/3gJTSuo

  • Spotify: https://sptfy.com/benyeoh

  • Anchor: https://anchor.fm/benjamin-yeoh

Transcript (only lightly edited)

I am super excited to be speaking to Kanjun Qiu. Kanjun is co-founder and CEO of Generally Intelligent, an AI research company. She works on meta science ideas often with Michael Nielsen, a previous podcast guest. She's a VC investor and co-host her own podcast for Generally Intelligent. She's part of building the Neighborhood which is an intergenerational campus in the square mile of central San Francisco. And she is all round amazing. Kanjun, welcome.


Kanjun (00:30):

Thank you. I'm really excited to be here.


Ben (00:33):

Everyone is talking about OpenAI's, chatbot, ChatGPT. The bot has some major flaws but can also produce some amazing writing and code. You can add on top of that the recent advances in AI art generation also via open AI or stable diffusion. And then other more technical advances such as DeepMind and protein folding and the like. I'd be interested what do you make of the current state of AI? Where do you see perhaps AI language going and where does Generally Intelligent and its own mission fit into this ecosystem?


Kanjun (01:10):

Yeah. It's a good time to be asking this question because I think when I first started Generally Intelligent with Josh, my co-founder, a few years ago we definitely didn't expect things to go this fast. I mean, we expected things to go quite fast. But I think this is faster in terms of progress than we've ever seen. It's really exciting and a little bit scary. We can get into the safety stuff later. But I think ChatGPT is something we've kind of roughly known would be coming for a while. But what's really remarkable about it is that you change the interface from something that's a freeform, unconstrained, humans have to prompt into an interface that's a chat interface and suddenly tons of people figure out how to do much more creative things.


Something I've been thinking about is like the Xerox PARC component of AI where we have all of this interesting development in capability. So one question is, "Okay, what are the interfaces that might allow humans to be able to get a lot more out of even existing models?" In terms of where models are going, I think-- At Generally Intelligent, we work on building general purpose agents that can be safely deployed in the real world. I think we kind of timed it well. We think we will have general purpose agents that can be hopefully safely deployed in the real world in the not too distant future.


So I can go into kind of our focus really is about studying generalization and reinforcement learning and how these models are able to generalize. And whether we can get a better, clearer theoretical understanding of how to construct these models in a way that is more predictive. Like, can we know ahead of time given this training data, these parameters, this training procedure, this type of model that you'll end up with a model that has these behaviors? So that really is the kind of hope. It’s that we can get to something that is more controllable. It's kind of like building bridges or nuclear power plants. Neither of these things is exactly safe, but we've made them safe because we understand how they work. So I think the same thing has to be true of neural networks.


Ben (03:38):

And so for a person outside the tech world or even outside the AI world, what do you think is most misunderstood about where we are with AI? So one impression I have is what you alluded to; it has gone a lot quicker than expected. Another element we can segue into the sort of rogue powerful AI, the so-called alignment problem on safety which I think the person in the street is generally not something which comes across their minds. And obviously there's a lot of strange and detailed technical elements to some of this. But I'd be interested in what you think is perhaps most misunderstood when you speak to the person in the street.


Kanjun (04:18):

I have a few. One is we tend to use words that we use to describe humans in order to describe AI. For example, the word 'understand.' So when I talk about whether or not a human understands something, I'm kind of referring to a mental process in their head that I have some sense of like, “It happens in my head too." So I have some model of what's going on in their head. A lot of people they say, "Oh, these models are just statistical. They don't really understand anything." In some sense that's true. Certainly they're not understanding in the way that humans are understanding. They don't have the same mental process in their head as we have in our head. But I think that is maybe foolish to expect these models to have the same mental processes and to say, "Okay, unless they have the same mental processes as humans, they can't be intelligent or capable and be able to do things that humans can do." So I think just being careful about using human descriptors to describe these models as a way to say, "They can't do X because they're not like humans in X." What else is misunderstood?


I think on the flip side some people say, "Oh, we already have something that's general. Everything is solved." I think that's probably not true. It seems like as we scale up models that we get a lot more capabilities for free. I think if you ask any researcher in the field, there are few results remaining towards something that's a lot more general.


Ben (06:08):

That makes a lot of sense. I think that initial observation you make about how we humanize things has been quite a human trend for a long time. So we humanize trees and we have already done the whole religions and cultures around that. So I can understand why we would do it with AI. But perhaps it's the same mistake to think that trees are like humans. It could be a similar type of thing. How worried are you about the alignment problem and rogue AI? AI safety is how real a thing that we should be working on? There's some people who are kind of dedicating their whole careers to it and others who seem quite blasé and just say, "Look, this is seemingly a human construct." Is there a small but real risk or is it overstated?


Kanjun (07:00):

I think the risk is that we don't know. I don't know, none of us really know how these models are going to evolve, what kind of capabilities they're going to express. The issue with complex systems-- and I would say neural network is a complex system, is that they end up with emergent behavior. So will they end up with behavior where they're trying to deceive us at some point? Maybe. It's hard to say, "No, absolutely they're not going to do that." So you can kind of construct the problem in ways where you can study whether or not they're likely to end up having that behavior. And I think it's really good for people to study.


Ben (07:42):

I guess that makes sense because I'm never quite sure how much we really understand the brain itself. Like maybe below 50%, maybe even as little as 10 or 20%. I'm going to segue into something which I've been reading. Some work that you've done and something which isn't very well understood in the world which I guess is around trauma or anxiety. I'm interested in neural networks and how the brain thinks of it because we don't really understand it. I'm particularly interested in this technique called EMDR which works on eye movement and it essentially seems to have a reprogramming effect. It stands for Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing therapy. If you look at controlled trials, it really seems to work for some people. Not everyone, but actually pretty good results in trauma and things like that. Quite a lot of neuroscience, we don't really know how it works. So I'd be interested in what you think AI or neural networks or this has perhaps told us about trauma or anxiety or the brain, and maybe vice versa in terms of maybe some learnings or thoughts you have about how it might be helpful or not in this kind of area.


Kanjun (09:01):

Yeah. So get ready for the rabbit hole. I have a bunch of thoughts on trauma. I think maybe the kind of core idea is-- and I'll write an essay on this at some point. This idea that trauma is overfitting and therapy is actually a process of retraining. So let me give some examples. I've done a ton of therapy on myself, I think. I grew up in China. I moved here when I was six by myself. My parents had moved here when I was much younger. I had a lot of abandonment issues that resulted in all sorts of weird behaviors that were not well suited to my current environment. Those behaviors were rooted in fear. I think basically young children copy a lot of beliefs from our caretakers, and in particular we copy beliefs where our caretakers are scared.


The theory behind social copying like this is that copying is a really efficient pre-filter on potential beliefs or potential behaviors because presumably other people around you have those beliefs and behaviors because they're adaptive. That's kind of one theory why we copy so much. So we copy all of this into our brains and so now we have all these fears that our parents and grandparents and family have. I had internalized a lot of those fears. We call something trauma for really two reasons. One is something that seems really bad happened. That's kind of the medical term of trauma. But I want to use trauma to refer to this other phenomenon where we call it trauma when it doesn't seem like it's well suited to our daily life or our current life.


So post-traumatic stress disorder is a trauma and PTSD is fine if you're at war. You do actually want to be super jumpy and really careful about whether or not a shell is coming. But then you migrate back into the real world which is out of the data distribution of the environment you were just in and now you're out of distribution. So you've been overfit to the previous environment-- and I'm abusing some terms here, but now you're not generalizing to this new environment that you're in. I think this is true of most people. We don't actually generalize that well from childhood to adulthood. We freeze a lot of these old beliefs because they're adaptive and in an environment that is much more dangerous than our current environment that worked really well. But our current life, this environment is quite safe and having these fears is actually not very useful and causes a lot of maladaptive behavior. And so trauma is overfitting.

So therapy is retraining. I think what I've observed in therapy is that there are really three processes going on. There is the process of activating or accessing a network; a sub network of some sort. There's the process of giving it new training data from your current life and then there's the process of updating it. So actually having that memory reconsolidation process happen. It seems to me that all therapy techniques are good at one to three of these three elements of retraining. So EMDR as you mentioned is actually quite good at all three. I think that's part of why it's so effective. It's that with EMDR, you are flicking your eyes back and forth or you're doing this bilateral tapping where you're tapping different sides of your body. Somehow that seems to reduce fear response so that you can more easily access a network.


EMDR I would say the places where it's not as effective is in giving your mind new training data from your modern day. Your therapist actually has to prompt you to do that. So if you're working with a therapist who doesn't understand this frame of, "Okay, now you need to see how this old memory is not adaptive and you can update it." If your therapist is not doing that, if they're not giving you training data from your modern day then you may not see updating. And so that might be why. I've done EMDR on a lot of people and it seems fairly consistently if you do show them the training data and their modern life is good, then they'll update.


Ben (13:23):

This is fascinating to know and also that's a sort of learning that you get from understanding ideas of neural networks and training data. It might in some ways bring us closer to some animal behavior type model. But I hadn't heard it articulated that way and also makes sense of why some of these things may fail or not.


Kanjun (13:44):

I kind of have this whole theory of why therapies work or don't work because I've experimented so much on myself and designed new techniques combining existing ones because they're not all good at all three things. So cognitive behavioral therapy is fantastic at getting new training data from your modern day because it's asking you things like, "What are the costs of what you're doing or what are the costs of that belief?" So it's basically a data accumulation mechanism. You can acquire more data using CBT procedures. But it's not very good at accessing these very old beliefs. The kind of complaint about CBT is that it often works at the surface level where it's actually really hard to get to these deep old beliefs. And then it's pretty good at helping you update. Has a bunch of different methods to help you update.


Like, you write down on the costs, you look at the list of costs, you implement habits into your life, et cetera. So that's particularly good for getting training data but it's not good for access. Now you look at something like Internal Family Systems where you're talking to different parts inside your body and these different parts are kind of-- The way I think about it is they're like old memories that are stored. IFS is really good for access. The whole point is that you're accessing some of these parts and able to go into them, but it's not very good at getting training data from your modern day. So often people do IFS, they go into those parts and if they're not prompted properly or they haven't prepared their conscious mind with new beliefs from today, then they'll just believe whatever that part is believing. They'll believe like, "Oh, I'm three years old and I'm really scared and it's good to be scared." And you're like, "Well actually no. You're not three years old anymore." You kind of have to bring them out of that purposefully.


So combining IFS and CBT or somatic therapy and CBT, these are effective methods. It makes a therapy method much more effective. I think this framework actually makes therapy debuggable. So if a person is for some reason not able to update a situation that they're feeling frustrated by you can kind of say, "Okay, well is the problem in access? Is it in training data or is it in updating?" There are techniques that you can combine to get all three to happen. Then to your point about neural networks and how that influence the mind, I think basically both neural networks and the mind are learning systems. And learning systems-- like modeling systems have some shared properties. So overfitting is one of them.


Ben (16:33):

That's amazing. So you definitely have to write that as an essay. It sounds like you should actually have a whole new startup investigating that. You may not get to AGI, but you solved the therapy problem which seems to me almost as great.


Kanjun (16:50):

Actually, I think an important part of safety is figuring out what values to align to. So understanding humans is an important part of that.


Ben (16:59):

Exactly. It leads me to think that... Do you think animals go through trauma then? Some form?



Kanjun (17:06):

Almost certainly. Yeah. So you'll see some dogs were abused when they were young or by a previous owner and then now they're really jumpy even though they're with a new owner. So these learning systems update very conservatively in humans and living creatures which makes sense because the real world is fairly unforgiving. If you update too quickly, then you might die.


Ben (17:32):

Sure. So this is the paired learning response. It's really strong. Okay. So a slight left field pivot then is, do you think dinosaurs felt trauma?


Kanjun (17:44):

Almost certainly. Again, it's a learning system. Unless dinosaurs never learned anything new, that's plausible, but unlikely.


Ben (17:56):

That's quite a good one because you have a question on your website which you posed which I guess we have no answer, which is they existed for 165 million years or so, give or take, and they did not seem to advance to the levels that we seem to advance to. But obviously they seemed to felt trauma and they have some of these learning mechanisms. I guess we can just extend this to other animals which have been around for a long time. Maybe you could do mammals like rats or you could do insects as well. What's your current thinking on this?


Kanjun (18:30):

So the question is basically-- I was reading a lot about dinosaurs and I was like, "Why is it that for hundreds of millions of years we had these creatures that evolved a little bit but didn't seem to improve dramatically or change dramatically? And then versus in the last like 1 million years or 2 million years on earth, we have had this crazy exponential change in the nature of intelligence of animals on this planet. Is there something that causes this kind of change in evolution?” My current best hypothesis is environment constraints force evolution of new skills or capabilities. So basically you want to be in an environment where intelligence is rewarded. If the environment is too abundant-- which at that time there was a lot of oxygen in the air. Maybe it was very abundant in terms of an environment, in terms of food. If the environment's too abundant, there's no benefit to being smarter. And so here now today, the environment's not as abundant-- I think, we think. I'm not sure, no one knows. But if that were true, then constraints, maybe.


Ben (19:46):

Yeah. Okay. I like that theory. I got one slightly downstream for that which is dinosaurs didn't have hands as much. I think the second thing which comes alongside is language. And that didn't develop. But why didn't those things develop? There is some evidence or there’s some theories that the human animal or something like that was forced to-- for instance in ice ages or when there was scarcity-- to develop these things to survive. Therefore that would happen with a bit of luck. So they kind of intertwine. I guess the follow one from that though is I was pondering when you go back just a little bit in time I guess on this time scale to the Romans and the Greeks, why did they not invent more advances than we have today? They certainly seem to have some of the capabilities-- and they did invent some things like Roman cement which we still can't seem to copy which seems to be a really good material.


But they didn't invent some of those things. You can see this is going to segue into meta science at a point because they also didn't invent some things which didn't really need other types of technology. The one I always think about is the randomized control trial. So you test one arm and you test another arm and you compare them. That didn't need any extra science and certainly they had seemingly the capabilities of it. In fact, you could have gone back 2000 years earlier and they would've had the capabilities of that. But it didn't develop, or maybe it did and it just didn't hold which is also kind of interesting. Have you ever thought about that? Why did Greek and...


Kanjun (21:28):

Yeah. I thought about it. Quite a lot.


Ben (21:31):

Is that essentially a meta science question? Because some of these ideas like randomized control trial or how they did it wasn't holding and so it didn't transmit.




Kanjun (21:41):

Right. So I'll talk about randomized control trials first and then we can go to the tie to evolution. So I think randomized control trials, the reason we have them now is because we have the statistics, the mathematical foundation to be able to evaluate these two groups. Are they actually the same or not the same? I tried this trial. I randomized one is the control group and one is the test group. Did the test group outperform the control group? There are a lot of statistical techniques that are needed to really understand that question. So I could see that maybe they would have done randomized control trials for really small effects a long time ago, but that maybe it's not very deterministic. You get some people in this scoop, it works and some people in this other group, it works. Then they might throw up their arms and be like, "I don't know what to conclude about this." So I could see the reason RCTs didn't exist before is because we didn't have the mathematical foundation to be able to look at the results and say something about it and get information out of it. And I think that's true.


Ben (22:50):

Geometry which I find a lot harder, but maybe that's just me. Euclid invented geometry which seems to be quite harder than the stats behind certain RCTs. But it's true. They hadn't seemingly invented the stats. But I'm not sure- Like the ability to see that.


Kanjun (23:11):

Trigonometry doesn't build on so many other fields of mathematics whereas statistics does. But I kind of back to the question of, "Why did Romans and Greeks not-- their civilization didn't accumulate in the way that ours does technologically?" I think it actually comes back to this process of variation and selection which is true in evolution and also true in science. So in evolution we were just talking about constraints. I think the reason why constraints are interesting is because in evolution you're varying, you're doing a lot of variation. Then what the constraints do is they enable selection. The tougher the constraints are, the narrower the selection is. In science at that time in the Roman and Greek era, maybe a way that people thought about knowledge is that knowledge maybe came more from authorities.


There is not this idea of evidence being a thing. So it was not until the royal society in the 1600s, I think, that they had this model; nullius in verba, which means take no one's word for it. Which means that before that model, people took other people's word for it. So people weren't varying and evaluating ideas and they weren't able to test and select new ideas to adopt as a culture. So the church had some top-down ideas-- many of which were wrong, and so no one was able to change them. But now we have this process of science is quite remarkable. In the ideas of science we can-- Any grad student if they're more correct than a Nobel Prize winner, the field actually acknowledges that they're more correct. So this is quite a remarkable thing to be able to have the ideas change not from the establishment, the authority, but from the outside; from people with no authority at all.


Ben (25:22):

It can take them some time but it does eventually happen. I think about ulcers and how they figured that out, but they weren't believed for some time. But eventually the science does seem to win out which like you mentioned is a kind of remarkable thing.


Kanjun (25:40):

Actually, in some fields it happens really quickly. Like in physics, there's this idea of superconductivity where Brian Josephson was this 22 year old and he had published this work on Superconductivity. John Bardeen who's the only person who has ever won two Nobel prizes said like, "No, you're totally wrong." People pretty quickly realized Bardeen was wrong and Josephson, the 22 year old was right. And the physics community pretty quickly, I think, came to this conclusion. So it's not true in all communities. Some communities rely a bit little bit more on authority, but happens sometimes.


Ben (26:21):

Isn't that true about-- was it Linus Pauling and DNA as well?


Kanjun (26:24):

Right. Pauling was wrong.


Ben (26:27):

He was wrong and he admitted it quite quickly and so did the community. And said, "Look, this is obviously right." So I think that's true as well. You speaking about the fields of mathematics in ancient Greek and all of these other fields leads me to something. So I've just been reading it in the last couple of days and I believe you were part of this conversation as well as actually a ChatGPT. And that was Michael Nielsen's recent notes on the ideas of fields or communities as a unit of advancing progress or thinking about progress. I thought this was a really interesting idea. This is reflecting on the fact that you said stats has to build on quite a lot of other fields, whereas some fields may just develop out of not quite nowhere, but may not have to build on so many other things.


I think of this in creative literature art fields and performing art fields. To what extent are you building on what goes before or to what extent do you take from a whole sideways field and make a kind of new field of it? It seems to me that actually that is one interesting way of thinking about how advanced we are, and that actually now that any individual human will find it very difficult to even have a surface knowledge of all of the fields, and certainly not an in-depth knowledge of maybe more than 5, 10 or 20 of which something like an AI could start to do. So I was interested in what you think about fields as a unit and therefore AI or some development putting these fields together to then create new fields, is maybe one of the key questions that we should look at.


Kanjun (28:12):

Yeah. I'm actually quite confused about the-- I think the underlying question here is kind of like, "What is the structure of knowledge? Or something like that. There's this one model of knowledge as being a thing that is like a tower block. You've got some blocks at the bottom and then you put some... This is not a good analogy. There's maybe a better analogy. Like a computer program where you're calling a lot of previous functions. So like you have a function that calls another function, and that function calls an older function, and that function calls an older function, and each of those functions is like a discovery. So there's that model where by definition, the outermost function is dependent on all of these discoveries that came before it and can't be simplified. It has to call all of these preexisting functions. That's one model, but that model is not really true.


It often feels like when an idea is first developed in a new field, the person who developed it actually doesn't understand it as well as the people who follow them. So I think there was a Feynman quote that talked about how like-- or maybe a Hamming quote that talked about, "Einstein didn't understand his own ideas as well as the people who came after him." There's this kind of reconsolidation process where the understanding is simplified and it may be simplified even more. So it's no longer true that this function is dependent on all the previous discoveries. In fact, you might end up with a new fresh function that doesn't depend on any other previous discoveries and that still captures all of the information. So it's actually not clear to me that humans can't-- in some fields at least, that humans can't understand everything. Maybe the reason we can't understand it yet is because it's not yet simplified to its final form.


Ben (30:18):

I guess that might be true because I'm going to segue from creative arts as well, and that does seem to be true in creative arts. Although it's argued about, the very simplified precis is that you might have a play or a poem or whatever it is. The audience or later artists make much more of that creative work than the original creator. The original creator has obviously their view and vision and have that. But actually those who come after make it even so much more than what it was. It's actually out of the original creator's hands, and particularly once time has passed-- I guess you can think about this in Shakespeare today. Obviously, he had a view and we don't quite know what his view was on all of his work. But it has been taken to another level by so many more artists and creators. And actually, I think arguably is greater today than it was in his own time because of that. And actually that feels-- although it's still argued about, quite well established within art. That your creation is not just your own and that the very greatest creations become bigger than what the actual original creator think and might be interpreted more deeply than what the original creator can even think. Therefore, you actually aim [inaudible 31:30] who at the peak of their art will often slightly step away from commenting on what they think their art is because they realize that their answer may not be the best answer and actually might narrow the interpretation of what that might be by imposing this idea that the author knows best.


Kanjun (31:50):

That's really interesting. I'm really curious about this process. So here's what's happening. In your view, what's happening-- let's take Shakespeare. These people who have built upon it, is it that they've kind of added additional meaning to what-- They're interpreting it in different ways. And so a single sentence if you read it yourself might only have a little bit of meaning, but if you read it in the context of everyone else's interpretations, it has a lot more meaning. Is it that they've added more meaning? Or is it that the people who come after have found simplifying patterns in his work that mimic this reconsolidation process in science that I was talking about of ideas. What is it that's making it richer?


Ben (32:36):

So actually for the most complex work it's both elements. And I would actually add a third to segue into something like cave art. So cave art, we find new... Obviously, we don't actually even know the original creators of that art, whether they even viewed it as art. But obviously we find patterns now. So young children put their hands in the mud or in wet cement. And so we riff on the now of the culture and then obviously we will add our own meaning into what we see how in the now. Then because so many people have commented on cave art and made their own mud art and a kind of, I guess, a meta art sense from that, it's also made the whole field richer. So you've definitely got those elements and it added together. Then you've got people who draw on those various things to then create more meta pieces.


So it definitely builds that way as well as wide. I'm only thinking out loud. I'm sure there must be more, particularly in something as rich as Shakespeare because it then becomes so pivotal to other things and actually might segue into things like culture. So it's now a key element in how British people think about themselves. If it wasn't for Shakespeare, we wouldn't think the way we do, I'm pretty sure. Obviously that would be arguable. There's probably a PhD in that. And even, there are words and catchphrases from Shakespeare's plays which now have gone into different nations' vernaculars which didn't exist beforehand, but have also made alive something which was already there. But actually crystallized it potentially in a simplifying form or in some form that people get, "Yes, that is what that was about and that's what that phrase means."


Kanjun (34:28):

That's really interesting. Yeah. This is another thing I'm quite confused about which is, "What is meaning?" I think an interesting thought experiment that my co-founder, Josh, gave is. "Let's look up at the sky, pick any star, and let's imagine that a hundred thousand years from now humans or some descendant of humans live on that star." Now, we have two scenarios. In one scenario, they have no memory of earth or where they came from. They don't know how they ended up on that star, but they're there and they don't know anything about their history. In the other scenario they look up on the night sky and they point at earth and say, "Hey..." I mean, maybe they can't see Earth, but in this general direction. Like, "Hey, that's where we came from." There's like some merchant on that star that's like, "I know that my distant distant ancestors came from Earth." In one of those scenarios it feels like there's a lot more meaning. That merchant feels a lot deeper sense of meaning than in the other scenario where they're kind of disconnected from where they came from. I don't really understand why. Somehow meaning is tied to this sense of context and history and kind of where things came from and why they are the way they are. But I don't know what it is.


Ben (35:50):

I can't answer the why. I kind of almost obviously, or if I had, I would've made some genius breakthrough in the human condition, I guess. But it is definitely true. So you think about money or cultural symbolisms or particularly art. But say in your example of the star. Say I said, "Oh, I went onto the internet the other day and I sold Kanjun that star or one of these internet star nomination things and 10 million ancestors later, Kanjun's ancestors arrived on the star which supposedly she owned." Again, you would've imbued that with so much more meaning. Except in today's day and age, what does it mean selling someone a piece of paper saying, "You sponsored such and such a star?" There is no ownership in our legal culture of what that star might be.


That's actually why I am not so worried about what some people are worried about in terms of some aspects of AI generated art because-- I don't know what the portion is, but some significant portion of art is the value is in the so-called the eye of the beholder. So the meaning we give it and its time and place and things, and that's part of its value. Obviously that's part of the value in the techniques and everything which went into it which is obviously going to be different in AI art. But there's definitely this part that humans bring. This kind of human value part which is not seemingly part of the physics natural laws, but seems to be part of the human natural laws.


Kanjun (37:21):

Yeah.


Ben (37:22):

That's leads me to think then, what do you think out of all of the things you are confused about, interested in. What do you think are the most important questions in science or meta science that we should be seeking to understand at the moment?


Kanjun (37:38):

We wrote a whole essay on that.


Ben (37:43):

Glad you noticed.


Kanjun (37:47):

Yeah. Talking about the essay, I want to come back to this idea of meaning later because maybe we can riff on it.


Ben (37:52):

Yeah. Essay back to meaning. Something might...


Kanjun (37:57):

So talking about the meta science essay, originally some of the questions that motivated us were questions like, "Why is it that a refunder says they want to do high reward research and yet they end up doing relatively low risk incremental work; a kind of funding low risk incremental work? What is causing that?" Clearly there's an intention to do something different and yet every new funder kind of gets sucked back in into the existing ecosystem. They don't diverge very much from the existing processes and norms and results. So why? That's so weird, right? Isn't it weird that you try to do something totally different and you end up being exactly the same? In many fields that's not true. In art, if I try to do something totally different, presumably at some point I'll ended up with something totally different.


So that really was the beginning of us trying to understand like, "What is going on here? Why is it that we can't fund things in totally different ways?" There are lots of different kind of ideas expressed in the essay, but one of the ideas is this idea that the space of social processes of science is very underexplored in that most funders have very similar social processes to existing funders. Even if you start a new funder, you might still have peer review, you might still approve grants based on you don't anonymize the names or anything. You approve grants based on how good other people think those grants are. You approve them based on how successful they seem like they might be.


Michael in his head already had a giant list that I started to add to of potentially totally different programs that you could run as a funder. For example, high variance funding. You only fund things where the peer reviewers really disagree with each other or funding an open source institute. So this is something that typically wouldn't be considered science. But if you're a funder, you could fund a whole institute that's working on open source projects and that is an important infrastructure for science. I think at some point we talked about like a traveling institute of scientists where you go around the world... A young genius immigration program where you immigrate people into the country, find people across the world who seem like they might be really capable in some particular way. So it was like, "This is infinite." We just kept going. And so we were like, "Okay, well that's interesting." Eventually we found a frame for this which is the beginning of the essay which is, “Let's say you come across some aliens and they do science. Would those aliens have discovered mathematics?” Seems likely. “Would they have discovered atoms?” Unless we're totally wrong about atoms, seems likely. “But would they have PhD programs or tenure or...?”

Ben (41:21):

And have randomized controlled trials.


Kanjun (41:23):

They might have randomized controlled trials or we may discover that actually... One thing about RCT... Sorry, go ahead.


Ben (41:31):

We haven't discovered it.


Kanjun (41:34):

Well, one thing about RCTs that's interesting is that we only do RCTs in situations. We don't do RCTs in physics because we can understand mechanistically why the phenomenon is happening. We only do RCTs in situations where the situation is so complex we've kind of given up on mechanistically how to explain the result. And so we just kind of divide into two different camps and see which one is more probabilistically likely, which to me... Maybe it is a method that we'll always have because there are some things that are always beyond our understanding. But to me it's very unsatisfying.


Ben (42:16):

Yeah. I hadn't heard it described like that, but you're right. Complex sciences, biological sciences; anything to do with humans, so social sciences, that's true. I will try and say, so what do you think is the best idea? Or you can do both. What was the worst idea in your meta science paper? Because maybe that's the one we should go for on the grounds that actually it should be a lottery and you don't know. You might say there was also failure audit, 10 year insurance, you had your traveling scientists, you had long short prizes, anti-portfolio, interdisciplinary institute, you had the funder as detector, and you had a variety more. What's the thing which you just think was probably Michael's like, "Oh, that's just really awful but we should just keep it in there because you never know. It might be right." Or the otherwise like, "This is mine and this should be right at the top because the best idea in it." What do you think?



Kanjun (43:10):

Maybe I'll answer a slightly different question which is like, "What are the most interesting ideas?" And then...


Ben (43:19):

Or you could go, what's the most high risk idea? What's the idea most unlikely that anyone's going to go for, but probably is the one they want to try?


Kanjun (43:27):

Well, all of the ideas are a little bit out there. I think the most interesting ideas are a little bit less about the funding programs because those programs are just given as examples of underlying generating functions. What's much more interesting is looking at the generating functions. So we have this general idea of latent potential. As a funder you're assuming that you-- When you allocate money, you can give it to people where there's latent potential; where their potential is not yet unlocked by another funder or another way of doing discovery. So your goal should be to find latent potential. I think this is actually a relatively new idea. Most funders don't think about their job as finding latent potential. Just like in finance, your job is finding edge.


Also as a funder, your job is finding edge. You shouldn't be allocating more money. And it's not very effective, I guess, to allocate more money just where everyone is allocating money. So this idea of latent potential is kind of this core idea. Then we have all of these-- The way we got to a lot of this part of the essay is that we were trying to understand, “What are different ways of excavating latent potential? How do you find it?” So the anti-portfolio idea, for example, came from Bessemer Venture Partners, which has on their website a list of all of the great ideas that they missed. If a funder had a list of all the great ideas that they missed, the theory about latent potential here is that there's something in the incentives or motivation of the program manager or the people making the funding decisions that maybe is overly risk averse or doesn't have a feedback loop and there's latent potential in that feedback loop and in shifting that incentive structure.


I think maybe another idea that is on the list or we don't have is a Noble Prize for funders. Kind of gets at a similar generator of latent potential which is changing the way that the program manager is behaving. There's a totally different way of thinking about latent potential which is around how you might construct new fields or how might we 10x the rate of field production. So that is a question that generates a lot of potential program ideas. The community's idea maybe is one of them. I used to run this big group house and one idea I had was like, "What if you started lots of group houses and funded lots of group houses and just got interesting people to live in them?" You end up with these interesting communities where maybe that would increase the rate of field production. Or another thing is maybe there's a field shutdown process where at some point the field feels too incremental and you have to shuffle people into a different field. So you get cross-disciplinary work as well as this kind of death of fields and maybe that would result in new fields. There are lots of ideas for like, “Okay, if you think about this question, you'll end up with lots of different ideas.”


Ben (46:48):

Well, people should definitely read the essay, or rather, I like to say open source book.


Kanjun (46:53):

Right.


Ben (46:54):

I'm going to riff on two of those things. So one you mentioned laterally and we might come back to the Neighborhood idea as well. I think that's really interesting because surely what 10, 20, 30, 50, maybe even 80% of the value in universities is the social capital of bringing people together. Why not recreate that and see what happens? The other one you said is about investing edge because that's really interesting in financial markets. There is this school of thought where you should try and identify where you have skill and then play where you have skill and don't play where you don't have skill. This is true of a lot of sport and other games. Therefore even if you are lucky, it will have been viewed as a mistake if you played where you didn't have skill. And actually if you won, that is also judged to be a mistake. Whereas if you have skill and you played a good bet and it didn't go your way-- which markets happens a lot-- that is actually the correct process because you played where you had skill. Where you had edge, the edge didn't come off. I think this is very true of funders. They probably have idiosyncratic skill because it's a social science, but they probably do have that and then they should play to that and not where they feel they don't. I think that's a really...




Kanjun (48:14):

Every funder is started by a different person and that person has different networks, et cetera. So I think their edge could be different. They could end up investing in really different programs but they don't. Another idea that we don't talk about that much in the essay is this idea of institutional antibodies. So another reason why-- and this is the entire second part of the essay. It’s about kind of bottlenecks to change. “Why does change not happen? We have all these program ideas. We just came up with a hundred of them off the top of our heads. Why doesn't anyone do them? That's so strange." That really got into the second question of like, "Okay, well actually there are a lot of bottlenecks and one is institutional antibodies where you try to do something different and existing institutions actually lump asked you for it.” They really don't like that. There are reasons for it. One is maybe they feel threatened. Maybe Harvard feels threatened by a new funding institution. I think Harvard said something really negative about the Thiel Fellowship when it first came down because it was a threat. And by definition, if someone's finding edge somewhere else and it's a little bit competitive, it will be somewhat of a threat to some existing powerful institution.


Ben (49:29):

Don't we call those type of things-- So you call them antibodies. But it strikes me that what we're really talking about or what a layman might think about is culture or at least part of that culture. There's something interesting about institutions which have a very long history about the culture that they develop. I know you're very interested in institutions and culture broadly. So I guess my question is, is that one of the problems about old institutions is the way that culture has ossified whether it's competition or not. And therefore you need new institutions or maybe new arms of old institutions. And maybe you could potentially look at through the lens of, or you might want to comment on the culture that maybe you are trying to build at your firm or in startups in general because that seems to be potentially one of the competitive edges that startups have. It's that they don't have to deal with a legacy culture of whatever that might be. Except there's this observation that old institutions seemingly have this problem, this bottleneck which you see in funders. .


You can see in a lot of old institutions and in fact in startup language. Jeff Bezos calls companies on that. They’re two companies. He wants to be a day one company and he says, "You're day two company, you’re dead." That's another way of saying dead's probably slightly overused. But it's saying that your culture and everything is ossified and you can't do all of these things that you want to do for innovation startup. But it strikes me that that seemed to be a very human thing. On the other hand, cultural and institutional knowledge when you take the long cycle of history has been incredibly valuable for making progress, at least up until this point. So I'm not entirely sure that something about it has been preserved for very good reasons. So yeah, your thoughts on culture.


Kanjun (51:18):

A lot of thoughts on this. Okay, there are a few categories of thoughts. One is an idea of old institutions that's overfitting. Second is, I think the phenomenon of institutional antibodies is speaking to actually something broader than culture. The way I think about culture is culture is a set of beliefs held by the people in that culture, and it is also reinforced by a set of systems. So kind of just going back to the point of institution-- I think there was a third thing that you talked about around-- I forgot. Maybe we should cut out the...


Ben (52:11):

The history of culture also being important for traditional knowledge as well on that flip side. But knowledge over time.


Kanjun (52:20):

That's right. So knowledge versus culture and history. So I'll talk about the institutional antibodies thing first. I think that goes beyond just the beliefs. I think that's actually more about the competitive system dynamic. So it's about the broader ecosystem of institutions and what happens when there's a competitive dynamic in general. So whenever there's a competitive dynamic you're kind of taking away the power of an existing institution and that institution's going to retaliate because they're old. And part of why they're old and still exist is because they have some kind of power. So I think that's actually more of an institutional is an organism and that organism is being threatened and less about the culture of that institution in particular.


I think there are some environments like the startup environment-- and we were inspired a lot by the startup environment where threats happen all the time and the existing institutions retaliate but it doesn't matter. It doesn't matter that much. There are some mechanisms in place like antitrust that prevent existing institutions from retaliating too much. So some ecosystems of institutions like a startup ecosystem is relatively healthy because new institutions form all the time and old ones die when they need to die, and they don't die when they don't need to die, and you have kind of this outside party that enforces antitrust laws. So that's one way to-- That's kind of addressing the institutional antibodies is broader than the culture of the institution.

But now if we talk about institutional culture. I think your question is something like, "Why is it that existing institutions can't implement new ideas? Like the Harvard, Harvard can't implement the Thiel Fellowship." I think it's because basically these two institutions have beliefs that are directly in conflict with each other. So that's one reason why the existing institution can't do it. So Thiel Fellowship says, "University/ College is not useful for some people." And Harvard says, "I am a college, you should come. It's clearly useful for you.” They have this core underlying belief that just can't coexist. So in this case, it's really hard for those two beliefs to exist under the same institution unless you have two really different cultures.


Ben (55:04):

I get that. But Harvard, I guess could do a failure audit or a ten year insurance or high variance funding which also seems to be a bottleneck in this culture. But I can see sometimes you just can't take it on because it's not part of your set beliefs.


Kanjun (55:19):

Yeah. I think Harvard could do a lot of these other things. We'd love for them to do those things. We just feel like people have not been very imaginative in the types of things that they could try.


Ben (55:30):

Why do you think we've lacked imagination?


Kanjun (55:34):

I think it's not very safe.


Ben (55:38):

I guess that hearts back to culture. I understand your point about antibodies of maybe being wider, but I do wonder about this culture thing. You're not safe to have maverick ideas. Maybe they're maverick, maybe they're not even maverick. I'm jumping around, but I guess that leads me to think how you create a positive maverick then if you've got institutional antibodies as a problem. Maybe you've also got culture as a problem, although maybe you've got these new institutions. And you might-- I cut you off before thinking about the knowledge question as well. You can return to that one as well.

Kanjun (56:14):

That's okay. We'll come back to that one. So this problem of safety I think is really interesting both from an institutional perspective and an individual perspective. So humans, if we feel unsafe as individuals we won't take risks generally. There's some survival instinct that prevents us from doing that. Institutions, I think a lot of funders don't feel safe because their funding is coming from some outside party. It's coming from the government or it's coming from someone who's wealthy or someone else who wants to see success. They want to see that their funding is going to a good place. So as someone who runs a funding institution I would need to be like, "Okay, I need to be able to show success because I'm not the source of this funding." But if you see funders run by the high network individual-- For example, the Arnold Foundation who funded Brian Nozick, who started the Center for Open Science which we also talk about in the second part of our essay. Brian was rejected by the NSF-NIH. Literally everyone, I guess NSF, literally everyone rejected him for years until the Arnold Foundation found him.


And I think part of why Arnold Foundation was able to do something strange or fund something strange is because John Arnold was involved in it and he was the supplier of all the money so he felt very safe. When I interact with funders of different types where the source of their money is held by the decision makers versus not held by the decision makers, they actually end up behaving in really different ways. When a funder's money is held by the decision maker, then the funder takes a lot more risk because they feel safer. They can spend their own money however they want. They have no one to report to.


Ben (58:10):

That's really interesting. So slightly adjacent to that would suggest that you might believe in all of the work done on psychological safety which is work in teams. Google sponsored it for Amy Evan's work. So this idea that when you're feeling safe you will point out bad decisions and also venture more riskier, audible decisions. And when you're not, you don't point out something which you think is obviously bad because you're worried it sounds stupid. And also you don't take more risks in new ideas because you're just feeling not safe in your team.


Kanjun (58:42):

Yeah. I think psychological safety is really useful in situations where you want higher variants. You want people to take risks. And you may actually not want it in situations where you don't want people to take risks.


Ben (58:54):

Maybe. Although they also point out stupid things you're doing. So it's not just the risk side. That adds to your point. You've been doing it for 10 years and you get a new member of the team like, "Well, they've been doing it for 10 years," but obviously this way is better and then they don't suggest it. Somehow they think it's better. Another thing then is I observe a strong streak of creativity in your work and life. There's setting up a Neighborhood...


Kanjun (59:22):

Sorry, we haven't talked about knowledge yet.


Ben (59:25):

Okay. Let's go on knowledge and then we'll go-- Maybe knowledge into creativity is a good way of going. So holding knowledge...


Kanjun (59:30):

Okay. Yeah, we can do that.


Ben (59:32):

Holding knowledge on an institutional level. Or let's hold knowledge in and then see where this goes as well. So strong streak creativity in your life. Setting up the Neighborhood you obviously had feelings before. I really wanted to talk about all of the dancing as well. The dancing comes in because I was going loop back to somewhere early in the conversation about meaning and value because I think dancing has that. Actually, dancing might be quite a good example because there's also knowledge held in dances. The way that we dance and that talent is also developed through time. Actually, we can segue, sometimes institutions hold onto that knowledge although sometimes it's groups and community groups. I think of things like, I guess Brazilian dance or Capoeira which held in a community and then has come out. Maybe not exactly a dance though, although you could call that. So how important is creativity? And you can talk about knowledge and institutions as well.




Kanjun (01:00:37):

Yeah. I guess to answer that question directly, I think for me, creativity drives basically everything I do. I only realized this a few years ago. I never really identified as creative personally. I had a really close group of friends in high school and a few years ago talking to one of them I was like, "I think I might be a creative person." And he was like, "Duh." Everyone knew that. It was really obvious. I was like, "That's strange." But anyway, I think like...


Ben (01:01:11):

All of those people understand you better than you understand yourself.


Kanjun (01:01:19):

Yeah. I guess it points to how powerful stories of yourself can be and how limiting they are. I believe in human creativity and the potential for like if we can unlock human creativity, then there's this extraordinary potential in humanity. I think that's why I'm so interested in artificial intelligence. It seems to me like fire or like electricity. One of the greatest tools for unlocking human creativity that we've ever encountered. So I think all of my projects; AI, working on meta science, the Neighborhood, the fund, the podcast, it's all about human potential and understanding human potential, unlocking human potential. Can we set up systems and excavate ideas that can unlock human potential?


I guess to your point of knowledge, there's something about knowledge I'm very confused about which is I don't understand really... It seems like institutions, there's like a benefit from institutions and cultures holding old knowledge and then there's a point at which it's not useful in many situations to hold that knowledge. So institutions like Harvard might have really outdated knowledge or beliefs that they're holding. And so this is why I was like, "Maybe there's an analogy to overfitting where times have changed and you actually should be dropping some of your beliefs.” But I'm also confused because it seems actually good for some institutions to hold the belief of, “Universities are good” because they're good for some people and good for other universities, other institutions like the Thiel Fellowship or New Science which is a new funder out here, to hold the belief that universities are not useful because they're not useful for some people.


So now you have institutions that hold different beliefs, cultures that hold different beliefs, and so you get a lot more variants or diversity and you're able to 'service' many more people because different beliefs, different institutions are a good fit for different people. But I'm kind of confused about this dynamic of like, "What causes an institution to grow?" Based on this beliefs like, "How come the Thiel Fellowship is still so small?" I'm sure there are more people that could service-- I don't know. I'm a bit puzzled about this relationship between knowledge and culture and diversity.


Ben (01:04:01):

Sure. So my reflection on that is that's because that form of knowledge is actually much closer to art than we would like to acknowledge. And so as we are riffing on earlier, art has a time in place and culture and can be interpreted by one set of group and people in time and place and one. And actually just adjacent to that in another country or another time or another thing, they can interpret that very same piece very differently. Plausibly both getting a lot of value from it, or one group could get one value or one less value. But because we pretend to ourselves that knowledge is closer to that physical natural science, like you said, the physics, like how the atom works. Well, actually institutional knowledge is not like how the atom works. To your point, I don't think the alien would view the same way like Thiel Fellowships or Harvard.


To the alien it might be, "Well, you might do it that way or you might not do it." It's not like the atom would be. Therefore it is closer to art than all of the complexities around art. That's probably why you need a randomized controlled trial to ascertain it. But even though I actually think it would give you a false read because as time changes and as people change, actually the value of that will also change which is why it riffs back to your earlier thing about creativity and art. It seems to me to be a lot closer to that, but I'm not sure.


Kanjun (01:05:21):

That's really interesting. Yeah, this idea that the beliefs expressed in art are dependent on particular things in order to be effective or useful or meaningful. So they're dependent on how everyone else is interacting with each other; some of the other norms and beliefs that exist. You can't take a belief fully out of context because it's part of this dependent system of beliefs and behaviors.


Ben (01:05:49):

Correct. And therefore that's the same of institutional like that. I'm going to finish off on the creativity and the dance element because I'd be interested to know what you think non-dancers do not understand about people who dance.

Kanjun (01:06:10):

I guess I was a non-dancer until college. Then I started doing competitive Ballroom dance which is a very structured dance style. That was very comforting to me because before doing Ballroom I was like, "I can't dance. I'm super clumsy." I'm still super clumsy. I don't have any spatial awareness. I'm not paying attention. I'm always in my head. So Ballroom was this really interesting way of getting to understand the connection with a partner and with my body and with the floor and with the air, the space around me, in an environment that felt like I wasn't just failing the entire time and doing a bad job. I think there's something interesting here about non-dancers where a lot of people say, "I can't dance."


It I think is more because of this lack of positive feedback, this feedback cycle where people are not getting any positive feedback for their attempt to dance. So then they end up with this belief that they can't dance. So for me, I did Ballroom first and then after 2012, I started to strip away some of the structure of Ballroom. I got tired of it and I was like, "I really want to do something where I can be a lot more expressive and still have this partner connection because that adds so much complexity to the dance. But where I can make things up or improv or try new things, discover new things." And so slowly got into first, West Coast Swing and then Fusion. Fusion is this really interesting partner dance style where it's literally what it says; it's fusion of all styles. You're just making things up the entire time and just combining contact improv, with ballroom, with swing, with all of these different styles and making up new styles all the time.


It's basically kind of like constructivist dance with a partner to music; constructivist movement with a partner to music and I love that. Some people come to Fusion and they say, "I'm not very good at it. How do you get good?" I do think that the structured training of Ballroom and this understanding of connection and how to hold my body and how to connect my body to itself was really helpful. I guess maybe a piece of advice I give people for dance or like new dancers is an easy way to hack this sense of connection is to imagine that you are moving through molasses. So air is no longer air, it's molasses, and it's very, very viscous. And now you're basically always pushing against some force that's pushing back. This actually basically imitates a lot of this sense of internal connection that you get in dance when you've done dance for a long time.


Ben (01:09:22):

Wow. That's really fascinating. So think of it like molasses or I guess like those slow Tai chi movement dances. And also that if you are a non-dancer and you think you can't dance, that's obviously false in some fundamental way. I guess I reflect every three or four year old can dance in some form. Therefore it's not something you must lose the ability to. You must somehow decide that. I've learned a lot.


Kanjun (01:09:53):

Dance is inside of you. It just needs to be unlocked.


Ben (01:09:57):

And somehow I'm not quite sure. But the fusion dance seems to me a kind of long loop analogy to general intelligence. This idea you mixing a lot of things, it's kind of everything that it is, but it helps with structure and you are forming new things in real time with a chat partner or the environment or everything that you are. Obviously that's a very human thing, but somehow in this whole conversation it seems to me a distant cousin of what we were talking about on the connections of all of these other types of things.


Kanjun (01:10:30):

That's actually really interesting because in AI we often talk about-- So if you're training an AI system in some simulated environment, we often talk about multi-agent simulations. So you want multiple AIs in the environment. Why do you want multi-agent simulations? Well, some people say, "Okay, well, you get maybe interesting emergent behavior." But I think that's actually much less interesting. What other agents cause is more diverse set of data, outcomes in the environment. So the environment is static and other agents are modifying it. So you're much more likely to encounter new states of the environment when other agents are modifying it than not. So I don't like dancing by myself because I kind of get stuck in local minima of movement. Whereas if there's somebody else then they're always introducing new states of the environment that caused me to have to figure out how to react in new ways and discover new things about myself and my own sense of movement. I do think there is this parallel to multi-agent simulations.


Ben (01:11:34):

It seems to me to draw another maybe tenuous parallel, that friction or dance between two entities, either in dance or something else seems to be more likely to create this new field or a field where we don't even know it's a field because you've had a new novel interaction within dance. Well, plausibly you do it enough times and people like it. That's actually a new dance form. At that moment in time no one would thought it was a new dance form because it was the first time it ever happened between those parties. And if that analogy holds, that would be other AI agents or whatever making those new fields to stay form.


Kanjun (01:12:08):

Yeah, that's interesting.


Ben (01:12:12):

So how about we play a short version of underrated, overrated and then you can talk about a couple of your current projects and things. So you can make a comment, you can pass, you could just say underrated, overrated. We have some of these things. Underrated or overrated having agency?


Kanjun (01:12:36):

Depends on what environment you're in. I think vastly underrated in the vast majority of the world. Slightly overrated in the rationality community. Speaking as someone who is very close to it. I met my co-founder at a rationality workshop. What agency is kind of the underlying description of human capability? I think of it as like, "What is our ability to change the world from one state to any arbitrary state?" The farther away that state is, the more agency we have or something like that.


Ben (01:13:15):

I could definitely see that. It's like whenever I meet a long-termist or something like that, I definitely think they overrate existential risks, but that's probably because everyone else underrates existential risks. So you're probably meeting somewhere in the middle. Although on that one, that's why I can never quite get my head around the totality of EA or effective altruism because they seem to just have so little weight on art and creativity which just cannot jive this no world view even though they try and make exceptions for it. So they vastly underrate it, but might mean I erect it a little bit. Okay, next one, city planning; overrated, underrated?


Kanjun (01:13:55):

Dramatically underrated. I think all cities should be raised except for some and then built from scratch.

Ben (01:14:02):

Would it be from a centralized planner or would you somehow let-- I guess you could call it a kind of market forces or people choose where to be? How much zoning would you there from, I guess, nothing to everything. Are you just in the middle?


Kanjun (01:14:19):

Yeah, I would basically... Okay, maybe not raise cities. I live in San Francisco which is the most frustrating city in the world. A good friend of mine studied zoning in lots of different cities. My vote would be basically almost no zoning. Tokyo is one of the most interesting cities in the world partly because it's zoning laws are very, very loose. So basically anyone can build anything anywhere. It's not fully true, but people have a lot of agency over what they're able to do with their space and so you see this really crazy stuff; really interesting outgrowths. To me, Tokyo is one of the most beautiful places on earth. It's kind of this melting pot of humanity in a way or where people really can express themselves in the environment.


I think San Francisco is the opposite of that. Everyone's expression is completely shut down because you're not allowed to do anything. So I wouldn't do central planning necessarily, but maybe a little bit of it. And much narrower streets, human scale, planning human scale cities. I think we can actually probably convert existing cities if there were enough motivation into much more human scale cities where we build onto the roads, or on the roads we have like parks and restaurants and pop-up shops and things like that.


Ben (01:15:47):

Yeah. So I can see that. And San Francisco is ridiculous like that, isn't it? It must be one of the highest GDP per capita places like in the world with maybe five other places. But one quirky thing about Tokyo which I'm sure you know is that-- or in fact Japanese planning in general is they think about their buildings only with 30 to 80 year lifespans. So because of that, actually this idea of renewal-- And you think of that because you think of the really old temples and wooden buildings which obviously lasted a thousand or even 2000 years. But actually those are the exceptions.


Kanjun (01:16:22):

The Shinto temple also gets replaced. So that's just really interesting. I think actually this is a very underrated thing which is death. In the western culture we really underrate death. Institutions should die. It's part of why we have all these problems in science because institutions can't die. Buildings should die.


Ben (01:16:42):

For those listening actually, before the 12th of January 2023, my next performance lecture is all about death. That actually in the modern day society we don't really talk about it enough. Whereas even going back just 50 years, but certainly fifty hundred, two hundred years, the death of everything-- whether it's buildings, institutions or particularly people, was a much talked about thing.


Kanjun (01:17:08):

Actually, I just made a connection which is I think there are lots of things with tradeoffs. So longevity versus death has very clear tradeoffs. Similarly, institutional history versus brand new institution with no knowledge has very clear tradeoffs. So just wanted to make that point of there are different parts in the space that you can choose with different tradeoffs.


Ben (01:17:32):

Yeah. I hadn't thought of them as the opposite, but that's exactly right in what we talked about in terms of institutions, death and renewal and all of that. Okay. Underrated, overrated; a couple more left. Innovation labs-- I think we're thinking ARPA or here in the UK we now have ARIA. Underrated or overrated ideas; innovation agencies?


Kanjun (01:08:00):

Probably neutrally rated. It's not really rated. They're useful and they're not that useful if you don't do new things.


Ben (01:18:14):

Okay. Very good. All right, last two. High frequency trading or in particular high frequency trading algorithms?



Kanjun (01:18:24):

That's hilarious. I guess the context is I was a high frequency trader in college and to pay for college. We'd always tell people... People are like, "What's the purpose? Are you doing something good for the world?" Everybody in high frequency trading says, "We're providing liquidity to the markets. That's the answer. That's the good that we're doing in the world.” So I think probably that purpose is overrated from within the community. I think most likely we should have much less high frequency trading.


Ben (01:18:59):

This is interesting because there's a debate within business market economists. So one of the functions of markets supposedly is to find prices or whatever the correct price is. And they have no idea why we need so many trades to try and actually find out what the correct price is because you don't need that in a lot of other forms of markets. But you seem to need it in stocks. There is also a debate as to whether high frequency trading actually provides liquidity or not. But if it funded your college, then in some ways must be massively underrated because it has allowed you the second or third order to produce all of this other amazing stuff. So that is a bet. Definitely what should have taken if you had that validity. Okay, last one is, I guess broad ranging is diversity in tech or in any domain. But I guess I'm interested in diversity in technology as it always comes up.


Kanjun (01:19:58):

What exactly do you mean by diversity?


Ben (01:20:02):

So you can't clarify. I'm probably thinking of people diversity but you could take it further. And I guess riffing back on our tradeoffs is this idea of lots of different things obviously being good for ideas and other things versus narrow focus which potentially might allow you to go faster on one thing. But you could take the kind of women in tech answer on any domain as well. Or you could take it broadly.


Kanjun (01:20:32):

Yeah. I think probably diversity in general is underrated, I suspect in Silicon Valley style cultures. The Silicon Valley style culture is very maximizing and capitalism in general is rather maximizing. So I think there're probably lots of things that don't get funded or don't get done even though they might be really interesting or useful. So the arts I think are a good example where there's not very much art here for that. I think for that reason it's very maximizing, it's very utilitarian. People are like, "Why do art?"


Ben (01:21:12):

[Inaudible 01:21:12] In San Francisco. There can be great people as well but not that much into art. In fact, I was reading just recently. Julian Gough wrote the end narrative in the original Minecraft but supposedly didn't sign any contracts and has now made that open source or essentially creative commons license. He has this whole long post on this riff about he has nothing against the people who did try and make him sign contracts but that was a capitalist system. And his system, his art, they clash in these very interesting ways for when you want to make or create things, whether you're talking about financial capital or if you want to use finance speak; these other bits of capital, social capital, intellectual relationship, human and all of those type of things.


Kanjun (01:22:04):

That's really interesting. I'll definitely read that. There are a lot of clashes and I like capitalism. It's very good at an important thing which-- this idea is Michael's-- which is aligning what is true with what is good with power. When those things are misaligned, you end up with very corrupt states. In capitalism it actually goes moderately well, but also it has a lot of tradeoffs. I wonder if there exist actually much better systems once we have more intelligence to be able to align things that can have a lot more diversity of ideas and types of things that people can be doing in addition to aligning what is true, what is good, and power. So maybe aligning what is true, what is good, power, and beauty; something like that. That beauty piece is definitely missing.


Ben (01:23:01):

Yeah, that's the next system obviously. My day job's obviously well within the capitalist system as well. I spoke with an earlier podcast someone called Jacob Soll, Jake Soll, who traced the history of ideas. That the early capitalists like Adam Smith traced a lot of their thought back to Cicero; these Romans and groups. But actually early capitalists, one of the ways that they thought about the world, one was an industrialized sort of world and that state and governments were also meant to make and create markets. But they also had this aligning the good and the incentive. I remember actually Amartya Sen has this anecdote or analogy for how he thought the early capitalists work. And that's if you are being chased down the street by someone who wants to knife you for your money or because you look wrong, and you suddenly throw a lot of money in the air behind you and they stop and they go for the money instead.

So it is actually meant to align people to something which is actually aligned for the greater good. So it's actually a moral cause. So the early capitalists actually thought it saved us from our basal nature to do something which you could align from incentives. I had never really heard that. Then I went to read back some of these early capitalists and back to Cicero and it is seemingly true, at least my interpretation of what they were saying, thinking then that that's that. We've evolved it to this state. So it's interesting that to your point, it will likely evolve again and how it evolved for these things is still very open.


Kanjun (01:24:38):

I think that's really interesting. How are we doing? Are we doing okay on time? I can do a slight diversion?


Ben (01:24:46):

Go for your divergent thing.


Kanjun (01:24:49):

Okay. I think this is really interesting in that capitalism has successfully aligned us toward satisfying people's desires and wants and somewhat away from our basal nature. Violence has decreased a lot. There are goals to go forth that are not tribe against tribe kind of goals. It actually feels like we're pretty ripe for some kind of transformation because AI is getting better really fast. If you were to ask a question like this, it's getting better way faster than most people in the world see. I think people can see ChatGPT and see all its flaws, but ChatGPT is just the tip of the iceberg of even research that we've done already. So there's still a ton of low hanging fruit in terms of the capabilities. So I think all of this stuff will happen faster than we think it will. And maybe that means a system like capitalism needs to be augmented somehow.


Ben (01:25:57)

That's an agree for me. So I actually work a lot in biological sciences and I bore everyone. I don't have technical details because I'm not really a coder. But what DeepMind have done with protein folding in biological and computational biology, and actually this is-- I mean there are a couple of generations in. But it's early journeys. It is so mind boggling having studied it 10, 20 years ago. This is the equivalent of magic or a form of magic. It seems that far away. Therefore the downstream effects are just very hard for us to imagine because even people in the field can only just start imagining it and what it would do. In something related to your point, typically we've had to use control trials because we don't really know. This is like some of the beginnings of actually we might start to understand-- and we've got a linking of the biological mechanisms of something. So it's not that we're at zero. But between zero and a hundred, we're closer to 10 or 20 than we are to a hundred for sure. You can just see on the edges of where I have domain expertise that these things are just opening up in ways which just is very hard to imagine and therefore I think could be both very exciting and scary at the same time. Riffing on the capitalism...


Kanjun (01:27:17):

Really one quick thing there which is one of the things I'm most excited about AI. Most people talk about automation and kind of doing what people are doing. That's maybe interesting, but I'm most interested in systems that are able to monitor very complex systems. Because they're interacting with the economy or with all of the people, the model can interact with all of these people simultaneously. It's building up some model of the system that we can then interpret and inspect. That might lead us to a much deeper understanding mechanistically of how human complex systems work in the way that outfolds. Allows us to better understand mechanistically how protein folding works. But you were going to say riffing on capitalism.


Ben (01:28:00):

I'm going to riff on that and I'll come back to capitalism. Are you most interested in human systems like markets and social stuff, or things like weather systems or other complex physical phenomena or essentially both because you think they will probably apply to both?


Kanjun (01:28:16):

More human systems. I think weather and other systems like that we can evaluate and measure using instruments. We can measure how good the weather is somewhere and then we can make better algorithms and collect more data. That doesn't require as much 'intelligence.' But what's interesting about human systems is that humans are full agents that need to be modeled. You need to model both the human agent and also somehow take what they're saying, communicating in language, and turn it into some something useful. That's just huge amounts of data. So you need something that's able to understand linguistically all of that data and maybe beyond linguistically like, "What is their body language, et cetera?" And then turn it into some useful behavior. I think for a system to be able to do that it needs to actually have a pretty good model of not just individual humans. but also groups of humans interacting with each other. And I think that kind of model is a really interesting model to inspect from the perspective of like, "How does a complex human system work? How does an institution or a culture work?" I can imagine deploying some AI chat bot within an institution. If it's actually learning from the people inside of it, then it will end up learning a lot of things about this institution. It would be really fascinating to inspect what is the fingerprint of this institution versus this other institution.


Ben (01:29:39):

Yeah. And because group behavior is different from the individual behavior, it is this uniquely or very interesting place to assess that.


Kanjun (01:29:48):

Exactly. Also you can think about democracy. Democracy is an algorithm that has really terrible inputs right now. It's just binary for every person. We use that terrible input because it's the highest resolution that we could reasonably aggregate from people so far. But AI systems, maybe that doesn't have to be true. It doesn't have to be the highest resolution.


Ben (01:30:11):

That's the best worst system we have or something. What is the quote? "Democracy's really bad. It's just better than anything else we have" or something like that.


Kanjun (01:30:21):

Right, right. Exactly.


Ben (01:30:23):

Okay. One final riff on the capitalism and then I'll ask you on your current projects and advice. If you go back to the seventeen hundreds and eighteen hundreds-- at least my reading of it, you had thinkers like Malthus who basically thought, “We could never really get rich as a large population.” And if you looked at the preceding thousand, 2000, 4,000, 10,000 years of human history, you would've broadly agreed with them which many people did that. There was seemingly these kind of limits whether they were physical limits and all of these others.


And then we essentially had the industrial revolution. You can talk about corporate labs, innovation, corporate forms, industrialization, energy, technology, innovation which seemed to break the Malthusian trap. And so we are at least in aggregate really wealthy in a way that the person in 1850 or 1800 or even 1900 would've been completely astonished by. This seems like magic. But on the other hand, I think they would be very surprised. In fact, my reading of what they were writing about at the time is they were very surprised that we cannot be splitting the pie better. So they would basically say, "There's no way we could have grown this pie this big." They would just be like, "That's incredible. What did you guys do? That's like magic."


But on the other hand is like, "How dumb could you be that you could grow this pie but you haven't-- You've got more than enough but there's no way that you can split it? Surely splitting it was the easier problem and growing it was the hard problem.” That's really interesting. You read the work and you go like, "Wow, they just thought the really difficult thing was growing the pie. They thought splitting the pie was just going to be really easy." Well, when you have it and you have all of these things like, "Oh, when we're really wealthy no one will work or they'll split it, all that." It seems to be the reverse is that-- and we see with AI will come. It looks like we are going to be rich in whatever form we are, at least in aggregate. But splitting the pie we have not got any closer really. I mean maybe at the edges, some ideas, welfare states, some insurance and all of that. But it's nowhere near what the thinking the 1850 thought we would get. But they had no belief that we would ever get this wealthy.


I find that's a really interesting dichotomy about how we got it wrong. So I think we probably got everything wrong in the future. But I always think this about capitalism is they didn't think they would be this rich, but they just didn't think we'd be this stupid in terms of splitting the pie. It's just incredible.


Kanjun (01:32:58):

I think this is a really big and important problem especially when it comes to AI being deployed. I want to kind of harken back to our points about death which is there was a study about how if you increase the estate tax to basically a hundred percent or even like 95%, then a lot of our incoming inequality problems would be solved. This is quite interesting. One hypothesis that they had is that basically accumulation effects are what result in the wealth gap, not necessarily what you're able to get in a single generation. Once you accumulate a lot of that wealth, get rich fund investment, it's a little bit harder to lose than it is to just get from scratch. And once your rate of increase gets much higher than someone could ever make in their day or lifetime, now you're just accumulating wealth at a much higher rate than anyone could even gain it when they start from zero. So yeah, I think this point of death or estate tax or-- Maybe hypothesis here would be something part of the reason why it's not actually about splitting the pie. It's about disrupting accumulation here. It's not a pie, it's actually...

Ben (01:34:24):

The pies that you continuously make because obviously the analogy falls down. But you're true in that.


Kanjun (01:34:29):

The pies that are always growing; self-growing pies.


Ben (01:34:34):

Great. Like, “We’ve invented self-growing pies, magic, but we haven't...” And so there is something on that because in the UK and Britain, the landowners have been rich for a very, very long time. Land is still basically the majority of Britain's wealth which is very weird. So for a thousand years they've been one of the richest people and that has not had the renewal, whereas actually most other long-dated families, technology or merchants or whatever have gone through and you see that. But actually the landowners have not because it's an accumulated wealth which you don't give up. Okay. So one last cheeky question and then finish. We had a slightly cheeky question from Twitter about how you can use your name as a verb. I have seen on your website that you can use it definitely kind of as a noun because you have kanjectures of which we talked about a couple. But do you also see yourself as a verb to action; so “kanjun” as well as have kanjectures?


Kanjun (01:35:36):

So this question's from Aram, one of my best friends who was my housemate for many years. The joke is that I love to steal people's food. People's food is much tastier when it's someone else's food than it's my food. So often I'll go out with friends, I won't order very much, and I'll just steal food from them. So Aram coined the term too can-june, which means to steal someone's food. However, there's another thing that I do which is whenever I talk to somebody-- and you didn't encounter it that much here although you would have if we had more time to riff. I kind of intensely question them about things; like trying to understand them. Like, "Why did you make these decisions? Why do you think this? What do you think about this?" So also too can-june means-- this is like my default state encountering anyone-- means to basically intensely question someone about their life and their thoughts. So it can mean either; take your pick.



Ben (01:36:44):

That's great. So actually that's two verbs and a noun. I will riff back to our earlier thing and posit that's because food from somebody else's plate has more meaning to you than food from your own.


Kanjun (01:37:00):

I love it. Yes.


Ben (01:37:02):

The calories are obviously the same. The value to it is more. I don't often do this. I'm open, you can ask me a question if you would like to ask me a question.


Kanjun (01:37:15):

Oh, I asked you some questions, but I have lots of questions about your relationship to art. I'm really curious how your reaction to-- The culture I'm in, in Silicon Valley, EA, and there's maybe a non-value of neural art. I'm really curious from your perspective as somebody who's a playwright and who clearly art is very important to. Why do you think that there's this disvaluing of art and what do you think are the things that are lost in a culture like this?


Ben (01:37:54):

So in my view, this stems quite clearly from a utilitarian led thinking which you can trace to both Peter Singer all the way back to John Bentham. And then you can also see it in the work of Derek Parfit who was viewed as one of the greatest living British-- actually global philosophers. He died a few years ago. But it was actually an encoder of his work, “Reasons and Persons.” So to put a long answer short is their shortcut for this is something which you'll know, but for listeners that you get round to expected utility theory or expected value. So this is a shortcut for trying to value something, particularly stocks or cost benefit or things with cash flows and things that you can count.


There are a lot of paradoxes which don't work for expected value. The classic one is Petersburg Paradox. But things like when you have a 51/49 bet. 51 you get a lot of value, but 49 you lose everything. Let's say you destroy the world or you double the value of the world and you play it for long enough and you're going to destroy the world. Strict expected value basically tells you to play this game. And that is because there's a lot of things which you can't put into an expected value calculation. Now, the so-called in my view, fudge for this in expected utility which can work for some things, is that you have this idea of utility which you then try to fudge the value to bring it closer back to humanness. But this is really hard for us to do. And actually mostly we fail to do it except in very simple cases.


Then even in complex cases where you can then take some idea of what humans might think, it's not clear that there's a consensus. So a classic one from healthcare economics is it's very expensive to save a preterm baby. It costs somewhere like half a million to a million dollars or more. Whereas you could spend that in saving the life of a diabetic which only costs maybe $20,000 or $30,000. In first order expected value you always save the diabetic. Then you kind of think about utilities, "Oh, maybe there's more life to something like the baby and the society" and you can try and fudge it. Or you can ask people and you find that the person in the street, the majority say, "No, we should save some babies." And so that's just one way of getting this kind of dispart which doesn't play into expected value.


But because expected value is such a core way of how their thinking has grown up, they can't do things which are hard to measure. Or to our point, things like art or creativity which is not only hard to measure, potentially impossible, but is also not time and variance. So moves across time, people, space, and culture. And because that doesn't fit into that framework-- and I guess some of them do get there if they think really hard about it or they do fudges or they might think of themselves as slightly pluralist. It really doesn't fit into that framework and therefore all of that falls down. Therefore when you had enough time to do expected value over malaria nets, you definitely can't do it over art. And then the second order effects which are just really hard to do about the power of art, you just can't put into your calculations. Yet they seem to be at really crucial tipping points for the world.


So two or three examples. Maybe it's emergent behavior talking about that. Greta, is that emergent behavior or not. But for instance, the white Texan lawyer for Martin Luther King Jr became a lawyer for minority rights because he listened to Louis Armstrong play jazz and he said, "I've heard genius in a black man. The only thing I know is that I need to fight for equality." He's on the record of saying that. That's the interesting formative power of art. You think of something like...


Kanjun (01:42:01):

Art is like a way to see the humanity in anyone else.

Ben (01:42:05):

Exactly that. And all of these important social progress points you had an artistic narrative which changed the system or made the system better. Some of that goes to our deepest myths. I call them myths because they're things that are true only because humans believe them to be true. Like money. The tree doesn't care about money. The dog doesn't care about money. The alien probably wouldn't care about money depending on whether we had to interact. Humans only care about money because we've made that. So that's one of our greatest myths. And essentially that's an act of creativity. In fact, that's kind of an act of art which is across that and humanity. Because that doesn't fit into expected value theory very well with some soft order pluralism, they can't get it so easily and therefore it fails by the wayside. But that's why you then get these critiques outside about how they don't understand the system. They do obviously understand the power story and art and things, but because you can't really weigh it up between individual stories, they tend not to really invest in it very much. So that's an answer to that. But I feel fairly certain that seems to be the roots of it. And when I speak to a lot of EAs that seems to be true. If you read their influential philosophy, that also seems to be true.


Kanjun (01:43:27):

Yeah, I think that's true. Peter Singer explicitly says funding the arts is not as good as saving lives in different countries. One thing that I think I've been puzzled by is this question of measurement. Michael and I think -- One of the things we talked a lot about is funders trying to measure research results and how that results in short-term incremental decisions. And I think measurement is actually-- It's something that I deal with a lot in my day-to-day life. I used to run a startup. Startups are all about measurement because it's all about short-term. But running a research lab, I can't measure anything. There's very little stuff that I can measure. So I've had to completely change my perspective on measurement.


So I think there's this really interesting point about utilitarianism. Startup founders can be utilitarian because actually they're not losing that much when they are super measurement oriented. But when you're doing research or you're in the arts or you're trying to do real long term change in world countries, then actually things are really hard to measure. The problem is that when I talk to an EA-- I would consider myself somewhat EA in terms of being interested in the philosophy but also finding some things quite problematic. But if I were to talk to an EA they would say something like, "Well, the issue is that your utility function just hasn't captured all of the things that you're missing." There was a time when I thought, "Yeah that seems true. We should be able to capture other things in the utility function." But now I'm at a point where I'm wondering, "Actually, that may not be true at all. Actually, some of these things may not be measurable. Maybe not for a very, very long time.” So actually using expected utility as a framework is just going to lead to the wrong actions. It's going to lead to non-optimal actions in the long term. So I think your point about art is super interesting. Old me would've said, "Okay, can you count art in the utility function?" The now me is like...


Ben (01:45:37):

And they believe you can. I think I'm arguing cannot. So what's the phrase? "Not everything that can be counted counts and then not everything that counts can be counted either." I have got quite a long podcast with a philosopher called Larry Temkin who has this critique on EA. It is for those listening, a little bit nerdy and it does go on for three hours. But his main point is that his work on moral philosophy and something called the transitivity or intransitivity problem shows that the axioms behind expected utility theory do not hold. They do not hold for moral choices. So they hold for maths; obviously three is bigger than two, two is bigger than one, three will always be bigger than one. And it holds for heights. So it holds for maths, it does not hold for social or moral reasoning.


He has a 500 page book to explain all of this, but you can get it as read. And when he first posited it a lot of people thought, "Hmm, that doesn't seem to be right because that's crazy." And now actually there's a majority of thinkers who actually think this is true. Therefore my point of view is if this is right and it seems like it is right. If one of the fundamental axioms cannot hold, then you have to use it with caution. Doesn't mean it can be a useful tool, it's obviously a useful tool. But to apply it to all moral reasoning you need to do with caution and it seems to be not potentially with a much caution. Early in the year Larry Temkin explains this in actually his book. It's very interesting reading about that if anyone wants to go back and listen to that.


Kanjun (01:47:24):

That's really interesting. I'll definitely listen to it.


Ben (01:47:27):

Yeah. I'll send you the link. Alright, so let's end on-- You could also feel free to ask me another question. But current projects that you are working on that you might want to mention. I think we have mentioned quite a lot of them. You could also offer any advice that you have either for startups; could be what you're looking for in startups, women founders or your own journey or something in AI. So yeah, current projects and any thoughts or advice you have.


Kanjun (01:47:58):

What would you like for me to give advice on? Advice is always very personal.


Ben (01:48:06):

Okay. So let's do advice on if you are thinking about working in AI or as a startup, what you should be looking to do? Because you already gave me really good [inaudible 01:48:17].


Kanjun (01:48:21):

Join Generally Intelligent.


Ben (01:48:23):

Yeah. Okay. So that's number one. You are hiring. If you're interested in that you should look them up on the website and you should go and join them. But maybe you are abroad so that might be tricky for you. So if you're not going to go and hire at Generally Intelligent, what's the next best thing?


Kanjun (01:48:41):

We also hire remote engineers.


Ben (01:48:45):

Other best thing. If you want to work on AGI, join Kanjun.


Kanjun (01:48:51):

That's right.


Ben (01:48:53):

So that's that.


Kanjun (01:48:55):

What else?


Ben (01:48:58):

Well, you can maybe look at current projects.


Kanjun (01:49:01):

My current projects?


Ben (01:49:02):

Or advice.


Kanjun (01:49:04):

Sure. Yeah. I guess I can briefly talk about current projects. So Generally Intelligent, we've already talked about-- Well, we are hiring and we're very interested in inspecting systems to get a deeper understanding of what's going on and using that to figure out can we get good guarantees around robustness, safety, et cetera, as capabilities increase. Other projects-- I guess if you're a startup founder I have a fund to investing folks called Outside Capital. We do a fair amount of AI investment or if you're interested in investing in a fund. What else?


Ben (01:49:49):

You want to talk about the Neighborhood at all?


Kanjun (01:49:52):

Maybe. It's not something I advertise too much. But the Neighborhood is a really fun project. The reason why we ended up doing it-- Jason Benn, my former housemate and coworker is the one driving most of it. I'm just helping him. We used to have this house called The Archive and it was a great house. I think it changed our lives in really important ways. Maybe this is the piece of advice I would give which is something like you really become the people around you. I really become the people around me. The like five people I spend the most time with. I think choosing those people very carefully is quite important. For me, I've chosen them in particular ways such that they are people I really look up to and would want to become more like because people tend to internalize the beliefs and the limitations of the people around them.


So I want people around me who are expanding my idea of what I can be capable of and not reducing it. So The Archive was a 25 person house that I co-ran for five years. One of the big things-- Michael actually made this comment that The Archive seems like a self-actualization machine. Like someone comes in and a year later they are just much more actualized. I think that was a really interesting thing that we did culturally accidentally just because of the people that we were. We were really trying to understand how do we become better versions of ourselves and discover what our potential could be. I think very seriously asking that question and having people around us asking those questions was really transformative. We shut down The Archive in the middle of Covid.


The Neighborhood is like a scaled up more sustainable for 30 somethings version of it where essentially we want something that is like a university campus for modern adult living where you can have your best friends around you and have this lively intellectual culture that we found at The Archive. And kind of live in an area in a city where you just run into people that you know and want to be around. So in the Neighborhood-- I live at the southern tip of it. I run into a lot of people which is really interesting and have spontaneous interactions in a way that in a normal city I wouldn't have.


Ben (01:52:26):

That's amazing. I really think that's an underrated thing. I wish in my twenties I was walking distance with my close friends and that. The only piece of advice listening to that is I would design it if it's at all possible-- and might not be-- to take you all the way to end of life. So when you're 60, 70, and you are 80 that would be great.


Kanjun (01:52:50):

That is the goal. We'll see what kind of institutions we need to build. In a lot of ways we're constructing a new type of institution, a new way of living. It's not really centralized. It's like a set of decentralized institutions. So we're planning schools and then eventually there will be like end of life type of things when you're growing older, when you want to leave a legacy, et cetera.


Ben (01:53:15):

Mini town within the town. Well, that's great. That advice sounds really great. So choose your friends carefully.


Kanjun (01:53:26):

Yes.


Ben (01:53:27):

And with that, Kanjun, thank you very much.


Kanjun (01:53:30):

Thank you. This is super fun.

In Podcast, Science, Dance Tags Podcast, AI, Kanjun Qiu, Metascience

Michael Nielsen: metascience, how to improve science, open science | Podcast

November 15, 2022 Ben Yeoh

Michael Nielsen is a scientist at the Astera Institute. He helped pioneer quantum computing and the modern open science movement. He is a leading thinker on the topic of meta science and how to improve science, in particular, the social processes of science. His latest co-authored work is  ‘A Vision of metascience: An engine of improvement for the social processes of Science’ co-authored with Kanjun Qiu (open source book link). His website notebook is here, with further links to his books including on quantum, memory systems, deep learning, open science and the future of matter. 

I ask: What is the most important question in science or meta science we should be seeking to understand at the moment ?

We discuss his vision for what a metascience ecosystem could be; what progress could be and ideas for improving the the culture of science and social processes.

We imagine what an alien might think about our social processes and discuss failure audits, high variance funding and whether organisations really fund ‘high risk’ projects if not that many fail, and how we might measure this.

We discuss how these ideas might not work and be wrong; the difficulty of (the lack of) language for new forming fields; how an interdisciplinary institute might work. 

The possible importance of serendipity and agglomeration effects; what to do about attracting outsiders, and funding unusual ideas. 

We touch on the stories of Einstein, Katalin Kariko (mRNA) and Doug Prasher (molecular biologist turned van driver) and what they might tell us.

We discuss how metascience can be treated as a research field and also as an entrepreneurial discipline.

“...."How good a use of the money actually is? Would it be better to repurpose that money into more conventional types of thing or not?" It's difficult to know exactly how to do that kind of evaluation, but hopefully, meta-scientists in the future will in fact think very hard and very carefully about how to do those kinds of evaluation. So that's the meta-scientist research discipline.

As an entrepreneurial discipline, somebody actually needs to go and build these things. For working scientists it's often remarkably difficult to do that because it doesn't look like a conventional activity. This isn't sort of science as normally construed. Something that I found really shocking-- you may be familiar with and hopefully many listeners maybe familiar with, the replication crisis in social psychology. So this was, I guess most famously in 2015, there was a paper published in which 100 well-known experiments in social psychology were replicated. I think it was 36% of the significant findings were found to replicate and typically the effect size was about roughly halved.

So this was not a great look for social psychology as a discipline and raised a lot of questions about what was going on. That story I just told is quite well-known. What is much less well-known is that in fact going back many decades, people had been making essentially the same set of sort of methodological criticisms. Talking about the file drawer effect, talking about p-hacking, talking about all these kinds of things which can lead to exactly this kind of failure. And there are some very good papers written in-- I think the earliest I know is from the early sixties. Certainly in the 1970s and 1980s you see these kinds of papers. They point out the problems, they point out the solutions. “Why did nothing happen?” "Well, because there's no entrepreneurial discipline which actually allows you to build out the institutions which need to be built out if anything is actually to change."


We discuss how decentralisation may help. How new institutions may help. The challenges funders face in wanting to wait until ideas become clearer.

We discuss the opportunity that developing nations such as Indonesia might have.

We chat about rationality and critical rationality.

Michael gives some insights into how AI art might be used and how we might never master certain languages, like the languages of early computing.

We end on some thoughts Michael might give his younger self:

The one thing I wish I'd understood much earlier is the extent to which there's kind of an asymmetry in what you see, which is you're always tempted not to make a jump because you see very clearly what you're giving up and you don't see very clearly what it is you're going to gain. So almost all of the interesting opportunities on the other side of that are opaque to you now. You have a very limited kind of a vision into them. You can get around it a little bit by chatting with people who maybe are doing something similar, but it's so much more limited. And yet I know when reasoning about it, I want to treat them like my views of the two are somehow parallel but they're just not.

Available wherever you get podcasts. Video above or on YouTube and transcript below.

PODCAST INFO

  • Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/3gJTSuo

  • Spotify: https://sptfy.com/benyeoh

  • Anchor: https://anchor.fm/benjamin-yeoh


Transcript: Michael Nielsen and Ben Yeoh (only lightly edited)

Ben

Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to Michael Nielsen. Michael is a scientist at the Astera Institute. He helped pioneer quantum computing and the modern open science movement. He is a leading thinker on the topic of meta-science and how to improve science, in particular, the social processes of science. His latest co-authored work is, “A Vision of Meta-science: An Engine of Improvement for the Social Processes of Science.” Michael, welcome.

Michael

Thank you so much for having me on the podcast, Ben.

Ben (00:33):

So first question, big question of science. What do you think is the most important question we should be seeking to understand around science or meta-science today?

Michael (00:45):

Okay. Science and meta-science are such large subjects that it's impossible to give a really comprehensive answer to that. I'll just stick with the sort of science itself. I think there's this really interesting transition that's happening in science at the moment where for the longest time, the way we made new objects in the world, in some sense it was sort of by inspired tinkering. And we’re now over the last 20, 30 years kind of going through a transition where we actually have a theory of the world that's pretty darn good. And we're starting to use that theory to inform how we build up new objects. It's a little unclear. What I mean by that is sort of atom by atom we are starting to do assembly.

We're not doing it ad hoc. We're actually able to design things from first principles. I think this is a really large change in technology. Over the next hundred or 200 years, we're going to figure out how to do this kind of first principles design whereas before it was always there were some external objects lying around in the world. Maybe you discover copper or iron in the Iron Age and you make use of it but there's no principled underlying theory. So I think that's actually a very exciting thing which is underlying a lot of changes in science over the last 20 or 30 years and I expect it will be a really large force over the next, in fact, probably centuries.

Ben (02:28):

You sketch with Kanjun a really dizzying vision of what a science ecosystem could be. And I understand your point is there's a lot of variety that we could be expected to see in a really healthy ecosystem. Then right in the start of your essay or book, I think you have this interesting provocation around what would an alien think when presumably an alien would understand the laws of gravity, understands the laws of physics. Although maybe if they've time traveled maybe there'd be something else on gravity. But you make the point that actually around the thinking of the social progress around science, there might be some elements that an alien finds the same. Maybe something like a controlled trial. You would've thought that design would also stick in an alien culture and some things that an alien might find really very different. So when you talk about some of these first principle building blocks, are you thinking of the principles that an alien would hold to be true? And in which case, which of those principles do you think we've discovered already?

Michael (03:33):

Yeah. Scientists certainly often obsess quite a bit about things like their citations and their number of publications and their h-index and all these other kinds of things. And it's pretty difficult to imagine that an alien scientist or an alien society would've rediscovered those. They don't seem like platonic elements of the world just out there waiting to be discovered. Although it also seems likely to me that alien societies might have some pretty strange constructs of their own that we would also laugh at. In terms of what's actually fixed, I would frame that question as a question about fundamental meta-scientific principles. Are there particular ways in which it's good to organize the social processes of science to enable discovery? So an example might be for example, in the 16th century, Francis Bacon had a certain number of interesting ideas, but a couple-- One was that there should be extremely limited deference to authority.

At the time of course, there was still a great deal of deference to the church, to the state, to Aristotle, to the other great thinkers of antiquity. And Bacon said, "No, that's not right. Really, we should get away from that. In fact, nature is the final." And anybody, if you do an experiment and it contradicts what Aristotle says it's so much the worst for Aristotle. You don't simply defer just because the great man of 2000 whatever, 1500 years earlier said so. There's a whole bunch of notions there. But this notion of deference to nature rather than to authority and freedom of inquiry, those are examples of meta-scientific principles that I think it's reasonably likely that in fact other alien civilizations, to use your framing, might well have discovered things which are quite similar to that as kind of being best practices how to organize the process of science.

Ben (05:43):

And how well do you think we understand how we've made progress in science? Because there's kind of essays out there saying, "Well, we don't really understand that much about how much progress we've made. It's all been a little bit haphazard." But then some people say, "Well, no, actually we do have some of these progresses and what we think." Do you think we've understood very well the processes that we've made? Or do you think it's barely touched and just been completely haphazard and we don't really quite know what we've been doing?

Michael (06:15):

We said they have lots of rules of thumb. Economists will tell you that total factor productivity is somehow strongly related to the practice of science. People try and write papers relating to patents, to productivity growth and things like this. It's hard certainly trained as a theoretical physicist not to feel like we're still in the pre Aristotelian phase of this. These are very gross kinds of ways of thinking that they just seem very coarse. We don't have anything like a detailed theory of how to design institutions to support discovery. But people are making little bits and pieces of progress which is fun. I think of it as kind of... I mean, it's a proto field. It's a proto field now with a long history. You can find people proposing doing this sort of a very explicitly kind of investigation going back a century or so. And then you have people like Bacon or in fact many others in the 16th and 17th century who in some sense were doing what I would call meta-science.

Ben (07:31):

So still the early days which is very exciting. So how should we go about improving the culture of science or these social processes? Perhaps one way of asking that-- because that's the whole big part of your book, is you pick up on one idea on high variance. So things that people support or donor variants. So maybe I thought I would ask you in the least that section, what do you think is the best idea in that and what do you think is the worst idea? What's the one that you would just not do and maybe else should do?

Michael (08:06):

So certainly the processes which we use now in universities and more broadly in the research culture, a lot of those seem pretty arbitrary and ad hoc. If you think about the NIH panel system or things like this, in many cases those kinds of systems weren't designed after a lot of careful reflection and thought. They were just done in a very ad hoc contingent manner by people who rush to get things done which is terrific. But then when you don't have any process for actually upgrading those systems later on, you can get really stuck in quite a rut. So I certainly think that I'm far from being alone in this. A lot of people I think have considerable problems with the notion of essentially committee based peer review of proposals for scientific projects.

You have five or 10 or sometimes more of your peers sitting in judgment of your proposal and you get these kind of averaging effects where the thing that is pretty acceptable to everybody is the thing that can get funded. And the idea that maybe is radically polarizing it's very, very difficult to get funded. So some people love it, some people hate it. That will tend to die under that kind of process. And that process wasn't designed to be the best. It's just something that made quite a bit of sense early on as something to try out. But it's now a little bit frozen. I've heard so many people refer to it as the gold standard. I don't know in what sense it's the gold standard. Maybe the sense in which it’s the thing more people complain about than anything else.

Ben (10:03):

Right. Okay. So that high variance would perhaps weigh against it. All right, I'm going to spit out a few of these and then we can maybe talk about why they don't happen or maybe which one is the worst or best on that. So use high variance on that. So I was very interested, failure audit, 10 year insurance, an institute for traveling scientists, long/ short prizes (prizes in general), having an anti-portfolio and an interdisciplinary institute. So out of that, maybe I'm just going to pick one first and then you can dwell on whether those you really hate or really like one of those ideas is. I'm really interested in why science hasn't really got a failure audit much built into it because a lot of other industries have it. Some it's even mandated somewhat either by regulations and law that you have to go and look. If your bridge failed, you'd look and examine why exactly that happened.

And actually even in one of my domains investing you're always looking at your investing mistakes; what worked and what didn't, particularly what didn't. And yet at least on the funding part where you haven't-- So like your high variance part, did they go looking back and, “Well, committees all gave this an average score and we put it through. Was that a failure or not?” So that does raise the question of why something like a failure audit hasn't happened. You talk about some of the institutional bottlenecks maybe for that. So how good an idea do you think this is? Why hasn't it happened and what should we do?

Michael (11:33):

Just to fill in some background. We propose a large number of different ideas more just as kind of grist for the mill than anything else in this long essay with my collaborator, Kanjun Qiu. One of those ideas-- it's just a paragraph, is the idea of a failure audit. It's that, for example, if a funder claims that it's serious about high risk, high reward research, then they should actually evaluate what fraction of their projects fail. And if the failure rate is not high enough there should be some kind of restructuring. Maybe the program officer gets fired, maybe the director's job is under threat, some kind of consequences if they really claim to be serious about this kind of high risk model. Whether that's a good idea or not is another question, but let's just assume for the sake of argument that they are.

So just a couple of points about that. One of many motivating factors for this was just reading a report from the European Research Council where they're doing an analysis or a retrospective on what they funded. So throughout this report, they talk very assertively about how they're engaged in such high risk work. But they also claim at the same time that 79% of the projects-- I think it's 79%, it's about 80% of the projects that they fund are extremely successful. So this is not quite a definition-- I don't know what definition of risk they're using. But when 80% of the things that you try work not just well, but really well, but you're also trying to claim that you are really engaging in highly risky behavior-- Well, there seems to me anyway like there's some kind of a mismatch. I can't speak to why they do this but it does seem a little bit confusing. This is certainly a common thing when I talk to individuals, many funders. They will talk a lot about wanting to encourage a lot of risk, but they're not assessing in any sensible way the extent to which they actually are buyers of such risk. And when that's the case, there's no real feedback mechanism which is actually encouraging them to move towards the behavior which they claim to want. So this is just sort of a simple-- There are many variations of this idea which one could try, but the idea is to have some kind of mechanism for doing that kind of alignment between people's stated intentions and the actual outcomes.

Now, when I've talked to people and individual funders about this, about trying some sort of variation of it, they're often fascinated by the idea. I've talked for hours to people at some funders about it but they won't do it. And I think for really quite a natural reason which is, yeah, they're nervous about having consequences in this kind of a way. It's the most natural thing in the world to want to avoid those consequences. Of course, I don't like having my nose rubbed in my failures either. But it does leave this gap between what they think they're doing or what they say they're doing and what they're actually doing.

Ben (15:01):

Maybe we need to pay them more to offset that but with consequences. So you don't think it is because they actually want to see success and they're not interested in high risk? You think they are interested in high risk but they just don't particularly want to be audited on it?

Michael (15:20):

At the individual level I'm quite certain many are interested in high risk. There is of course this issue around, “What exactly does one mean by this?” So you talk to individuals about what specifically they're looking for, and it turns out that what they're looking for is actually quite different than what one other scientists in their potential pool of fundees thinks is high risk. So also having that kind of mismatch creates something of a communication problem. So I live in San Francisco in Silicon Valley and I have some friends who work in the startup and technology land. It's interesting there to talk about risk seeking behavior on the part of the venture capitalists. Certainly I've chatted with friends and acquaintances who've been pitching some idea for a startup company and they eventually realize that what they're pitching is not ambitious enough to get the attention of the top VCs. So there it's a case of what-- Basically, the good they're selling is not ambitious enough for the VCs. In the case of many of the funders, they're saying they want a purchase risk but they're only buying safety because eventually the scientists just start offering safe kind of proposals.

Ben (16:50):

That's what's happening. There's something slightly akin within investing world, one of my primary domains. If you claim you are a value investor and you actually define value, then when you're audited at the end of the year your own end investors will ask you, "How did you make your money?" Hopefully you made some. But if you didn't make it doing value and you bought--In investing you can buy growth and all sorts of other things, well, they say actually you failed. “You might have made us money so you might have had successful projects, but you didn't do what you said. And we can audit and we check you.” And actually, you check it in very many different domains. So this goes back to your VC example. VCs are expected to take these hundred x, a thousand x return type of businesses. Typically, a café business is not going to do that even though you might have an okay return. So you wouldn't expect to see a café business in a typical VC portfolio. And if you're pitching it, you're not really likely to that because it doesn't match what they're looking for. But there is an audit on that. It's both a success and a failure audit. So I thought it was really interesting that it didn't seem that science funding really had that.

Michael (18:00):

Not to my knowledge. I don't think I've ever talked to a funder that said that they really do a pointy version of this. Many of them do retrospectives. That's quite common. But they tend to be very soft in terms of the consequences. Actually, for an interesting reason which is those documents are both evaluations for the funder in terms of how they're looking at themselves and you can view them potentially as self-improvement documents, but they also tend to be marketing documents as well. In particular, it may be a document which is being used to communicate with government and with the wider public. Then there's a very interesting situation where to the extent it's a marketing document. They're trying to use it in fact to raise money or to ensure the continued supply of money. That's obviously a difficult spot to be really brutally honest with yourself about your own failures. Sort of absent really strong controls to ensure that you are honest in that way.

Ben (19:04):

I guess it's hard to put into that language of risk and you need something maybe simple. Like the person proposing the project has got to say, "Well, I honestly believe there's only a 4% chance of this project working." And you assess, "Well, I funded 10 projects at 4% chance which actually means all of them should probably fail. At the end then if I got one out that was really lucky." But it's quite hard probably for the originator of the project to honestly say, "Well, this is only a 4% chance of working” or something like that. Interesting I do a lot of analysis of early stage drug development, and we actually know before you enter phase one, you are talking roundabout 1% chance give or take a little bit within the error. So you kind of know what the average is when you go into that funding without having to say that. So if you get one in a hundred right you're doing about average on that. But we have a language of risk that you use which I don't see when I look at a lot of projects. And maybe that's because it's hard to do. But I guess the originator of the project or the funders should probably put a percentage chance and if they funded something they should say, "Well, I honestly thought this had a 10% chance of working."

Michael (20:12):

So I mean, in the conversation we're having we are putting a lot of emphasis on risk and working and failure. I guess I just want to emphasize-- That's a particular-- You could have a particular set of VCs around that. Those VCs may or may not be right. We're sort of for the sake of the conversation assuming that they are.

Ben (20:31):

Yeah, this might be completely wrong.

Michael (20:33):

It might be wrong. But once you have doubled down or decided that you want to pursue a particular thesis, having mechanisms in place to ensure it's not just words but something that's actually being done is obviously a valuable thing to have. The one really large funder that seems to do this quite well... I don't know of a really formal estimate that's been done of the failure rate of DARPA's programs. But people pretty close to the agency have estimated rates of sort of 80 and 85% failure which is truly remarkable given the scale at which they operate. And yet, I think most people at least view DARPA as having been really quite an outstanding success.

Ben (21:25):

And that's one of the things I'd emphasize on reading your essay is that you just put out so many ideas, some of which you think might not be any good at all or might not be correct. But the whole point being is that there seem to be so many ideas out there which we haven't really tested at all. And you make the point that actually that might be really the early days of it. So I might just touch on a couple more ideas and then move on to exploring this thing as ideas of funder as a detector. But I was very interested in your interdisciplinary institute because I sense a lot of universities or research thinks think of themselves as interdisciplinary or they have things and maybe some universities have that different type of scientist meeting. But the vision you gave of something which was truly interdisciplinary, I didn't see out there in the world. And when I read that I thought, "Well, that is actually surprising that there's a lot of talk as well about how great it is to be interdisciplinary and how much you learn from far domains and near domains and mixing of people in agglomeration effects." But to your point-- and you say this with a lot of these things, it hasn't really been done in the real world. Maybe assess the idea. Do you think interdisciplinary institute's actually a good idea? And what would you do if you thought it was a good idea?

Michael (22:42):

So again, this is just another-- It's sort of an amusing idea. It's simply to point out that in fact programmatically, you can try and engineer serendipity. If you've got 30 pairs of disciplines and you simply hire three people at the intersection of all 30 choose two, whatever that is. I think it's the-- I can't remember. It's about 450 odd-- sort of intersections to work at the intersection of any pair of those disciplines. Most of those researchers are going to fail. A few of them though will be doing something that is not supported anywhere else in the world and that happens to actually have a lot of latent value and they may pay for all the rest. So again, it's really sort of a mechanism design point of view where you say, "Let's take seriously the idea that maybe actually we have a systematic problem with funding interdisciplinary work. Let's simply see how to do it in a scalable way, design the mechanism to achieve that end." And then there's a question, sort of a meta-scientific question which is, "Is the value created actually sufficient to justify the upfront investment?" We don't know the answer to that question. You probably I think need to do a lot of work to make a prediction about it, but it's at least plausible as kind of an interesting way of going.

Ben (24:06):

And you could test some aspect about it.

Michael (24:09):

You could certainly do it at a low level relatively easily. The standard way in which a lot of interdisciplinary work is done, it's by people who are pitching their particular interdisciplinary work. I was involved in quantum computing beginning in the early 1990s. At that point it was very much a field that was seen as interdisciplinary. It was at the intersection of computer science and physics, didn't really have a natural home in either place. And so a certain number of quantum computing people would go to universities and sort of pitch at us essentially an interdisciplinary kind of a project. So that's kind of a bottom up approach. This thing we've been talking about is much more top down where you're just sort of saying, "Let's seek to create it at the intersection of every possible pair of disciplines." It might be that the bottom up approach is better to sort of look for things which are bubbling up. Again, that's something that actually needs to be tested. If you wanted to do something which was a little-- didn't involve quite as many resources as funding 450 at the intersection of 450 disciplines, you could simply sample from that set, for example and you'd get some interesting information.

Ben (25:19):

Yeah. Actually it would probably be pretty interesting even with fewer numbers of pairs.

Michael (25:22):

Even with 10 or 20 pairs. Just randomly chosen. You think about, actually... A good example, much of the modern deep learning revolution has of course been enabled by GPUs. GPUs were created—basically, my understanding is for video games. Just because modern displays had gotten such high resolution they needed dedicated chips to drive them. They're also very good at just doing linear algebra in general. And so circa sort of-- the latter part of the [inaudible 25:58] or whatever we call that decade, there was a relatively small number of people who were both familiar with AI or familiar with neural networks and also had some experience of GPU programming. And those people had an interesting competitive advantage in getting into neural nets. I just don't think that the intersection of video game programming and artificial intelligence is something that you could have predicted was going to be a good spot to be at the intersection of.

Ben (26:29):

Yeah. Hard to get that right; top down. And maybe that brings me onto one of your last ones, at least in this section, which was the anti-portfolio. You gave some quite interesting examples in the essay. For instance, one of the key scientists behind mRNA pretty much didn't get funded within the public university system a little bit. And then the university kind of celebrated it and said, "Well, actually you should definitely have funded her more." And then these other near misses or complete misses that we can see. Sometimes scientists now being a taxi driver rather than being in science. I had this overwhelming sense of, "Oh my gosh. How much have we missed out?" So I'm not sure if the anti-portfolio would really help with that, but I thought it was quite an interesting idea borrowed maybe from investing in VC about, "Well, these were the mistakes that we could have invested in and we didn't."

But then the next step being, "Well, why did we miss those and why didn't we invest further?" Because some of it, like in mRNA, they could have controlled it because everyone thought, "We're not really ever going to get a drug out of this.” So very low chance, let's not really fund it. But to your first point if you are funding high risk, this is exactly what we probably should state. “Government public, something other funded for a while because it is so low chance of success.” And the people in the field were telling you, “But if we make this work it's going to have a really high impact.” I just thought it was really interesting how you sketch that out and we missed it. Do you think that's a system--? Because you can always have individual misses and you make this point. But the way you sketch it out, it seems to me that it does seem to be more of a systems problem. How certain are you of that and what do you think we should be doing about it?

Michael (28:12):

So one of the most famous stories that you learn as a young scientist is that of Albert Einstein stuck in the Swiss patent office, unable to get an academic job. It's totally sort of a funny story. In this one year, 1905, he did plausibly four or five things that are Nobel Prize worthy which is pretty good for a guy who couldn't get an academic position, including I should say, he reconceived the notions of space, time, energy and mass which is not bad for sort of a side hustle. The thing that is omitted from this story is anything about what changed in the university system as a result. Did people say, "Oh, maybe we made a bit of a mistake here? Maybe this guy should have been able to get a good job." Of course, after having done that he quickly was made a professor and had a long academic career after that. But as far as I know, there was no postmortem done sort of systematically to say, "Why did we miss this person? Why was he actually not offered jobs before that?" That's sort of a spectacular example. You mentioned this example, Katalin Kariko, the scientist or one of the key scientists behind mRNA who in fact lost her job or was demoted, I guess, by the University of Pennsylvania. Had basically a lot of problems in getting to the point where she could pursue that work. Repeatedly turned down for NIH grants.

The University of Pennsylvania and the NIH will now happily take a lot of credit for her work. But as far as I know, they haven't done a serious postmortem internally. I mean, these are very spectacular, sort of very relatable examples. But if you've worked in science, actually you will know a lot of examples which are like this. But there is no then systematic reform. There is no way of conducting a postmortem which actually leads to systemic changes. So of course, it's fine. Any system at all is going to miss some people. The question that I think needs to be asked is, "How do you change in response? Do you just accept that that's the price?" Maybe that's the right response to the Kariko example but maybe it's not. Doug Prasher, the scientist who discovered green fluorescent protein which later won the Nobel Prize-- At the time of the Nobel was awarded for that work. He was working as a shuttle bus driver at a car dealership which is fine work but probably not the best use of his talents. There are many such stories and just no way for them then to feed back to cause systemic change. That's the issue, not that mistakes are made.

Ben (31:20):

Yeah. And I worry that although science is a discipline where outsiders with good ideas can be proved by the science, that it's not as strong as we would believe. And you have all of these data, whether it's minorities or outside, or your CV doesn't come from a prestigious university or your idea is just way out the mainstream where it just doesn't seem to shed light. So I'm not exactly sure but I do sense that might be a problem. Then it's interesting because you go on to make this analogy of the funder as a kind of detector system where they're looking for dark intelligence matter out there. And that that as a model is like, "Well, if it's out there, maybe there could be more ways of finding that type of dark matter and intelligence." When I was thinking about that I was reflecting that in some ways you're also incentivizing more dark matter intelligence to form in ways which won't work in the current systems that we have. How useful is that analogy in thinking about, "Well, are they really just looking for stuff which is out there and if we change some of this system, we could find it more as to your point is that that dark matter like it is in the universe just to be so much wider than we can currently invest."

Michael (32:40):

Okay. Let me just give it a really practical example. So a friend of mine, Adam Marblestone, has this notion of what he calls a focused research organization. A focused resource research organization is basically, think sort of tens of millions of dollars, an independent organization which is typically going to-- It has one very specific goal and it will create a particular type of a tool or a particular type of a data set. So for example, the cultivarian is an example of a focused research organization. And what the cultivarian is trying to do is it's trying to develop synthetic biology for non-model organisms. So a lot of the work that's done in synthetic biology at the moment it's typically done using e-coli as the particular organism which is modified.

So we have great tools for doing it in e-coli, but we don't have great tools for doing synthetic biology in a lot of other organisms. And so what they're trying to do in the cultivarian is they have a very specific list of tools that they want to create so that they can be used in certain other types of organism. So this is a very specific kind of-- It's a crossover between engineering and science. In many ways, this is something that is extremely likely to succeed because they just have kind of a checklist. "We need to do it here, here, here, here, and here. Here are some of the bottlenecks. Here's what the outputs are going to be. We're going to exist for a certain fixed period of time. It's going to cost--" I have no idea how much that's going to cost, but let's say 30 million dollars or something like that.

This is just a type of scientific problem that has been certainly been solved in the past but it's always been solved in a very bespoke fashion. So something like the Large Hadron Collider, the Human Genome Project, LIGO; the gravitational wave detector, these are all examples of projects where you had a very specific outcome very clearly in mind. You had a very specific process which was intended to get you to that goal. You just needed a large enough organization, the right set of resources to do it. But those were funded in a bespoke fashion. They weren't funded... Basically, people had to go off and sort of make an individual case. The clever thing about the focused research organizations is they're trying to do it in a scalable way. They're creating this container, convergent research, which seeks out people who have ideas for things which fit this general template.

And it just turns out-- What they tell me, they talk to a large number of scientists about this and most of the scientists don't immediately necessarily have anything to say. They're not used to this kind of container. There's no funding vehicle for it previously. And so if they've had an idea which would be a good match for the focused research organization, they don't necessarily-- It's not something they've developed in the past because there was no avenue for taking it further. It was a form of intellectual dark matter, this kind of very nascent thing and you got on with doing other things. You got your NIH R01 one grant or whatever was available and you did that kind of work. So it's interesting what they're essentially doing with the focused research organizations is building a kind of a detector to search out this intellectual dark matter.

Hopefully people have many, very nascent in most cases, ideas for focused research organizations that might actually be just a much better use of their talents than doing more conventional projects. So that's just kind of to sketch a very specific example of a person who identified a particular type of knowledge that at the moment, most funders just have-- They have nothing they can do with that. They're not set up to do it at all, but they founded this template and now they're systematically searching it out. I like to think of it as-- It's almost an antenna for eliciting this kind of information. Most people of course say, "Oh, I don't have any ideas like that." But a few people say, "Oh, actually I have this very half-baked idea." And then they may go off for three months or six months, think about it a lot more, and then actually come back with a really solid proposal. It's very early days for the focused research organization. I think the first two were funded last year. So we'll know whether it's a good model in five or 10 years. But certainly I think it's very interesting as an example of expanding the range of things which funders look to fund.

Ben (37:22):

Yeah, that makes a lot of sense to me. So correct me if I'm wrong, but I think in the essay you make two points around meta-science as a field. First of that it should be treated as a research field. And I could see that related to philosophy of science, history of science and things that this particular element of meta-science could definitely be seen as a research field. And then your other point is that it should be seen as an entrepreneurial discipline. So you actually have to trial out things, scale it, try these new social processes out. I'm interested in both, but on that entrepreneurial part, it seems that that's particularly challenging to say, "Well, we've got this new field and now we've got to try a lot of other things and then scale it out which we see on the experimental level. But we are seeing this at the meta level.” Do you think this is the only way that we should pursue it? How strong do you feel is this entrepreneurial field and what is it about it which means that you think, "Okay, this is what we've got to do. We've got to trial these small things. There's loads of ideas out there we don't know and then we scale and do it." That's kind of what entrepreneurs do and therefore I'm saying it's an entrepreneurial field. Have I got that right in terms of what you're saying and arguing on that?

Michael (38:35):

Well, there's certainly at least two components-- Actually, I would say three. We might come back to the third. One is just studying the processes people use and how well do they work? How can they be improved? What's not working at all, these kinds of things? So taking an evaluative approach, I mentioned, for example, the focused research organizations before. At some point in the future it's going to take a little while. It's going to be very good to do an evaluation of those and to start to think about questions like, "How good a use of the money actually is? Would it be better to repurpose that money into more conventional types of thing or not?" It's difficult to know exactly how to do that kind of evaluation, but hopefully, meta-scientists in the future will in fact think very hard and very carefully about how to do those kinds of evaluation. So that's the meta-scientist research discipline.

As an entrepreneurial discipline, somebody actually needs to go and build these things. For working scientists it's often remarkably difficult to do that because it doesn't look like a conventional activity. This isn't sort of science as normally construed. Something that I found really shocking-- you may be familiar with and hopefully many listeners maybe familiar with, the replication crisis in social psychology. So this was, I guess most famously in 2015, there was a paper published in which 100 well-known experiments in social psychology were replicated. I think it was 36% of the significant findings were found to replicate and typically the effect size was about roughly halved.

So this was not a great look for social psychology as a discipline and raised a lot of questions about what was going on. That story I just told is quite well-known. What is much less well-known is that in fact going back many decades, people had been making essentially the same set of sort of methodological criticisms. Talking about the file drawer effect, talking about p-hacking, talking about all these kinds of things which can lead to exactly this kind of failure. And there are some very good papers written in-- I think the earliest I know is from the early sixties. Certainly in the 1970s and 1980s you see these kinds of papers. They point out the problems, they point out the solutions. “Why did nothing happen?” "Well, because there's no entrepreneurial discipline which actually allows you to build out the institutions which need to be built out if anything is actually to change."

So it's just academics doing what academics do; studying a problem, figuring out what needs to happen maybe. But then they don't actually have the kind of infrastructure which is necessary to go and really make the changes. Turns out there's just a lot of institution building. And fortunately, that has happened in the modern era but it required a tremendous amount of energy and foresight and intelligence and also, I should say, actually funding from some unusual sources. A lot of the money for this work actually came from the Arnold Foundation run by the Hedge Fund operator, John Arnold.

Ben (42:18):

It didn't came from this different source of funding which I think is interesting. It struck me that these institution builders may well be not desktop scientists but they might well be meta-scientists. But actually the disciplines are potentially a little bit different for institution building. Actually, you see that in some other perhaps slow to change or slower to change industries. So for instance, lawyers have potentially run themselves by lawyers but now they're slowly evolving. They realize that actually, "You know what? If you're really good at law does not necessarily mean you're good at running your own organization." And they started to get in people who might be better at that. Accountants are the same. They might be very good at accounts. Is that the same as running an organization, small or large? And it struck me that science is having this similar problem that actually there's even more in law than in accounting about what you should do. It should maybe be attracting not those who've necessarily studied physics, but could have studied anything or interested in this to help build those institutions. And that's the kind of entrepreneurial part. Do you think that can happen just understanding some of science to build those organizations like a whole different discipline? Or do you think it's got to come from scientists themselves?

Michael (43:33):

I think just looking at examples where this has happened successfully in the past, there are a certain number of people who largely come from outside of science who have contributed successfully. But with that said, most of the examples begins with a scientist who is very close to the particular problems, understands them well, feels them very acutely, has an existing network and begins to develop solutions from there. Often when they do it, a classic is that they need to leave their home institution. Sometimes they need to leave science entirely. You’re often beginning to seek very unconventional sources of funds. Actually, I should say the default thing that happens under those circumstances is it just fails because there is no sort of support mechanism. It's done in this very strange, very bespoke fashion.

Brian Nosek who was the person behind some of this work on the replication crisis, he started the Center for Open Science sort of as an entrepreneurial kind of an organization to build out a lot of the required infrastructure. He took a leave of absence from his university position. And partially, just because the kinds of person who they needed to hire, there was just a person that is quite difficult to hire conventionally in an academic environment. So that's an example where it was done successfully. But when I talk to people who have ideas like this, they don't have any model for how to do this successfully.

Ben (45:17):

Yeah. I was talking to innovation historian Anton Howes and he has this idea that back in history, you essentially get people who were disgruntled but couldn't let it go. And from that you have all of these type of things which happened. He's got a lot of historic examples whereas more individual inventor scientists forming these things, but scaled in slightly different does seem to apply to today. And you think about homes for other types of thinkers. I think of the Santa Fe on complexity. There was no home for these, I guess you call them slightly maverick scientists and thinkers, although maybe not today. But they couldn't find homes in their home institutions and so homes had to be built for that.

The other thread of work I see through the essay and from your previous work which I feel is quite important although it doesn't necessarily touch on this exactly, is on decentralization and also open science. Entrepreneurial stuff seems to work better decentralized. We can talk about how much you can do top down versus bottom up like we said on kind of pairing disciplines. And then this idea of open science-- Even going back in history, how much you could build on what was public knowledge versus whether it was shared or whether you kept it as patents. But this idea that if you are thinking of just the glory of science as opposed to any profit motive, then building on other people's knowledge or knowledge out there might be quite useful for speeding up that which is a kind of open science idea. How important do you think are those two threads to expanding the field of meta-science, particularly entrepreneurial? Or are they really separate threads which may or may not happen and don't have to intersect with how meta-science is?

Michael (47:00):

I think that they are sort of separate. The point about decentralization, it's really just this point that you want change to be able to come from anywhere. So in particular, you don't want gatekeepers who are able to inhibit change. The ideas of science, we have a pretty good balance there. There's certainly a large number of Noble prizes are awarded to people who actually a long time ago when they were doing the original work, they were the outsider. They were the grad student or whatever. And maybe the famous expert was saying, "No, this can't be done." Certainly there are examples where science is not so receptive to outside ideas but overall, has a really remarkable track record of accepting that kind of thing. An example actually given in the essay which I rather like is the determination of the structure. The DNA molecule done by Watson, Crick, Franklin and arguably her student, Goslin as well.

They were very much kind of scrappy outsiders. They were at well-known institutions but they were almost completely unknowns. The other person who was in this race at the time was Linus Pauling who was the most famous chemist in the world. He was a Nobel Prize winner. I don't know whether he'd won his second Nobel Prize by that point, but he certainly had won. And it wasn't any Nobel Prize, it was a truly spectacular piece of work. Pauling actually announced that he'd found the structure first before them but he was wrong. The remarkable thing is Pauling accepted this immediately. They pointed out-- I think it was Watson pointed it out to him the error that he'd made and then showed Pauling the structure that they'd found, and Pauling just looked at it and realized that he'd goofed.

And this kind of situation where nobody with a good idea can sort of essentially emerge almost immediately victorious over the incumbent is obviously a very healthy thing. It's possible in science at the level of ideas, it is much harder at the level of institutions. If you have a much better idea for how the NIH should be dispersing its funding, good luck. I mean, the only way you can be taken seriously is if you are already at power. If you're sort of at that level-- If you're at the level of the director of the NIH or you have a Nobel Prize or something like that, sure, you can get taken seriously, maybe, but you're not going to do it as a grad student like Watson or Crick or somebody like that. So that ability to do decentralized upgrades in the social processes, the institutions of science is something which we just have no mechanism for at the moment. And I think that's the reason for much of what I see as sclerosis.

Ben (50:10):

And so your solution is new institutions, or can you do it new arms of old institutions?

Michael (50:16):

A few things. I mean, there are some patterns that work decentralized already. I won't talk about them now. One thing that would help a tremendous amount is a much more serious discipline of meta-science which is able to do evaluations which are dispositive. So I mentioned before this example of the replication crisis in social psychology. That is an example where you had an outsider who was actually really able to change an entire discipline because the strength of the evidence was so good. But it was also rather a peculiar situation where sort of the key paper-- arguably the key paper that they wrote, 270 authors replicated a hundred papers over multiple years of work. So it wasn't just get a data source, write some Python scripts, generate a few nice graphs.

This was a very serious kind of a project where they had said what level of evidence would be so overwhelmingly convincing that in fact even people who hated this conclusion would be forced to accept it or would be forced to... I think really it's change your mind; that's the relevant question. So even somebody who is initially hostile would change their mind. At the moment we just don't have very strong techniques for doing that. This is an example of where it was done, but what you would like is many more such examples and in particular, just a lot of people to work on developing techniques which are strong enough to do that. I think there are a few people who are doing that. Pierre Azoulay, an economist at MIT has I think also done some very strong work where it starts. I don't think it quite meets this bar, but it's getting close to the point where the evidence is so strong for certain processes that you might actually start to think, "Oh, I was wrong before in what I believed was the right way to do things." So that's kind of the bar. We introduce this term, decisive meta-scientific result, meaning a result which is so compelling that it would actually cause somebody initially skeptical to change their mind.

Ben (52:46):

Skeptics changing their mind. That's a good hurdle to cross. So I'm going to see if I can pin you down then on a meta-science question or idea. What would be the one thing that you would bet on most or most want to change in meta-science or some experiment to run do you think would be most valuable? Or you could also do the work like high variance. We could do, what do you think is the best idea in meta-science and what do you think is the worst idea in meta-science? And maybe we should go from the worst because then we'll be... Anyway, best and worst?

Michael (53:17):

Going to the bottom of the barrel you can always go further down. I'm certainly very fond of the idea of people thinking much more explicitly about increasing the rate at which new fields are founded. Actually, some funders do a certain amount of this work. They think explicitly in terms of trying to support fields in their relatively early days, but never that early. Something funny happens at the beginning of new fields very often. It's often very hard for people to get support for their work. I was involved in quantum computing in the relatively early days. I started working on it in 1992 just doing things like, “What journal do you publish in?” Surprisingly hard question. If you submit it to a lot of journals that you might think were relevant they'll just say, "I'm sorry, what is this?"

So it requires some editors to actually be a little bit friendly. If you try and arrange something like a scientific meeting actually people are like, "What is this?" So there's all these sort of very interesting barriers. But at the same time if you look at the papers which are being published retrospectively, they're enormously important; not all of them, but many of those papers are incredibly important. So there's kind of this very interesting mismatch where the work that is being done is often of incredibly high value relative to the resources that are being put into it. But also the barriers are much higher than much more conventional work. And I've used the example of quantum computing because I saw that very firsthand. But in fact, reading histories and talking to people seems to be quite a common feature across many fields.

There's often a lot of really very important low hanging fruit in the early days and yet pioneers surprisingly often it's very difficult for them to obtain even very extremely minimal resources. So certainly I think there's a lot of room for funders to think about this question of how can we accelerate the rate at which new fields are being produced? One of the things that they can do is to try-- To think about the question much more seriously, "What are the very early signals which currently we're not able to detect at all?" If you have a really good story, a really compelling kind of an account of how this is all going to play out and so on, that's actually a sign that maybe you're a little bit later on in the whole process. Very few fields start that way. Alan Turing inventing computing in the 1930s. He certainly didn't anticipate video games or something like this. He was actually trying to solve a logic problem. So many fields are born in very strange, almost entirely illegible ways. And this is one of the reasons why funders have trouble funding a lot of that work very often. But it's also an opportunity for them. So that's something I would love to see done.

Ben (56:41):

I could definitely see new fields. I've seen it tiny bit afar from science but actually more in the arts when you're talking about new ways of working or work. The interesting thing what I've seen in the very early days, I would say call it something where it's about a quarter baked-- So working on something else is their main thing and they've got this quarter baked idea and typically, almost everyone in the world or in that room won't understand what the person's talking about. It's quarter baked, so they don't even have the language to describe it. Quantum computing is quite a good example. You have to invent the terms and the language which are derived from other things but its own unique thing. Yet what I see, at least in art world-- And I think tangentially I see it in some science as well, is this quarterback idea is part obsessive.

You still have to do other things because you've got to do other things, but it nags at you or it nags at the person and it doesn't go away at the back of their mind. And then somehow the successful ones I see is they get a piece of usually chance funding or time or something and they work it into enough of a language that someone else can then potentially get it and go-- And someone with status or something saying, "You know what? This is worth a bet on. I can barely understand it, but I think I understand enough of it to know that it's true as opposed to completely wacky." You see that in art easier and I guess the stakes are lower in art. Then if it develops, it develops into it a language. You see this in language of art. They develop the whole other language and go, "Okay, that is a compelling vision," which in its very early days everyone thought was crazy or couldn't even understand and maybe wasn’t art. You could see it sometimes too early for its time. So I give a lot of credence to this quarter baked or fifth baked idea thing where they're trying to express something and in a language that you can't quite understand. But I can completely see it from a funder, if they can't understand it, well, how are you going to fund it? Except that that's maybe the signal that they're really obsessed about it. You can't understand it, but someone may be something and they're trying to invent something new about it. There seems to be tentative signs around it, still very low probability at success, but you have got these kind of meta-science which I think could be explored.

Michael (58:58):

I think the difficulty there, the challenge of a funder is the natural tendency is to want to wait to see whether or not things will become clearer. But of course they don't necessarily become clearer because if the person is not being supported at all, well, the demands of everyday life just mean that they will do other things mostly. So that's really quite a significant barrier. To your point about sponsors, so the English physicist, David Deutsch, wrote what is arguably the first really serious paper-- one of the first serious papers about quantum computing. In 1985, was communicated to the journal by Roger Penrose who has since won the Nobel Prize. My understanding is that actually Penrose was very skeptical of the paper, but sort of in a friendly fashion enough to be willing to have an opinion.

And really, certainly the community of physicists had almost no opinion at all for 15 years. It was just certainly in the late nineties that the most common conversation I would have with other physicists about quantum computing was, "Is this physics at all?" There was no interest. It was just, "Is this physics at all?" Got that question from many people who now work full-time on quantum computing. But I think it's really to Penrose's credit and to your point, it's an example of how having this kind of friendly, maybe somewhat skeptical but also ultimately supportive kind of sponsor can be very helpful.

Ben (01:00:42):

Great. There are two other things in the essay which you sort of look at askance which I'm quite interested in. One is essentially science in non-European, non-American type of institutions. I guess India, China, Russia, maybe to some degree, which you only fleetingly talk about but I was quite intrigued by. Do you think there's any particular learnings from that? There's a whole other type of, I guess sibling ecosystem. Anything we can learn from that or do you think it will go on a different track and should it go on a different track rather than converge?

Michael (01:01:19):

Well, you will know from the essay certainly we hope that it will go on a different track or at least there won't just be mindless duplication of the existing-- There's obviously a large research ecosystem in the United States, in the UK, in Europe and many other countries. But for countries who have a lot of scale in terms of population and whose economies are growing very rapidly, obviously China and India are the two most obvious examples. But you also have places like Brazil.

Well, there are many other places; Indonesia which match this kind of description. They have a really interesting opportunity. Historically because their economies have been relatively small, small relative to their population at least, they have tended not to put that much of their GDP into developing a research ecosystem. Now they're at a point where in fact they are very rapidly developing that research ecosystem. And the question is, "Do they do the same kinds of things? Do they duplicate the NIH? Do they duplicate UKRI or do they try and do something more adventurous?" I certainly hope that they'll take the opportunity that they have to study these systems, hopefully identify what they think are some shortcomings and then maybe make some big bets about doing things in somewhat different ways.

They can actually probably to some extent have their cake and eat it too. Nothing says that they can't spend 70% of their research budget in a way that looks relatively similar to the UK or to the United States but then also actually have a big chunk which is spent in very unconventional ways. Sort of just a way of saying, "Well, maybe we can actually do this much, much, much better." As far as I know this is not happening. I don't know of any large scale initiative to do it. It is a little bit encouraging. Certainly a lot of the innovation you do see actually comes from small countries that have just decided, “Let's try a little bit of a random experiment. We're not going to beat the United States on scale. Maybe we can do it in some other way.” Some of the foundations in Denmark do very interesting experiments. The New Zealand Health Research Council did, I think the world's first large scale experiment with randomized funding or lotteries that you just sort of give some of the money to an applicant at random. That kind of innovation I think is fairly natural in places which are already somewhat peripheral. But I certainly hope that India and China will do some experiments in that way. They have this opportunity.

Ben (01:04:13):

And I think these mid-size countries-- So Denmark's already well on its way. Singapore maybe. But places like South Korea, I think about their social housing as an example. They didn't bother with wired phones. There's a joke that those are stock phones and they went immediately to mobile. So skipped all of that infrastructure because it was of a generation that they didn't need anymore. I kind of simplify the story. And I wonder whether there might be in those countries which are already there, and like you say, there's a variety. The other one on the-- Again, which you saw askance was you mentioned Hume’s is-ought because you mentioned that all of this meta-science does not tell society or anyone what should be studied. Whether that should be climate, physics, quantum computing, how the economy is run or anything like that. Do you have a sense about what should we and where we are on the balance? Do you have any projects where you think, "Well, this is really important science questions?" Do you think the mechanisms that science decides on it is any good at the moment? What should we be exploring on this? Or is this something which is just that much far away from meta-science which it should leave well alone and just stick with trying to develop its own field?

Michael (01:05:34):

So I guess my-- This is partially a personality thing. I certainly have very strong opinions about the way the world ought to be but I also feel that's not my own personal comparative advantage sort of professionally. It's more sort of a personal thing. Something to chat about with friends and to have some opinions about as a civic actor. So a very concrete example, in the United States for somewhat arbitrary historic reasons, some of the big funders-- There's the National Institutes of Health (NIH) which does biomedical research typically with a human focus. There's the National Science Foundation which does basic research. There's DARPA which is doing defense oriented stuff. There's the Department of Energy, does a lot of high energy physics. Those organizations, the way in which their budget changes is determined in fact largely at the political level.

So the NIH, for example, has actually grown consistently at a rate-- It's roughly 1% above if you look sort of over a long enough time period. 1% per annum faster than the NSF. And I think this is most likely really a reflection of politics and political constituencies. People, taxpayers, perhaps understandably rather more interested in research which seems like it might be connected with improving their health than with the more speculative kind of basic research which the NSF tends to fund. That might be a bad choice and there are certainly some sort of 'is' questions which can be asked. For example, you might ask the question, "What fraction of human health span extension or change has actually been due to discoveries made at the NSF versus discoveries made at the NIH?"

It's quite plausible that that's a reasonable kind of a research question or might be turned into one with a lot more thought than I've just put into it. And you can imagine trying to sort of disaggregate that in a variety of ways. That might then feed into some sort of decisions at the political or the values level but I'm not going to try and wade into that. I think you want to develop good techniques which can be used to answer that kind of question. But then it's an entirely separate question and to some extent, I want it to remain separate. How one reasons about it after the fact, you might decide that it's tremendously important that you have a very strong defense research establishment in which case you would be strongly in favor of increasing DARPA's budget perhaps. But perhaps you're not, and that's not a question that can be settled by studying the way the world is. It's a question where you need to bring some of your own values. But to the extent that you can decouple those two things, I think actually both really strongly benefit. Both sides of that benefit.

Ben (01:08:47):

Well, maybe delving into that just a little bit more. This movement of effective altruists or EA do have some strong sense of this. There's an interesting part of the EA movement which is actually very concerned with progress and actually on new institutions which is a kind of interesting overlap. You had really interesting initial reflections in a blog on EA which EA by its nature also they solicit criticism so thought about that. You had a conversation with some EA's and they're obviously worried about existential risk, pandemics by security and how you can think about utility and doing good. After all of that, and you've gone through that, has it changed the way you think rather than going through all of that which was kind of on the record already. Have you changed your mind at all around some of your thinking around EA and how they think about that? Or have you arrived at roughly the same place still with an open mind but it's kind of like, "Well, they have the way of thinking which is good?”

Michael (01:09:50):

Actually, I'm not sure I'm quite understanding the question, Ben. Can you...?

Ben (01:09:54):

Yeah. I guess, having had all of these conversations around effective altruism and what they're thinking, do you think that is a good way of thinking around the world and has your view changed since your blog and conversation on EA?

Michael (01:10:04):

Okay. So I think the connection you are drawing to your previous question, like in some sense they have a set of values which they're using to drive, their giving in a whole lot of ways.

Ben (01:10:15):

And essentially they've decided this is how things ought and is to be. So that's one world view. I'm a little bit too old. EA was not invented when I was at university so I've also come to and it's like, "Oh, I find that quite intriguing. It's not my way." And obviously you've done some work on it. So I was just kind of intrigued partly because that's the connection. Yes, they have a way and also you've done some thinking and it might have changed. So it was kind of like, "Is that EA way of doing it? How much does that resonate in part?" It's a way of thinking about the world where they have-- And it's a new movement as well as opposed to utilitarians were there before and you had the various things. But I find it's interesting because it's a new movement about how to think of the world and at least some of them have quite strong views as to how to do this, maximizing good or maximizing utility.

Michael (01:11:04):

Yeah. It's a really interesting question. They are using their values to drive their giving. I suppose you can break your question down into two pieces. One of which is, "Are they just mistaken about certain facts about the way the world is?" And actually, I probably think they are. But then there's also the question of, “How do I align with them on values?" And just so happens that for personal reasons I don't particularly align with them on values. I like many EA's a great deal. I have some close EA friends but it's not for me. There's a big long personal conversation about why that's the case. You could talk about why that's the case.

I don't know that it's necessarily so interesting why do I have the particular set of values I have? Well, that's of interest to my close friends and family and probably not to too many other people. The question that you might find more interesting is, “How do I think they're mistaken about the way the world is?” Certainly I think EA is actually practiced when they're oriented towards research. I think they don't appreciate nearly enough the value of illegible work, very early stage work. So most of the things which they seem to be strongly oriented to support, they're very big, very legible goals. The most common one is the people-- Well, the one that people perhaps talk the most about and think the most about is AI safety.

It's a big scary monster which is very easy to describe. To sort of think about it, it is a big goal. But historically, a lot of the most significant work on progress has not been legible in advance. I mentioned Turing before as an example solving a logic problem. Didn't realize that it was going to become maybe the most important industry of the 20th and 21st century. He wasn't working towards a big goal. And this is such a common pattern across research. I tend to think that systematically the EA organizations undervalue that. When I talk to EA friends they're perfectly aware of this. I don't really understand why they're not more indexed on it though.

Ben (01:14:05):

Yes, it's hard to... I guess there's a corporate truism that what you can't measure doesn't get managed. But then there's an aphorism above that which is this idea that if you only try and do the things that you can measure, this is not everything that can be counted counts and not everything that counts can be counted, actually, you go even more wrong because of those things.

Michael (01:14:36):

I love this book, "Seeing like a State" by James Scott where he talks about the way in which or what he called the high modernists have often caused problems when they're in governance because they will adopt some goal as being good for the locals in some part of the country which they're governing. But they're ignorant of so much local knowledge which is actually important for the functioning of the systems. And so with complete good intentions, sometimes they actually make things go very backwards. I think it's sort of the government version of this. Figure out what you could measure, use it to manage it, and then sometimes be very surprised when in fact it's a disaster.

Ben (01:15:22):

Some of the disasters in international aid can be well traced back to those routes. I guess I partly ask because I see EA's are building new institutions and new organizations and some of them will be quirky and that's probably a good thing.

Michael (01:15:38):

That I'm totally in favor of. Actually sort of...

Ben (01:15:42):

But it's also separate. It kind of doesn't matter in that sense that they may have got the version of the world wrong because they're a new organization doing things in a new way and therefore will hopefully discover something around the dark intelligent matter even if it was not the thing that we may or may not have thought was there.

Michael (01:15:59):

Yeah. I think some interesting question about scale, what fraction of all philanthropic giving do you want to be EA? The interesting thing to my mind anyways, there's not really a natural regulator for that. Nothing sets the scale, or at least there's nothing really strongly sets the scale there. It's a question just of to what extent do these ideas become fashionable? So yeah, maybe it ends up as actually 50% of all philanthropic giving. Maybe it ends up as 5% of all philanthropic giving. I don't know what it is at the moment. I think it's maybe on the order of 1% or something so it's actually pretty tiny. So you might say, "Well, okay, if it's tiny it's fine for it to grow.” But if there's nothing obviously stopping the growth-- and there will certainly be many internal drivers; lots of people whose careers and self-image has now bound up with it that doesn't seem so great. Of course, I mean this is the story of so many things which don't have a natural mechanism limiting their scale.

Ben (01:17:15):

Yeah. And when you don't have the tradeoff audit-- You see this today in terms of like, "Well, how much should we be working on climate versus deep poverty versus pandemics?" No necessarily natural capital working on any of those so really tricky.

Michael (01:17:32):

Whenever it's politics which is deciding it there's a natural sort of oligarchy tends to form where... You would think that if you had two pretty promising approaches to solving some problem and one of them had let's say 90% of the funding and the other one had 10%, and if you did a serious evaluation and conclude the 90% funded one was only slightly more likely to be successful, you'd get a rebalancing. But actually that's often not what happens. What really matters is politics. And many more of the people on the 90% funded one are actually in a position where they're able to influence future flows of capital. So actually it gets even more lopsided. It's kind of a, I think a crazy-- It's just a natural way in which oligarchy is formed and that pattern you see absolutely everywhere. But it's such a problem in philanthropic funding, this kind of rich get richer effect.

Ben (01:18:38):

Great. Okay. Well, wrap up with a couple of questions and then your current projects and advice. So maybe just a couple of quick underrated, overrated things then. So rogue AI risk, AI safety, do you think underrated or overrated?

Michael (01:18:53):

I have no idea.

Ben (01:18:55):

No idea. We'll pass. Okay. Critical rationality or rationality as a movement?

Michael (01:19:03):

Well, I think those two things are used to mean very different things actually.

Ben (01:19:07):

Okay. Yeah. That's probably true.

Michael (01:19:08):

Critical rationality I tend to associate with Karl Popper and with David Deutsche and with a few others. Rationality sort of in many of its modern incarnations is a slightly different branch of the tree.

Ben (01:19:20):

Perspective, value, probability and that type of thing.

Michael (01:19:21):

Yeah, exactly. And EA actually for that matter which is a different group of people completely. Just having clarified the terms, what was the...

Ben (01:19:32):

Let's go through critical rationality because we covered...

Michael (01:19:34):

I think probably underrated.

Ben (01:19:37):

Yeah. Maybe that's part of a...

Michael (01:19:39):

It's funny I can't read Popper-- That's not quite true. I just don't respond to him. But I still think underrated.

Ben (01:19:51):

I found Popper and actually Deutsche quite hard. I think I get it, but I'm not sure I do get it. And I speak other to people who I think they think they get it. I'm not sure they get it, but maybe that's where it is. So I probably think mildly underrated too but I'm very uncertain because maybe I just completely don't understand. One on this-- although this could be quite a long answer you can just give a short one if you'd like. Memory systems? Obviously you've done a huge amount of work on that. Maybe I'll just split them because you've got the kind of your card based repetition space systems and then you've got memory palaces. I get the overall sense that you probably think memory is more important than people think. So the overall underrated. That's my impression from you. But I'm not entirely sure because you've written a lot on it. So is that your view and what should we know about memory systems?

Michael (01:20:48):

So certainly underrated. It's a combination of I guess technology and science that really points out how people with very minimal effort... Actually, it feels like one of those products that is promising you the world with no effort. You know, "Lose 25 pounds in three weeks while eating hamburgers only."

Ben (01:21:16):

Just by saying this mantra three times.

Michael (01:21:18):

Yeah, exactly. It turns out though that with memory systems actually you can have a much, much better long-term memory for relatively minimal investment and it's just due to some quirks about the way the human brain works which have been known to psychologists for more than a century. There are thousands of papers about it. People have now built systems. They're a little bit aversive in some ways. They're like bicycles. It takes some work to get good at using them and most people just give up because they don't see the effect. If you stick with it and master them, actually they can be very useful if you are doing the kind of work that benefits from a really good long term memory. Not everybody is, but for the people who are, I think they're absolutely wonderful.

Ben (01:22:06):

Yeah. I think for me personally, the space repetition type ones I find are a little bit more useful because I think they can do more interactions with other forms of whatever you are learning. Whereas the memory palace ones are great for long lists of things but are actually less practically useful. They can be. So you've got a long list of history places, you've got your history exam, well why not learn them that and you'll learn them perfectly? But less practically relevant although not always. Whereas I actually think the space repetition ones amongst with other ways you can actually form new-- Well, maybe new to myself ideas, but newer ideas just due to that. But that's a personal thing. So last couple of questions then. What are some of the current projects or things that you're working on or what you're most excited about?

Michael (01:22:59):

So I'm on vacation at the moment which is part of the reason why I'm here.

Ben (01:23:02):

Very exciting.

Michael (01:23:03):

Little break in London. I don't know what I'll do next. We'll see. I've just finished this book that took way longer than I thought. I am just enjoying goofing around; reading about religion, trying to understand religion better, trying to understand art better and trying to understand a little bit about the latest technical progress in AI. So maybe a project related to one of those, but I don't know. And then there's some follow up things from the meta-science work that I will almost certainly do. But I just want to clear my head a bit before making a decision.

Ben (01:23:35):

Sure. Well, if you're looking at art, is this particularly visual art and do you have a view on where, I guess AI art will be? I would say that I'm less worried about what some people worry about AI art because my view art has-- I don't know what percentages, but there's this term in philosophy of art of the beholder share. And so this is the fact that art is valuable because someone receives it. So it's not just obviously you've got paint and creation and then it's all great. I see this very much in my theater practice. Essentially, theater is not really theater unless it has an audience. And actually that's true of quite a lot of art. I think people-- because it's new and because we're going to generate so much stuff and because of where it's come from, I have not quite seen that part. That's my own personal view. A lot of people have the other side. But if you're thinking about it, do you have a view or a thought there?

Michael (01:24:33):

I have many, probably far too many. What's a particularly interesting thing? Okay. So maybe one concern and one observation. The concern is just essentially capturing of the commons. So if people-- Where it used to be that anybody could buy a set of paints and just start to paint, if you actually need technology which is the IP of somebody, yeah, they've inserted themselves as an intermediation layer and historically that's... It always causes some problems. There's always some tradeoffs. I don't know how that will turn out. Most of the conversation which I hear about it is by people who have some sort of motivated reason either to be very, very keen on this possibly because they may own some of it, or to be very, very anti because they're worried that they will be put out of a job by it.

I don't think either of those things necessarily-- It leads to interesting perspectives but doesn't necessarily lead to a particularly clear perspective unless those people are really unusually honest. So a lot of the conversation I hear about that just seems, "I'm a VC and wow, I'd love to own some of this" is kind of the subtext very often. But yeah, you don't get actually very interesting thoughts from that or not a lot of clear thoughts. The interesting observation, I do just enjoy seeing what some of the artists who are working with this are doing. Like when they're able-- I admire so much people like Matisse or Cezanne or Picasso who were able to discover new ways of seeing. Picasso, probably particularly to some extent, Rembrandt, that's sort of a slightly different thing that he was doing.

And I wonder if we're going to see the same kind of genius with the new AI art systems. That would be very exciting. It's very tempting if you look at the way the systems work to think, “Well, they're not really going to be creating new ways of seeing in the same kind of way." You don't get that sort of-- Once you begin to understand cubism, it's really remarkable. You get what they were trying to do and you realize that you've expanded the way you can see the world. Somebody discovered that and it's just incredible. I guess I'm sort of just cautiously optimistic that maybe the same thing will happen with AI art. Brian Eno, the musician and composer has this really interesting observation that it took hundreds of years for us to figure out what possibilities are latent inside the grand piano.

And today, an instrument as rich as the grand piano is being invented every day and nobody will ever master it. That is kind of sad in some sense; to have all these kind of latent possibilities which will never be explored. So that's also a potential outcome maybe from the AI art systems. Maybe it turns out that actually the system is changing sufficiently rapidly that nobody ever masters it. Certainly, I think you see this with software systems at the moment. The rate of change in something like JavaScript frameworks or whatever is so rapid that nobody ever gets really good. A friend who's a dancer and a programmer committed to me that she finds it irritating when people have been programming for five years and they think they're really, really good. They're a senior software engineer at Google or meta or whatever. She's been dancing for 28 years and feels like she's just getting the hang of it. There is something to be said for that kind of deep art and if the AI systems are changing sufficiently rapidly, it might be that nobody ever masters them. That would be a little bit sad. That's a very long answer.

Ben (01:28:50):

Yeah. That's a really interesting observation. I hadn't known that. I guess I can take the other side and say it's quite nice that there's always going to be opportunity. But I think of the other observation then is like we'll never even master the programming language of sea. There will be no real Picasso of sea or something about that which was so elegant and beautiful or something. We're beyond and past it and it might not have even been-- I don't know whether the current languages are better. Is English really that much better of Latin? But you've got heights of Latin expression which we've had and we'll have in English which we might never get in these programming languages which have been around for a short time. I hadn't thought about it like that but that could well be true.

Michael (01:29:35):

Somebody who was at Google pretty early on-- So one of the people who famously helped build Google's early systems, Jeff Dean-- I guess they knew Dean at that time and commented just unselfconsciously that he poured out code. I just thought that was such a lovely way of describing somebody. Sort of a real master is pouring out code.

Ben (01:30:02):

Yeah. Maybe this settles back I think this act of creativity; arts, humanities is much closer to where we are on science coding software than I think it seems like first glance when you speak to actual scientists and particularly that messy layer before you make it legible and put it into an equation. All of that thinking before that seems to me to have much more in common with what dancers do, with what artists do, with what performance do than you might have thought. So I do think that ties around and I think that might even be true in what we discover on the meta layer when we think about those. That act of imagination that you need for something which isn't quite discovered yet, that part of whatever makes us human on that is still quite mysterious and seems to dwell in this creative part or blob or however we do it. In any case then, last question. Do you have any advice or thoughts for people? Maybe young people thinking about their careers or what they might want to do or maybe someone who's wanting to do the leap into a new organization or something within meta-science or open science? Do you have any advice or thoughts about what you would do, what you would tell them?

Michael (01:31:21):

I'm certainly interested... They say that the advice you give others is the advice you'd wish you'd given your younger self. That's probably true. Paul Buchheit, the creator of Gmail has this lovely equation that advice equals limited life experience plus overgeneralization. That's certainly true. The one thing I wish I'd understood much earlier is the extent to which there's kind of an asymmetry in what you see, which is you're always tempted not to make a jump because you see very clearly what you're giving up and you don't see very clearly what it is you're going to gain. So almost all of the interesting opportunities on the other side of that are opaque to you now. You have a very limited kind of a vision into them. You can get around it a little bit by chatting with people who maybe are doing something similar, but it's so much more limited. And yet I know when reasoning about it, I want to treat them like my views of the two are somehow parallel but they're just not.

Ben (01:32:31):

Yeah. Well, I guess that might suggest maybe one needs to try out more things to actually know.

Michael (01:32:39):

That does I think is probably generically... It's generically true. One way in which it's not is it depends on what kind of a safety net you have. Some people have, and I am certainly one of those, have pretty reasonable safety nets and so that enables me to try new things. But the great majority of people in the world do not. And so they're I think, justifiably extremely cautious. But then people also the size of the safety net they think they need does tend to expand as well. If your safety net includes driving a Mercedes and having a et cetera, actually you can probably do a little bit better than that. A friend of mine who's a science fiction writer-- Science fiction writers do not make much money. Even famous science fiction writers do not make much money for the most part. He was trying to decide, "Was it fair on his daughter that he had chosen to be a science fiction writer?"

Because it meant that she probably wouldn't-- He couldn't afford to send her to the best high schools and things like that. Maybe she might get a scholarship or something like that. There were certainly some opportunities. He said that he was on a-- I think it was just a little boat somewhere off Northwestern Australia with a collection of his science fiction buddies who are just an incredible group of people. And he said he realized there that she might not necessarily get quite as-- She might miss some opportunities but she would also have opportunities like that, that she just would not have if he had chosen a more conventional and solely higher paying line work. So I think of that also as kind of a living that kind of a life is a safety net of its own. It's certainly something that you're providing for you and your family and your friends. I don't know whether that's clear or not. Hopefully it's clear.

Ben (01:34:58):

I would interpret that saying there's these immeasurable, these uncountable elements which are actually very valuable. And if you only measure it in dollars, then you might miss actually some of the vast positiveness or wealth or safety net that...

Michael (01:35:18):

Yeah. She was getting an expanded conception of the world, I guess, in some really interesting way. And I could see it would be valuable. You can't eat that, unfortunately. That's the flip side. But you actually don't need to make that much money to be able to eat.

Ben (01:35:35):

Great. Well, on that note, thank you very much.

Michael (01:35:38):

Thanks so much, Ben. This was fun.

In Life, Podcast, Writing, Science Tags Michael Nielsen, Metascience, Open Science, Podcast
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