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Dan Wang: Silicon Valley Culture, London’s Building Crisis, and China’s Cultural Squeeze

April 21, 2026 Ben Yeoh

Dan Wang joins Ben Yeoh for a conversation about what different societies are good at, what they neglect, and what that reveals about culture, ambition, and power. Starting with Silicon Valley, Dan argues that tech has become thinner-skinned and less funny as harder-edged founder culture has replaced its more playful countercultural roots. That narrowing shows up beyond humour: San Francisco still has legacy cultural institutions, but newer tech wealth is often far less willing to support the arts unless it can see a direct return.

“You have to have a sense of which rules to break. If you break no rules ever in life, you will absolutely get nowhere.”

From there, the discussion opens out into a broader comparison of California, London, and China. London, in Dan’s view, is almost Silicon Valley’s opposite: culturally rich, socially sparkling, and full of serious artistic life, yet held back by pessimism and a deep inability to build.

“The UK has the housing prices of California and the per capita income of Mississippi State.”

 Ben pushes on whether Britain could reverse that decline if it fixed planning, housing, and energy bottlenecks. China, meanwhile, is presented as a place of extraordinary physical achievement but increasingly constrained cultural production, where censorship, weaker reading habits, and even food delivery systems are flattening parts of public life.

“The discussions on AI seem to have quasi-religious tones. Either this is going to be utopia or this is going to plunge us all straight into hell.”

They also explore why AI debate has taken on a quasi-religious tone in California, with utopian promises on one side and apocalyptic fears on the other, while more immediate problems such as propaganda, low-quality content, energy supply, and permitting constraints receive less attention. The second half of the episode turns more personal and literary: neurodiversity in Silicon Valley, cadet training and discipline, opera, Shakespeare, Tom Stoppard, writing craft, and the underrated practice of retyping great prose or reading plays aloud with friends.

“The immigrants are best able to appreciate what works and what works badly in every particular culture.”

It is a wide-ranging conversation about how people think, what institutions reward, and why culture matters more than technocrats often admit. 

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.


Contents

  • 00:21 Why Tech Lacks Humor

  • 02:09 Silicon Valley Arts Funding

  • 05:28 London Versus California

  • 08:31 China Culture Censorship

  • 12:56 Food Culture US China

  • 18:58 AI Utopia Versus Doom

  • 23:04 UK Building Energy Bottlenecks

  • 30:58 Fixing UK Planning Housing

  • 34:28 Neurodiversity In Silicon Valley

  • 37:04 Cadets Discipline Rule Breaking

  • 39:15 Modern Opera: Mozart. Verdi Debate

  • 42:04 American Shakespeare Picks

  • 45:31 Book Tour Reflections

  • 48:09 Retyping Great Writers

  • 52:56 Reading Plays Together

  • 58:29 Playwrights And Prose

  • 01:01:38 Overrated Underrated Round

  • 01:10:21 Advice For Your Twenties

Transcript (lightly edited, transcribed by LLM AI, so mistakes are very possible)

Ben: Hey everyone, I'm super excited to be speaking to Dan Wang. Dan has written an excellent bestselling book on China and America called Breakneck.

Dan, welcome.

Dan: Great to be here.

Ben: In your recent annual letter, you suggest it's nearly as dangerous to joke about the top Silicon Valley venture capitalist, as is to joke about a Chinese CCP party leader.

Why does Silicon Valley have no humor? And did it ever?

Dan: at one point it probably had a little bit of a sense of countercultural humor. In the days of Steve Wozniak perhaps Steve Jobs, there were slightly playful act personalities back in the eighties up until the nineties.

And then these much harder core nerds took over. Does Bill Gates have much of a sense of humor? Does Mark Zuckerberg have much of a sense of humor? Perhaps so in private but certainly not in public. And so I think that there is this progressively thinner skin where every generation of founders loses a little bit of humor and funny points.

And then they also shave off a little bit more of their skin. And I think that is really well represented now by Elon Musk, who maybe it's not his fault now he's trolled to insanity three times a day before breakfast by all of these crazy people on the internet in a platform that he controls.

I think that this is also, perhaps he is a little bit funny. He certainly thinks of himself as being very funny, but I don't think that there are many sparkling personalities in the tech world such that it is pretty difficult. And I've tried this exercise going up to tech friends and asking who is the funniest founder out there?

It's a pretty thin list of names.

Ben: And they started off in the hippie world. I guess that wasn't necessarily the tech bro. So it is interesting that they do seem to have lost their sense of humor. Also Silicon Valley. And the CCPs seem to me to be less involved in cultural production.

Standup comedy would be one thing, but it also seems to be the case in art and music with some exceptions. So for instance, Patrick Collinson of Stripe fame seems to be very interested in beauty, but do you sense this too, of overall cultural production? And is this narrowness a big problem for Silicon Valley or not really?

Dan: San Francisco has a certain amount of elite culture. And so I am thinking about the art museums. I'm thinking about the opera and the ballet where the old rich, the old money in San Francisco has given fairly generously to the symphony, the opera et cetera. The arts, which makes it look quite a lot more like New York City.

And there is some new money that is also involved in some of these pretty traditional art forms. But generally speaking it seems like these. New billionaires that have been created over, let's say the past 10 years, have become significantly less interested in funding the arts.

Broadly speaking the movie theaters, the indie movie theaters have been closing down in San Francisco. Downtown is generally a mess. There's very little foot traffic. And even the art museums are not necessarily doing super well. And so when you combine all of these things and you have the fact that Silicon Valley billionaires are much more eager to fund the next generation of technology than anything else which has been one of the great factors of Silicon Valley success that you had, the semiconductor people funding, the telecom, people funding the internet, people funding.

Now the AI people. And so I think that has generally been pretty positive. But when creatives go up to billionaires and ask for money for the arts, the billionaires are often asking for a return as if arts could ever be productive. As if the arts could ever be profitable almost anywhere. And so you cannot possibly generate a real return on the arts, whereas it seems like the rich people in New York and LA are quite a lot more forgiving of the fact that if they give money to a documentary filmmaker, they'll never see a scent back of it.

Ben: I think it, Silicon Valley seems to understate that intangible return, the sort of cultural reputational value, social capital, or however you would put it. So do you think if you were to add a cultural institution in San Francisco around Silicon Valley, that would be a good idea and what would it be?

Dan: I'm not sure if I could add a new cultural center. I think it is. It's hard to figure out what the right format is. Could it be something in visual arts? Could it be something in the theater? Perhaps. But I think that something has to grow, probably out of the tech world out of something that the tech world really embraces.

And the challenge is that I don't think that many of these tech people want to go to the opera except as an affectation. Or really see very many plays because the play going audience in the US is generally fairly smaller. Even in somewhat larger cities like Boston or dc or la.

There is a scene, but it is quite a lot more difficult to find than in a place like London. So here's my case to you Ben, that if we had to find the polar opposite in terms of culture to Silicon Valley, is it not London? In Silicon Valley, you speak to a lot of engineers and they don't necessarily have many jokes to tell as I've established.

They don't have much culture that they want to go to in London. It is much easier to find to chat with people where those conversations sparkle. And the plays and the classical music and the visual arts are completely off the charts for even I think for most Americans, even perhaps for a lot of New Yorkers, the cultural scene in London is really amazing.

And whereas the weather in the Bay Area is pretty, pretty perfect the weather in London is by default, fairly gloomy. So isn't London the opposite end of the world from California?

Ben: I think it's, I think that's almost correct. So London or the UK as well, you've said you've argued it's very good at clever sounding industries.

But the offshoot of that is maybe we're overweighted in journalism, also accounting and legal, but we're also overweighted in theater arts, visual arts, music and all of that. So it makes us extremely happy. Culturally rich and actually there's a lot of soft power cultural events. So even nearby there's Glastonbury, you've got the tennis and the rowing and the sporting events and all of those kinds of things as well as that soft cultural power.

On the other hand, we don't build anymore. We've got poorer. Millionaires are still leaving us, although actually non millionaires are still wanting to come to the uk. So I think a lot of Chinese millionaires are leaving China and going all over the place, but some of them are still coming to the UK so that's interesting.

On the other hand, And it also means that I think London in some ways has a little bit like the US some fixable problems because some of the stuff which is around there is more fixable. Then it would seem, but I'm interested. So if San Francisco has maybe this cultural problem, it'd be interesting whether we think that's broadly in some spots of America, and I wonder whether China also has some of these cultural problems as well.

So I'm not sure whether you find, I think in your letter you did say Beijing and Singapore were, Beijing and San Francisco are a little bit similar in that respect, but whether you think that is also a problem of narrowness across a lot of their Chinese cities.

Dan: Yeah there's also something else that Californians have that Londoners and British people do not have, and that is optimism.

And so I think that there is a little bit of this sense. Even among Brits are the first people to say that, yeah, they're all very cynical. There's not that much hope for the future. I find it a little bit odd that there is just this self-professed pessimism gloom within the national culture.

And I think that is probably not a healthy trait when everybody kind of jokes about it. I think I am a little bit more constructive, at least in a lot of parts of culture, in the US relative to China. Chinese culture such as it is, has been very severely squeezed by the censorship apparatus.

Very few art house films anymore. Not that much by way of very popular groundbreaking fiction. That, there's a lot of really creative short form videos and they can AI slop with the best of them. I think in terms of broader culture, I think that China has not done super well, not much in terms of journalism because that has been the part that has been strangled the most.

And so maybe some people are really impressed by dancing robots on really big bridges. But I'm not sure if that is going to be the sort of culture that you and I are very much drawn to. Now, you and I are quite different, but I think that Chinese cultural production has been pretty disappointing.

And I think in general fewer and fewer people read and read books in China these days. That's my sense that the book sales are really falling. At least in the US the book sales have been holding steady over the last few years. Now a lot more people are reading. Romantic and fairy smut, which is fine and whatever.

But I think that it is still pretty striking that book sales are holding up in the US where they're falling in China. So at a first approximation, people are just reading far less in China these days.

Ben: And I think if China does end up stumbling, it will be because they've tried to engineer on the social side, all of their physical engineering, which you described very well in your book, has been so successful.

But the social political engineering has been such a disaster. And I know you're very critical of the one child policy, but reading it over, I wonder whether we understate how catastrophic that could be for the medium term in China. So it'll be interesting to see where that holds.

And I do think you're right that actually Brits in general are a little bit pessimistic for those who've been around, but those who come to London. Immigrants first, second, even third generation, actually remain optimistic. And this is the kind of interesting thing about where they've left and they think of all the great parts of London and the uk and just to really perplex that Brits don't really value that as much.

And I find this is a little bit in Americans as well, they don't quite appreciate what they have yet. The immigrants who come and say this is amazing. Why don't you, why don't you appreciate it? And I'm also immigrant

Dan: immigrants are the best people to assess. I think they're the best people to appreciate local cultures.

The left I think generally is too critical of cultures and the right are too critical of the immigrants, whereas the immigrants are best able to appreciate what works and what works badly in every particular culture. But I do find it a little bit sad.

Immigrants arrive in the UK feeling quite optimistic and maybe that effect persists. But generally the people, the culture around them is trying to drag down their mood or that just happens that most people are, have a bad mood or over the longer term, that feels a little bit sad to me.

Ben: Yeah, I completely agree. I do think London's a little bit of a special exception of, versus the rest of the uk. But I do think that is the general vibe and that it's

Dan: more optimistic or less optimistic.

Ben: It's more optimistic. But then London isn't, probably half of London even something like that has English as a second language or a co language.

It's every immigrant, either first or second generation. So perhaps it's a little bit different and it has such strong agglomeration effects in London, which you really don't see in any other cities, which actually is a real problem for the UK versus even Germany or France.

But particularly versus the us I was in Nashville not too long ago, and Nashville can just go and do their own thing. They're a, I think they were half a million people when I saw them last time, which was maybe 15 years ago. And now they're almost a million person city and growing with their own culture and vibe, and they can stand alone in that.

Whereas a place like Leeds can't even put in a tram or a metro system. And all the best people from Leeds, not quite all, but a lot of them end up in London. So that's one of the UK specific issues. On the other hand, the thing about the immigrants coming in is that means that the London food scene has got, amazingly better over the last 10, 20 years, even the last two or three. I was interested, do you think the differing food cultures coming back to the US and China have anything to explain about how similar or different the US and China are? Obviously China has got quite a monumental headstart on the US which I don't think America will ever close up.

But maybe it might, and I would be interested in what you think the most underrated US food is and whether food cultures explain anything around the US and China differences.

Dan: China has a monumental lead on food production. Perhaps the only other arrival to Chinese cuisine is Indian cuisine.

Now I still prefer Chinese over Indian because I find that there is more variety and better use of better ways to prepare vegetables than Indian cuisine. But I think that China is already at the peak of various ways to prepare, whether these are vegetables and greens or duck and rice and almost anything else.

We care to name the Chinese who have perfected it. Perhaps the only exception is alcohol. They don't integrate alcohol quite as well into the food, but. I think that the Chinese have represented some sort of perfection. On the other hand, if you are in a state of near perfection, it is really hard to grow beyond that.

And I think that there is a little bit of a sense among some foodies in China that food culture in China has gotten just a few percentage points worse over the last five, 10 years. There is just much greater emphasis on these central commissaries to produce food outside of restaurants and then ship it into restaurants for them to essentially reheat.

And that has grown because people value speed over taste. There is just much more of a takeout culture because it's super, super easy to have food delivery. There's something, there's some figures now that the number of people working in food delivery just part-time in China could be north of 200 million people is what I saw in the Wall Street Journal because the job market is so bad.

So what could be really amazing for getting food is not so good for the job market and perhaps not so good for the cuisine itself because people are just so optimized for making food work well inside a box and a container that could be delivered in 25 minutes or less. And as China's grown richer people are more interested in different varieties of foods.

But I think that there has also been quite a lot more standardization within the foods as more chains have taken off as well. And given that the US is so far behind China there's tremendous room to grow. And over the last two decades in the last few years, I think that all sorts of food in the US has grown better.

There is even more of a migration culture into the US where, you know. A lot more Nigerians settle around the Houston area. There's all sorts of different varieties of people bringing their cuisines to the US. I think that Americans are learning to eat better themselves.

They have greater demand for seafood or fruits and the US also has, the US perhaps has very good recreations of let's say a Parisian croissant or anything else. It is just a little bit hard to get to. And so I think that the US has this dynamic churn even though it might perhaps never quite converge to Chinese levels of perfection.

Ben: Yeah, I agree. And I would probably add to that, that I've seemed to sense China because of this. Influenced modern tradition I guess, and the food influencer, they are now slightly cooking to how it looks on the plate over taste. Yeah. So obviously presentation is something. And so that has also maybe taken a couple of points down because they are so good at engineering, like you say, this central planning of food delivery.

That means that maybe the speed and efficiency's gone up, but also at the cost of, at the cost of taste. I also think maybe the most underrated American food for me is barbecue. So they've got this huge barbecue tradition in lots of different ways of doing it. And that seems also to me obviously influenced, but quite quite American.

But do you have an underrated American food?

Dan: I like barbecue, but I think that the challenge with barbecue is that you really should not have it multiple times in a row. Yeah. And for me, that is one metric for thinking about food. I have no hesitation about having Indian food multiple days weeks in a row.

The same goes for many other types of cuisines. If I eat barbecue twice in two days, I think that would be a little bit too much for me. I think that. Probably overrated is Californian cuisine. There has been so much of this emphasis on Californian cuisine, which started with Alice Waters and all sorts of other big chefs in Northern California.

To me that is not very distinctive if we wanted to look at another sort of cuisine. I haven't spent much time in l Louisiana, but I would really like to eat much more in New Orleans which seems to have a very good local cuisine. But just generally, I think what I would bet on is, immigrant cuisines in the US whether that is, the Austin food scene getting quite a lot better, whether that is the Nigerian food scene in Houston. I think that Chinese cuisine still has room to grow. In the US there's a lot of excellent Taiwanese in the, let's say the LA area.

There are all sorts of fantastic Chinese in the flushing area in Cupertino even. I'm getting better and better Chinese food, which is not too far away from where I am at Stanford University. And so I think that there is always room for growth in the US so long as we are still welcoming of people.

Ben: Yeah. Okay. I should move on from food, which we could probably, we should do a long chat just on food. I think we could do two or three hours on that. But I have to mention ai, which is all over everything. And you even mentioned it in your latest letter, and it's interesting when I hear Silicon Valley people or maybe Americans in general they all seem to either talk about existential risk of losing jobs or everything going completely wrong.

Or they talk about a tech utopia where AI solves everything from climate to poverty to manufacturing. And there doesn't seem to be a middle road discussion and maybe not even that much thinking of the kind of economic bottlenecks and things like that. What do you make of this, and do you sense this as well and do you think central planners have any edge in AI because of the energy supply chain and Americans are just too much focused on these kinds of really strange tail risks on either side.

Dan: It is a very strange thing in California. The discussions on AI seem to have quasi-religious tones. Either this is going to be utopia or this is going to plunge us all straight into hell and the machines are going to torture our minds for eternity. And you know what, if we just get a scenario in which which will be amazing in which productivity growth TFP growth goes on for 5% five percentage points for a very long time, I think that would be a pretty positive scenario.

But, when we talk about AI safety in California essentially what that means is how do we stop the machine God from torturing us for eternity rather than, oh how are people engaging with this very strange information ecosystem in which there's gonna be. A lot more slop and perhaps a more adversarial propaganda that is going to turn us all insane.

That to me feels like a very tangible sort of product, that project that we perhaps should discuss and tackle and try to solve. But this might be doing to teenagers. And, but instead, we can only talk about the antichrist. And that feels very strange to me. But tell us about the tenure of AI discussions in London.

Obviously London is one of the big AI hubs in the world. How do folks in London talk about it? Is it more the California variety or in, is it the variety of how do we control the harms and increase TFP?

Ben: I guess there's a little bit of both of that Californian variety and there's a little bit of the harm piece, particularly the bias piece and a little bit we've got a little bit of regulation or start up in terms of regulation in terms of as of now, are there biases?

Is it just gonna do utilitarian decision making? How do we incorporate other forms of thinking in that? But I would say there's another strand which kind of leans towards what I see in Asia, all to do with energy infrastructure and supply chain infrastructure, which slightly crosses over with. The climate conversation, which obviously is really diminished in America for other reasons, but there is this kind of very self-interested saying we've got a real problem if we don't have a supply chain.

If we can't build, we don't have energy infrastructure, and if this is gen, just basically a way of turning energy into some form of intelligence how do we deal with that? Which is this kind of more European wide issue of the fact that we can't build. We can definitely see that China seems to have a headstart in that and America is forming.

So that's the other part which kind of fills in London a little bit. And maybe that's because London is a little bit more connected to old world economies that I guess everyone except the US is underweighted technology versus some of these old world things. And that particularly in the last two or three months has started to come as a conversation, as people go, oh, this bottleneck seems to be these data centers and the energy.

And then they go why can't we produce the energy? And it's not that we don't have the technology as we don't seem to have the permits. We don't seem to have the regulatory things. And they're going, why is that? And why can China build like the equivalent of all of us? Domestic energy in six months or something like that.

And America had taken seven years just to build 10% of that. So those are the questions which are starting to come up, which is intersectional with that AI question. But is coming up with that on the supply chain? So maybe that's somewhere where central planners might have an edge because of all of that?

Dan: Yeah. Generally I think every year China builds about as much as one or two UK's worth of total energy every single year. And I used to collect these figures more actively, but I think that's the rough pace at which they are going. And it, it should, we expect that London can hold on to AI leadership in the longer term if it is impossible to build much more power and really difficult to build transmission lines and really difficult to build data centers because we take a look at some of these headlines around the uk.

The FT has recently written about the fact that home building in London has essentially collapsed. And I wrote this line, which is not quite right, but roughly accurate that the UK has the housing prices of California and the per capita income of Mississippi State. And the third runway for Heath Row, which has been planned for about 20 years now.

Yes. Yeah. It's supposed to cost 30 billion pounds. And so if we can't get the basics right, how can the UK really hold on to leadership for a pretty important technology?

Ben: I think on a 20 to 30 year view, unless we fix a couple of those things leadership will definitely lag. Maybe it's okay being, I think the uk depending on how you score, it's something like.

Number 10 as a kind of power, but slipped. So 10 years ago you probably could have said it was number eight or number nine. And in aggregate it's maybe slipped a place or two, it slipped less than Italy, somewhere like South Korea. Which metric are you

Dan: looking at?

Ben: Which next? You do a blend of things like soft power, GDP education and some of these things.

And if you aggregate it, there's a soft slipping of the uk. Some of it has slipped, more cultural powers probably have probably held on. And so I would see that continuing. But on the flip side, we have got some tail optionality. I wouldn't put it as too high probability, but some and maybe things will still have to get worse to look better because for instance.

If the country changes its mind on things like mini nuclear power or also particularly onshore wind. So we've got the planning for wind, not the interconnections and not the final planning. And actually we've got mini nuclear power SMR technology through British industry. So this is a thing 'cause it can come through some of our engineering, so it won't feel like, oh, we have to rely on foreign technology.

That is possible because you could put mini nukes next to smaller data centers and London could keep up. I'm not sure it will go through with this, but there's been a nuclear power review with, puts it as a possibility. So you really rely on that coming down on the cross curve. Otherwise I Do

Dan: Do you think politically and in terms of permitting people will accept having these mini nuclear reactors spread throughout the country?

Ben: I would say at the moment it's unlikely, but not zero. So we'll have to see where it goes. But there's enough places which are maybe far enough away from cities that it's possible. And also the miniaturization is getting smaller. And there's an argument for building British, there's a couple of British companies which could do that.

So I wouldn't give it a high probability, but I would definitely say it's more than, it's more than zero. I think America's own reassuring attempts are quite Trixie. And so this is where, oh, this is where China might actually have a lead if some of their other things go there.

But there are possibilities.

Dan: Tell me more about a British optimistic case about how they may be able to, instead of slipping through these ranks, how does it regain its position?

Ben: Oh, okay. I guess you would have to have some political consensus. I guess there is a technocratic consensus.

So the number one thing is I think we would need to try and unblock planning both domestically by building buildings. Which we could do. So it's just a legal policy coordination problem. It's not a technological problem. So that's the upside. But we haven't been prepared to burn our political capital to do that yet.

So we shall see. And then on the infrastructure side as well, so this would be building power, putting data centers next to things. So those two things I think are plausible. I also think we might get a one-off. Bonus in our health system because of weight loss medicines, GLP ones coming through.

So they'll be generic in 2031. And we are now seeing there's a lot of second order cost to chronic illness of which the UK isn't quite as bad as America, but it's not brilliant. And that is actually gonna be billions of both first order and second order savings. And if we can use those savings a little bit better, both in terms of making our NHS better and putting a little bit more investment within that and on blocking some of these more pro-growth elements, I think that is actually a possible fix because we've got the capabilities to build more.

And we've all got possibilities of infrastructure and we've got an agglomeration effect of London. Some of our second cities might continue to suffer. So I'm not sure on the UK side whether that is true, but as Americans tell me, the fact that Manchester's only two hours away on, on the train or two, two and a half hours, or even driving, they're like, that's just a suburb in America.

We would, we would drive there. They don't understand why Brits don't drive to like these centers of excellence in that same sort of way. So because it is solvable by political coordination I think there is. And then because there's still a lot of cultural soft power, you've still got finance here, although it's maybe not quite as great as New York or maybe equally as great as New York.

And you've got all of these things where you're second best, maybe not the very best. Biotech, some technology and the like. That still means that you're gonna be a really important non-US hub. And because you're at such a low, because of some of these regulatory issues, you can turn it around.

So that's the optimistic case.

Dan: And are you optimistic about London's agglomeration effects? If millionaires are leaving, is it still going to be a growing city that is growing in population and wealth?

Ben: I'm a little bit more neutral on this. I probably was more optimistic and that has down rated somewhat is not quite as bad as what I think the media has said.

Some are definitely living in millionaire status. But what is also happening is that although they're leaving in terms of permanent domicile, they still come here for three to six months of the year or a few weeks anyway. And particularly actually, if you are in the a hundred millionaire status, who often don't stay in one place that long, they're still passing through London somewhere between four to 12 weeks a year, which actually is enough if you're getting all of these other things going through.

So maybe they come to an auction event, maybe they go to Henley or to. Children go to Glastonbury or they do some of these other things, or they strike a deal. And then if you've got these other things right, they only have to be here a couple of days to sign some kind of check or something like that.

And we've got huge capabilities like around Cambridge, Oxford, there's lots of fields, there's lots of empty fields, which we could build on very quickly if the regulations allowed us to do that. And Cambridge is still only a 40 to 50 minute train ride from central London.

And then that literally is a suburb of the US so you could build out that whole corridor with labs and tech and all that type of thing. And you can get the flying millionaires to visit and you're still getting. The Middle East, some Russia, some China who are still doing business in London and actually in preference to America at the moment because of the politics of the situation.

So there's some hope still for London. I haven't given up my optimism,

Dan: I wanna believe Ben. But let's get building in London started first and then we can build out the corridors. Like why has it that the home building has completely collapsed in London when it is such an urgent thing that we have more homes.

Ben: So the primary reason is our planning system works on a political veto. Actually, this goes back, this is gonna get a little bit boring and technocratic, but post-war 1948 when we put in the British planning system, and you can compare this to France and Germany, which are built more in kind of similar things or even the Nordics.

Their house building is still about double R rates and have always been higher than the British rates. But essentially what happens in France, Germany, even the Netherlands, is once you've passed the planning rules and everyone's got some sort of zoning and guidance, you basically are allowed to build, no one can stop you.

So that has crept forward in all of those nations. But essentially if you pass the zoning and you meet the pattern book or whatever you can build in the uk, not only has our regulations got a little bit quite a lot worse, as has Germany and France. But even once you've passed all the technocratic, tick boxes, you can be called in either by your local politicians, or even worse, even if your local politicians don't call you in or even if they pass it, it can be pulled in by central government. And so your builders can never have a hundred percent certainty. And that is the core is the big difference between actually the British system and all the other systems which are built more.

And I think they didn't realize in 1948 this would be the case when they wrote the law. Any government who really wanted to do this could rip up that planning law and rezone much like Germany, France, or the Nordic countries. So you wouldn't have to go and do it somewhere like Brazil does it, where you wouldn't have any sort of planning and some of that and you could at least jumpstart those rates.

Then there were other issues to do with capital and we had a big fire disaster, so some of our building regulations got tighter and we didn't give it capital. But all of that is actually secondary to the fact that we've got a political veto. The only other way you could do it is you could convince the people doing political vetoes, which are essentially local residents, that it's in their best interest.

In order to do that, you could pay them off. So there are some things like street zones and things like that, where if you give them more money to allow them to build, that is also a possibility. I actually think that's a little bit harder. Some people think that would be easier, but either of those two things could get building going again.

Dan: But the law has been there for a while and there's been like a change, which is that there's basically no new homes in London. I understand that there was this disastrous fire and maybe capital is getting tougher, do you think that, let's say two years from now, that number will be quite a lot higher than it is today of new housing starts

Ben: Not in two years, not on current trajectory.

There is some stuff actually clogged up with our current government, which might pass, in which case that might unclog. I'm currently not too optimistic about that, but potentially after that, if people really sense okay, new young people really can't live where they want to live. And old people are a little bit more willing to give up the fact that they need buildings next to them and that Vata power, again, not high probability, but certainly more than zero.

That's what I would say in that. Anyway, moving on from building, perhaps I'll move on to a couple of other softer things. I have a question here. So someone we're both keen on as a mentor, Tyler Cowen, he once interviewed Temple Grandin in part on the ideas on neurodiversity. And I tend to see some neurodiverse at the head of some big US companies, arguably Microsoft, arguably Tesla, arguably Palantir and a bunch of others.

So there seems to be the silicon subculture which embraces this positive nerd culture. Do you think that explains anything about the US or Silicon Valley, maybe vis-a-vis China or anything out that, or I'm interested whether neurodiversity might be a key unlock for America.

Dan: Yeah, certainly it does feel like there is a lot of neurodiversity in Silicon Valley and not just among these people who make it to the top in terms of these companies, but also just in the rank and file. I think that many more narrow neurodiverse people manage to thrive in the San Francisco Bay area relative to a place like Washington DC or Boston or London or New York City for that matter.

So there is a little bit more of a reward for neurodiversity or at least tolerance for it. But I'm not sure whether it could constitute an unlock. Maybe this has already been unlocked, maybe there are some ways in which the people are able to, people just know that Silicon Valley is a good place for them.

On the other hand, Perhaps the reason that the neurodiverse can't necessarily make it in these East coast cities like DC or New York, is that people generally don't tolerate the neurodiverse very well. Maybe there's a reason that we call Washington, DC Hollywood for ugly people.

We don't have to focus on the ugly, it is like Hollywood, which feels like a much more popular contest from high school. So if maybe most people are intolerant of Neurodiverse, and maybe this is part of the reason that Silicon Valley just isn't very funny, then who's gonna win the neurodiverse?

Throwing their culture out into the rest of America? Or is the rest of America going to engulf Silicon Valley? I'm not sure.

Ben: Yeah, I'm not sure. I guess that's maybe more of a lever for China, not necessarily on neurodiversity, but if they could just loosen up, like embrace some more of their subcultures overall, I think that would be potentially a really big unlock for them.

Obviously that's probably the nightmare of central planners to let loose what your population actually thinks. Maybe turning to a few more personal thoughts. I was interested to pick up that you were a cadet, an army cadet and quite a successful one. So I was wondering what did being a cadet of the year teach you when you were growing up?

Dan: When I was growing up in Canada, I was part of the Royal Canadian Army Cadets and it was a tremendous fun for me. And this is essentially just a big after school program. This is not that much different with Boy Scouts, although we were handed real rifles to do target practice with.

And so that part is a little bit more interesting. And I remember having to go to these drill camps on a formal army basis to run around at 6:00 AM and do a lot of pushups. And so I think that I was definitely more fit in those days than I am today. And I think what the army Cadets Program really taught me was first, you have to have a sense of which rules to break.

If you break no rules ever in life you will absolutely get nowhere if you break the wrong rules. You might be tried for treason or whatever it is. And so you have to have a sense of which rules to break and being in that sort of a formalized system in which rank matters and hierarchy matters, but also moving ahead matters.

I think it is a good thing to have to think about which is the room for creativity. Otherwise I think that it is really good to be part of the Cadets program, just to know, learn a little bit of discipline and I'll learn how to, focus on having a long-term program and figuring out what's important.

And all of these are banal lessons which most of us should not know as an adult. But I, when I say most, there are still many of us who have never properly internalized a lot of these lessons. And so it was a major part of growing up for me to figure out what is important, how do we set priorities and how do we actually work towards them.

Ben: I think SBF should definitely have done that, maybe more effective altruists, but yeah, if SBF done, that would be in better

Dan: shape

Ben: For sure. Much better shape. What do you make of the operas of Philip Glass? Can any modern opera get close to Mozart?

Dan: I guess the only opera of Philip Glass that I've seen on video not live was which is his interpretation of.

The Egyptian Pharaoh. And I've only seen licks and selections of that particular opera. Now has Mozart been superseded? I would argue yes. And I think the peak of opera is represented by Wagner and Verdi. The German great and the Italian Great.

I would say it's mostly downhill from there. And one can identify these perfect in Mozart, but perhaps Mozart is a little bit too now. I see. And perfect. And you have these superior tones of a lot of Mozart, but. But you see a little bit more in Verdi and Wagner is just this total emotional conviction in which they, there is no doubt that the protagonists are feeling as they do, whereas there are some of these climactic scenes in Mozart, which.

Don't feel quite mature. If I'm thinking about something like the marriage of Firo in which the count of ama viva confronts the Countess over allegations of infidelity. And this is a comic opera in which the count is a fearful that the Countess has hidden the page Carino in her closet, and he is trying to identify and find that page this climactic confrontation actually sounds not that he doesn't quite have the conviction in order to not make this as apocalyptic, as it could be.

Whereas there is no doubt if this was in this opera, was in Verdi's hands, the music would be quite a lot more dramatic than faintly comical. There are some things that Mozart could have done maybe a little bit better. I note that the marriage of Figueroa is the first of his three great Italian operas.

Next came Don Giovanni and then came Cozy Tuite. I think that one of these things I wonder it would be, would've been wonderful if Mozart was able to study a little bit more the techniques of Wagner and Verdi and how would he have revised the marriage of Figueroa based on that.

And one of these tragedies is that right before Mozart died for reasons unclear he was supposed to be composing an opera based on King Lear. Imagine how wonderful it could have been to a c one of the c king Lear in the hands of Mozart.

Ben: Yeah, that would've been brilliant. And I agree, Mozart, like perhaps would've been firm or more dramatic would've been really interesting. I think you wrote in your last letter that King Lear is the most Chinese of Shakespeare plays. So I was interested in that comment, but also what do you think then is the most American of Shakespeare plays

Dan: maybe a Midsummer Night's dream speaking to you from California but to be a little bit less glib about the potential drug use there?

Ben: Yeah.

Dan: What could be a very American Shakespeare play? Have you given some thought to this? I'm curious about your review. I

Ben: put it down to two, which may be a little bit more on the nose, but. Being potentially at this point in time Julius Caesar or Corey Elis. So either you've got this tension between like singly an elite or not.

And strong man politics or not. Maybe those are on the nose, but yeah, whimsical, maybe something like Matsu Knight's Dream. I guess you could also make some sort of call for the trading part with the Merchant of Venice or something like that. But as of now, I think he would maybe go for something like Caesar.

Dan: Yeah. It is quite interesting that Steve Bannon in one of his many lives produced this. Was it a Lanis movie that starred? I am Anthony Hopkins.

Ben: I didn't realize that. I'd have to look that up.

Dan: One of these major film adaptations was produced by Steve Bannon, and I believe that he was.

Really obsessed with COIs in particular. Take a look. Take a look with this Anthony Hopkins production. Now, could it be something like McBath? Could it be something like Othello, probably not this. These are not sufficiently political. These are two people. But if we take Tyler seriously, I think that Shakespeare's peak was Henri as a unit.

Now, could that, does that have a contemporary relevance for the US today?

Ben: Yeah, I guess if you take it as a unit for sure it has, for sure. It has some, I'm not sure it's an exact mapping. But yes.

Dan: That's what, and King Lear might have some contemporary relevance for the US as well, which one of the interpretations I have of King Lear is that violence can really spiral and there is no limit to political chaos.

You can have a political figure not really be aware of what he's doing. And then a lot of other people are simply bewildered at what's going on. At least in the case of King Lear. You have these two Dukes, the Duke of cornball, who is married to Reagan. And then the duke of Albany who's married to the other sister, not Cordelia.

And the Duke of Albany seems to be the good guy. He's just bewildered about what is going on and at the very, and come to a census where he has a Cornwall is just a kind of brutal and evil and completely ruthless. And there, there is no limit to the sort of political spiraling of a collapse.

I'm not sure that describes contemporary America right now, but it might, and that's part of the scary part.

Ben: Yeah, and I guess maybe that also shows the similarity between China and America, that actually maybe kingly is also an American play. And particularly you could think about the relationships between the old and young within kingly also could apply to America and actually the politicians in America particularly getting elderly as well across the spectrum.

So it's interesting to think about it from that point of view. Okay. I was also interested in coming off all the book tours and all the many amazing podcasts that you did over last year. Having done all of that, is there anything that you might have changed your mind about in terms of what you've written in the book?

Or maybe not completely change your mind about it, but maybe overweight or underweight compared to when you first rated it?

Dan: I've learned that people can be a lot more kind than I expected, and I've learned that people can be a lot more mean than I expected. There's all of these tanky who love to roast my ass on Twitter, and I think that it is just, there's all this misreading of what I say.

There's nothing an author can do about that. People might say that. Oh, I have forgotten to say that America has been ruled by lawyers forever, but I do say that in my very first chapter that the US used to be a little bit more of an engineering state, which is why I was able to build.

But people either forget to read that part or pretend that I never wrote it. And these are one of these things that authors everywhere have to deal with. And that is just one of these taxes of being of writing that there is just a lot of malicious, creative misinterpretation of one's work.

Now, I don't feel like I have it especially bad relative to a lot of other authors. And it is fine. It doesn't bother me that much. And I also have learned that there is a lot of great interest in this topic. That there are a lot of people who are, who enjoyed this book, who tell me that they enjoyed this book and who are rooting for my success.

And I think that is also a very heartening thing to have. I am surprised that people are still asking me to do podcasts. Generally now I am happy to do podcasts only with people I already know and are friends with like you, Ben. And so all of that is quite positive.

I'm curious for your feedback on my conversation with Tyler. Do you think it worked? What, what did work and what didn't work?

Ben: I thought it was great and I thought you both really enjoyed yourselves and obviously Tyler's got a really large audience, so you did have to cover some of the topics in the book again, I guess in the first half.

But for me, the sort of second half where you both talk about more personal and perhaps esoteric things maybe like this, our conversation here today where we touch obviously on China, but not for the main thing I thought was really interesting and I loved you challenging on, I still haven't heard his list of popes in order which should be, which are the best popes or which not 'cause you could imagine, you can imagine to do that, but I thought it was a very it was a very good conversation.

And I think you mentioned in that one as well as in some of your podcasts that I think maybe you still do this, that you type out. Sentences or write out sentences for writers you admire. So actually I did this with some of your own work recently this week to see what that feels like.

And it was actually pretty good, I noticed. Sometimes you have a good, very good way of using a kind of trilon, a series of three things within your sentences and when you use it, unfortunately chat has made this something that we don't see as much anymore. But you've got a very good use of M Dash generally, and actually when you write that in the pause, it's interesting.

I actually wrote this out by hand because it's not as it's not as emphatic as a, as a.in your sentence, but it is this little dash. I always think of Emily Dickinson within it, but it does punctuate another point. Normally a few words. And then again, I did think that technique was interesting.

I last generally for poems, like writing out poems is really interesting because of where you have the slashes and ate, but I hadn't done it for essays or nonfiction, and I read plays out aloud. I think that's quite interesting. But do you still type out writers that you admire and you still think it's a good technique?

Dan: Not so much anymore, but I keep a running scrapbook of my favorite phrases. And when I sometimes pick up a very nice turn of phrase and either a book or a magazine or wherever else, I paste that in. And every so often I looked through my scrapbook and it. Find some new forms of syntax that I want to play with.

I think it is good that you picked up my tricho as I myself am a Trinitarian, so anything that goes in threes would be really good. Have you tried the exercise of trying to re type rewrite play and has that what has that exercise given you insight into?

Ben: Yes. I haven't done it.

Greatly I've done it particularly on Harold Pinta work and also for some bits of waiting for Gado. And this is because both of them are very interesting, and this is where it started. Essentially pauses and silences, which are quite hard to judge. But in the writing out, and then also when you say it, it does give you this real sense of ah within that pause and what's it be?

And it gives you a stronger sense of the rhythm of language. So writing it, in fact, I would suggest if you're doing this, you actually write it out by hand as well. It tends to be a little bit slower for people versus typing. And then also to speak it, I think for essays and other things, probably not speaking it, but for plays, which will eventually be a vocal form as well, that is quite an interesting write up.

And so you, you are writing the dialogue and then you'll speak it. And it gives you the sense of rhythm and also the pausing. And another thing that shows you both in Pinta actually and in great playwriting overall is punctuation and the use of punctuation. And actually we have some unusual punctuations which have developed over the last few decades, but we use a slash quite a lot as well as hyphens and on and on dashes.

And also this is to try and get overlapping sounds and rhythms. And you only pick that up really by trying to write it or also speak it which you don't. Even just listening or seeing it on the written page isn't quite the same. I'm not sure 'cause I don't really hear music in the same way.

Maybe some people would have the same when they can read sheet music and then also have to play it out or practice it out. But there is something within that. And I also think it's interesting 'cause a lot of art students will, they will have a phase where you just copy what old masters did you, even if you're doing life drawing, you will start out with that to just see, okay, this is what drawing a Michelangelo kind of feels like.

Even though in very modern art, obviously we don't do that, but from that roots. 'cause it does give you that, that sense of feeling. So I think it is an interesting creative practice.

Dan: Yeah, I mean I think it is still a kind of an underrated practice. The reason that I started with sheet music is because I used to be very into reading music and holding a score as I listened to a string quartet or something.

I remembered copying out, I believe it was a Mahler symphony, just like writing a page or two of that out. And you really see what the choices a composer made when you do something like that. And when you retype a story, an article, whatever it is of another writer, you really become much more hyper aware of the choices that they make of particular punctuation or adjectives or syntax.

And you have to start thinking a little bit more about what might you do in that scenario? And that is actually a really good exercise. And it doesn't, it feels surprisingly underrated of a thing to just get into the minds of other people. So this kind of inspires me to ask you.

I've never played, but I haven't really been a big part of my life, although last year I attended I think just two plays. There's a David Henry Huang play on called Yellow Face, which I saw on Broadway. I also saw this new production of Oscar Wilde's importance of being Earnest on the West End, which had this very camp production starring Stephen Fry as Rael the starches of the Victorian matrix.

And I'm thinking of getting into plays more, but is there some sort of analogy where instead of writing out a play can we scare up, let's say two, three other friends to just read out all of these parts and just read these things out and for pleasure? Do you think that is actually a good exercise or that doesn't really work?

Ben: No, it's a really good exercise. Let's do it. So particularly in pandemic times, that is actually what a lot of playwrights and actors ended up doing. So you do it across your favorite plays but it is also the one of the very earliest ways of work shopping your own work is to get people to read it out.

I do these performance lectures, so you like standup. Sometimes you just have to test it with a live audience because you've got this interaction. But certainly simply just reading it out and also reading it out as the parts of others could be can be really good. And I'm sure amongst our group we'll have some to do that.

And then you can do it also. You can go and watch the production or something like that. But yeah, it's definitely worth doing.

Dan: So let's say that I am on holiday next week with three other friends who are as interested in plays as I am. Probably Shakespeare is not the right answer.

But is there some, I don't know, stopper play or something else in which we should just read out the parts to each other? Is there a good kind of starter play if none of us are very familiar with plays to try to have this sort of fun?

Ben: Ooh, I, so with just three, it's interesting that I might start with four, four

Dan: people total.

Ben: I might start with Harold Pinter 'cause they've got really interesting pauses and they're a little bit simpler. And it's also the birth of a lot of. Where Modern Drama goes, or Samuel Beckett, I think I would do Pinter. But actually the one that you maybe do is now, and also 'cause I think it might be his greatest play, although has more characters, I don't think it really matters would be Tom Stoppard's Arcadia, maybe start with Rosen Krantz and Gilden Stern, which is his most philosophical play and actually needs less dramatization for it and has fewer characters.

Rosen Ks and Goldstein are dead, has a slight Shakespeare connotation, not really. And then do Arcadia 'cause Arcadia you get this multilayered time effect where if you are reading it out. And it's really funny and I think it will probably still prove to be as great as play. Yeah, that's why I suggest, what's

Dan: the appeal of Arcadia?

Ben: So Arcadia Whoof. I think it is just a very good reflection of humanity and thinking overall, but also has concepts of time and quantum physics, also chaos. Also maybe the complexity, and then inexplicably inexplicable, of human life. But also has overtones of this reverse of are there patterns?

Are there things which reverberate through time? Are there these narratives that we feel? And he packages up that really well. So not only touches on chaos theory, complexity and quantum ness. So the cutting edge of some science thoughts, which are not fully captured, but also has these characterizations of narrative and pattern and then puts through some of these other obscure things like the patterns of English gardens and French gardens and these other things that humans are grappling with and shows and shows some of that through time.

So I just think it's really neatly wrapped up. And obviously as he's recently died, it's probably the moment of that. So that's why I would highlight that. But it's actually quite quick to do. So Pinta plays are probably, some of them are only for an hour and a half, so you can definitely do that over an evening with some tea.

Arcadia's a little bit longer. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern [are Dead] I think is only about an hour and a half as well [Ed: actually runs 2 hours]. So you could do that quite quickly.

Dan: Let's say that the chaos and quantum and time are just a little bit too philosophical and complex for a starter group. Is there an easier stopper to play?

Ben: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead. It's okay. It is philosophical. Comedic as well. So in that sense it could actually be harder than Arcadia because Stoppard  is really good at explaining these concepts of chaos theory and butterfly flaps its wings and things like that. So in that sense, I don't think you will struggle whereas Rosenstein and Gilda and have some of these more philosophical overtones.

But structurally and character wise it is simpler. So that's potentially there, but you could just flick the first chapter or two, or sorry, scene or two. And that will give you a sense

Dan:What about Leopoldstadt ?

Ben: So I think I'll have to see it again. I liked it but I wondered whether the first showing may, or may not be definitive and I think maybe we need a little bit more time as it will prove to be his last great work, whether that will prove to be greater.

I still prefer some of the concepts on Arcadia. I. Your podcast dub obviously had a little bit more of a personal connotation. So I would like to, I would like to see it again. I should reread it actually to make that sense. Maybe actually there's a really good biography of him also by Ion e Lee, so maybe putting all of that together, it would give me a more complete sense.

I think it's interesting because playwrights in general, or I guess right in general, tend to lean a more complicated left, say I know it's more complicated than that, whereas Stoppard lent a more complicated and I would say that just because he was very interested in notions of freedom and liberalism because of where he of how he grew up.

So I think that makes it really interesting. And I do think playwriting is one of those things where even. If you're successful, say leftist or rightist. Most successful plays always have very strong and nuanced arguments arguing for the other side, whatever position you have. And in fact, for some of the greatest, you're not even sure within the play where the playwright's actual position might be.

So that's one of the reasons I still think performance is really interesting on that level. And reading it out you get to inhabit a character who might not think well, almost certainly doesn't think like yourself. And so though I think that is a really good way of inhabiting something else, which obviously fiction gives you performance, gives it to you in a very live manner which I think is one step up in importance.

Dan: Do playwrights tend to write distinctive pros in terms of essays? Can you tell who is a playwright based on their essays?

Ben: Oh, I don't know about that. Some playwrights have gone on to write. Quite interesting essays as well. I would have to think, my guess is maybe yes but I can't think offhand.

Maybe more interesting or equally as like some players, like Tom Stoppard famously wrote some very successful Hollywood stuff. Like I think Steven Spielberg used to ring Stop Pod up when he had a problem in his script and sometimes Stop Pod would say, I think that was fa, I can't remember what film it was some famous film and Stoppard said, no, I'm working on this small play.

And Spielberg says what? But this is a million dollar multi thingy hit. And Stoppard was like that, but I'm more interested in this. But I think that's quite interesting in some of those crossovers. But I have to think about the essay question. I'm not sure about that in terms of essayists.

Dan: I've been reading a little bit of this Auden collection of essays called The Dyer's Hand, and this is his only collected series of his essays. And I'm not sure that one can really tell that, oh, this is a poet. I don't know if when poets write essays in prose it, I'm not sure if it usually generally turns out necessarily very well.

I was also, I also read David Mamet's Was it Three Uses of the Knife? And I thought that was pretty good, but it didn't, I also didn't feel like I learned a ton from it. So maybe we should mostly stay in our lanes. But I am still curious if there is some sort of a distinctive training that they can bring into our pros Essay writing.

Ben: Yeah, I'm gonna think about that. I'm gonna, I'm gonna look at my bookshelf and see some of the essays, because I think of more of their memoirs, things like Edward Alby or something like that. But some of them have written some essays some have written quite interestingly about. Theater, although, and now I'm thinking about Peter Brooke and Empty Space, and that was a director writing about theater in general.

So I'm not, yeah, I'm not completely sure. Unanswered. Okay. Maybe we'll do a short last, final section and then some of the things that you're working on in any advice you have, but I guess in honor of Tyler Cowan, he doesn't do this so much anymore, but I thought we should do a short section of overrated, underrated in terms of the podcast.

There's some quick hits and some on some things so we can give this a go. Overrated or underrated US suburbs

Dan: correctly rated, I think correctly. I think that the suburban life, I think that this is, I recognize that this is the dream for a lot of families. Absolutely. To have a lot of space and then to be able to try a kids swimming pool. That's great. There is a lot more culinary diversity in suburbs because the rents tend to be cheaper.

And the people like Costco and those gigantic super stores. I like Costco myself. I don't mind visiting like once every two months or so to buy a lot of Kleenex tissues or something. I think that these things are quite fine. But let's not overdo our enthusiasm for them.

Ben: Yeah. Great for parents, I think. I still think they are too boring for teenagers, but Yes. I think Tyler likes the suburbs a lot though. Great. Hedge funds, overrated, underrated.

Dan: Overrated. These are compensation schemes masquerading as an asset class. And maybe you are more familiar with this data, but I remember reading a while ago that catch fund, quote unquote hedge fund performance has been pretty bad over the last couple of years.

They're not overperforming. And I think where the energy seems to be for a lot of smart people, they're going into these quant funds, and that seems to be where a lot of them are, where the action is. Hedge funds were never very well defined up until, after you moved on from long, short.

But so it feels like it's mostly a marketing category, right?

Ben: Very good for employees. Yeah. I'm not sure about it, I'm not sure about anyone else. Okay. We, I guess we briefly covered this, but I would say AI existential risk is overrated or underrated.

Dan: Maybe correctly rated may probably be overrated by all the Californians.

If we take this view that, okay maybe we will be tortured eternally in our minds by machine, God forever that seems pretty bad. I wouldn't like that. So maybe it's good that we have some people worrying about this. Maybe it is great that we have some people worrying about biotech security, but let's also worry about all of these other things, like what sorts of harms that this might be doing just to our minds every single day.

Ben: Yeah. I think that's the problem with a lot of these things. Yeah. The people really deep into it could probably do with thinking about some other things, but the people who've never thought about it at all could probably do with at least thinking about it a little bit. Okay. Overrated, underrated five year plans.

Dan: Overrated, the Chinese don't take this all that seriously anymore. Maybe the first two or three, five year plans were important. Right after the first the conclusion of the first five year plan felt that he was being excessively constrained and then he essentially did away with much of this concept.

So the gap between the first five year plan and the second five year plan, they didn't do this immediately afterwards because Mao hated them. I think that they are overrated. The Chinese have never paid that much attention to their own five year plans. I think something like this could be more centrally planned than high-speed rail?

High-speed rail arose in reaction to the global financial crisis, which was outside of the plan. So they built this enormous rail system without even planning for it. Yeah. And so that just shows, it's just this sort of aspirational marketing statement because they have to praise marks on his birthdays and sing the internationale to after the party congresses.

But this is actually not all that serious for, at least for the Chinese. Yeah. And if it's not that serious for the Communist Party, I can't imagine that being serious for anyone else.

Ben: Yeah. Mostly signaling. I think non-Chinese analysts are probably the people who read it the most. Okay.

Dan: It's worth reading.

It's an aspirational document.

Ben: Board games underrated or overrated. Yeah.

Dan: Correctly rated. I believe in the efficient market hypothesis. I think that most things are correctly rated. I

Ben: do.

Dan: And I like board games, but I have, it's been, I think, like years since it's really been part of my life.

I think a couple of board games can be great and perfect, but one doesn't need to keep learning new board games. And so in that sense it's not a very vital industry, just like opera. No, I think that it's good for some nerds. Maybe more people should hang out and play board games.

But people just should just find some way to be more social, whether that's to go to plays or to play some board games or just to go on dates more.

Ben: Yeah. I guess I mentioned it 'cause Silicon Valley doesn't have opera, but it does have more board games. But yeah, maybe correctly rated space exploration.

Underrated, overrated,

Dan: overrated. There's. Basically nothing out there within a reasonable timeframe. It's good to serve as an inspirational device. And I think that, maybe we should go find it. I think it is a scandal that there's very likely life within one of the moons of Jupiter and maybe of Saturn as well.

We're not even really trying that hard to go look for it. Now it's like right here within our solar system. What sorts of Moby Dicks lie within the moons of the Moon of Europa. So why don't we go, why don't we, why don't we go find Moby Dick?

Ben: Yeah. But then we've got a lot of problems on Earth as well, so yeah, I guess there's difficulties on that.

And last one then, venture capital. Do you think overall it's underrated or overrated?

Dan: Incorrectly rated. I think that it has definitely been a major factor in discovering the capital market ecosystem in general. What is venture capital exactly anymore? Maybe these are just marketing agencies with an insurance policy attached.

But I think that the general capital ecosystem has been pretty efficient in the US. But also people love to say that VCs don't work very hard, so maybe they also need to be working a little bit harder.

Ben: Yeah. Okay. That's very good. Yeah, I was interested in financial valuations and BC and the, in your letter you mentioned something you've talked about a little bit for looking at, for instance, the valuation of something like AppLovin, although it's actually fallen quite a lot since you wrote the letter. 

Dan: Really?

Ben: And you compare that to something like


Dan:, I hope it wasn't  because of me.

Ben: No it, there's been this whole revaluation of what software might mean, I think might even be down about 50% since you last wrote it. Wow. But it's still got a larger market cap than Xiaomi, although not by such an incredible amount or more, or something like BYD is maybe more well known for people in terms of EV makers.

But I was thinking that. When you think about it, maybe if you think about it purely in terms of capturing consumer surplus or wealth for the nation, certainly BYD and Xiaomi are doing better for their respective nations than Afin. But that's maybe what the financial shareholder equity people are looking at is that Apple vendor's better for the equity holders, but isn't adding so much more value to the United States.

And so that's part of this disconnect that we have with the financial market cap thing. And where is the actual value going? I think about this a lot in healthcare because actually within biopharma, a lot of the value actually goes into a. Into people, into patients who live longer and some value goes back to the biopharma, but not as much as you might have thought.

And certainly probably less than in, in tech companies. But that's partly because society demands that they might need to capture more of that value. And I think that's an interesting kind of tension between who, who is really getting the value from that.

What are you working on at the moment? Any current projects or any questions you are obsessed over?

Dan: There's two books on my shelf that I really want to read. One is a history of the Royal Navy, actually by a historian named NAM Rogers. It's called The Price of Victory.

This mega long history book and the Royal Navy has inspired a lot of excellent historians. Another is a novel:  Middle March. I'm deficient for being a bad California and not having read George Elliot and I'm also, I've also just picked up Dublin nurse. So I'm starting to read a little bit of the short stories of James' Choice, which are pretty charming and not as difficult as I imagined as something like Ulysses.

Ben: Great. And then the last question for a smart 20 something, deciding where to live and what to learn and what to do, what would be your advice for them?

Dan: I think that it is really important to be with ambitious people. I think that the default is to not be ambitious people. And certainly I've felt that my own ambition has ebbed as I've entered as I've crossed into the wrong side of 30.

Certainly, your ambition will get lower and lower, and so it is a good thing to have when you are younger. And this is, and it seems to me like some very ambitious people are in San Francisco as well as New York City. This is where I am a little bit more glum about London, where.

If the default national culture, it's just this cynicism and cleverness about people who are absent and then there it feels like a country in a national decline, even if London is delightful. I think that it is probably a good thing from a civilizational perspective not to be super cynical all of the time.

And so I have many friends in London. I love visiting. It is a superb city, but maybe it is also good to get some optimism and get some sun.

Ben: Yes. So raise your ambition and surround yourself with great people. I will make one further plea for London, although I do think we are a great museum like the rest of Europe.

Good to visit, but not. I think maybe so percentage wise, like we said, there is some doom and gloom here, but there are. Ambitious young people and then all were young, some are a little bit older and they are forming groups. So there's a big emergent venture cluster here. So this is Tyler Cowen’s venture philanthropy.

You've got British progress, you've got abundance for London. So you have got a cluster of young people who are there. There may be absolute numbers numbering in the hundreds and low thousands as opposed to tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands. But I still think you do have it here, partly 'cause of where the agglomeration effects are.

But I do think surrounding yourself, the people you surround yourself with, you tend to go, I think, what's the quote? If you want to run faster, you run with the antelopes. So if you want to be a fast antelope, you run with them some quote like that. That's the idea. And I think that has a lot of truth to that.

Dan: Antelopes may have to run really fast because they're being chased by lions. So I've put more emphasis on the lion rather than the herd. And having a bit more of a sense of threat is important too. And I think it is really good to prepare these lists of ambitions… just in case we have to medevac them into California at some point if the gloom pervades too deeply into their hearts.

Ben: Yes. Although the California's aren't they all going to New Zealand instead? So maybe we'll come round full circle.

Dan: Okay. That's right. Just a global tour of the angles here.

Ben: Yeah. Great. With that, Dan, thank you very much.

Dan: Thank you very much. This was a lot of fun. I'm glad that I got to hear more of your thoughts, especially on place.


In Arts, Podcast, Life, Politics, Writing Tags Dan Wang, Ben Yeoh Chats, Silicon Valley, London, China, AI, tech culture, culture, housing, planning, infrastructure, censorship, urbanism, ambition, writing, Shakespeare, opera, food culture, neurodiversity, politics

Hansong Li: China, Tangut, political economy, history | Podcast

June 14, 2024 Ben Yeoh

A podcast with Hansong Li, a political theorist and historian of political, economic, and legal thought. We discussed a breadth of topics ranging from the Tangut language, Eastern philosophy, development economics, to modern political ideologies and cultural expressions. Hansong’s insights shed light on historical contexts while drawing connections to contemporary issues.

The conversation delves into broader philosophical and economic themes, comparing past and present political thoughts and examining the effects of international aid on development. Hansong emphasizes the importance of learning from history and cultural interactions for a more nuanced understanding of contemporary global dynamics.

Transcript, contents and summary below.

  • 00:18 The Tangut People and Their Language

  • 11:16 Modern Interpretations of Chinese Philosophy

  • 22:07 Global South and Regional Concepts

  • 27:09 Montesquieu and Sea Imagery

  • 32:55 Rousseau's Plan for Corsica

  • 37:56 Economic Development in Northeast Asia

  • 40:34 International Aid: Help or Hindrance?

  • 46:56 Global Economic Thought: East vs. West

  • 56:29 Hamilton: A Political and Cultural Analysis

  • 01:01:51 Underrated or Overrated?

  • 01:06:04 Current Projects and Life Advice


The Tangut Legacy: A Journey Through Language and History

Our dialogue began with an exploration of the Tangut people and their language. Hansong provided a richly detailed account, explaining that the Tangut were referred to by the Mongolians, while the Chinese knew them as the Western Xia. Significantly positioned along the Silk Road, the Tangut introduced their own script, imitating Chinese characters but retaining a Tibetan-influenced grammar and syntax. 

"Learning the Tangut language is fun," Hansong remarked, pointing out its synthetic nature, blending elements from Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan. He also emphasized the diverse cultural fabric of the Tangut, mentioning Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Han Chinese influences, and how insights into their daily lives reveal much about medieval Northwestern China.

In discussing the Tangut’s military prowess and strategic diplomacy, Hansong noted their frequent military victories over the Song Dynasty. He highlighted how Genghis Khan's frustrations with the Tangut contributed to his deteriorating health.

When questioned about the regulatory landscape for something as mundane yet fundamental as opening a bakery in that era, Hansong illuminated the extensive yet fascinating legal codes and contractual details. This granularity highlighted the historical depth and richness often obscured in conventional narratives.

Modern China: Misunderstandings and Moral Vacuums

Transitioning to contemporary topics, Hansong challenged the notion of a moral or spiritual vacuum in modern China. He argued that, despite China's complex relationship with its traditions post-1950s and post-1989, a rich tapestry of normative traditions persists, driven by intellectuals and everyday people alike.

"There is a world full of normative traditions, contentions, and intercultural contestations in China," Hansong asserted, adding that today's intellectual landscape thrives on the interplay of Marxist, Confucian, and other philosophical streams.

Economic Thought and Development: Lessons from Rousseau and Modern Implications

Hansong's reflections on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s plan for Corsica drew fascinating parallels with contemporary development economics. He praised Rousseau's stage-by-stage approach to building economic surplus, emphasizing its relevance to modern East Asian economic models where initial industrial policy laid the groundwork for technological and innovative leaps.

This led to a critical discussion on international aid. Hansong acknowledged its varied impact, cautioning against viewing aid as a one-size-fits-all solution. He stressed the importance of domestic capability in creating surplus and self-reliance, advocating a balanced approach akin to China’s industrial policy.

Western Economic Philosophies: Evolution and Reflection

Discussing Western economic thought, Hansong spoke about the ongoing evolution from 1970s neoliberalism to today’s reflective and sometimes critical stance. He emphasized the significance of considering both distribution and production in economic models, rejecting binary views in favor of nuanced, context-specific strategies.

Cultural Reflections: Musical Theater and Classical Music

We concluded on a lighter note, reflecting on cultural phenomena like the musical "Hamilton." Hansong critiqued its oversimplified portrayal of social mobility and individual heroism, while acknowledging its power to communicate complex narratives. He pondered the power of performative arts in shaping social and political discourse across cultures.

Travel and Inter-Normative Thinking: Life Advice

"Traveling a lot and being open-minded to different ways of life is essential for any public intellectual," he emphasized.

Transcript (AI derived, mistakes are possible)


Ben: Hey everyone, I'm super excited to be speaking to Hansong Li. Hansong is a political theorist and a historian of political, economic, and legal thought. Hansong, welcome. 

Hansong: Thank you so much, Ben. So glad to be here. 

Ben: What can we learn? from the Tangut language and people? 

Hansong: The wonderful question to start us off to start, of course, the Tangut and the word Tangut is the actually was a Mongolian reference to the people whom the Chinese call Western Xia.

And they occupy to the [ ] corridor so somewhere between modern day, [Gangsu and monglia] there were people who basically occupy this very strategic place in what we today would call the Silk Road as we reimagine it. And at the time of course, it creates some troubles for the Song Dynasty because they really blocked the pathway to Central Asia and to Eastern Europe.

We can learn a few things from the Tangut groups. First of all, the way they created their own script in imitation of Chinese characters, but also preserving that [ ] somewhat, it was rather close to Tibetan in, in grammar and syntax, but with a lot of loan words from across the board from Sanskrit, from Chinese.

So it's a very synthetic language, and it's just so much fun to learn. I started learning it when I was 13 or 14 reading martial arts novels, which involved some characters from the re imagined Tangut dynasty, but and then I wondered, I really wanted to know how they spoke and what they really thought and what kind of buddhism did they have and how did they treat people of different cultures, religions and ethnicities, because it was not just a regional kingdom, but there were [ ] medieval Uyghurs the [Hui] people who were conquered and incorporated in there. There were Tibetans, there were more Central Asian peoples.

There were obviously also a lot of Han Chinese influence. And it was a very diverse. And incredibly rich source of historical imaginations. And we can also look into the daily lives at the micro historical level, the way they contracted loans and investments. And my favorite piece of artifact was really just a piece of paper saying all the things you need to start a bakery shop and all the utensils you need and how much it cost it. And of course, you have to rent the room to open that bakery shop. So all the details you need to know about ideas, we would call it high medieval, late medieval Northwestern China.

And their interactions, their diplomacy, their economic life, their total activities it was just a kind of black box because it's not officially classified as 1 of the 24 histories and dynasties of Chinese history for complicated reasons. But this mysterious dynasty really has a lot to offer once you open up this black box and you see all the treasures inside. 

Ben: I mean arguably it was on a par with the Song dynasty. Is that correct? ... the 1100s to 1300s 

Hansong: Exactly and it overlapped with both the northern southern Song dynasty. So it started in the really in the heydays of northern Song dynasty So [they] able to battle off both the Khitans and and Han chinese And then later on, the Khitans were replaced by the Jurchens and the, the Song Dynasty, the Imperial Dynasty, then retreated to the South, but it continued to exist until the Mongol conquest.

And obviously the Mongols had a lot of troubles conquering the Tang groups. And it's rumored, several sources, including some Mongol sources, that Genghis Khan really was infuriated at the slow pace that Which they were [attacking Tangut] territory. The Tangut was really good fighters in terms of military power, not in terms of economic power.

They were probably much superior to the Songs. There were more victories on the Tangut side than on the Song side throughout the North and Song dynasties. [it is said on Ghengis Khan... that] The frustrations he had with his Tangut campaigns might have contributed to [his] the worsening of his own health situations and might have even contributed to his death. And, but of course we can't really verify that. 

Ben: And were there many bakery regulations? Is it like today where you needed lots of licenses and tax inspectors, or was it relatively simple still to open up a bakery? 

Hansong: It involved, of course, the regulatory regimes and and the legal code was extensive.

The Tanguts ... learned from both the Tibetan and [ ] their Chinese sponsors, patrons, peers at the time, and they also compiled they learned both from the [Tang] and the [Song] codes. And to open up a bakery shop, of course, you have to have a certificate. You have to have the permission to do that.

But then the taxes, right? All the the loans, the pawning and the transactions the land. Ownership and all of that have to be sorted to legally and we do have these legal codes, both the code itself and how it actually applied because we have the contracts and the laws and you can compare if in practice, they were really enforcing what the law says.

It's incredibly fascinating that you can do a lot with these materials. Then sometimes you can do with the seemingly richer Chinese sources at the time. 

Ben: And was it predominantly a steamed bread or a baked bread? And I was bread more popular than noodles, or I'm assuming rice at the time.

Hansong: Yeah. Northwestern Chinese. [The Tangut] took over basically the agricultural zone of the yellow river[ region quickly but] they never gave up on nomadic ways of life. They kept herding hunting and other activities, but they also took over the local agriculture of Northwestern China.

And so these are rough. pies with, I I don't think there was a lot of filling in there. But then there is also this question of the evolution of things like. Momo for example, in this Northwestern Chinese dialect, it really just nowadays, it meant just a bun without any filling in there.

But and then what the Chinese would call baozi and jiaozi nowadays are closer to samosa and momo and manti. But all of these words, of course, come from Tibetanized Chinese. Or other like Turkified Chinese. And so all of the new, so you can basically, like an average Chinese tourist would go into these Central Asian or Eastern European restaurants and order by speaking Mandarin.

Ben: What would have been the greatest cultural artifacts of the region in the time? 

Hansong: In the territories, it would be, architecturally, these magnificent pagodas and the imperial mausoleums actually, it's been the government of Ningxia has been petitioning for a UNESCO status for the Tangut Mausoleum, and I was involved in translating some of the documents that was also very tricky, right?

If you want to call it the tombs or mausoleums, and if it's like classifying it as a kingdom or an empire, it also has geopolitical implications hence also political sensitivities. And these are architectural wonders. On the other hand, you also have Buddhist sutras and also block prints, because the Tanguts were very advanced in book printing.

Towards the end, because of a lot of fiscal disasters and also because of the high expenditures on military campaigns it suffered a dearth of resources. So at the time they were using a recycling papers a lot. So in, in towards the end of the Tangut Imperial history, you will see that all the sutra pages were recycled and you would write your personal like diaries or practice your calligraphy or even write out your contracts On the flip side of maybe a sutra or some kind of textbook so it becomes messier at the time. It's a combination I guess to answer your question. It's a combination of textual artifacts and then there are a lot of These Buddhist artifacts these boxes where you will put in a tooth or it's or there, there will be like larger architectural artifacts.

So we, we have a lot of these and also inscriptions and steels and other things spread out across mostly Inner Mongolia, Gansu and Ningxia. 

Ben: And what would have been the dominant philosophical thought of the time?

So there was obviously Buddhist influence, a kind of Tibetan Buddhist influence.

You also had the nomadic people. There was, a spirit influence. And I guess there's a little bit of a, one of those medieval diverse melting pots we would, might say today, but I was interested about that philosophical thought either I guess a little bit is economic military philosophy, but also the kind of [ ] spiritual, how should they live their life?

Hansong: Absolutely, it's also fascinating if I could time travel, I would definitely try to reconstruct a kind of cosmology of the 10 groups, but I also, I guess it would have been a melting pot and even just officially the 10 groups had bureaus, they had bureau, Creative structures, which regulated Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism.

So you have the Confucian academy system. You have a regulatory regimes overseeing the conduct of the Taoist monist. Of course, part of it is also to make sure the religious sectors don't get subversive and they're well regulated. So there's that kind of state to view it through the eyes of the state.

There is that regulatory intention there, but also it says a lot about the prosperity of Buddhism and even Taoism, Confucianism. And of course, at the imperial level, there were all ways. These more like pro harm confusion. Sectors, and there are these more Buddhist state sectors, and there are the more kind of authentic, if not indigenous 10 good intuitions about, we should be more nomadic and less sinicized.

And so there's always this contention from within the Imperial household. Sometimes the the clan, the maternal clans of the Empress would be a little bit more pro Tengu, pro like more indigenously minded and sometimes the male clans would be a little bit more pro Confucian. And then on top of that, of course, you have military treatises, which are also very philosophical.

You have. receptions of all kinds of thinking from the Central Plains, from Tibet, from, India directly, indirectly through Tibet. And so you have this kind of synthetic cosmology in which different sources of normative and philosophical religious thinking would come together. And usually the Tengu are very versatile in synthesizing them and they print all kinds of texts in all across traditions.

And they're quite proud of that. 

Ben: That's a good segue into thinking perhaps around today's thinking, tracing it through a sort of history of economic thought or philosophical thought. What do you think is maybe misunderstood about China today? Or perhaps another way of thinking about it is, it seems to me that an understanding of Chinese philosophy or, different parts of it still seems to be an underrated way or lens [of thinking about China].

You've already mentioned a few the Tao or Confucianism and obviously you've got that through to thinking about modern China today. What do you think are the important to understand about how China's come about and it's thinking tracing it through the history to where we get today?

Hansong: Yes, absolutely. I think there are several intuitive assessments of the situation in China that I think needs to be more qualified or enriched or expanded. And the first is that there is some kind of moral vacuum, a spiritual vacuum if not post 1950s. ... at least post 1989. So this thesis about moral vacuum or spiritual vacuum could either come from neo left reactions to China's integration into global neoliberalism is a kind of discontent with the fact.

And now we only care about the market and no longer about the morals. So that would be one critique. And the other critique is, Oh, you've got, you've lost all of your Confucianism since the 1950s. This obviously is an oversimplification because since I would say since early modern China, at least not since the Jesuits came in, there was this kind of a first and the Jesuit pivot to the Buddhists.

And then they gave up on the Buddhists. And decided to align with the confusions against the Buddhist and talking about the material moment. And and then after that you still have this continued legacy of inter cosmic or inter epistemic contention, which exploded of course, in the aftermath of the Western.

Interventions in China since the open war. And this and then with the the reception of Marxism, you have traditional, and it must be emphasized this, a very heterogeneous traditional world of Chinese philosophies, which shouldn't be too Confucian centric about it the Confucian, Buddhistic other Traditions of thinking heartening back, of course, to the late spring, autumn, early warning states periods.

This entire internal world of contention descent then interacted with, of course, the Marxists and the liberals. And you literally see the receptions being parallel and also crisscrossing overlapping with each other. And we're very much in the aftermath of that kind of molten. Multiplex reception and today, of course, you still have intellectuals adhering to or mixing and matching these very different traditions.

And it's really not the case that you have a vacuum. If anything, you have a world full of normative traditions. Contentions and inter normative, international, intercultural, inter religious contentions. And I think that's a very healthy thing. So I don't think there is a moral vacuum. And I think it's actually a, an exciting moment to look at the ways the Chinese not just intellectuals, academics, but also the ways that people on the middle or bottom level.

Understand and different sources of normative. Imaginations, right? So that is one big thought that I think it's there, there's a lot in there. And secondly there is a kind of post colonial reading of China, or a And also it's not appropriate to say indigenous, but it's kind of NeoCon confusion or neo post-colonial reading of China, as you know now that China's reacting against the whole, the entire legacy of post imperial, then post-colonial, and then post-war liberal international order.

And it's responding to that, reacting against that with his own tradition. But then here are my responses again that the Chinese tradition must be unpacked and and deconstructed. And it's not just about Confucianism. It's a lot of things in there. And to what extent China's opposed colonial has a.

Post colonial mentality, it's certainly strategically and geopolitically identifies with the post colonial moment, but it's also a very special case. So I think the best way to approach the thinking world, the thought world of China today is to look at, first of all, the genealogy of these ideas and how they contest each other in the long duration, not just in the past 10 or 20 years after reform and opening up.

But throughout the 20th century, going back to the late imperial moment but also to be open minded about the many ways that different sectors of the Chinese public sphere part choose to participate in these different kinds of problem consciousnesses. 

Ben: So that's a rejection of both. The simplistic view that you could understand China today just as a post colonial thinking, or also a rejection of just thinking about China entering a free market, neoliberal type of thinking, either way seem too simplistic.

And the best way of thinking about it is still a pluralistic melting pot of many traditions which have been there for hundreds to thousands of years To, to where we are today. So perhaps thinking today and crystal ball into the future, how do you think this might pan out? And maybe we could maybe make it a little bit simpler because you already pointed to the fact that different parts of Chinese society think differently, and you can think about this almost urban countryside, elite, non elite.

Technocrats merchants versus bureaucrats. So it there's no one answer either because it's a pluralistic kind of view of the world. But I guess with the dominant thought on the government side, or perhaps trading merchant side, where do you think it might be going? Is any one of those threads of thought potentially becoming more dominant or some intersection of that where you think this is maybe a little bit misunderstood and seem to be a more dominant piece of thinking which might last for now and into the immediate future.

Hansong: I see the continued relevance and prevalence of this idea that we we're bear, we're torch bearers of this particular socio political economic tradition that Situates us somewhere in as a kind of dual track policy thinking mode and in between big bang neoliberalism and old fashioned collectivism.

So I think that kind of middle ground, the post 1980s, 1990s. Eastern European moment when, of course, China sent economists to the Eastern Europe to discuss what to, what should be done or what is the old Leninist question what is to be done now that we share the kind of global East mindset, we don't want to go back to this basically empirically.

Ineffective mode of collectivist economic production, very imbalanced, very unhealthy, does not even deliver on social welfare that we pride so much we pride our system so much on and but on the other hand. Not only the symptoms of, the old Martian language, the inner contradictions, but not so much.

The, just the state of crisis in a blind and unreflective kind of neoliberalism. So I think it's now become a kind of implicit tacit doctrine that we are somehow a dual track. Political economy, and that's when the state comes in to correct, say, during a crisis panic moment all the prices go up irrationally.

Of course, the state will come in and instruct some state enterprises to lower the prices and to stabilize the markets. So the there was no no, no feeling that this is somehow working against the logic of the market. It's if anything, as opposed to moderate, the irrationality is propping out here and there and not wait until a hundred years when, for the market mechanism to really work out.

And but on the other hand, the idea of the market primacy as the main market. Place for for transactions and as the way to distribute resources. I think that's not going to be shaken. With whichever administration comes in place, which, whichever kind of ideological orientations.

Is taking precedence within the standing committee within the Congress. I think that stands that socioeconomically. We are a dual track political economy. We stand ready to use whichever instrument that will deliver. We will use industrial policy to support new energy, knowledge, technology, Economy based, I know the industry, there is no qualm about using industrial policy.

And so it's, if anything, it's harmonized with the market reform logic. So that's something I see at the end, since you were asking about the governmental side, I think that's going to be like a very. Stable policy, but as for how to interpret that kind of dual track identity, and as for which one to use at what moment, that is definitely a matter of prudential judgment.

And you do see ideologies coming in when the committee members or the, the top leadership. Selectively uses the different elements of that dual track identity to further its own vision of what is better for the country going forward. So it's so I guess it's not purely ideology, but it's not purely like 1 of the 2 political outlooks.

Say it's it's, there is something stable there, but also it depends on the floods and the reflux of ideological leanings. 

Ben: That makes a lot of sense. So in principle, dual track, but case by case, hard to know which track [has most of the waiting and in the moment] 

Hansong: But having, but basing your legitimacy on the dual track identity, I think, I personally find it a better alternative than many others, but I think it provides a source of stability because if you can't walk back on the dual track ideology, [...] Then at least you wouldn't go full mode, [Thatcher, or]

[Reagan] on the other hand, you wouldn't go full mode.... let's return more power to the state. If you can't really say that within the framework of legitimation then if you must provide some kind of explanation for why you're sticking to the dual track identity, then I think that's at least a constraining force and it's a good thing to have it because otherwise you could have much more unstable policies that confuse people and potentially damage the ecosystem that has been built over the past 40 years.

Ben: Sure. That makes sense. And I guess a lot of western thinkers have come out with large, broad based concepts, sometimes geographic or things. The Global South and South Asia, you've done some work on Indo Pacific. But actually, on some of those concepts, Take one, which has talked about when you unpack something like the global South, it seems so much more con complex than that broad based element.

How helpful do you think some of these concepts are? And maybe if we would unpack global South, or we could also comment on South Asia and Indo Pacific, are they. too simple as to actually being potentially not helpful or as a way, particularly for those in the West, or maybe when you're thinking about some of the causes that the global South tend to campaign for is that a useful framework for them for now and into the future?

Hansong: Yeah. Yeah. That's a great question. I think these spatial concepts are becoming more and more ambiguous and fluid. There is a narrow reading of the global South. And there's a narrow reading of the global East and the narrow reading of the global South is the Latin, Latin American, African, Asian solidarity in the 1970s moment.

When these postcolonial states sought statehood and autonomy and self rule and self national determination, UN seats and all of that, they did share and you can All that entire blog, global South. But of course now in that post 1970s moment, what is global South? That becomes more ambiguous and the global East.

Also, there was a narrow definition, all the post Soviet Eastern European or central Asian moment of, what to do now. And do we preserve the Soviet institutions? Do we mix and match? Do we grow food like EU mode? And where are we turning? Is there a third path? So that's a narrow reading, but nowadays you have plural and parallel solutions to that.

You can for example, if you're a post Soviet Central Asian state, you can go to the Turkic coalition. It's not only not yet a Turkic union, but it's a kind of international society. You can go to an Islamic world. You can go to the Eurasian, the Neo Eurasian you can do the Eurasian project of Russia.

You can do belt and road. You can do Shanghai cooperation treaty. You can do all kinds of things. So nowadays it's hard to say, what is the global East? What is Eurasia? What is global South? And it's hard to say what is the Indo Pacific? Because even if you're looking at it from the point of view of institutions, political institutions what are you going to do with South Asia?

And even just India looking at India... western all cruise type of think tankers who would like to simply impose Western liberal assumptions on the largest democracy in the world always have trouble understanding ... what exactly India is doing. It confuses them profoundly because they don't really look.

Go into the cultural aspects. So it, it's hard to pinpoint these concepts nowadays, but to look at them as intersected regional phenomena of intercultural and international development to look at them as for example, to look at. Southeast Asia as a whole, as a source of innovation.

I think that made sense to look at the global south in the South Africa and South Africa's pleading at the ICJ and all the signatories too. South Africa's case against Israel, you can definitely see some kind of coalition building there, and that's most. Around the global south. And then that kind of goes and then it conquered the global north.

'cause all the European states then decided they must side with South Africa on this limit. [At least on the li more limited] limited side of the argument that and then you have China coming and say that we have to go back to the 1970s- mode and say that anybody under occupation has the full right to resort to even violent means to to regain their territory.

And that is a pretty strong argument. So China clearly is also trying to give itself a post colonial, anti colonial identity. So you have these moments where you say, okay, these kinds of regional spatial concepts somehow make sense, but when you really try to pin down where is where it's, it becomes very fuzzy because we now live in a very, we now live in a world of parallel alternatives and all of these overlap is very hard to even single out. If there is a US backyard, a Russian backyard, if there is a region that's dominated by a set of cultural norms, because it's all very fluid. And so we live in this kind of world of of normative and in geocultural fluidity.

Ben: That makes sense. So in the historic moment, the narrow definitions make sense descriptively, like you said, East Asian moment global South moment, post 1970s or post that. But in, in today's case it's much more complex where even nation states have different things going on in them.

I'd like to turn to a couple of pieces of your work, which are I guess slightly esoteric, but still seem to tie up to me. I'm going to turn to Montesquieu and sea imagery. So I was reading that someone interprets Montesquieu as saying his law is like being a fisherman's net. So this idea that often you can swim through it and only big things get captured.

So you go through most of the time and the laws don't really affect you and obviously he was very influential to many legal systems and constitutions like the U. S. Founding Fathers and a lot due to this idea of separation of powers. But I think you've done some work on the sea imagery in Montesquieu.

So what's going on with this, the sea ocean trade and is this a way of understanding Montesquieu and economic thinking of the time? 

Hansong: Yeah, it's of course, it's one of my passion projects and Montesquieu being one of the first Western readers I came across when I was a child growing up in China.

And he's very hard to pin down because Montesquieu is very versatile and is all over the place. It's very hard to know what is Montesquieu all about? Of course, the Americans have a Separation of power in their mind and it's that kind of label Montesquieu Montesquieu wanted to be a natural philosopher.

He wanted to be even an engineer at some point. He there was a famous story where Montesquieu, of course, would go to the school. And we know this from the Asian experience. Teacher would tell you all the, horrible things happening with your child and why you should help the teacher and inculcate and infiltrate the mind of your child at home and make it easier for the school.

Also someone just went up there and asked the teacher, what's happening with my son and the teacher said I'm not sure if you're smart enough. Is really into the natural science. So he seems much more interested in the literature and the humanities. And won't just to hearing this fell back onto the chair and all growing pale in his face, Oh, no, he's not going to be another useless humanist like me.

So he's really he would rather be and a hard Art science professor and not a a rambler about law and philosophy. And and I find some of that, of course, in his early writings on the natural sciences. And he was chairing, coordinating, and sometimes writing natural science words.

And when he was traveling and noticed that he was really interested in the sea, the lagoons, and these water projects, these aquatic engineering projects. And he even had thoughts that he was going to build a machine that takes out all the mud from the lagoon. So that as to so as to facilitate a maritime traffic and trade and on the other hand.

So this is the natural scientific leanings. On the other hand, I read a lot of very classical Western thinking about the sea and land and starting with Plato and Aristotle, they wonder. Plato famously was skeptical of the port. He decided that if you have a port and everybody's coming in through the port, what's going to happen is that you will have a lot of different normative thinking and a lot of ideas of how to live your life.

What is the best way of life coming in? And it will be very hard. Yeah. To to implement what you think is the best form of civic life. So it's very dangerous to have a port. You don't know who's coming in. You don't know what's being talked about in the marketplace once you open up the port. On the other hand, he realized, oh, if we have to have a port, let's have a port.

You have, I have to have some kind of trade with other cities, other polyas. Plato never was that autarkic. He always conceded, especially in the laws, not so much in the politics. That you need to have some kind of intellectual exchange between the police. You need to have certainly some kind of trade as well.

The Montesquieu was living in a moment when commerce was really taking over with the post Machiavellian moment where there was no return. You have to have trade. And the question is how to tame trade and use trade. In a way that doesn't end up in disasters, but actually benefit your physical well being and all the entire health of the civic body as a kind of in a physiological sense as a body politic that the money is circulating through your body.

Rousseau would call it would make the metaphor. The money has blood going through your your body. But if you have too much finance, unregulated finance, it's almost like having too much fat clodding your veins. Montesquieu was already thinking in those terms. He said that Marseille classical, like ancient Marseille, and also in his own time, was it, it's good to have all the ideas coming in and all the different groups and services coming in.

But the question is how do you think about it legally, philosophically in such a way as. To promote and not to damage the health of the citizenry. And so those two strains of thought, his interest in the sea as a natural phenomenon is interested in the fact of human sociability on the sea.

So maritime sciences or oceanography, there wasn't like proper oceanography yet, but some kind of oceanography. And maritime sociability and the political philosophy, legal philosophy of of human movements of people, ideas, goods, materials, tests on the sea or came together and made Montesquieu this this, I think a major thinker of the sea.

I identify him as a pivotal moment in history, political thought. And and I think he really made a huge Impact his nose, his diaries during his voyage went directly into it. So the the spirit of the laws where, you know, the founding fathers of America founding moment they drew a lot of inspiration from it, but I think it really was a kind of collection of reflection on what he saw and thought during his travels.

And he thought a lot about the sea during his travels. 

Ben: Okay, I hadn't appreciated that and then the interlink obviously at the time that to see was so important for trade and trade being the lifeblood of what's going on there. But like you say, needed to be tamed. You don't want it to be clogged. You mentioned Rousseau as well, and I hadn't realized until reading your work that he had a plan for Corsica and its government in the mid 1700s.

And this kind of plan has echoes today about. Or perhaps it doesn't we can discuss that relevant to thinking about what do we do for developing countries? Yes, should other richer nations have a plan for these countries? What should that plan be? Is international aid good or not? Do you wrap it into your own political ambitions... like give cheap loans... buy land... belt and road or international aid or whatever but maybe we could start with what do you think about Rousseau's plan for Corsica in the 1700s? What did that mean? And has that actually influenced our thinking about global development today? And then what people think about, these supposedly less developing countries and what other thinkers should demand or suggest for them in terms of their own development economy?

Hansong: Absolutely. It's a wonderful question. It would allow me to be very honest about it because when I was looking at Rousseau's historical thought on what to do with Corsica, I was completely, my mind was completely filled with development economics as a discipline and my reflections and critiques Of that and my own preference when it comes to thinking about development in our own time.

So I think they're really connecting. It's very personal as a piece of history of political thought. It felt very personal to me. So Rousseau was invited to give a constitutional plan. It wasn't really like a constitution in like strict doctrinal legal sense, but he was reflecting on the situation in Corsica, so it's a very contextual piece.

Not only that we need to contextualize him in that moment, but that piece itself reflects the way he contextualizes Corsica at that particular moment. And occasionally he made the essentialist remarks on the, how the Corsicans are brave and they're just intrinsically good as a people. But of course, you have to say that when you're legislating for them, you're all stupid.

And here I am, I'm your legislator, but he certainly thought a lot about an African. of an affinity with the core students. But more largely, he was thinking systematically and it was thinking he was trying to apply, really what he thought about the the questions bothering Europe at the time, which is the physical, the fiscal and financial imbalance, which Took many years and centuries for France to resolve.

At the time, the question is, are you going to use finance? If you use finance, and if you finance your your military campaigns, are you ever going to pay it back? Is there something else? There's some other way to finance the army is, They're another way to finance these other development projects.

Rousseau's answer is surprisingly pragmatic, but it's also, at the end of the day, I think it's quite radical. He believes that Corsica first of all, since we were talking about the sea, the Corsica is an island. He says you should close it up for a while. Most readers of that piece think that he's autarkic.

He wants to close the entire island to the outside world. I disagree. He clearly, there is a temporal thinking there. He wants to close this, the island to the geopolitical threats for at least a while enough time so that Corsica could grow into an economic not an economic power, but at least grow to a sufficient degree where it would be able to finance its own defense. So in the here and now Corsica should start with agriculture, and that's why people think he's autarkic, but you have to start with agriculture and then go into industries. And for now, the different regions of Corsica, given these different geographical features, they should trade inter regionally.

And if you don't have a healthy cash flow- barter, no but you trade by goods first, and then you can have a currency system. So he's not against currency, he's not against trade, he's not against opening up, he just thinks that you need to do it step by step, stage by stage. And then we're getting very close to the kind of economic development idea there.

And he thinks that you should build up a surplus in course of time, a very rudimentary sense of surplus by agriculture and industry and collect that surplus invested in where you think matters the most and in a sustainable way. The extraction of salt should be very carefully deliberated because there are these easier to extract harder to extract or higher quality salt that you want to export 1 day.

So please try to do it sustainably. There are woods of different calibers. You need to save up the best wood that in the future will be used to construct warships. But for now, you're not having a Navy because you're not there yet. And let's. Use the worst would for just daily consumption. So he's very careful at every step.

He wants to make sure you're doing the right thing so that the plan would evolve into the future. And how does that teach us? What does that teach us about economic development? This whole idea that look at Northeast Asia, look at Korea, Japan, China and Taiwan for a while, when during the cold war They were very much using industrial policy to build up surplus at home.

And then they were using that surplus in a very centralized way. The Republican Chinese government in Taiwan, of course, used industrial policy. Korea, South Korea used a lot of industrial policy to build up the surplus. And Japan, under all the influence from the U. S. Still, it tried to really concentrate its energy on certain sectors and to succeed from that from there.

And China is also a [an example..] China is a great example that we built a surplus from, manufacturing and other industrial activities. And then selectively and concentratedly use that surplus to advance other knowledge, economic productions. And so as to to leap across certain stages of development and to go straight to the more innovative parts.

And there is a certain level of success. Empirically it, it worked to some degree, at least that's from the anxieties we see now with Chinese export of EVs back to Europe that this idea of. Building a surplus investing strategically and then going straight to the more innovative sectors and then while maintaining an overall balanced healthy economic development.

That is very resilient to me. That's very resilient. And it's not just about opening up. And then you naturally see the. Then the resources will flow and the incentives will work. And then somehow in 300 years, it will grow to a some kind of natural, naturally grow into a political economy that you're teleologically determined to be.

There is, there's not that kind of big band full blown. I don't think any economies, even my Chicago teachers, I don't think any of them really think like that. I think there was Rousseauianism in every. Economic thinker of development. So that's what I learned from it. And I think we can learn a lot from Rousseau's thinking.

Of course, it's not just authentic agrarianism. It's very sophisticated in step stage by stage. He walks you by the hand and tells you what to do. And and it's a very open minded outcome there. 

Ben: It's really fascinating. And just seeing how these patterns of economic thought, go back and where they start and how they then express themselves today.

I guess that leaves me also with a couple of thoughts. So one is for particularly the poorest nations is international aid potentially then more detrimental than not, I guess there's a couple of schools of thought. So one school of thought which Deaton, the economist suggests is that if you give international aid, the country itself cannot develop its own... that well, its own infrastructure, its own form of government or institutional capacity. International aid will often misallocate not very well and therefore produce more harm than good. The opposing thought is that. You get there's a kind of hump that you need to get over in terms of some sort of surplus or you need some capital they don't have access to cost cheap call it cheap capital so if you get cheap or free capital from other places you can make really big differences in terms of things and the so that's One blob I'm thinking about and then the second kind of almost riffing off You're saying is I can see the success of so Korea or Singapore and in Japan And then you've got those which look like they might be doing something similar So say Vietnam, which is still a little bit manufacturing But you can see is going up into some higher knowledge even Bangladesh Which has been pretty successful in clothing other manufacturing seems to have other elements going through you parts of India, whereas that whereas it looks like this could be quite hard to replicate in places like Africa, where it's hard to see what even their domestic surplus would be.

I don't know. There's kind of arguments Other side of that. And so whether that playbook will still work for some nations, it could actually still definitely work in places of Latin America. Arguably Mexico is actually doing this similar idea as well. So I guess there's two components because international aid listed on that.

So do you think it will still happen that way? And we should encourage that. Today and where does international aid play if that playbook is the one to follow or not? 

Hansong: Absolutely so the part one of the question is about international aid and I think there are different levels on which we can think about it.

Some international aid is through international, Organizations institutions and humanitarian aid, and that's one thing. There are compensated compensation, motivating international aid. And then there is also this kind of development oriented loans and other forms of aid. And if you're talking about.

Political science literature is on the effectiveness or political economic literature is on the factings of these international aid. It's very context dependent. Once the aid or FDI, in more like classical or neoliberal terms, come in and gets injected into the domestic political economy, a lot depends on the ecosystem in that country and how it's being channeled into the economic lives of the people.

I think it's the aid loans and foreign direct investment, and then they certainly form an important channel through which the initial surplus, the initial capital could be found. But we shouldn't simply. Assume that the allocation will be uniform across the board because it depends a lot on, again, on the ecosystem at home and the ecosystem cannot always be dependent always be dependent on because it fluctuates from government to government from, factors like corruption to simply how favorable it is to do business and invest in these projects.

And from the bottom up, we also see entrepreneurs Either from homegrown entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs with education from abroad who need to then adapt to their home environments. They could also come in and feel those institutional voice when you can't really rely on the government and providing a perfect Martin environment then you can do something that will also alter and hopefully optimize that that environment.

I think a lot of the. I guess the ways that this model cannot be simply generalized and applied in across geocultural regions is has to do with that. But I think the people on the ground and with, if you can negotiate different kinds of expertise is a little expertise scientific expertise and marketing incentives an effective way to negotiate these Different sources of knowledge, so this kind of epistemic synthesis, if it works well, then you can adapt in different contexts.

But I think across the board, what is general about this? So an insight is that you need to before you can strategically invest in anything that then make up your political economic identity to even get to that stage of being able to choose. The Milton Friedman says the free to choose, but you have to have a base from which to choose.

And how do you get that base? Is I think all the African students whom I've come across at Harvard, they tell me that what they envy about, or they, what they want to emulate from like these Northeastern nowadays and Southeastern Asian countries is is to get to that base. And not to emulate or imitate any of these models, there is no such thing as a Chinese, Korean, there's no, no such thing as a Northeastern or Southeast Asian model of development, but there is that sense that you need to have a base and just blindly waiting for FDI to generate the base for you, or to simply let loose your speculative financial system and wait until the free investments from random incentives takes place.

To do the magic of building your base is probably not going to be as effective as if you're also willing to combine it with some kind of industrial policy or some other kinds of planning that of course, should not interfere then with the market mechanism. So it again comes down to if you can do a dual track or multi track kind of development.

Ben: That makes a lot of sense. So that, international aid compensation or humanitarian, whatever it is, can work on a context specific basis, but you need to get all of those things together, but in terms of overall development, if you don't have a base [to] work with some sort of foundation where you're at least neutral or ideally have some surplus, then it's really hard.

So you might be aiming at the wrong question. If particularly for really poor, say African nations where, you know, where they are below that. Okay. So trying to put a lot of this all together So this is impossible task. I'm going to put some things to decide because obviously we got Chinese political and economic thought.

We're going to loosely call that dual track. You've got actually another kind of geopolitical axis centered around that. Perhaps you have Russia, India, Indonesia. So this is one whole axis. I'm going to slightly put that to the side because we touched on it slightly in terms of development economics and Chinese thought.

And then if you put the other side, the kind of Anglo Saxon, Europe, UK America, North America. There's a sense here that there's been a split as well. So I guess we've called it a neoliberal or free market, although they would argue how free it, it really was. And now there's a kind of pushback.

You've got the extreme pushback, which I would say, they tend to call this then, late capitalism or post colonial and leads into arguments around degrowth, which is a kind of very Malthus, Malthusian idea, actually which, we can comment on, but really backs away from economic growth, which is problematic in its own sense, but it's a kind of backlash from some of this.

And then you've also got, even in Western thinking it comes and goes, but in terms of industrial policies, but the U. S. with the Inflation Reduction Act, IRA is a kind of industrial policy piece. Actually, if you unpack it, if if China or Russia announced it, you go, Oh that's definitely industrial policy.

It's interesting that you've had that and some supply side, economics with it. When we stretch it all the way back to economic thoughts, you can go back to Adam Smith, you can even go back earlier to some of the the Roman or other thinkers or trade thinkers.

It just seems that we're having another evolution in, in, in the thinking about what what markets or what capitalism would be. How do you think that that balance is at the moment between the opening up that we had over, the Thatcher, Reagan years Friedman with, much more free markets less regulation, but what do we do with the lifeblood of trade to where we are today, where there's been a partial backlash.

Some of it is still going on. We've got some places which have some industrial policy. We've got pushback on both sides, from left and right as to working out, particularly in Western thought. But if you look at growth today, it's muddling through, it's positive, not as high as it was, but it's certainly not is not yet sort of recession.

And then these are just tensions between free markets, industrial thinking, Or all the way, is that how you would think about that Western part of the world? And do you see that balance shifting anymore into where we see the near future? 

Hansong: It's an enormous question. I certainly now as a now, as I'm pretending to be an international lawyer in Germany, I I always hear this nostalgia, of course, for the 1990s and nostalgia coming from the legal, juridical community is that it was a time when global institutions diffused.

Of course, that meant Western transatlantic values and institutions diffused, but of course it diffused. Until recently only because of this 2 reasons. 1st of all, there is the Western and transatlantic NATO domination in the security sphere. And then there's the economic consensus that free market has 1 and so there are these 2 reasons.

So it values institutions only diffused under these 2 umbrellas now, both are being challenged because with the diffusion of material power and agency no, you no longer have those kind of us Western European led global security system on the 1 hand. And you also don't have this universal uniform consensus that there is 1, only 1 way to advance economically.

So I agree with you that we're not in the complete, moment of rejection of of the post 1970s, 1990s the golden era of a global liberal economic doctrines. We're not there yet, but there's definitely a lot of reflections, as you also pointed out and critiques of that, and both from the left and from the right and part of the critique.

At home across Western nation states especially in the U. S. and Europe with where you, I didn't really see this so called back right wing populist backlash has to do with socioeconomic inequalities and different the hierarchy of priorities when it comes to socioeconomic distribution. So it is fundamentally a question about distribution- distribute distributive justice. Now the right things we have the wrong priorities. We prioritize all of these global projects or liberal elite projects and spend a lot of money on these leftist ideological programs, but do very little about the very basics. If you go to a [poor/run down] in the rural areas of Northern Netherlands.

Of course, the peasants used to vote for the Communist Party, but now they have no viable leftist alternative. So they do turn to the right wing parties for simply the socio economic quest of, more egalitarianism or something like that. And then on top of this kind of distributive discontent, you have a productive reflection, which is holding production constant, we're moderately growing. The question is how to distribute more fairly. You also have this question of can you sustainably grow or even grow further into the future? And then you look at different modes of growth and not necessarily the rates of growth. That transatlantic economies are no longer the sole drivers of innovative economic productions, right? You now have productive hubs, innovative hubs across the metropolitan areas of East, South, Southeast Asia, Latin America. Occasionally also, in Africa, there was a lot of, it's just not as systematic, but there are a lot of these innovative hubs across Africa.

And and of course you still have Silicon Valley, you have Boston, you have Frankfurt, you have other places, yes, but this diffusion of innovative capacity and agency is definitely a fact. So now the question is, are you going to have something to say about production, not just distribution?

Are you going to have something to say about both? And to think about it more productively, I, on the level of production, I think. There is a kind of sober moment where this idea of the, reindustrialization in it may be not in, in the literal sense of it, but it's introducing some industrial policy elements or to think about, is.

Technology uni is technology linear in its development evolution. Do we have different preferences and aesthetic tastes when it comes to what to innovate? If we have scarce resource to invest in Potentially 10 different things, which ones do we care more about at the normative level? And to go back to the Chicago school, if you look at Frank Knight and these 1st generation, 2nd generation, even and even Milton Friedman and certainly higher and others, they draw a clear line.

Between aesthetic taste and market efficiency. And so the whole idea is that only if you hold taste and aesthetics constant, can you have a framework of price theory or can you have a framework of market mechanism to allocate resources effectively? But of course, we have different philosophies of aesthetics.

So I think that- that also means that when it comes to technology there is not a linear progression towards something like a particular kind of AI or something. You can choose what to develop. China chose to invest fully- emotionally also- but also financially in EVs, but you don't have to do, you can do something else because there's only so much you can do with your limited time and resource.

So I think we need to rethink at least on the level of production, what to invest in, which ones are worth our time and energy and thought. What do we care about as a political community? And as humanity as the human collectivity. Yeah. Altogether, but whichever way we go and whatever we think it's no longer viable to simply sit there and say that the global distribution of labor and the way we invest in these alternative projects of economic production is simply.

Something according to a magical algorithm embedded into whatever we received from the 1970s and 1990s global economy, because that has drastically and dramatically changed. 

Ben: I hadn't picked up on that point on aesthetics about having an agreed set of taste, which does it. And actually that you can see in some places, for instance, in the Nordic countries where they become more heterozygous, they just weren't, they weren't as, they were more homogenous than perhaps they had realized.

So with this has produced. Difficulties in terms of setting that and that interesting thing about actually nation states will maybe have to decide what they want to focus on and they can focus on all sorts of things, whether it was, EV or batteries or art or whatever it will be, but they might have to focus.

Excellent. Okay. Running through the last couple of sets of questions, something a little bit more fun for, although also with that it's thinking about Hamilton, the musical. And I hadn't realized in your reading of Hamilton that actually there is, in some ways, if you look at it today in its reading, there's a kind of almost pro Democrat, pro Biden sense to running through Hamilton.

And that actually. It's it can be thinking slightly selective in terms of what you want to emphasize or not emphasize within the musical as well as all the dance numbers and songs and things. But do you think is your reading of Hamilton that its current reading is actually slightly more democrat than Republican?

Does it have a politics to it? And how else should we understand both the songs and the story narrative in the musical version that Lin Miranda did for us? 

Hansong: Thank you for asking that. It's a very fun question. I, my reading is that the Hamilton is A great piece of art but of course it was produced in the late Obama context where a more progressive and appealing sense of social mobility was used to provide a kind of.

Common ground on which we can reason together as as, one American nation. And so the idea is that Hamilton technically it's not an immigrant. If you went from one British colony to another and Lafayette somehow, they like they. A clap hands and they feel like we, we immigrants do the job and something like that.

I'm Lafayette was certainly not an immigrant. He was a French. But this whole, I, this emphasis on immigrants rising right from random, from poverty, all the way to the founding father status and and this kind of heroism in that story of social mobility. A very individualistic heroism and romanticization of social mobility in a pivotal moment in American history.

So that's, of course, a, I think there is that's definitely a, an undertone that a basso continuo throughout the musical. And is it's, of course, a lot of the in that historical inaccuracies come from the book on which it was based. So I wouldn't blame the production team for that, but at least the kind of ideological message there.

That America is socially mobile, that you can be an individual hero from just being ambitious and hardworking. And this idea that Hamilton started with calling his mother a whore and son of a whore and goths and Scotsman. It's not true that his mother was called a whore by in the court by someone who was trying to abuse and and and vilify her, but what's she.

So this over emphasis on him being from very humble backgrounds, but just through his own exertion of energy and and effort rose to what he was. And then where is Hamilton's financial ideologies? Of course, not emphasized. His hawkishness is neglected. So all of the troubling things that still matter.

America today, right? Hawkishness in foreign policy. This trust in, of course, we shouldn't over, shouldn't oversimplify that either, but his trust in them the financial system that he created and all of these are omitted in preference to, to give time. To glorify this individual heroism and social mobility story.

So I, I think that is quite ideological. And then, of course, at a superficial level, we can also look at the way the production team and the actors and actresses literally intervened, lecturing Mike Pence, not that he shouldn't be lectured on, but it just, now that you've seen the show, here is something we want to say to Mike Pence, who's sitting right there and the way they gave free tickets to the Hillary campaign.

It's quite obvious also at that kind of campaign political level. But I care more as a political philosopher, I care much more about the messages it delivers. And. Of course it resonates with Upper East Side, Upper West Side, New Yorkers who see it. But if you go to the Rust Belt, if you go to the Deep South, if you go to rural America and play Hamilton does it resonate with them?

Are you going to use Hamilton to turn around the upcoming election? I am seriously skeptical of that. 

Ben: Maybe not. Although that that doubling down on this idea that the underdog through Just hard work and become the pinnacle of being America is the American, I'm going to say myth in the kind of most positive sense, like every nation state has to have it.

It's missed the British like underdogs and we like royalty, right? And the Americans like this American dream that, immigrants and that. And so it's really interesting the way you see it. And you can see from the outside that's being constructed. And yeah, there is a Democrat slant, but the actually it's, it is a left and right thing.

This idea that no matter how poor you start off with hard work, you can make it to the top, even how mythical in actual practice. That is for the average anyone, but average Americans, that's interesting. Wait, okay, we have a short section of underrated and overrated, and then we'll finish on current projects and life advice.

So just a couple of things random things about whether you think these things are underrated or overrated. 

Sauerkraut. 

Do you think sauerkraut is underrated or overrated? 

Hansong: Underrated because of how global they actually are. And of course, German sauerkraut is overrated, but there is a global sauerkraut phenomenon.

Ben: So that's like kimchi and all the fermentation foods. Yeah. Okay. All right. Global sauerkraut. Underrated. The German version maybe not so much. Great. I stick on the food theme. Rice porridge or congee, do you think it's an underrated or overrated dish? 

Hansong: Overrated in the white rice version of it.

Of course, you can have millet and other things we eat in the north. So I think because of the Cantonese influence, we always think of it as white rice. So again, I think it's. The narrow sense is overrated, but the broader idea of the porridge with grains in it. It's... underrated. The grain porridge.

Yeah. I've been cheating. I've been cheating. It's always the same. 

Ben: Go into politics. On the one hand. Yes. On the other hand. No. So I'll take votes from both sides. Very good. Classical music today. 

Hansong: Today. Yes.

Ben: No, I guess in the, in history, but I guess how we do it today. So is it underrated or overrated?

Hansong: Oh, wow, that's very difficult. I think it's I think it's still underrated. 

[Cross-talk] Neutral. Yeah still under Yeah, I think it's the right amount in terms of the I think it's overrated in the industry. 

In the industry I think the musical the classical music industry is in terrible shape so it it's not healthy but I think in terms of it's impact on the way of the way of thought.

In the way that we talked about the musicals it's underrated because we don't realize how it actually shapes society in very profound ways. But I think the classical music as an industry as a group of people doing what they're doing, I think it's overrated in the sense that there is inflated and it's not it's not.

It's all the market incentives are distorted and you don't have jobs for the musician, it's in horrible shape. 

Ben: Okay. And last one on this, then maybe harking back to Hamilton, musical theater overrated, underrated. Should we have more or should we have less of musical theater? I 

Hansong: think the right amount or a slightly overrated because but I shouldn't say that.

Let's say the right amount, because I think the at least by Broadway standards, I think it's still healthy. Yeah. 

Ben: Yeah. It's still very influential on, on the world. I think that's the one thing about arts and humanities, because we don't realize how. Yeah, so you don't have like in the hard sciences, you don't have exact answers and they change we know in the moment in the context. 

They are so influential on [absolutely] how we are

Hansong: I would say it's underrated in China where I write these musical reviews.

Musicals have not become the standard currency of language or currency of thought In east asia yet. There are a lot of fans because But they don't really delve into the musicals in the ways that musicals are obviously scrutinized and interrogated very deeply in in Anglo American art.

So I think it's underrated in East Asia, I would say. 

Ben: Yeah. It's interesting if I think of performative arts in the broad sense the popularity of TikTok to me. is a slight sign about both the power of essentially performance. These are just mini performances done by individuals.

Some of them are that, but the fact that it draws in such an audience and you have everything from the really banal and not to quite political thought embedded within essentially these performances, they were a form of performance. And I think it's a form of social artifact. Really social media overall, but even in the TikTok form I think it's a, it's a broadly thinking it's a kind of form of art or expression and actually it's a form of social expression.

[So absolutely] Yeah, it's really intriguing. Great. All right. Last couple of questions. What are your current projects that you're working on or anything in the future that you'd like to share? 

Hansong: I'm working on a few projects. One is a global micro history of Shanghai's sand shipping industries in, 17, late 17th to the early 20th century. So from when sand shipping... 

Ben: is that shipping literally gravel? 

Hansong: In this, it started as a way of shipping on sandy maritime terrain. So you could easily run into these sandy rocks and other things. So it requires a slightly adjusted technology when it comes to navigation, but then it got into deep oceanic waters.

So at least start at the start, it was more like on the. In the yellow sea in the northeastern Asian seas, and then it slowly was able to go into the deeper and stormier waters of the South China Sea. The, but it's I also looked at the sociological phenomenon of sandshipping merchants, the way they integrate in an infrastructure.

Urban development in Shanghai. They were financing police stations. They were financing lifeguards along the seacoast, and they were building theaters for the city. And they also were increasing the enrollments of local academies and sending more people to Beijing for civil examinations. These are like, Shanghai is the Gentries who were generous who generated the profit from from shipping and they went to Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, but also just between North and South China.

And then used to use our language of the surplus, to use their surplus to do these projects, these cultural projects, these political liaisons they've built within. And so it's a kind of global micro history of a. Of Shanghai as it turned from the late imperial to the international status.

So that's one project. 

Ben: It's interesting how a lot of these big, important organizations, companies even call them put this, call it civic arm onto themselves as they get to a certain size. Even if you look at a Google alphabet today, they have a Google culture. Thing Apple have the same Facebook meta has the same micro Microsoft of this, the same.

And some of it is now called this. Social responsibilities here, something, but a lot of it is this, you're influencing the humanities and arts for either locally. So local companies always do it in their community, but then when you reach this global scale, because of this interaction of essentially social phenomena, which you then become a part of.

And if you don't influence it or steer it into your favor you're not as You're not thought of as the same as you're not as important. Absolutely. Anyway...

Hansong: As a historian of political and economic thought, I would add that in the early modern moment, the idea of the state as a corpus, as a body, and the idea as a of course the body and the state and the corporation.

And that's how it the, these ideas ran in parallel that the corporation was a corpus and was also a kind of state and the state was a kind of corpus and a corporation. And these three metaphors really were blended since the early modern era, and we're still living in that kind of intellectual legacy and thinking of states and enterprises, right?

We still draw these analogies between states and enterprises, but that's a small note. Yeah. Yeah. And the other project I am working on is a book on the ideas of interpolitical justice. In. In Western Indian Chinese traditions. So I draw from my classical and in analog chronological musings to shed light on how political communities have thought about ideas of justice across.

Territorial and cultural borders. And so it's a kind of comparative and connective a study of ideas of common justice in 3 different thought worlds. And so that is the more theoretical and normative project. And the Shanghai merchants are the fun project. 

Ben: Excellent. Great. And then last question is, do you have any life advice or advice that you want to share?

Maybe advice thinking about being an international public intellectual or scholar or advice on music or the arts or your career or anything you'd like to share with us? 

Hansong: My advice would be just to do a lot of travelings, because I'm a enthusiastic traveler, and of course, to the idea of being open minded to different ways of life, I think it's a very Herodotian anthropological starting point to be, to be in any but of course, certainly to be a public intellectual nowadays you have to be an inter public intellectual.

It's hard to be a public intellectual in the U. S. or in Europe without having something to say or just being able to understand what's happening in Ukraine and in Gaza. So it's no longer viable to be a public intellectual, you have to be inter public, and to be inter public you have to be able to think inter normatively.

How do you think inter normatively between different ways of different cosmological approaches to making sense of what's happening around the world of course learning more languages and talking to people from very different normative backgrounds, and of course to go there and take a look. So it's but it's also not this kind of globalist ideology of, Traveling around and it's, it could be very, it's in China, it's a medieval ideal of traveling around and blending in with with the landscapes wherever you go.

One of my favorite thinkers, poets writers, literati from the Weijing period, late Three Kingdoms, early Weijing moment Renzi, he was famous for having said, I think he said he his ideal life is Huo Bi Hu Shi Shu, Lei Yue Bu Chu. I would rather stay at home and close my windows and read for months and not go out.

Or he would travel around and and and forget to even return. So you can go in between these two modes and but the idea is, That is no longer viable to stick to a very enclosed a normative framework. Now that we have no choice, but to have something in mind about what's happening around the world and all the, and even just locally, how a global divisions of labor are affected.

In our local lives, and how we can no longer take anything for granted without regard to what kind of global understanding. So I think that would be a nice to travel a lot like Herodotus did Montesquieu did, like Montaigne did, and keep a travel journal as I do. Write down your conversations with the locals and reflect on them many years later, show it to your friends and families and hear what they think the more communicative assets to invoke the Harvard Marcian concept to globalize it, because Harvard must distort ethic is still quite limited in my view, but to expand it and have a kind of global discourse assets and do the conversations like we're doing right now with more people.

Ben: That sounds great. Yes. To travel is to learn. With that thank you very much. 

Hansong: Thank you, Ben. It's been a pleasure. Thank you so much. I enjoyed the conversation.

In Podcast, Politics, Life, Arts Tags Hanging Li, Travel, Economics, China, History

Fuschia Dunlop, understanding China through food

April 10, 2021 Ben Yeoh
Soya braised pork. My recipe. Many Chinese families will have their own versions.

Soya braised pork. My recipe. Many Chinese families will have their own versions.

-understanding China through its food

-Sharks fin and Sichuan pepper a memoir travel book by Fuchsia Dunlop gives subtle and deep insights into Chinese thinking through food

-oppression of Uyghurs through food

-understanding the rare and exotic and why increase meat consumption is a trend is likely to continue

-understanding the sheer range and complexity of Chinese food

-How Buddhist  thinking is expressed through food

-why understanding a little about the culture or cuisine of a food  is necessary to appreciate whether it is “good” or not


Fuchsia Dunlop's travel and food memoir of China, Shark’s fin and Sichuan pepper, is one of the two best books I’ve read in recent years in helping me think about China today and its history.


(The other book is by Julie Lovell: Maoism a global history. Lovell has also recently translated an abridged version of the monkey King which is also really worth reading. The Monkey King is one of the four great classic novels of China the others being the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Water Margin, and Dream of the Red Chamber. A great number I would go so far to say that the majority of educated Chinese people would have read or at least know the stories in all four books this observation indicates a quality infused in Chinese culture)


Dunlop immerses herself in Chinese food culture and commits to eating everything. While grappling with the tapestry of Chinese food and culture on its own terms she does not lose sight of her own British upbringing and lens insights to those of us who have never visited China to understand why some practices might be.  Through the stories and experiences one can see how food and cuisine are culture and how  they travel through the country and through the world


This is meaningful to me as the British born son of a Chinese Malaysian father and a Chinese Singaporean mother and I see this in the story I’ve related of how the dish of chicken rice came from roots in China via immigrants to Singapore, Malaysia and SE Asia and where it is now handed down to me in London.


Take the topic of eating everything and the potentially  unsustainable food trajectory that the world is on


“...The Chinese do you seem to eat everything one must admit.  But in a sense they are just a distorting mirror magnifying the voracity of the entire human race the Chinese word for population is people mouths and in China there are now over 1,300,000,000 mouths all munching away… it’s the same with timber, minerals and oil which feed Chinese economic development. China has become the worlds largest consumer of grain meet coal and steel. It may look rapacious but the Chinese are really just catching up with the greed of the rest of the world on a dizzying scale.


There is an equally rich and ancient strain of Chinese thought more than 2000 years ago the sage Mozi wrote of ancient laws regarding food and drink.


Stop when hunger satiated, breathing becomes strong limbs are strengthened and ears and eyes become sharp. There is no need of combining the five taste extremely well or harmonising the difference with orders. And if it should not be made to put your delicacies from four countries.


Confucius living at around the same time did not eat much and took care that amount of meat he ate did not exceed the amount of rice. His example has been used as a model for generations of Chinese children urged by the parents to eat up their rice or noodles and not be distracted by meat or fish…. And while businessmen and officials in early 21st century China stuff their faces with meat, fish and exotic delicacies, many people live at home on a simple diet of mainly grains and vegetables.


For the irony is that despite the conspicuous consumption of Banquet culture...the traditional diet of the Chinese masses could be a model for the entire human race.


...the way the older generation and the poor still eat... steamed rice or boiled noodles served with plenty of seasonal vegetables cooked simply, beancurd in many forms, very few sweet meats and small amounts of meat and fish that bring flavour to the table.


The traditional Chinese diet is nutritionally balanced and marvellously satisfying to the senses. After all my gastronomic adventures I don’t know if I can think of a better way to live...”


(Dunlops cookbook Every Grain of Rice is a tribute to this frugal healthy and delicious home cooking idea).  She addresses the culture which values the “banquet culture”, and how rarity or the exotic is valued. And in parallel what has happened to the environment, and to some traditional “old” things - like architecture and building and “wet markets” - disappearing under “progress”.  I can see from this that these trends seem very likely to continue. 


In other parts of the book, Dunlop evokes in vignette the clash of cultures and riches within China that she sees.


This observation stuck with me.


“...As I waited in the courtyard for my lift to the bus stop the local butcher was doing his rounds. A slight scruffy man bearing two bamboo trays on a bamboo shoulder pole he shouted out “meat for sale, meat for sale''. He paused in the gateway and I caught a glimpse of his wares.


He didn’t have much to sell just a few rather mean looking hunks of pork and some bones. At the entrance to the roundhouse next door he discussed prices with two elderly men one of them frail and dignified in his threadbare Mao suit , ended up coming to a deal and then walked home clutching his purchase, wrapped in his hand. It was a single pork bone, a small one, with a knuckle at one end to which clung a few ragged threads of meat. 


I thought back to the vulgar extravagance of [a meal]] in northern Fujian and the easy abundance of a rustic dinner the night before - the plentiful dishes of duck and chicken the steam pork that we had barely touched and my heart stuck in my throat…”


The challenges of China echo in the west and UK. Inequality, the meanness of western abbatoris and our own food supply. Dunlop also touches on how you need to engage with a culture, with a food or cuisine to be able to tell or appreciate it.


One aspect for me, is how Chinese value texture in a way that the west does not and a wastern palate does not appreciate bones, cartilage, cold, gloopy jelly fish textures (although the west has them eg oysters). And it goes both ways, this from a later time when took super accomplished Chinese chefs to one of the best western restaurants in the world (French Laundry)



“...it was a most difficult, a most alien, a most challenging experience.


We begin to talk about it in Chinese. They explain that they find the creaminess of the “sabayon” in the first course off-putting. And surprisingly, given the Chinese penchant for strong and salty pickles, none of them can stand the taste of the sharp Niçoise olives that accompany the lobster. “They taste like Chinese medicine,” they all agree.


They are shocked by the rare flesh of the lamb, although it’s the most perfect I’ve ever tasted. (“Dangerous,” says Xiao Jianming, who refuses to touch it. “Terribly unhealthy.”) The sequence of delicious desserts is an irrelevance for these visitors from a food culture without much of a sweet tooth. (The only dish they relish, curiously, is a coconut sorbet.) They are also mystified by the custom of serving tiny,personal portions of food on enormous white plates, and find the length of this meal served à la russe interminable.


I am struck by how much, at some abstract level, Thomas Keller’s food has in common with the finest of Chinese cuisine, in its magnificent ingredients, intellectual wit, and delicate sensitivity to the resonances among tastes, textures, and colors. But the physical facts of its expression, the sequence of dishes before us, might as well have come from another world.


“How am I supposed to eat this?” asks Yu Bo, puzzling over the red snapper that has sent me off into flights of ecstasy. He is as confused as a Westerner faced with her first bowl of shark’s-fin soup, plateful of sea cucumber, or serving of stir-fried ducks’ tongues. I’ve often seen this scenario in China, but this is the first time I’ve witnessed it from the other side.


The chefs are not as arrogant about their own prejudices as many Westerners are in China. Lan Guijun admits, “It’s just that we don’t understand, it’s like not knowing a language.” Yu Bo is even more humble: “It’s all very interesting,” he says, “but I simply can’t say whether it’s good or bad: I’m not qualified to judge.”


That last line sticks with me “It’s all very interesting,” he says, “but I simply can’t say whether it’s good or bad: I’m not qualified to judge.”

Not only does this apply to food but a range of cultural arts like parts of theatre and art, this can be applied to. But, interestingly when applied to food - you might think that food - high end food can be universally appreciated. I don’t think that is the case. Perhaps more particular high end food can be harder to understand without knowing the traditions it is working in.

Dunlop also examines the prejudice and tensions in China through food. Take a topic that has become increasingly controversial which is the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 


“....I began to notice how often the Uyghur’s loathing week of the Han Chinese coalesced around the matter of pork for the Chinese of course porkis the staple meat to eat it on its own or stirfry with vegetables - they wrap it in dumplings, they use its bones for stock and its fat to flavour almost everything they eat. When the Chinese say meat. they usually mean pork unless otherwise specified.  To the Uyghur, as Muslimsthe idea of eating pork is abhorrent. One taxi driver cocooned with me in the privacy of his cab assured me that if a true Muslim eats pork his his skin will erupt into blood-spouting boils that can be fatal.


...And Chinese have occasionally use the pork taboo to inflame Muslim sensibilities.  During the cultural Revolution Chinese Muslims were reportedlyforced to eat pork and  to drink water from wells contaminated by pigs. Although the Chinese authorities in no way condone such crass behaviour, many Uyghurs  feel the government does not try hard enough to protect their feelings. 


The Muslim taboo on pork reinforces strong social divisions between Uyghur and Han. Most Uyghur won’t patronise Chinese restaurants even those that claim to serve food in accordance with Muslim dietary laws.


You can’t trust the Chinese not to use any pork products whatever they say, a shopkeeper told me. And as for the Han Chinese they tend to see Uyghur restaurants as dirty. And so the two ethnic groups dine separately and don’t talk to each other.


Revulsion at the pork-eating of the Han Chinese is the focus for general anxieties about cultural assimilation and contamination….”


There is so much thoughtful observation in the book and of course fascinating detail about food.

Here’s a YT of Tyler Cowen and Dunlop plus guests, dining out and talking about her book and Chinese food in the US. Of note is Ezra Klein who is a notable vegan as well as media commentator and NYT op-ed writer.

Amazon Link to book.

In Arts, Food, Life Tags Food, China, Fuschia dunlop
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