Alex Petropoulos: Europe 2031, AI, Power, and the Future We Actually Want

What happens if Europe gets AI wrong? Alex Petropoulos is Chief of Staff at Arq Foundation and one of the authors of Europe 2031, a speculative story imagining Europe's technological, economic and political future in a world of transformative artificial intelligence.

We start with the predictions behind Europe 2031: from severe shortages of AI computing power to the possibility that compute becomes abundant and today's infrastructure investments lose much of their strategic importance. Alex explains why he and his co-authors chose speculative fiction rather than another policy paper, and the power, and danger, of making people feel a possible future rather than simply understand it intellectually.

Can Europe compete with the US and China? Or should it concentrate on its own comparative advantages: industry, data, infrastructure and supply chains, while accepting continued dependence on American AI?

Alex argues that Europe's deeper problem may be institutional. Its commitment to democracy, consensus and constrained power is part of what makes it worth defending. Yet those same processes can make change painfully slow. Which European values really matter? What trade-offs should we be prepared to make? And can politicians offer a positive vision of the future that brings people along?

We explore the opportunities and catastrophic risks of AI, including why scientific progress might accelerate dramatically in mathematics and other verifiable domains, while biology, clinical trials and the social processes of science remain more difficult. If intelligence becomes abundant, what becomes scarce?

Alex also explains why he has changed his mind about a publicly funded European frontier AI laboratory, the challenge of sustaining successive generations of increasingly expensive AI models, and what we can learn from institutions such as ARIA and the Institute for Progress. We discuss scientific moonshots, tolerance for failure, and why we urgently need better measurement of AI's capabilities and effects.

We then turn to some of Alex's more personal interests. What did captaining a successful university Overwatch esports team teach him about teamwork, learning and comparative advantage? How does he use AI as a thinking partner? And why does writing remain such a painful process?

In our overrated/underrated round we cover recursive self-improvement, universal basic income, AGI, compute taxes, open-source AI, prediction markets, effective altruism and science fiction.

We finish by imagining an ordinary Tuesday in a better future. For Alex, it involves friends, a bakery, a park, good health, affordable travel, meaningful work and perhaps a little whimsy and mischief.

A useful reminder that the point of economic growth, technological progress and better institutions is to make possible lives we actually want to live.

Key takeaways

  • Europe's greatest risk may be institutional, not technological. Individually sensible decisions can produce collective failure when incentives, bureaucracy and political processes are poorly adapted to rapid change.

  • AI sovereignty is not the same as AI self-sufficiency. Europe will probably continue importing American AI. The important question is how to retain influence, resilience and bargaining power.

  • Comparative advantage matters more than winning every race. Europe's factories, industrial expertise, data and infrastructure may provide more realistic opportunities than attempting to replicate every frontier AI laboratory.

  • Values require trade-offs. If Europe wants to preserve what makes it distinctive, it needs to decide which principles are essential and which existing practices can change.

  • AI progress will be uneven. Mathematics and other verifiable domains may accelerate rapidly. Clinical trials, physical experiments and the social organisation of science could remain substantial bottlenecks.

  • Publicly funded AI labs need a sustainable model. A government might fund one frontier model, but competing over successive generations requires an economic and organisational structure that can keep going.

  • Measurement is badly neglected. Confident predictions about AI are often built on unreliable benchmarks or inadequate evidence. Better policy needs better information.

  • Competitive gaming can teach surprisingly useful lessons. Teams can outperform by leaning into unusual strengths rather than trying to approximate an idealised strategy.

  • The ultimate test of technological progress is human flourishing. A better future should mean more agency, more opportunity, better health, stronger relationships and lives that young people can look forward to.

Further reading

  • Europe 2031 — the speculative scenario, including an audio version.

  • Arq Foundation — research on preparing Europe for transformative AI.

CONTENTS, TRANSCRIPT AND PODCAST LINKS BELOW

Contents

00:00 Meet Alex Petropoulos
00:28 Europe 2031: Which predictions might come true?
01:32 The compute crunch — and a world of abundant compute
04:01 Why speculative fiction can change policy
06:46 Is Europe waking up to transformative AI?
10:53 European values and difficult trade-offs
14:47 Is AI a normal technology or a national security issue?
16:14 Where Europe could have a competitive advantage
20:09 Can Europe move faster without sacrificing democracy?
25:24 Catastrophic AI risks: Loss of control and misuse
29:52 AI optimism and breakthroughs in science
33:29 What becomes scarce when intelligence is abundant?
36:53 Why Alex changed his mind about a CERN for AI
40:12 Institutions that work surprisingly well
43:01 ARIA, moonshots and funding ambitious science
45:16 Risk tolerance, failure and feedback loops
47:09 What should ordinary people ask about AI?
48:14 Bottlenecks, comparative advantage and better measurement
50:40 What Overwatch teaches us about leadership and teamwork
54:55 Video games, strategy and recommendations
57:24 Writing, creativity and thinking with AI
01:01:22 Overrated / Underrated
01:06:24 Imagining a future worth wanting
01:11:18 Future projects, writing in public and final advice

Transcript

AI-assisted transcription; errors are possible.

Ben: Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to Alex Petropoulos. Alex works on AI science and the institutions we need to make progress. He's chief of staff at Arq Foundation and one of the authors of Europe 2031. A speculative story about Europe's technological future. Alex, welcome.

Alex: Thank you Ben. Very, very good Greek pronunciation for me.

Ben: I've been practising! Of all the things you imagined in Europe 2031, what do you think is most likely to be true by 2031?

Alex: This is a difficult question because already some things in Europe 2031 have come true. Or rather, small versions of them have come true. You know, we sort of predicted access controls and predicted the US cutting off access. And a small version of that did happen with the Department of War, Anthropic and Mythos. Although I would say it's a hint at what could come as opposed to an actual thing coming true. And the other thing that makes this question difficult is that, in general, when I talk about the predictions we make in Europe 2031, I'm like: don't index on any one particular prediction.

We're not necessarily trying to get them exactly right date-wise. In fact, we fudged dates in, [I ] in order to keep things working in a way that would keep the reader happy, especially certain audiences that we had in mind when we were writing it.

I would say the prediction that I think is still looking to be on track is that we will hit a compute crunch. Compute capacity will just be incredibly constrained. And especially if you hit a capability threshold, people often say that data chips are depreciating in value, but actually in many cases chips have appreciated in value because the AI models have gotten better, which only just keeps pushing demand up and up and up.

And so if we suddenly got a big capability breakthrough, demand could go through the roof and we could be in an even more compute-constrained world than we are now.

Ben: And you can see that in some market prices, particularly upstream of compute. So the bottlenecks you need to make compute are still, I mean, they flip-flop a bit, but they're still going crazy.

Well, I don't know if this will be an easier question on the other side, but what's probably wrong by 2031 or maybe even not the date, but directionally wrong, but still really useful to consider?

Alex: I'm going to be very cheeky and I'm going to give the same answer, which is the compute predictions. In general, I think people should internalise that we might not be compute constrained forever or that compute is important.

The reason we focus on compute is because we talk about ways countries can be important on AI. And normally, to do all this really difficult R&D, you have to spend billions. You have to compete in capitalism, it's difficult. You probably will lose by default. Or you could build a data centre and suddenly you're important.

And so you are, you've got the lowest-hanging fruit possible for becoming important on AI and having some sort of relevance. Great, we should do it. However, we should also remember this relies on compute being constrained. And there are worlds in which even in five years time compute isn't a constraint.

Like Elon could have massive breakthroughs with SpaceX. The cost per kilogramme of launch capacity could come down sufficiently. There could be a couple breakthroughs and suddenly we have orbital data centres and all of your ground-based compute doesn't matter anymore. And all this investment that you did and you're like, 'We're fine.'

We've got the compute, but it doesn't matter any more because now it's all being made redundant.

Ben: That seems like a good idea. Look at, in some ways, the left tail and the right tail: compute is really cheap and abundant anywhere, or there's a crunch and you can't do anything about it. Those seem to be quite useful extremes to speculate about.

And I'm interested, so there is a horizon scanning future scenario-type industry and academic literature out there. But I was interested in what made you think speculative fiction or say scenario planning seemed to be a better way to examine this and potentially examine this for European policymakers rather than just another white policy paper, 40 pages.

I'm going to give you part of the answer already, that no one really reads apart from three people in a little room before it gets shelved. But anyway, speculative fiction: is it a better way, and how did you come to this?

Alex: I mean, in one sentence, you want people to feel the AGI, you want to create an emotional response.

I sort of talk about what we did as wielding a very dangerous tool using scenario writing to create buy-in to a problem that you think exists is epistemically impure. You are violating some of these, I don't know, purist rationalist norms. When you sort of wield this weapon, you have to be really, really confident that your take is correct and that you want to achieve.

And I think that we were confident enough that we're like, 'We're going to do this.' But the point is that it makes people feel something, you know? We had hundreds of people messaging us, having read it, people who said that they were lying in bed, listening to it, and they started crying when they got to the end. We had a mother who messaged us saying my daughter is three years old. There's no way in hell that she's going to wait, be eight years old in the world that you described, what can I do to stop this happening? And so as a side effect, you have this virality, but we never really intended it to go viral. The theory of change behind it was. Convince or sort of be heard by the 2000, 3000 most important people within a country that the elites basically. And that would've been sufficient. I think that it sort of reached an order of magnitude or a few more people than that. But that's the basics of why we chose to use this dark, magic, forbidden weapon.

I would look at it in that sense.

Ben: That's an interesting theory of change. I think there's quite a lot of truth to that from my way of thinking. Obviously you have to feel 110% that you're going to be correct, but on big moments in human history, maybe just taking the last a hundred to 200 years, I always think about the movement, which where society overall went from being pro-slavery or slavery in society to being anti-slavery and the anti-slavery movement started small and had to do these things to convince people otherwise.

But obviously you're going against the majority grain. So if you're wrong, you can do a lot of damage. So it's kind of interesting. So maybe taking some of your premises within that. I guess in my mind the paper argues Europe has been making several misjudgments around how fast AI is advancing.

Maybe we could say almost everyone is making these misjudgments also misjudging its impact and the ability for Europe or maybe even countries overall to catch up. We also make the point that a lot of people on the frontier of say policymaking and government or even the person in the street is not actively using frontier models.

They're not solving Millennium Prize Problems. They're not solving [ ]. So we're a little bit behind the curve because the curve, or the frontier, is going so fast and we are ahead. [ ] I'd be interested to think, has anything happened in the last few weeks, few months since you've written the paper, which has made you change your mind on any of that?

Or if anything, has this emphasised the arguments that you were making? Speculatively, even if the dates are wrong or at least in the direction of travel.

Alex: A couple of things. On the high level, people sometimes ask me, 'Are you optimistic, Alex? Are you pessimistic?' And you know, we wrote quite a doomy scenario. It's doomy for me under the assumption that we do nothing. And I've never believed that we will do nothing. I've always believed, we like to wake up and smell the coffee.

The question has always been: how quickly do we, how fast do we sort of viscerally internalise what is going to come or what might come and then act in accordance. And so I think there has been this visceral reaction faster than I would've expected it. So, bullish. You know, Ursula von der Leyen in her state of the Union, this is the EU version of the US State of the Union.

She gave it to me on Wednesday. She talked about recursive self-improvement and the possible risk that this could bring. And the fact that our enemies might have this technology and we won't. If you told me a year before that she'd be talking about that, I would've, I would've laughed at you.

That being said, I think that, you know, that there are these three assumptions that we talk about, right? Miscalibrating how fast it's moving, how important it'll be, how well positioned we are. But then there's this third meta level thing, which is at play, which is at every step in the scenario, everyone takes what feels like to them, the sort of locally rational action.

They sort of act within the limits that they perceive themselves to have. And the incentive structures within, like the bureaucracies within the institutions are set up in such a way that people aren't able to take the correct action. And not much of that has changed there.

Things that would make me maybe be more optimistic would be people who really get it, choosing to go into government, choosing to put themselves into these positions of power and next to the people who take the decisions to help inform them. And then also like broader reforms to how these institutions work.

And this is, this is by and large why I'm more bullish on European member-state policy than EU policy, if that makes sense.

Ben: Yeah. We can come to that maybe Europe has to be a tiny bit less consensual in terms of getting all member states around and have, well, what I would say is perhaps a tiny bit less democracy even though there's this strange paradox where in order to defend democracy, maybe you have to be a little bit less democratic.

And I see some analogies with climate movements, maybe even within COVID pandemic, particularly within climate. It's interesting, if you go back 20 years, the median, in fact even maybe 10 years, the median scenario was looking at perhaps a four degree world. And today we're looking at between a two and three degree world and still on a downward trajectory you can argue about speed.

So that's one of the really tricky things. Because humans generally moving at speed is not our default scenario, but actually we've done quite a lot within climate and certainly within climate have now taken out a lot of the negative tail risks. I mean, there's not exact analogy because of the tail risk in AI, so I kind of get a little bit cautiously optimistic around that given some of our other complex wicked problem type things.

Bringing it back to Europe, I was interested if you think it, well, for Europe it should not really become simply a slightly worse version of America or China. That seems to be, again, what the paper's suggesting. It can't really be America or China in terms of compute or frontier labs and things like that.

So I'd be interested now also a few months after the paper, what do you think Europe should optimise for or Europe should be doing if it can't be America or China? Or do you think it genuinely should try and catch up in certain domains?

Alex: So, on catching up, I think it has to just be really realistic about where it can and where it can't catch up. And then you maybe take a calibrated bet and say, I'm going to put a bet on this moonshot. I'm going to put some amount of money. Maybe it'll work, maybe [ ]. By default it won't.

You should be aware that it's like a big risk. What should Europe try to emulate? I think that Europe needs to have like a conversation with itself about like what makes Europe great and then how is that a threat and how is that at risk? And I think in general, I sit in the position of why care.

I guess that's a question one might ask, which is why are we even talking about Europe? Why do we care about Europe? And one reason I care about Europe beyond the fact that my friends live here and my family live here is the fact that I think the US have a set of values and these values are quite good and Europe has a set of values and these values are also quite good.

But I think that regardless of whose values are better, I think there is some weighted combination of both of those values that is superior to either. And I would like to see a world in which those values are represented into the future, if you want to say that, or at least represented within AI systems and within the way we develop this technology.

And so then you should be really okay, you're, you need to do a better job of exporting your values. But then the question is which values are you willing to give up? Which values are you willing to import? So it's sort of like a question of what do you want to take from the us?

Like what actually matters where are your trade-offs going to happen? And I think that for all the talk that people in Europe do about values, I think it's quite an immature conversation still because there's never any conversation about trade-offs and what they'd be willing to give up. Like where, what is the ranking order?

You can't value them all equally. That doesn't work because you're going to lose them all. A bit of a fluffy answer. But I think it's like a prerequisite to actually be oh, why do we care about this? What model are we going to follow? What should we do? We can still be good at many things.

Ben: I, in some ways that echoes just overall thinking around industrial plans. Like should you have them, you've got to figure out, you can't do them for everything. You need to figure out where you are good or not. But specifically for AI. But I guess one, if you're quite purist about some of these things from say a market or say your anti industrial plans at all, you'd maybe argue why can't Europe simply just be very good at using American AI or Frontier AI?

I guess I already think of one of the counters because of what's happened with defence or defence pacts recently. But you could maybe say, well, we become really great at something else. We keep mostly European values and we just import American AI and that's it. Spill below has happened that way. Is that not a cogent argument because of all the other European values, things that we need to maintain or argue for.

And also, I guess, the specific different industries and values that different countries have.

Alex: So I think it's first important to acknowledge that some version of that will be the version we end up in. There is no world in which we don't import American AI just as there's no world currently where we don't import part of the US security umbrella, right?

Europe isn't independent, Europe isn't sovereign. It shouldn't pretend that it's totally sovereign. And so I think it's silly to pretend that we could get there on AI within 10 or 20 years anyway. I think that there are like two stories that I tell when I talk about, AI policy.

The first is like if AI timelines, the pace of AI progress is sufficiently long. If AI is a sufficiently normal technology, whatever that means nowadays then what you should be doing is basically just copy progress studies and just look at what, like the [Rhine Group] people, look at what Mario Draghi is doing.

Do the Draghi report. Listen to Patrick Collison probably, like read Works in Progress. And just do all of that. And you'll probably be fine. And that's like your normal baseline. If AI were a normal technology, if timelines are really long, you have your adoption, you have your market effects just like unfuck the European economy, great.

I think the disagreements in AI policy come from okay, but AI isn't necessarily like perfectly normal technology. First, it might be very important. It might be securitized and treated as a national security asset and there might be a US administration which isn't operating in a perfectly positive sum view of the world or you know, willing to take very negative-sum trades with partners, even allies.

And two, if AI progress moves really, really quickly, these reforms take five to 10 years to kick in. So you need things to bridge that gap. And so you have to be thinking about okay, I'll do these reforms, I'll fix my economy, I'll be fine in 10 years maybe. But what are you doing over the next 10 years to make sure that you're relevant?

Make sure that you're not slapped about by the US or China.

Ben: And what do you think European countries should do, either as a European blob or you could choose one or two countries, UK or Greece or, maybe one of the bigger ones like Germany and France. I get the reading from the paper. There's some suggestion that potentially industrial AI, whatever that might mean, might be an area or robotics or some other part of applied AI.

But then I was wondering, is there a European comparative advantage in any of that compared to American or Chinese companies capturing most of that value. But I guess Europe has got to place some of its bets somewhere within that. So I'd be intrigued if there are any suggestions that you feel Europe can explore or is it still at that higher level where they have to just figure out what it is they're not sure and they're just too slow and figure that out.

Even if they don't get all eight correct things, if they get two correct, that's going to be much better than where we are now.

Alex: Yeah. So three things. First, you got to do the reforms to make sure you can actually do all this properly. You got to set the groundwork such that a trillion dollar European company can be created in the future.

That's your long-term play. Get that out of the way. Second, I think that some of these things you mentioned are up there. There are some competitive advantages. It seems like Europe does actually have quite a good data advantage. There are just like European data sets. We have big European companies, we have industry.

We still are, we haven't completely deindustrialised. We still have lots of factories. So there are lots of places where we are strong and have valuable things to offer. I guess the question is can you use that well enough to ensure that you are, that if access is what you are worried about, ensure that you retain access.

I guess an example is: make yourself the person that produces and builds things for the Americans. If you think the Americans will get to do powerful AI systems very quickly, we can be the ones with the factories, right? It is a version of that world. But then the third thing I will say is Europe 2031 is a, go, to go back to the analogy like we use the dark magic. We dabble in ideology. We point all of these faces and attention towards a problem. It is an exercise in problem defining. There is some amount of work and we've done our best to think about solutions.

But I will just say the field of people solving this problem, there are two bottlenecks and one of those bottlenecks is ideas and just people, like a community of people thinking about solutions. I don't think we have very good solutions at the moment. I think our solutions are, to be honest, crap.

And I would like to see more people, more ideas flooding in about what we can do. Because I think that, yeah, we just haven't had enough tokens on it, so to speak.

Ben: I think you're going to make a very good policymaker or politician because that is a three-point plan, right? They like that. I think there may have to be an odd number, like a seven-point plan or 11-point plan, but that's not quite as sexy as a three-point one.

So we need more people thinking about this. Not enough people. Because we can see that not enough ideas at the moment might be happening. I feel the vibes are there, but I guess we're a little bit slow. Europe may have some comparative advantages though. We have to think about that. Maybe supply chain into America, something like that.

And then the long term reform, which is kind of win-win. Even if you think this AI stuff, they've just gone completely crazy. Yeah. What are they doing? Well, this just, you should have it found foundationally. And actually it's an interesting edge, just the glass half full is because Europe can potentially unlock that more than say, some places in the US and potentially unlocks maybe more easily.

There's a, there's a chance that it can actually jump up. Like some parts of America can't actually deregulate that much more. They've reached the frontier of that. Whereas I don't think you could claim the same in Europe. But it's interesting on that first and third point, maybe to some degree there seems to me a little bit of a tension in terms of, and I mentioned this before, the argument essentially is Europe's consensus and procedures are somewhat too slow that needs unpicking speeding up more people in it.

But part of the European values of all of that seems to me that they have this: liberal democracies constrain power. Now you can see that's tipped too far and Works in Progress are very good on this, where you've seen like it's really reasonable for the fire department to say we need access for our ladders to go into the buildings.

But when each individual stakeholder does that, it means you can't build any buildings, or they're not really suitable or are very expensive. So I'm interested is at that higher level, do you think there is this throughput where we can become dramatically faster, we can get more people within this new industrial AI policy or long-term reform without destroying enough of these European liberal values that actually we so and I got the impression from your answer earlier, is that yes, there might be some trade-offs within those values, so we do need this hard conversation.

But if you come with a call, I'm going to make it up to 10 or 20 of them, you know, a good eight to 15 of them survive and that still feels sufficiently European that's what we should do. Is that the right way of thinking about it and that there is a tension there? Or actually is there some other through line that we could pursue here?

Alex: I think there is a tension. And if you don't do this right, you fail. An example is look at the way that the US have done their data centre policies. And they've had this laissez-faire approach and now they have this massive backlash. And so this is an opportunity for Europe. Because Europe hasn't built as many.

They've imported a little bit of the US data centre politics, but it's still very nascent. We can take a lot of lessons, we can learn how can we do it well? So you bring people along so that you are actually making sure that the communities benefit from the data centres being built, that they get some of the tax revenue that the data centres are building in electricity production and not using water even though that's, you know, made up. But in general, I think this touches on what you said, which is glass half full. I'm an optimist. I think you have to take many of these things and frame them in the optimistic sense. There is a world in which you can say, Tyler has this saying, you know, what is it the Europeans are so culture, they can tell you about porcelain.

They can tell you about all this and that, but if the world was run by them, negative 1% growth rate and we have all these bottlenecks and if AI sort of becomes so important, the bottlenecks means Europe is doomed. And, then that's the reason to freak out. It's like also, ah, if we get rid of all these bottlenecks, Europe has so much to gain.

Like there is quite a strong compelling win-win of oh, we can get the growth in the short term from doing the deregulatory stuff or, and whatnot. And then we get like the AI growth in the long term. Or maybe the AI growth kicks in first and the long-term reform. So there are some interesting political economy packages that you can put together.

I think the ultimate question is, are you presenting a compelling vision of the future that is positive, and that you can bring people along with, because I think it's fair to say that people, I think most politicians have failed at this and, most politicians are like failing to rise to the challenge of like presenting a vision to the people of the future. And saying, this is how your life is going to be better because of this thing. I think this is especially true with young people. And they sort of have this negative-sum view of the world. Because the world has been negative-sum towards them. Now you have to do politics. There's like the difficult stuff.

And find ways to create your coalition to take, pick the set of policy choices that give you wins and give you win-wins across the board. Make some trade-offs. I think that's possible. I think I've seen a way that you can do that. I don't think necessarily politicians are catching up to this quite yet, but I think that there's a festering, I think something's festering in regard to youth politics and disenfranchisement and that this will extend and sort of blow up around AI. And so I think if you don't sort of get on this early as a politician, it will sort of consume you.

Ben: We

Alex: Need, or how does that relate? Yeah,

Ben: I say we need the storytellers back. Well we need in some ways like the force, the Jedi side of the force because you're probably going to dabble in these dark arts. So yeah, you might fall the way of the Sith with these very charismatic storytellers, but you are going to have I guess the Yoda-like characters hopefully coming through and saving us.

Well perhaps zooming out. I mean we can come to other policy bits if they occur to you or come up. And I do wanna talk about the opportunity side as well as the risk side, but maybe touching on the risk side first and zooming out because I think that's what, a lot of things came very cogently in 2031.

I still think we need some good positive speculative futures and I know people are trying, but we're just not coming towards it. I don't know why. Maybe, maybe humans are just inclined to look at dystopian sci-fi more readily. But in any case opportunities and risks. Maybe on the risk side I tend to hear two different categories of catastrophic risk arguments.

So one goes, we create intelligence vastly beyond our own and we can't control it. It's like we are humans or, and they are mice or I prefer to think like octopus and you just can't understand it. Like the mice don't know what's going on and they just all disappear because humans don't really care about them.

And it'd be the same for this vastly superior intelligence. That seems quite sci-fi to a lot of people that I know. Some people take that argument seriously. The other which seems more cogent to sort of everyone is that you just get a very powerful AI tool, say, and it gives certain humans, maybe quite a few humans who may want to do harm or some version of evil, much greater capabilities at much lower cost.

And they can simply just do that. So you don't even need to get super intelligence of any form to just kind of see okay, that could be quite a bad risk. And so that comes in a cluster of manmade pandemics or all of these other things that you could do with super intelligence. I'm interested, do both of those categories of risk worry you?

Does one of them worry you more? Should we be thinking about that in the AI risk world? Do they worry about certain things too much? But how should we be thinking about AI risk and what some people would call X risk or existential risk?

Alex: Maybe I should start with an epistemic status. I don't think about this maybe as much as I should in terms of I'm quite pragmatic and I think about things through the lens of what could Europe do? But I'll, I'll like to indulge the question. And I think on like the first and octopus risk if you wanna call it, I think it would be foolish not to hold some amount of huh, we should think about this. That I'm not confident that this is impossible. I think I'm more optimistic in the sense that I can definitely see or smell like technological pathways that lead to good outcomes there, right?

it is not like I'm oh, any possible version of like super intelligence or like powerful different intelligence you build will always, do you, I think that you have a lot of agency over like the direction of the technology that you, build, but you have to exercise that agency and you have to be really cognizant of it.

These are like my priors and I sort of see like most of my takes, like informed by tweets that I see, but it seems that we have taken decisions in different directions that have been both negative and positive in terms of our ability to shape these intelligences in the way that would be desirable.

And the misuse risk, I think this is basically a force multiplier to possibly other misuse risks. Like if you're already worried about bio risk, many of your friends who were worried about bio risk, they're now just really, really worried about bio risk.

I think it's something that we should clearly pay attention to. I think maybe the thing that should make you worried is the pace and whether or not you feel like your governments are sort of on the ball and whatnot. But, you know, in this State of the Union address that the president of the European Commission did, she talked about how she opened her AI section talking about risks and talking about loss of control.

The equivalent of the Secretary of State for technology of the EU has talked about loss of control multiple times before. I think they think about this, they think they care about it alongside a bunch of other things they care about. The question is what can Europe even do about that?

And that sort of gets you towards I guess some of the things that we work on and whatnot. But that's, I sort of employ some of these like mental tricks in terms of I don't think about the fastest possible takeoff scenarios because there's nothing Europe can do about those takeoff scenarios.

So it's not useful for me to think about that. And I sort of limit the amount I think about certain risks because I'm more focused on what is within the realm of pragmatic and the possible within this operating theatre that I exist in.

Ben: Sure. What is tractable? What you can only control what you can control, even if you can distantly control it.

I mean, I remain pretty optimistic on that. Part of it is because actually we've had pretty terrifying capabilities for quite a while. And actually, I don't wanna give too many hints, but you could think about it and you, if you wanted to do evil, evil people could have actually done quite a lot more devastating things in the last 10 or 20 years than even that they've managed to achieve.

And they haven't for a complicated set of reasons, which I think should still hold. But maybe let's flip to the other side. So, AI optimists, and the opportunity side. What do you think AI optimists are getting most right, or what should we be hopeful about? And there's a lot we could cover.

Everything, I think around science is pretty good. Second order things. I actually think that because I do some work a little bit in climate and health, all of the climate people are underestimating what kind of gains this could give us in solving some climate things. The health people actually are beginning, they're actually already beginning to see it, so I'm not sure they're underestimating it.

They're kind of seeing it and not sure where that goes. But I'd be interested in your view, what are AI optimists getting right? I guess you can lean to Europe if you but it could be anything in the world that you are seeing.

Alex: I come from a maths background, so I'm just like incredibly excited about everything happening in maths at the moment.

It's just: wow, what a time to be alive. Right? We're like solving all of these. I mean, we solved the (I can't remember the name) the [Millennium Prize Problem], Navier–Stokes. We solved Navier–Stokes. There's like rumour that two and a half other ones have already been solved.

Ben: P versus NP or whatever it's called.

Alex: P versus NP. Yeah. You know, like register your predictions now. You don't have much time left. So incredibly exciting time, to just be a nerd like mathematics. And sort of you can extrapolate along. I do sort of hold this opinion, you know, like the verifiable areas will move faster than anyone thinks they will.

And then the non-verifiable stuff will move slower. So I think on like the, health side and on the biology side, I think all of this really sort of annoyingly just reinforces like how important all the other sort of science reforms you're going to make will be of like our clinical trial reform now actually is like a lot, lot, lot more important because you could do so much more with it, but it's still going to be the bottleneck. And so I'm curious where the bottlenecks end up arising in science. physics will pop, like maybe with physics we'll also see some crazy progress. But I sort of have an ongoing debate with colleagues and friends about how much transfer you will get from the non-verifiable domains.

And I think even in, even within mathematics, it's interesting because there are branches of mathematics that have easier to formalise than others, essentially like it within Lean. It was written by algebra people. It's written in a way that makes algebra very easy to formalise. I have friends who are like graph theorists who are this is very annoying.

I can't write my stuff in Lean because it's written by people who speak like a slightly different language. It's it's like your alphabet was written in French and you're Italian, you are like Greek or something. And you're trying to use the programming now because you're well I don't speak Italian or French.

And so I'm paying attention to will the AI model solve problems in those? Like the AI models have been trained in French for maths. Will they solve problems in Greek as well for maths? And this is like a thing that I'm  paying attention to. And maybe I'll get a hint of whether that happens then I'm way more excited about the future of science.

Ben: I think there's something with that point in particular, I agree, they, the AIs, the code will have to, I think, invent the French. So they'll have to do their own version of lean, which isn't for algebraic things, but I think they're now fully capable of doing it. Even my sense, this is just vibe really, but if GPT-6, [Astra'] has already trained seven to be able to do Navier–Stokes and we've got some self-recursive, then it seems to me that seven or eight is going to be able to build those things.

But I'm then interested just to dig one level deeper. So if AI is really good at these verifiable domains as you call them, and if intelligence becomes really abundant, what becomes scarce or what do you really think are the bottlenecks? So we, you've kind of blobbed it as non verifiable, and I'm going to expand that to say some of this, what I guess the economists or social scientists would call tacit knowledge.

Some of it is called Polanyi knowledge. So these are things like how a carpenter builds or all of the things you get in a meetup as opposed to what's written in code. I guess all that goes into Polanyi-type domains is the type of stuff which becomes scarce. And I guess the bottlenecks, if we talk about clinical trials, I as yet don't quite see how you're going to get around putting the drugs into humans to make sure they are safe.

And actually some of this efficacy and clinical trials are quite a big bottleneck, although I do think we should be substantially faster. Clinical trials take on average eight to 10 years from first in humans, six to eight years should be, I mean, should be a no brainer. And we should have already gotten there in one to two years.

Seems to me like a very big jump, which is where we ought to go. But I'd be interested if you've had any thought when you've seen about that, about emerging bottlenecks or because your bottleneck is still, ah, we haven't got enough people in policy thinking about this. This might not be a domain you've thought about too much, but interested in bottlenecks or what becomes scarce in a high intelligence world.

Alex: Yeah, I have a colleague who's thinking about this. I should talk to her more often. I think even though you talked about this like tacit knowledge, I think even the non-verifiable stuff is stuff you are just trying to learn about like biology and stuff and you have to prepare everything.

Like you don't have a fully self-driving lab. Even within, like, I am still deeply confused about recursive self-improvement and whether that's actually happening and whether you've cleared the bottlenecks. Because I'm not convinced that you haven't cleared all the bottlenecks and there might still be some bottlenecks.

But on science itself, I am.

I think that, and maybe this is just from like a metasciencey direction, but there's a lot like the way that. Scientific information is communicated between scientists and the way that the social dynamics of science that seem like hard to replace and hard to get that serendipity from.

But maybe we'll get there. I sort of find myself often thinking oh, I'm so grateful that my job is safe because all I have to do is talk to people all day or have face-to-face conversations. AI's not going to take my job.

Ben: Yeah, communications. I actually think humanities in some ways should be less worried than they are.

I mean, they're, they're really not going to disintermediate theatre for instance, or albeit not many people actually make that much money in theatre. And yes, maybe you will speed up some aspects of script writing, but people really don't like that. I mean it is half of art, or at least some bit of art is all of the tacit knowledge, which comes with the artist and everything around that.

That's let alone before we get into questions of or style and taste on that, about whether it can do that. And even when it matches that, I think human audiences will not find that as satisfying. But I'm interested then also in what you maybe changed your mind about, we could do this on any level. Because I think you're involved in this proposal for a type of CERN for AI and institutions and kind of how institutions work and then subsequently you've kind of moved away from that form of thinking. So perhaps specifically on that, what changed your mind and then anything else over the last two or three years that you think that you've changed your mind about or as they say in some communities updated your priors on, but anything you've changed your mind on.

Alex: Yeah. I changed my mind so many times, like the whole CERN for AI journey. Like the main one is like any sort of publicly supported effort, needs to answer, answer the question of okay, you train like GPT-N, what's the plan for GPT-N plus one? Because you can corral all this public funding.

You know, in the most recent transformative AI strategy for the EU that a bunch of these experts, some of my colleagues included, published, they're to train a competitive model to get to the frontier now would cost 780 billion euros. Okay, you spend the 780 euro billion, now what?

Because do you have a competitive company? Are you going to create like the revenue loop that OpenAI, Anthropic have to train the next model? It just all falls apart if you are trying to directly compete at the frontier. So then the idea evolved more and I think the CERN idea evolved more into like what sort of R&D areas you could work on that could still be quite important.

That could still be quite important for resilience and still be quite important for competitiveness. And I think there are versions of these ideas that I'm still standing behind and still keen to push and you know, I'd be very keen for the EU to do something like a DARPA, maybe.

Other things that changed my mind on that. Just like priors around like centralization of power. I used to think within the terms of like one big AI, like the big super intelligent AI and I'm much more like actually that's like there's a cognitive bias that you're employing there when you think about that.

Like it doesn't have to be that we don't have to build the technology in that way. We could have multi-agent systems and have lots of different personalised AI. And so that's like another place I think. I think I've softened and nuanced my opinions about governments and bureaucracy and there are good people within the government who are trying very hard, but incentive structures that allow them to do the things they want to do.

And then there are also some people with just some horrendously outrageously wrong opinions. And if I was a dictator, I'd send them to [ '] or whatnot. But, so people contain multitudes.

Ben: Yeah,

I heard Tyler Cowen recently somewhat defend bureaucracies, which was quite interesting.

He was taking the other side of the view and said, well, maybe they're doing something that we don't know about it. I think this was more like in America saying, well actually, the fact you've got to fill in a lot of bureaucratic forms means that some aspects of fraud go down. Because if you want to claim benefits and you're on the margin, you're not going to put all of that effort in until you're really doing it.

I mean, I guess that was on a, on a different level and we spent quite a lot of time, I guess, softly critiquing institutions and bits by that not understanding your little softer aspect or some good people working on that. But maybe taking the flip side is there any institutions or organisations that you've accounted for that you think work surprisingly well and can we learn anything from that?

I mean, and on the other side, I do think institutions have been surprisingly robust or even anti-fragile in this current world of geopolitics that we've seen that, not many of them have imploded. Not as many of them as I thought could have done. I'm not sure whether that says that they're good, but they certainly seem to be somewhat resilient.

But I'm, I'm interested if, yeah. Do you think anything has worked really well and can we learn from that?

Alex: Be really bad if I didn't have an answer.

Ben: It might be you've not really come across one, which has worked super well. I mean, I guess in governments, people sometimes say Singapore or Estonia. I think they have advantages of working really on a small city state level. So that's kind of interesting.

And then some other organisations tend to have been maybe shorter lived or more nimble or specific small institutions. And I think it's interesting that I've detected actually, I guess from some of these foundations, which are actually being funded with AI money that they're starting to do institutions, which are just tackling one particular subset area.

I can't even remember the areas, but it's something just health data or that's it. They wanna solve Alzheimer's, so they're not going to do anything else, but they're going to start an institution and foundation just on that because they've thought that those sort of more time limited, purpose-driven, mission-driven, driven, but with a more well-defined mission have gone well.

Although I do think you can still critique that, I'd be interested. Have you seen anything?

Alex: I think that my interactions with the Greek state have been like much better. Everything's been digitised. You can get every form online. Previously you'd have to go to some dusty office.

You'd have to go to the thing. no, you need this form. You have to go to another office, the other side of Athens to get this form. And then go back and no, you also need this form. Spend hours and hours going back and forth. There was a minister, Pierrakakis, who championed a lot of these digitization reforms.

And now he's the governor of the European Central Bank, I think. And so, yeah, they can make your life better, make the burden on your life less bad. Another example is, is it Taiwan that have little lottery tickets on receipts so people hold onto the receipts?

Alex: Is it cheating if I just fanboy about the Institute for Progress for like 30 seconds? 

Ben: You can do that.

Alex: Sure. I just think they seem to have just been insanely impactful and both in sort of very short term, let's do a thing. And in these like long term bets and building something of like over five years that has been really, like long lasting and has moved the needle in a really positive direction. I sort of look at them, and I'm like, 'That's ambitions for what we could be doing in like five years.

And then yeah, so I think that they make me bullish that you can do things that are like sort you know, they're, they're, they're basically an extra branch of government and, whatnot. A meta branch of government. And then there are things within the focus research organisation space.

Like ARIA has good vibes. I don't know if it has more than good vibes, it's like it's still too early to tell. In some sense,

Ben: You've got to start with the vibes, you've got to start from somewhere. Yeah. I mean even, exactly. Even if they all fail. And in some ways, I think actually it'll be fine if every single one of their projects fail at the meta level.

Just saying we are going to actually try some moonshots and things is, I think, I think good. And I also do think they've taken Economics 101 and they are funding things that private markets basically can't fund as in private capital. They still won't be that. So I think if every single one of those fails are that, and also I know people complain, but actually in the grand scheme of things, it isn't actually even that much money.

Alex: Marginal.

Ben: Yeah. People really struggle with hundreds of millions and billions. It, you know, we're fine in the thousands of pounds and even tens of thousands and whatever, but once we get into the millions and billions people just, that's one thing that investors and markets do have a sense for, because we have to wrap our heads around billions and now actually trillions.

But it's a completely different scale of things.

Alex: Yeah. I am also an ARIA fanboy but I, you know, I will say the vibes are immaculate and one should be careful as to whether that is, how much of that is motivating your enthusiasm.

Ben: Yes. That's true. But I also think, so this is, some, so, you know, I've had a podcast with Alec Stapp and we talked about startup things, and I've also had a podcast with Stian Westlake who's talked about funding and how you make decisions and actually Michael Nielsen on metascience and how to make decisions.

So putting all of that together, one of my things is that people claim they do high risk things and then they go, oh, look, two thirds of these projects worked out. Actually, that must mean that your first statement was wrong. Because if you have even moderately high risk, then you cannot be more than a one out of 10 success, which you can see in biopharma and you can also see in VC.

So I do think that most of those projects should actually fail, or at least only advance a little bit. So I think maybe we will only have vibes to go on, but at least as we said, the vibes are good.

Alex: And it's so weird when you get to politics. Because if you're like a political operator, nothing is guaranteed, right?

You have to hedge, hedge, hedge, hedge hedge. You try like a bunch of things. You put in all this effort and it fails and you put on. So in some sense, like people working in bureaucracies, people working in politics, are operating in this high risk environment where lots of things fail and only few things succeed.

But they seem to have internalised it in the wrong direction. I haven't thought enough about what's going on there. But you would think that. That it would maybe go in the opposite direction.

Ben: Yeah. I think in my mind there's a mismatch on the timing of when you get feedback. So Mm-hmm.

The thing about at least shorter term R&D projects, or even within biopharma, which I know quite well, and this is your whole point about what is verifiable or not, your trial fails after a year. So you get quite good feedback quite quickly in the political cycle. Not only would you maybe not know within your political cycle, but your KPI might not be that clear.

So you start something you vaguely think you want GDP to go up. I'm going to slightly make it up, but you have no idea really what your intermediate KPI was pointing in that direction. In any case, we've been talking for a while like people who spend far too much time thinking about AI and policy. Maybe my pivot question should be to the person in the street who probably maybe doesn't even particularly care too much about AI or policy or any of this stuff. What should maybe be one thing or something that they should be thinking about here?

Alex: Interesting. Because the person on the street now comes up to me and asks me about AI safety and I went, I was in my dad's office the other day and they're like, 'Is AI going to kill us?'

And I went to a wedding and two people asked me, is AI going to kill us? So that's the wrong question.

Ben: And what data? The wrong water and data centres is also the wrong question. So what are the and that's what, and that's what obviously the mainstream media or even not even the mainstream media, media is all around that.

So yeah, we get a chance to communicate maybe one or two things that they could be thinking. And I also, I would quite like it to be not, oh my god, they're going to take on jobs as well, which I don't think is helpful. I'm not quite sure why they focus so much on that. You might not have anything, but if you do, what, should the person in the street maybe be thinking?

If it isn't worrying about data centres, isn't AI's going to kill us or take our jobs?

Alex: I think it's bottlenecks and sort of reiterating this thing of if something is automated, it just moves to the bottleneck. Please think in terms of bottlenecks and start thinking about where the bottleneck is, and it's sad that you have to do this. Because the government shouldn't have to be thinking about where the bottleneck is because that means the system's broken normally. Like the market does that. But, I digress. So bottlenecks are probably one comparative advantage. And this notion that even if AI is much better at you than something like at everything, if it's much, much better than you at something else, it will only do those other things, right?

And so, comparative advantage of countries and different countries should do different things. And then finally like we are not measuring enough, like nearly enough. Like everyone, everyone who's talking to you about AI's going to do this, AI's going to do that. Like we have no numbers.

We don't know, like we don't know how many jobs, all vibes, like taking away all vibes. It would be great if we had some numbers. But we don't have any numbers on the safety front, numbers on like the employment front numbers on like even the capability front. I don't know if you saw how Epoch AI did a benchmark.

They basically evaluated, meta, evaluated a bunch of benchmarks. And more than 50% of the top benchmarks are dubious and 20 to 50% of them have false positives and false negatives. The answers flipped the wrong wave round. Like there's data contamination so we're operating with a bunch of bunk numbers or could be better numbers.

Ben: Yeah, what's the aphorism? You only manage what you measure but if you're not measuring it right. But we've got this whole thing because the UK has just come out with new data from our statistical agency and it turns out productivity wasn't quite as bad as we thought for all sorts of reasons. And they don't even really know what's happening in the job market.

So there's definitely something on the measurement front and I like the comparative advantage, which I guess is Economics 101, but with this split between the tacit knowledge bit or the non-verifiable bit, which humans are still going to be somewhat good at to maybe very good at. And there's definitely going to be a comparative advantage versus AI and other people.

Great. Well I'm going to pivot to maybe some more personal thoughts or personal creativity thoughts before then going to a more quick fire round and rounding up. So you were also Cheese Lord, captain of Warwick's Overwatch team. So, yes. Why Overwatch? Why not Valorant? And what do you learn from being in competitive video games and being a captain?

Is there anything we could learn apart from the fact that it seems to be fun or maybe stressful?

Alex: Fun and stressful and very rewarding. Valorant hadn't come out, up until that point, but I really don't like Valorant. I really dislike games that require you to stand still while you have to shoot.

It's just a very, there's something about me that's no, why am I standing still? I want to be jiggling left and right. What's the, where's the fun in that? I quite enjoy games with movement. And so that's why I guess Overwatch drew me and I had to be, it was again one of those things where a friend would be you have to play this game.

You would love it. You have to play this game.  I ignored them for so long. They eventually bought me the game just so I'd play it and I was oh, I love this game. On like the esports side ka there's like this whole like video games and being good at like competition teaches you a lot about starting in a domain, being really shit at a domain. Starting off and being like bronze or silver or gold and slowly you'll kind of like platinum and then diamond and masters and Grandmasters and maybe you'll now like top 500, you say I am one of the top 500 people in my country, in my region. And you have this very clear reward signal and that I think you can generalise out from that and be ah, I can like get better at things.

There's also a lot around it like team competition and being able to. So I think what's really nice about university esports is the fact that you play with what hand you're given, right? You have a bunch of students that show up. You have to find the best that you can get, and then you get like a freaking Roadhog one-trick, and you get a Symmetra one-trick, and you're like, 'What the fuck am I going to do with this?' And you make it work. And I think that we were very successful. We went back to back years. And what made us successful was playing to these strengths and being a really weird team that was very okay with the fact that we are not playing perfectly. We wouldn't be world champions, but we can be good enough to beat every other student team by leaning into these weird niches.

And I think that in games and in life, if I'm, if I dare to philosophise, briefly, like the people haven't explored the space of ideas nearly enough and haven't sort of tapped into the market's not efficient. They haven't tapped into like all the alpha and how far you can take an idea and how far you can stretch and optimise something. So have you just tried winning?

Ben: Yeah. It's amazing that I'm going to loop together so many of our thoughts with that because leaning into your team is essentially leaning into your comparative advantage. If you've got some oddball technique, which I, that's they're the best at two things.

They can't do anything else, but you're going to have to lean into that. So that's really interesting. And I only discovered a few years ago that Elon Musk, for instance, still plays a load of video games. I was seeing him play the recent Diablo game, which isn't even that complicated game. And then I don't, there was something else, which I thought was really fascinating.

And I do think generally I've, I've got a bit old, so in my youth, the first-person shooter was Doom came on. It was like the first thing within that and it seemed so incredible, but it's gone down a little bit. But parents still, I think, fear too much about children in gaming because they are learning an amazing amount of things, particularly if they're just something on like Minecraft that they're doing all of this stuff.

Yeah. We haven't pushed the frontier of this. So, I was listening to a philosopher who was making some very, leaps of faith arguments around what can speedrunning games teach you. Mm-hmm. Because you're losing all of these. I never, I'm, you are obviously we would know, but people who speed run these Mario games or these quite complicated games where.

A standard person would take a standard, really good gamer should take days to play through these like hundreds of hours and they cut it down to four hours using these like crazy methods of which we're definitely not on the frontier of what all of that. So I think that's all really fascinating.

So, I mean, maybe putting it together, what, any games that you would, you, like playing now or you would say, oh, if you, if you've never really thought about video games, this is, something that maybe you should, you should trial. And maybe while you're thinking about that, because I think games is another aspect where we don't have to be that worried about AI.

I mean, AI [is] kind of solved chess and go, or in the sense that they are now much better at chess and go than the very best human. And chess is at an all time high in terms of people playing. I mean, people didn't play that much go, but I'm sure AI is much better. I mean, obviously it can control other, other things.

If you had an AI bot it would be better at the shooting game. So that's not why we're going to play shooting games. But anyway, any games on your mind at the moment or anything we can learn.

Alex: A few different directions. It feels more like a puzzle person. Like another thing I put in a variant of Sudokus in my free time because I don't do enough maths-y logic-style stuff.

So I just like to sit and I play my Sudokus. They're very satisfying. There's this YouTube channel called Cracking the Cryptic. They blew up in the pandemic. There's a game called Blue Prince, which is like a puzzle game, if you like puzzles at all. It's an, it's a phenomenal game. I'd recommend it.

I think as I've got less time,  older and I can't, I don't have time to be good at muscle memory or grind away. I'll play more strategy games on my phone or whatever. My vice is Clash Royale, but I would not recommend that there's a game called Super Auto Pets, which is an auto battler.

It's a bit like chess. I still think Overwatch is fun as like a competitive game. I think that there are games like Civ VII or like Age of Empires. I can't play those games anymore because, you know, I stopped playing them and I recently picked up Civ again. I played it for a day. I was oh, I'd love this game.

Why haven't I played this? And then after like 14 hours of sitting in my chair, I realised why I don't play that game anymore.

Ben: Yeah, more addictive than anything else. That's a bit dangerous. Yeah. I, in general, there's I think there's a lot you can explore whether you wanna explore like the pure one-v-one nature of there is no outside force that I can blame for this.

Alex: This is either my skill difference or your skill difference. Versus like the team based games where it is like, you enter with a suboptimal hand and it's, 'How do you play this suboptimal hand?' And lean into the comparative advantages, like you were saying.

Ben: Yeah. That's all great.

So maybe thinking about your own personal creativity. So you wrote this 2031 with a team of, maybe it's about eight of you. I can't quite remember the count eight in total.

Alex: Yeah.

Ben: So, and

Alex: Many reviewers and many people behind the scenes supporting.

Ben: So do you write, so there's no correct answer to this at all, but are you a morning writer, an evening writer?

Do you write in bursts, do you think in the shower or in a coffee shop? Or do you think best through a conversation? Do you feel like you have to write it all down? Do you write long hand? Do you write straight onto the computer? Do you even voice type? How? Yeah, I'm thinking about what makes you productive or creative and, how you think about your own processes.

Alex: So I definitely enjoy a long ramble to Claude or like put Wispr Flow up. It's like working in an office. I'm able to do this less. It's quite annoying. But I usually like being able to ramble about a difficult topic for like 15 minutes to Claude and then have it chug away and process that and think through.

I've made big progress on difficult problems before doing that. So big fan of that. I'm someone and that's

Ben: Because Claude is prepared to listen to you more than a natural person or can also digest what you actually said in a more legible form back to you, which probably an ordinary human can't.

Alex: Many things. One, you're just able to provide so much more, and richer context.

Ben: Yeah.

Alex: Like the amount of context you can provide 15 minutes spoken to Claude is and it's like

Ben: Days.

Alex: Yeah. An hour. Yeah. An hour of typing at least. And you wouldn't spend an hour typing your prompt.

Maybe it would. So first context is just like so much better second, yeah. Through the process of talking. You know, you talking is a version of thinking. It's like prompting is a version of thinking. So it's more like a rubber ducky or a thought partner. And you're able to iterate on the thoughts.

While I'll sometimes talk through a problem or and, through the process of talking through it, I'll end up with a skeleton in my head. But the process of writing itself I was actually on a writing retreat recently in Barcelona. I sort of have close fresh experience.

It's laborious and painful for me. It's excruciating. Maybe it's because I get distracted all the time, but like,

Ben: And it's not just being in Basel. Too boring. Yeah. I'm just joking. Sorry. Basel, Swiss people.

Alex: No, that's really funny. I was in Barcelona, not Basel.

Ben: Oh, okay. All right. Oh, that Barcelona, you can't, you can't blame for being unfun except that the vibes I get is that they don't want any more tourists coming in, so, yeah.

Alex: Yes.

Ben: So definitely. Sorry Basel and sorry Barcelona. But anyway,

Alex: Beautiful architecture as well. But, there is, it is useful, like the pain is useful, both in terms of informing: is this actually a tweet, not a blog post. But also in terms of why is it painful? Like what is the idea that I'm trying to articulate that's like struggling to be, born.

And. I think I'm, the one thing stuck with me was there's like this curve of like enthusiasm about an idea. And you got to start writing about it at a very specific point on the curve. Because if you start too late, you're going to be fall off the curve. But if you start too early, like you haven't had the process.

So being able, like if you have the flexibility to clear time, you're like, 'At this point in the curve, I'm going to write about it now.'. Otherwise you ends up in like draft jail. Yeah, but the writing retreat was great. I showed up to it thinking I was going to write about Europe and AI and ended up writing about my feelings.

So yeah.

Ben: That's great. I like your sense of that curve. It's a little bit similar when I do playwriting in some respect, which is if you show it or try and edit it too early, you definitely kill it. But also if it's too late, sometimes it's bored, like you said. Well we might touch on the end about feelings about what we might think an ordinary Tuesday might look like or what the future might hold. But we'll do maybe a little section of overrated, underrated, and then finish with a Mm-hmm. Couple of questions. So, you can go overrated, underrated, you can even go correctly rated. You can give a little thought on it. You also don't have to. We can, we can pass. So we're going to go overrated, underrated recursive self-improvement,

Alex: Overrated.

Still might happen, but everyone is way too confident. I don't know how they know. You're not in the lab, you don't see what's happening. You don't know what the bottlenecks are. Have good epistemics.

Ben: Yeah, that seems fair. I think a little bit of it's happening, but way, no, over, like I would not put it over 50% at all.

Like probably 5% or, something like that. Great. Universal basic income. UBI overrated or underrated?

Alex: Overrated. I used to be in the Yang Gang. But I think the political economy of it breaks. You know, a new politician comes in and says, I will raise it. I will raise it. I would be happy if we could magically fix it at the optimal threshold.

I mean, I don't think you can do that.

Ben: Yeah. Not protect from politicians. Also the latest small trials haven't been quite as good as we thought they were. So disappointing, but, okay. Overrated. So, AGI, although I guess we don't even know what it is, but say artificial general intelligence or I guess we could do ASI artificial super intelligence.

Either one of those, some something like that. Overrated or underrated?

Or no

Alex: Rating. I have conflicted views. Overrated in the sense that I think that there are some wrong—overrated in the way that most people talk about it. Like constrained to the set of people who talk about AGI and ASI overrated because too confident about certain ideas, too confident about like the nature of intelligence and whatnot.

Underrated in the sense that not enough people are talking about this and everyone, everyone should be talking about this if this is even remotely possible.

Ben: Yes. I think that's fair. I have the same view on expected value. The people who think about expected value think about it way too much and apply it to too many areas of their life, but an ordinary person doesn't think about it at all, and so they need to think about it a little bit more so it becomes both overrated and underrated.

Okay. The idea of taxing compute or taxing tokens underrated or overrated?

Alex: Super overrated. I think it's a terrible idea. I think we should just tax consumption and tax land in Alex's utopia we tax both these things we're fine. Maybe, we're fine ongoing debate, but I think the burden is on the tax compute people to really rebut why we can't do those other two taxes first.

And why their taxes are better than those.

Ben: Sure. Consumption taxes. Pigouvian taxes. Very classical Economics 101, right. They still argue for that. Hasn't been put in. Great. Open source AI. I guess this could also be open-weight, open tokens, but open source AI overrated, underrated.

Alex: I think that the people who boost them are overrating them. I think the reason they're doing that is because they haven't realised just how much they are at the whim of the direction of technology. Like the people who want open source to be prolific the most for that world to exist, we have to develop a bunch of technologies that improve resilience, that improve safety, that make this open stuff deployable.

And these people are the ones who are least caring about this stuff. Guys, come on.

Ben: Yeah, that's fair enough. Prediction markets overrated, underrated. I mean, I guess you can, normal markets are forms of prediction markets, but I guess overall prediction markets.

Alex: Does sports betting count?

Ben: Yes.

You could put sports betting in that. So you could do a sub, but I, this is more, I guess, political and other betting Manifold or Kalshi and things like that.

Alex: Yeah. Without the sports betting underrated. With the sports betting overrated.

Ben: Yeah. We don't need more sports betting. We have all of that.

Great. Final couple, I guess, effective altruism has a probably slightly bad rap at this very moment in time, which is where September 2026. But generally, do you think overrated or under—

Alex: Overrated. Definitely within the European continent. Like the version of EA, the sort of continental EA, which is, a specific shape of EA that I, that I think we need to move past and, build something else to replace it.

Ben: Yeah. Overrated. Great. And then last one, science fiction. I guess you could do science fiction as policy, but science fiction. Overrated or underrated?

Alex: Saying underrated because I've been, I've been reading some Harry Potter fan fiction recently and I've been enjoying them.

Ben: Yeah, it's got to be underrated, right?

Anything which makes us think more broadly. Although I do think we do need to shift as I was, we talked earlier about to the Jedi light side rather than any more dystopia. But I guess, we'll have, we have something, we've got to have our villains as well as our heroes. Great. So, we spend a lot of time imagining a future Europe, particularly a future Europe, that we should avoid.

What's the future that Alex actually wants?

Alex: Vending machine on every street corner. No, I think the future I want is one where young people can like look into their own future and be ah, this is a future that I'm excited about. This is a future that I want to live in. And for that to happen, we got to radically restructure the way that society and the social contract has been like playing out.

We've got to get a bunch of things right on technology, because this is like the most important thing that is important for young people's futures, but also government in the way that government has like stacked the book against them. And so I think about the future, like within the frame of what would an a, would an 18-year-old Alex be happy to live in like 20 years from now or 30 years from now?

And currently, no. Because I don't think 18-year-old Alex would be happy to live in like right now. And we keep going in the wrong direction then, but we're going to fix it and we're going to we can fix it and I believe we have to fix it. Sorry for vague bursting.

Ben: Yeah,

no, I'm optimistic on that as well.

Well, maybe I'll push them one. Maybe you could think about a detail. So we assume we have fixed it into, I don't know, 2050, or you can go even further if you want 2100 sometime in the future. And we can forget GDP and compute and geopolitical power. We've somehow solved that at least. To Europe's somewhat satisfaction, we've, we've got to somewhere.

What does an ordinary Tuesday in that future look like? What are two or three things that ordinary Alex, 18— So this is a really interesting dilemma because it's your future self, but you're back at 18 years old. So what does, what does that look like?

Alex: I think it doesn't look too much different from today in the sense that that Alex wants to wake up, wants to go to the bakery, wants to walk to the park, wants to see his friends there, and bump into his friends on the way to the park and the bakery and then they go to the park and they eat their croissants or whatever. And in this future Alex has received a magic like engineering shot that makes him able to consume lactose and he is able to enjoy his croissant in the park. And he feels safe. And then maybe like he's then able to hop on a really fast train and pop over to London for the day and visit all his friends there. And it's really cheap. And he's able to have that lifestyle and I think that lifestyle is just like ludicrously out of reach and then live close to where you want to work. And I think that life and your friend, that lifestyle is likely out of reach today that feels like fantasy.

Ben: Yeah, good health.

Good health. Being with your friends. I guess just on that one you mentioned in that, do you still have a meaningful job in this? Was it just a choice that people will want to have to pursue to what sort of meaningful job for them and therefore they have the opportunity space that if they want that they can pursue it?

I guess I speak to a lot of young people who feel that is diminishing. So that, you know, that is of now, there's only a small segment which have the right opportunity space to kind of do the meaningful work they do, which is kind of interestingly why medics are still quite popular and also teachers and some others.

I guess the small niche of policy, also people going into it and, things like that. But I think this is one of the bits that some of the UBI enthusiasts have also got wrong is that they don't understand that people actually jobs have always been meaningful for humans. And it might not be this artistic creative job where you sit around and paint all day or even make video games, which will be a portion of it, but it's actually something else connected with human flourishing.

But I'd be interested if you think you've still got this meaningful job and actually what your 2050 meaningful job for 18-year-old Alex would be, assume you've solved policy, although I guess policy will never be solved. Maybe you're still in policy, but you'll, you have to do something else.

Alex: Yeah, I have two, two senses of like what 18-year-old Alex wants.

It's like part of me wants to have agency over my own future and over like the collective future of society and humanity and be able to meaningfully improve and contribute to that future and make it marginally better. I don't know, send me up, on the space elevator. I want to go supervise asteroid mining Belt 12.

Another part of me really just wants to create whimsy and joy for other people and see smiles in their faces and just have lots of bits. And lots of like stupid jokes. And pull a bunch of pranks on people all day. And that also sounds quite nice. I would be miserable without either of those.

Ben: They sound like two great things to have. Great. Last couple of questions then. Anything you are working on now, current projects or future projects that you'd like people to know about?

Alex: Yeah. I don't know like when this will be ready, but I can tease it. I talked about how we, don't have ideas.

Our ideas suck. So we want to fix this. So we're, we're doing an essay competition or writing competition or something of that sort. Basically okay, you read Europe 2031 or something else. You care about this problem now you want Europe to be prepared for transformative AI, whether it's for its resilience or it's flourishing or its agency what you're going to do about it. What should we do about it? Write a letter to someone who has have like an audience or recipient and outline your idea of how we should get out of this mess. I don't know when that will go live. Probably not for a while, but you can already start thinking about your solutions.

Ben: That sounds like a good idea.

I do think you need to get a celebrity to front it. So I've seen a couple of writing ideas, this year. In fact, there's one which has Neal Stephenson and Gwern on GPU. 

Alex: So there's, you've got to write a story It has to be AI-generated.

Ben: Yeah. Or no. I think

Alex: The Gwern one has to be an AI-generated piece of literature, I think.

Ben: Does it have to be AI? I thought you just had to disclose it. 

Alex: I think it, I think it has to be fully AI-generated. [Ed: No, only disclosed]

Ben: Interesting. But regardless, so that had some publicity. So when you do send it out, that would be my, but I think it is quite interesting. I do think we need to incentivise the storytellers to be involved.

For sure. And so then the last question is, do you have, I guess we have given quite a lot of advice out for listeners, both the ordinary person or the person being involved in policy and you have a big call to just get involved and do more thinking on that. But any other advice that you wanna leave for listeners? It could be, what character they should choose in Overwatch or more general life or career advice or any final thoughts that you want to leave

Alex: Arq Foundation/careers we're hiring.

Ben: That's a good one.

Alex: We also have referral bonuses. So if you find someone we should hire, we'll pay, we'll give you a thousand euros.

Maybe it'll be more my generic career advice. Write, please have a Substack. Even if there are only three posts on it, I want to see the way you think. I think the agents would also appreciate seeing the way you think. I think people need to be founding new things. And you don't necessarily have to have a good idea. There are [fuders / organisations] that can bring you money. So, don't let that shy you away from founding something cool and impactful.

Ben: That's great. So do build, write in public, check out Arq Foundation. Apply if that's a good job or make your friends apply even better, and get a bounty.

And with that, Alex, thank you very much.

Alex: Thank you.



Matt Lodder on Tattoos, Memory and the History Written on Skin

Matt Lodder on Tattoos as Art History

Art historian and author Matt Lodder joins Ben Yeoh to explain why tattoo history is not a niche subject, but a way into art history, class, colonialism, gender, fashion, technology, archives, and the stories societies choose to preserve or forget.

Matt is the author of Painted People: Humanity in 21 Tattoos and Tattoos: The Untold History of a Modern Art, and co-host of Beneath the Skin, a podcast that explores history through the lens of tattooing.

In this episode, Matt argues that tattoos have often been misunderstood because the historical record overrepresents people whose bodies were monitored: sailors, soldiers, prisoners and other surveilled groups. Meanwhile, tattooing among women, the middle classes, queer communities and “ordinary” people was often hidden under clothing, poorly documented, or preserved only in private archives.

The conversation moves from Matt’s childhood fascination with tattooing to the art-historical questions that animate his work. Rather than asking only whether tattoos are “art”, why people get tattooed, or what a tattoo “means”, Matt asks what tattoos reveal about style, taste, authorship, technology, reception and power.

They discuss myths around Captain Cook, the strange archival afterlives of tattooed skin, the invention of electric tattooing, Instagram’s acceleration of trends, AI-generated tattoo aesthetics, eye tattooing, and why museums still struggle to preserve an art form carried on living bodies.

It is a conversation about tattoos, but also about how culture gets remembered, flattened, misread and rediscovered.

Key takeaways

  • Tattoo history is a way of reading wider human history, because tattoos sit at the intersection of image, body, identity, fashion, technology and social judgement.

  • Many tattoo myths persist because archives preserve the bodies of people who were surveilled, while more private or ordinary tattooing often left fewer records.

  • Matt pushes against the narrow question of whether tattoos are “art”, arguing that art history is more useful when it asks about style, authorship, taste and reception.

  • Tattooing was not simply “discovered” by Europeans through Captain Cook. That story reflects later colonial myth-making more than historical reality.

  • Instagram has not changed the basic fact that people copy visual culture, but it has radically accelerated the life cycle of tattoo trends.

  • AI tattoo imagery is technically influential, but Matt is sceptical of its aesthetics and ethics, especially when it shortcuts artistic authorship.

  • Matt’s practical advice: ask tattooed people who did the work, look at healed portfolios, choose artists by style, and do not treat people’s bodies as public property.

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.

Contents

00:00 Meet Matt Lodder
00:36 Why tattoos tell history
03:27 Misunderstood tattoos
10:49 The art history lens
19:48 Performance art and the body
23:12 Writing Painted People
28:28 Unfinished tattoo mysteries
31:59 Myths, Captain Cook and cultural amnesia
39:28 Archives, access and private collections
42:02 Medical curiosities and preserved skin
42:31 Lost tattooed skin
43:56 The electric tattoo breakthrough
45:23 Museums misplacing history
46:32 How Instagram speeds tattoo trends
52:13 The internet and flattened styles
54:23 AI tattoo aesthetics
58:38 Overrated / underrated
01:00:50 Tattoos in museums
01:03:55 Eye tattooing risks
01:05:42 Current and future projects
01:07:13 Better questions to ask about tattoos
01:12:44 Closing and Ben’s tattoo confession

Transcript (lightly edited with AI so mistakes are possible)

Ben: Hey, everybody. I am super excited to be speaking to Matt Lauder. Matt is a historian of art. He's the author of Painted People: Humanity in 21 Tattoos, and also the author of Tattoos: The Untold History of a Modern Art. Both are brilliant books, which I found fascinating in how they treat tattoos as a story of being human.

He co-hosts his own podcast, Beneath The Skin, which looks at the history of everything through the lens of tattoos. Matt, welcome.

Matt: Hi, thanks for having me.

Ben: When and how did you first realize that tattoo history and tattoos in general was a way of telling the history of almost everything?

Matt: That's a good question.

I think when I, ... i- I've been fascinated with tattooing, tattooing itself and tattoos for a long time. And I didn't do history at school. I didn't do GCSE history or eight level history. I didn't ... I've got a PhD in art history now, but I didn't have any undergraduate or master's degree in art history.

So I had no ... It wasn't like I had a big wide ranging interest in history per se that then translated into a histori- into a historical interest. It really was the other way around. I got fascinated with tattoos from a very young age, and wanted to figure out as much as I can about them. And then I found my way through a kind of fairly circuitous, although it makes sense in hindsight the route to doing a PhD in art history.

And I think what you realize when you start understanding what art history is exactly that, right? We're not just art historians, not just interested in pretty pictures from the past. It's different from art criticism in that way. We're not just interested in whether a painting or a sculpture is good or bad.

But we're interested in what we would call, the indexicality of a work of art, right? So the basic kind of practice of art history is to figure out what works of art tell us about people and places in the past. And I realized, without really, cynically sitting down to, to do it this way, my, my questions about tattoos and where they came from or what they told us about tattoo people were also then really, interesting ways into thinking about human stories and cultural historical stories from a wide range of the human past, right?

If you can ... the way I used to explain it, if you can tell something about the past by looking at paintings in museums and churches and country houses, that must be also and perhaps particularly true for the images that people carry on their bodies. And yeah, when I sat down to write my first book and I was talking with the publisher and the agent about what kind of thing would work telling a story that wasn't just about the history of tattooing, but was about what tattooing could tell us about people and places in the past was a way into it.

But I came here really initially from a very ... literally childlike. I was literally a child who thought that tattoos were cool, and like 40 years later, here we are.

Ben: And they're still cool.

Matt: Yeah, exactly. Or people could tell me they're not, which is also part of the interesting, trajectory of tattoo history, whether

Where ... People ask me often. I speak to journalists and people ask me if tattoos are cool and I said, look if I could tell you answer that question, I wouldn't be a historian. I'd be a presentist, a- and I certainly wouldn't be a middle-aged man. You don't ask middle-aged men what's cool.

Ben: Yeah. I guess that's the problem is that some Facebook and social media isn't cool because now your dad is on it. And if your mom and dad are on it, how c- how can that, by definition, be cool? Exactly. I'm interested in how you came to it, partly because I have the impression that tattoos are still misunderstood.

I'd be interested if you think that they are misunderstood. And if they are, why in your mind are they so persistently misunderstood? And I don't know whether you'd hint at some of the biggest misunderstandings that you think you come across.

Matt: Yeah. It's, again it's mis- it was misunderstandings really that dr- that drove me here.

I've told this truth before, but I'll tell it to your listeners too. When I was a kid I got told ... I, basically, I was born in 1980. I was growing up in the early 1980s and seeing basically WWF- WLF wrestlers like The Undertaker, with cool tattoos and rock bands like Guns and Roses with cool tattoos.

And started as many young kids still do today to start scribbling on my arms with Byro and Felt Penn, and explaining it slightly to my mom and dad what called tattoos I wanted to get when I was older. And my grandparents sat me down and told me two stories, both intended to, to put me off, right?

One was the story of my grandfather, who was a Dutchman, submariner in the Dutch Navy in the then Dutch East Indies in World War II, and he told me a story that he was drunk on his rum ration somewhere in Jakarta in the early 1940s as they ... And he woke up just as they were about to tattoo a fly on the end of his nose.

So he told me and he woke up just in time and escaped the ignominy of having a facial tattoo, which is even more hilarious. It would be even more holistic if you knew my grandfather. He was a very austere, very stern, sensible kind of guy. And so that, in a way, is a quite familiar story.

I think that the drunken sailor and the regretful, youthful mistake i- is a fairly familiar story. My grandmother, though, told me another story about her mother, so she was born in England, but grew up in Australia. Her mother was the, grew up in Kent, the daughter of a tenant farmer in the early part of the t- early part of the 20th century, late part of the 19th century.

And she'd said that her mother, so my great-grandmother had a tattoo, which came about because one day her brother came home one day with a tattoo machine and said, "Hey, sis, can I tattoo you? " And she said, "Will it come off?" And he said, "Yes." So she apparently had her initials tattooed on her wrist and obviously hated it and regretted it.

And again, in a way, it's this story of a kind of youthful regret. But as I got older and jumped in those puddles, so to speak, you tell a kid not to do something and they'll get obsessed with it, as at least I did. I, as a bookish lad, I went looking for books about tattoo history and the late, the 90s in particular was what I now know as an academic of this period, we call the culporeal turn in the humanities, lots of real interest in the body in the 90s, lots of gender theory and racial theory and that sort of interest tallied into interest in tattooing as well.

And so when I got to university and I was starting to get tattooed and pierced and body modified as well I was just getting all the books I could find from the library at the university I was at and then on interlibrary loan about tattooing. And they all hinted at least in some senses towards that drunken sailor story of my grandfather, but didn't

The story of, like, where my great uncle got a tattoo machine from as a tenant farmer's child in Edwardian Kent I was like, "Where's that story?" And then moreover, as I was getting more and more tattooed and hanging around with tattooed people, the kind of only tattoos, t- only criminals and tailors get tattoos kind of thing I was reading was making less and less sense.

And I think w- to properly answer your question, I think the misconceptions have come from really a lack of visibility of the kind of stories of my great-grandmothers. I now know that, for example, tattoo machines were sold in Edwardian London in essentially department stores.

Whether or not that was the kind of machine that my great uncle had, I don't know, but, th- those catalogs, for example, were not in any museums I looked for, or libraries. The vernacular history in general, let alone tattooing, is not very well preserved and tattooing, of quote unquote regular people, is just not recorded anywhere.

It's not, you have to look very hard for it, at least. But what you do find if you're an academic who's interested in tattoo history, and this has been going on really since the middle of the 19th century when tattoos became a kind of important part of various branches of anthropology and criminology and sociology research.

If you're looking for tattoos in libraries and museums, what you find is tattoos on surveilled populations, criminals, because their bodies get recorded because if you run away, they wanna be able to check that they've got the right person and on sailors for similar reasons. So I think a huge part really, and we're talking, I'm talking about with, Western tattoo history a huge part of the misconception is just that most of it has not been visible.

Literally, it's been under clothing a- as well as being subcultural, and it hasn't been recorded in a way that was available to academics of prior generations. I think the other thing as well, to complete that thought is that tattooing is something that I think if you ha- if you are tattooed, or even if you understand the desire to be tattooed it's not that weird.

There is something ... I hesitate to use the words inherent, but it will do. There's something inherent about that desire to get tattooed if you have it or even if you don't, I think you can understand it. But for someone who doesn't want or have that desire to be tattooed, it looks painful.

So, it looks like why would you get something permanent on your body when you're gonna be, it's gonna be out of fashion in whatever time, and it's gonna make your life more difficult, it's gonna interfere with your job prospects. The questions that non-tattooed people ask tattooed people, does it hurt?

What will your mom think of it and what will you do when you're older? I think they are saying psychological insights as well into the kind of misconceptions about this practice. 'Cause as I talked about in both books- there's the wrong question to ask.

Why do you wanna get tattooed is the wrong question, at least for me.

Ben: Yeah. Reflecting on that, it feels a little bit like, I think people will probably understand if you say, why do people wanna dance? You dance from young, you have this impulse, probably quite a hard thing to put into words, but people, people- Yeah.

would get. And I'm interested that you come at an art history lens because like you say, there's being anthropologists, sociologists, blah, blah, you've got a high art, low art, what gets documented, what are the untold stories element to it? And I'm interested in looking at it as a cultural form, this art history form.

Yeah. What do you see or the kind of ... To me, it seems like a broader lens that perhaps anthropologists or sociologists have missed or this whole telling of the story, which seems it ... There's a sort of irony that I feel that it is art on your body or too on your body. Yeah. And yet some of it seems to be hidden and untold.

Yeah. Whereas it seems to be, I guess it, tends to be la- last for the life of the person, although we have mummified and other things, so it doesn't go into museums at some art, but you have more ephemeral art practices- Yeah. ... which do go into the art conscious, from my practice, performance for sure- Yeah.

but a lot of other ones. So it seems to me really intriguing this and how it got picked up by the sociologists and things maybe first and through potentially a narrow lens and where we've ended up.

Matt: Yeah. I think ... So this is really at the core of ... I think this is really where I got to. It wasn't really the starting point of my PhD, but it's where I got to.

So my PhD, which I started in 2005 on the back of a master's degree that touched on some of the same topics a couple years earlier I wanted to write really in this kind of, l- in the light of this late '90s work on embodiment, I wanted to think about what it meant to be an artwork in the world, right?

Like what was the kind of ... This is a kind of very pretentious, philosophical thought, really, commensurate with scholars in their 20s and what academia was like in the late '90s anyway. I wanted to understand, I think, the phenomenology and ontology of an artwork, right?

Because tattooing's an art practice body art, we all know what that is. So I thought then I'd be interested to know what it means to be what's the ontology or phenomenology really of being an artwork in the world? And it turns out that the first premise of that question, which is tattooing an art form anyway, was actually way more complicated

In some senses, not complicated at all, I think, but it was certainly understudied. And so I'm still working on what was gonna be really the first chapter of my PhD that I started 20 years ago, right? The ... What I think is really important about art history as a methodological set here is that we don't care what is and isn't art, right?

Whether something is or isn't art is for us a kinda contingent question, right? So we will take it as a given in a historical moment or, the classic kind of formulation of if an artist says it's art. That's really the position that art history as a discipline has taken since the least 1970s, probably e- even a little bit earlier.

For philosophers of art, aestheticians, the question of is something art or not is interesting, but art historians, we don't really care. In fact, I have interesting conversations with my philosophy colleagues at Essex who keep telling my students that there is a definition of art, and I have to tell them off telling them that.

So art historians can skip over the thing that I think a lot of other disciplines get hung up on. Anthropology is really important here. Anthropologists and I've written an academic paper about this particularly the work of a guy called Alfred Gail although there are predecessors as well to him in the '90s wrote basically a kind of series of books about what has n- now become known as visual anthropology, right?

The anthropology of making things, making images and objects. And Gail basically based that initial thinking because he was largely anthropologist of the Pacific on tattooing, right? He wanted to think about how tattooing could be art in an anthropological sense. And in a well-meaning way, he wanted to avoid this idea that he understood art Western art history to have, which was a kind of chauvinism, right?

Which it can be art if it's good, if it's beautiful, if it's technically proficient, if it's normative, none of which is particularly true. I don't think of contemporary art history as a method but probably is true of art history as a cultural thing. So Girl and others then came up with this idea that to, to get away with that the way that anthropologists should, would think about tattooing and other forms of, i- indigenous art making, for example, would be to think about, not about their style, not about their beauty really, but to think about their function.

And this was and Gail himself says "I'm methodologically Philistine, Philistine, I'm a methodological Philistine." He said, "I'm anti-art necessarily," right? And what he meant by that is he didn't wanna get bogged down into questions of beauty, which he understood as hierarchical, and he wanted to think about form.

So that's why it functions. The point of making a shield with a lion's head on it, this is an example that he gives, is because it's scary for the, for example, the scary for your enemies. So there's a kind of functional thing here. And so anthropologists who've been thinking about tattooing after Girl, and it's also implicit in work before him too, we're asking basically, why do you get tattooed right?

Which for a nice story, and I, as I just said, I think it's the wrong question. We don't ask. In fact, it's completely uninteresting to tell a night story and why people paint, or if we do ask that question, it's only the beginning of our inquiry. There are functional art objects in the Western Historical Canon, things like altar pieces and stuff.

But, like, why people do it is only the first kind of layer. And then we get into things like, which I think are much more interesting, which are questions of style and taste and reception. And weirdly although it seems really obvious to me that tattooing is a, can be understood in the same way as a painting.

Crucially, I don't ever wanna make the claim that tattooing is art for reasons I've already explained. What that was- wasn't present anywhere, surprisingly enough to me when I started up my research. And it feels a bit like an open goal to me, because most tattoo people understand it.

It's natural, right? But the implications of that question, so things like who is the author of a tattoo, for example, is it me as the person who has it on their body? Is it the person who puts it on my body, the tattoo artist? Is it some combination of us? These are things that art history has tools for and theoretical arguments about.

We talk about things like patronage and architecture. For example, there is a lot of interesting literature on collaborative making, but anthropology and functionalism can't do that, don't even think about that. And I think I have been asking the wrong questions. And there are similar examples for sociology as well.

The sociology of tattooing comes out of criminology, really, which was designed in a moment of scientific racism to try and diagnose how primitive you are, right? So I think ironically, art history, particularly art history as it developed in the back end of the 20th century, was just a method set that was increasingly interesting, let, uninterested in the things that had bogged down and I think impeded other disciplinary approaches to the same set of questions.

But it seems, it's ... I talk to tattooists sometimes and have my whole career who go, "Yeah, obviously." Obviously it's an art form or obviously we can think about style, taste, authorship, fashion, technique, the relationship between technology, machines and inks and the kind of tattoos people get.

All of those things for people who are doing it, it's almost a bit obvious to them.

Ben: Yeah.

Matt: And it's very rarely that I say stuff and publish stuff that hasn't in some form been articulated by a tartarist amongst themselves in the last century.

Ben: That's fascinating. That brings up so many things, but the simple answer is yes but then you go on and then also that it might be completely the wrong question.

I recall speaking to someone who essentially studies photography as well through this lens. I don't think they quite called themselves a historian of photography, but maybe ... And they also answered, there's a question, from philosophers is photography art and they were completely- Yeah.

uninterested in whether it was art or not art or how you might ...

Matt: It's interesting as a historical question. So as a contingent question, when galleries start treating photography as art and photographs as artists, is it a historically interesting question because it tells us something about the cultural moment, but whether the object itself is or isn't art is exactly, as you say, a weird question.

Anthropologists also, some of my students take a module with my colleagues. We have a really great set of anthropologists  and I'm not shitting on them really although it sounds often like I am. I don't mean to. I've got some of my best friends who are visual anthropologists.

But some of my students take visual anthropology classes which focus on photography in visual anthropology and that, and they're quite astonished actually the methodological divergence between those two approaches because those first photographs will be te- treated as functional or as documentary or even if they're not, even if they have a kind of aesthetic dimension, that aesthetic is itself taken as functional, which is just not how art historians think about images,

Ben: Yeah. I guess it's the same on, I guess what we call cave art it's got, it's, completely, obviously we have, we'll never, ever know what the people who made those things were thinking, and it's just impossible. Yeah. So exactly. You gotta start from a complete-

Matt: Yeah. I cited an art historian in, in, in this paper that I wrote about who pointed out that art historians still, or maybe now especially, don't have a theory of intention.

We have to import theory. We, if we need them for our questions we're asking, we have to import them from i- from psychology and art and anthropology. But since the 1960s and 70s, art historians haven't had a theory of intention, which for me is interesting because, so many things about tattooing pa- have boiled down to what does that mean or why would you do that?

So why would you choose a tattoo in the first place and it, why did you choose that tattoo? And I think for that really makes sense, it really cuts off a lot of potential areas of inquiry which an historical approach enables, you know?

Ben: Yeah, that feels very narrow. I'm really fascinated essentially by what word would I use?

The interdependencies, the interdependency of the tattooist, your choice, how you present, and that's for a lot of creative human endeavors, interdependencies in music, when we make things together- Absolutely. ... collaboratively, particularly in performance art where you have a script and then it's embodied and then it's ephemeral, all of these types of things.

Matt: Performance art for me, performance art for me was a real clique moment as I was doing my ... I did a master's, so I did an undergraduate degree in languages. I've been really interested in ... I did a theater studies MA. So I was really interested in my teenage years in Brexton and in fact my A- level theater teacher hated theater theory, and I ended up teaching my class Brett when I was 17.

But I went and did a degree in French and German, and in my final year, had a module in European cinema about remakes. And all, in that, we started reading again some of the things that I'd been interested in, including Brecht actually in, in, in my theater studies degree. And then I started realizing

I did a master's degree in the body at Reading, interdisciplinary master's degree in the body. And on that, we had lessons, lectures from theater studies and performance studies people. And all of a sudden, someone said to me like someone like Lee Bowery the fashion, club kid and performance artist who I'd seen on a genes ad, in the late 80s and thought was incredibly cool.

Or like all these people that I was seeing, like Ron Athey who were getting in trouble for doing kind of very bloodily performance art. Someone said, That's called art, right? All of these bands that I liked were doing very bodily, shocking performances, the fact that there was a kind of lens to understand that stuff as art, as I said, my parents didn't take me to art galleries.

I didn't really have a frame for knowing what art was. And when someone said, "That stuff that you like that is performative and performance is art in some senses," I was like, "Oh, that really clicks for me. " But I didn't know it was art, when I saw Franco B bleeding, until he fainted and when I saw I don't know, Gina Parney, all of those very extreme, if you like, or very kind of intense performances from the late '90s that just crept into my subculture as a kid who was like reading heavy metal magazines.

When s- when it turned out to me that was art, I was like oh, okay. Now I can start making the connections." And performance art for me was really, a real cornerstone of how I think about all of this stuff.

Ben: I remember seeing Franco B, I think a performance cutting and bleeding on a white paper roll in the room 


being so viscerally impacted and thinking if I have this visual impact from all of these kinds of things, I can see why these things we're putting in the realm of art." I'm interested that through the lens of history, I guess a typical person thinks of history chronologically within time, but when I read Painted People and your choice of that, you went through individual tattoos, I think 21 of them, rather than a straight chronological history.

Yeah. And alluding to that, I'm interested why you chose to do it that way via, versus time, essentially a linear time thing, although I guess historians would argue that. And also then how did you choose, and maybe in that choosing and choice and investigation, did the, was there anything which you discovered or your mind was changed a lot about what you thought about it?

So it's a little bit why through individuals rather than say a strict timeline and how did you go about ... thinking and choosing that?

Matt: So I'm a big fan of chronology in general, partly because we talked about misconceptions earlier. One of the misconceptions that really bugs, for example, the history of Western tattooing is this idea that it quote unquote only recently became, not just for sailors.

I have a whole lecture that I give on this and the re- more, most recent book was a bit structured about this too. This idea that tattooing is over now and is far too fashionable and it was better and it was underground, and it goes back to the 1880s. There's examples from every single decade in the la- from the late 19th century to the present, saying that tattooing only recently, became fashionable, which I think is hilarious when you're finding examples from the the, from 1905 saying that, ta- tattooing used to be confined to seeming only, so when I did my exhibition, I did a big exhibition called British Tattoo Revealed, that doing that chronologically is really important because it helped people understand, I think, when we started out telling, what early modern antiquarian historians were saying about tattooing in the 16th century it was able to instantly give people an idea that everything they thought they knew about the recency of tattooing as a presence on British bodies wa- was misconce- misconceived.

So where tattooing can, where chronology can serve a rhetorical purpose, I think it's really useful. The painted people is laid out chronologically, but I also really wanted to A, tell as much of a geographically diverse story as I could, although I because I'm not an anthropologist, something else I'm really, I try and do that, that other people haven't done in the past is I try and not go, get out over my skis.

So painting people I talk about, for example, Inuit tattooing and a couple of chapters. I talk about tattooing in Fiji, I talk about tattooing in ancient Siberia. But I do so as much as possible from a lens of, like, how the people from outside those cultures encountered them, wrote about them, en- en- engaged with them, I can't write and wouldn't wanna write an anthropological account of what those practices really quote unquote mean, because to do that requires, much deep expertise and I don't.

And this is, this comes down to this sort of cl- one of the cliches that I repeat a lot, which is, tattooing as a medium, not a phenomenon. I wanna, so I wanna try and ... So the painting of people approaching having an individual sort of character tattoo for each chapter was a way of de- anthropologizing the practice in a way.

It was also a way of trying to break up this idea that again, is a problem, I think, in the historograph- historiography of tattooing in the West, which is that people think increasingly less now. I think the message has been getting out there after me and some of my predecessors were shouting about it for a long time.

People thought, like Gail himself did, that tattooing was discovered in the Pacific and there was no tattooing in Europe prior to the late 18th century. And so deanthropologizing those stories and having individuals from dif- disparate parts of the world from a broader period of time, I hope, try

I wanna sever the connection between that and the idea that Western people stole tattooing from indigenous people, because that itself is a kind of racist lie. And in fact, there's a chapter right in the middle of Painted People about Mecock, this Inuit woman who was brought to England basically commissioned with the departure of Cook's fleet to Tahiti for the first time.

And her portrait with her facial tattoos was hanging on the wall of the Royal Academy in London the day that Captain Cook and Joseph Banks first set foot in Tahiti in 1769, which I think is a remark- it was a remarkable piece of like final nail in the coffin of that, what my colleague and friend Anna Friedman called The Cook Me.

So the approach was just a way of yeah, de- anthropologizing, ta- tattooing in a way selecting the stories there are annoyingly actually, and we only, I, only 20 chapters, because the 21st was supposed to be the prologue, which was the story of my great-grandma that I've already told you.

But the editor basically thought that it was taking too long to get to the first chapter, which was fair enough. So we incorporated her story into the book, and by that point it was too late to change the title. So there actually are only 20 chapters although I, the 21st is my great-grandma and I got that into the introduction.

But the way we chose them really, I wanted to tell cool stories. I wanted to tell stories that represented as much kind of global tattoo history as I reasonably could with my skills and what I thought was interesting. There were some things we had to get in, all good popular history books need a bit of ancient Rome and ancient Egypt and ancient Greece and ancient China, these are great.

But they were also opportunities to tell, I think big stories of the kind we were alluding to about colonialism, about myth making, about cultural normativity and each of those individual stories were ways into specific problems. There's a, there, there's chapters which also deal with things that I wanted to myth bust.

There's a chapter, for example, about two criminal, two Victorian s- sex working women who were presumed to be part of this gang, the 40 thieves, and it turned out that, the jailer in that case basically pointed out that not every single person who has a tattoo is in the same gang, a mistake that the FBI is still making 200 years later.

So there were a few stories I wanted to tell in there, stories that needed to be told and stories that kind of worked in the context of a trade book. In terms of things that I learned there were two stories in the book that are unfinished and they're ones that I've written errata for on my website and are still unfinished.

And with them, when we did the paperback there wasn't enough room to fully include the bigger stories and both of them kept developing. So this is a long answer, but we'll just go quickly into both of them. One is the story of this young girl, which I think is also a really good example of what the book's trying to do.

The story of a young girl called Madeline Altman, who was a middle class girl from Brooklyn in the early 20th century, 1906. She ran away from home and they found her a few days later cheering gum and covered in tattoos, basically. And she's linked to tattoo history because one of the people that tattooed her was the guy who invented the electric tattoo machine, a guy called Samuel O'Reilly.

But as far as recorded history goes, she was in the papers for about three days, four days. She, and she just seems cool. Like she's 15 and sassy and I always wonder what happened to her. And what happened to her becomes a story of that chapter and it's, the book becomes a story about children's homes and how young women are treated in America in the early part of the 20th century.

And when I wrote the book, I wasn't able to find her. She disappeared into the historical record. And then in subsequent years some more genealogical documents were uploaded to various databases that allowed me to finish her story. And long, long story short, after a sad life marrying into a wealthy family in Texas, she ended up running away with a cowboy actor who's one of the most famous cowboys in drugstore cowboys in Hollywood history.

So that was nice. Her her ha- she got a happy ending anyway. And then the other story, which is a story that is also interesting and ongoing, was the story of whether Picasso was a tattoo artist. And there were stories essentially in the Icelandic press in the 1950s. So that chapter becomes a story about basically prop- propaganda, communist propaganda in the 1950s.

I was researching the Argentinian beef trade, for example. There were a couple of things that I missed in that story and a couple of things that came to light later on. And anyway, it turns out the story was that he was, as a joke, Picasso tattooed the wife of an Argentinian beef magnate with a hammer and sickle in 1953 and this became a diplomatic incident.

None of that is true at all. So then the question became like, where did it come from? I think it was pretty likely a CIA plot. And then a paper was published by a guy in Sweden who pointed out that the author of the original article in the Swiss, in the Swedish papers was basically a kind of undercover Swedish intelligence operative.

So my kind of instinct played out there, but it's still quite murky. But then subsequently, I have found through some private archives and some really digital stuff that there is evidence of Picasso discussing tattooing with George Brack in about 1917. The, those two stories, which both of those chapters almost were written as I'm going through these very weird and strange archive trails and both of those trails continue to roll out,

Ben: That's amazing.

It just really reflects your other tagline, the history of everything or certainly the history of humanity. And it seems all entangled. And I was, it was really interesting that a lot of the ideas we're grappling with now are ref- are reflected with that, or been grappling with, since forever.

And I'm interested in some of those myths. How important do you think it is that we have these origin stories and they're apocryphal or wrong and where they are. You mentioned a couple sort of the Captain Cook one. Yeah. The class one, through the British lens of class, but you can see it through money or call it aristocrats or not, which seems to also reflect this low art, high art kind of thinking around and what respectable women to tourists seem to be- Yeah.

like women in art and also women in novels, although perhaps a little bit less at least as writers, mostly forgotten or not. And that seems almost amazing as well. And then obviously the Western traditions versus all non-Western. Do you think that just reflects how human culture is developed or do you think there's something specific around this where you think about it through class and women and what's been forgotten?

Is it just unsurprising to you that we have this history which just reflects through tattoos?

Matt: Yeah. It becomes, I think it becomes essentially a historiographical question as much as a historical one, right? So the Cook example is really interesting. So as I said, you will still find books and even scholarly books written. I said fewer now, because I think we've got better at getting the story out, but certainly up until very recently, books that said Captain Cook discovered tattooing in the Pacific.

Now, Captain Cook didn't even believe that. That story s- so the Cook Voyages, between 1769 and 1776, that story appears, that said not long after the Voyages, the first examples I think are in the early 1800s. So then the question becomes, why does that story happen, right? Why is it that people believe that Captain Cook discovered tattooing and there was noticing on Europeans?

And of course the ar- I pause that I say, of course, I posit the answer to that is essentially, scientific racism, that it becomes the story of the colonial era of the 19th century that non-Western people, the people of the, global majority who were colonizing are different to us in a quite profound way.

And tattooing is one way to articulate that. So the narrative of history is a way of cultural storytelling. And that's really just, and I don't mean that in any kind of conspiratorial way, really. It can be, but it's just a way that, it's just the way that history and historians work and the way that knowledge works.

The Anisia question for me was so interesting and why the story of Meacock was one of my favorites to write in Painted People because I was like, how did people forget that there was, a tattooed Inuit portrait on the wall of the British the role of the Royal Academy in 1769.

And prior to that, not even hidden away in ... there is some tattoo history that we're discovering that is very buried and quite obscure back into the 16th century and stuff at the moment. But every major history of the British Isles, for example, talks about tattooing amongst the ancient Britains.

Now, it turns out, ironically, it probably, it actually probably wasn't true but certainly antiquarian Britons believed that there was tattooing happening in the British Isles, and these are in all of the classic histories of British tattooing. It's in all of the major Roman histories and of Britain, it's in Tacitus.

So how did we miss that? What, why did people think that? The same is true of, and again, to pick my great-grandmother's example, right? It was really amazing to me to learn that you could buy tattoo machines in essentially Edwardian Debenhams, a place called Gamages, and we've since found out they were also available elsewhere.

Not, not hidden away. One of, one of the catalogs is basically tattooing, comma, telephones, et cetera. It was a fairly normal part of the offering of this particular store and some others like it in the Edwardian period. But the story of the 20th century and World War II, et cetera, a- and the intellectual histories doesn't really allow for that to be an understandable, perceptible truth.

The same is true across all kinds of historical thinking. You see all this outrage in tabloids about storytelling of people of color in British history, for example, and it gets slandered as rewriting history, as if that's a bad thing. But what all rewriting history is doing is basically going, "Let's go back and actually check.

Let's go and see if we've missed anything. Let's see if those of our prior generation look..." And of course, we do this ourselves, we're looking, we're always looking through the evidence we have through the lens of our own politics and experience to some degree. Yeah, I think for me, tattooing's really interesting because so much of its history has been told by i- in particular ways and also much of it's been invisible.

So much tattooing has been under clothing, particularly marginalized tattooing. Gay, I write a lot and do a lot of research on queer and gay tattoo histories- so much of that would be hi- hidden away. And I never wanna kinda also say that and this was a problem in the newer book, really.

I, I, in a way, the new book's a bit re- it feels a bit regressive historically because it is, someone did write this in a review, but it is a story of largely white men, right? But unfortunately, I have to say, that is what happened. The tattooist who was in ... There were loads of tattooists who were women, people of color doing stuff, tattooing, but the people who were influential, the people who were popular, people who were known about, the people who actually made an impact on the history per se, were white men.

Some of them gay, not all of them straight white men but were white men. And it's a fair criticism, but as a c- a friend of mine once said, he's a historian of piercing, he's or he's where are all the kind of trans, diasporic piercers from the 1950s?

And it's they didn't exist or they did exist, but they didn't exist in a way that is relevant to the overall big story of the tattoo and piercing industry story. So we found these individual people who were doing cool stuff o- on their own time, and there were some interesting archival lens problems that we got into.

L- lesbian history's much worse told than gay male history, for example, partly b- largely because of social reasons.

Ben: That's really fascinating. That, that whole idea that what, what gets told, what gets hidden, all of the reasons, all of the reasons behind that, I think that's really, that's really fascinating about what remains not.

And on the whole, we forget the amnesia point the more I speak to people, it's interesting how we seem to do this across all domains. So we seem to have forgotten science ideas. Yeah. Like even just because Captain Cook's been mentioned a couple of times, but the whole lemon scurvy thing, it's an idea- Yeah.

we seem to rediscover two or three times within a period of 50 to 100 years because we forget it. And even scientific method ideas, like we come to this idea of today, this controlled trial, which is a very core science idea, you, we could have discovered it ages ago and it seems to have popped up and then disappeared again.

We humans seem to be very good at forgetting stuff. 

Matt: Yeah, for getting stuff and getting stuff wrong, and again, I'm, we're all guilty of this just necessarily as human beings. And part of the structure of academic thinking and scientific thinking is meant to correct for that or meant to kinda, mitigate those things as much as possible, things like peer review and things like just, academic rigor in general footnotes and citing your sources and stuff, like that's meant to as much as possible work against that.

But also a big part of it for me has been the institutional history that I alluded to earlier on as well. Historians of tattooing in the past have those who've been academics have either come to tattooing really because they were bored with what else they were doing and they thought tattooing would be a fun hobby and they'd ring someone up and basically, "Hey, you're weird.

Can I come and interview you, whatever?" And they get told to, to go away. But also this institutional history of collecting. Tattoos are not easy to collect because of their ephemeral nature. But more than that, just the ephemeral history of tattooing, the things that I study a lot, machines, drawings, photographs self-published, small run magazines, letters between tattoos, they're not the kind of things that have any institutional history anywhere in the world, right?

Some are collected peripherally, but the big collections of tattoo history are all in private hands which comes with its own challenges, but with its own joys. And it's, I think it took a generation ... So there was a ... I came, as I said, of age as an academic in this period in the late '90s and the 2000s, which coincided with a general interest in the body, which I'm very fortunate to have.

Lots of my colleagues who did PhDs in tattooing are now not working in academia, they're doing other things. But nevertheless, I think we all benefited from having been tattooed, from knowing tattooed people, from understanding it from the inside to some degree but even, it's taken me as I've been doing this, however you wanna count it, for somewhere between 25 and 30 years.

And it's taken me that long in a way to really start to get credibility and access to material that, let alone the things that people don't know are out there, that people know and just don't wanna share with people. And there still, I'm sure there's still things out there like that too. And that's important.

Huge amounts of my work is premised on, in a way stuff that the tattoo industry in, in part already knew, but it's based on documents, images, stories that just weren't accessible to conventional academic methods.

Ben: I think that's really important. I remember viewing the photographs of Nan Goldin and part of her work is the fact that she's essentially documenting her community and coming through that and you have that.

And it's this really interesting question of, who gets to collect, who gets to decide, who documents, and in the past, like you say, l- the lesbian community wasn't documenting anything for l- lots of reasons- Yeah. ... or were being purposely marginalized, and then even coming through it.

Matt: Let me give you another example from, that's in both books, but again, I found out more about this in the time since. During COVID I was, putting together Painting People and I came across this report in the Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons and it talked about in 1891, this group of, group of surgeons, as they do, get together, and they basically meet up once a, a few times a year or whatever, and they'd bring along a cool thing.

They'd cut off a patient recently, essentially, show and tell, right? And there's a story in there of this guy called Jay Biggs, who brought along I'm not, I'm quite from memory here, but some, something like a most interesting specimen of a tattooed Irishman, right? I have been doing this a long time. As I said, my colleague, Gemma,  is a historian of specifically preserved tattooed human remains. I said, "Have you heard of this, Gemma?"

No, I looked at the University of Edinburgh's human remains record. It wasn't there. And, no one had seen or heard of this since. So I presumed it must be lost, but I wrote to the librarian and said "I know you haven't got this skin anymore, but do you have any records of where it might have gone or who it might have come from in the first place?"

And a few days later, he was like, "Yeah, I think I've seen that. I think it's in the storm." Anyway, there were two freestanding dry preserved skin specimens, one of basically a whole front of a man, a young man, and then one another of two rib panels. The back piece must still be out there somewhere or always lost.

And it's just been sitting in this library since it was, or archive, since it was donated to them in 1891, and no one had looked at it or recorded it or seen it since. And I went to look for records of ... So now I know a bit about big things and stuff. I went to look for more records. And basically, the records are just had a meeting, people bought stuff.

It wasn't even officially interesting to them to write much down about it which I find amazing. And it turns out, and here's the kicker, something that isn't in the book because I found out subsequently, that, those skin, that skin is basically the first tattoos ever done with electricity.

That man was the brother of Sammy Lo'Riley, the first electric tattoo artist in the world, and I only spotted that because someone on Reddit had posted a picture of this guy, John O'Riley, that I'd seen before, but had upped the up the contrast of the image, and I was looking for something else, and I was Googling it, getting something else.

I think I was looking ... I was looking for a story about another, a different tattoo Irishman, actually. So I was Googling how to tattoo an Irishman, this image came up, and I've seen the picture, but I hadn't seen it with the contrast made up. And I was like, instantly you only see the top part of his chest, but I was like, "Oh my God, that's the skin."

And now all the story makes sense, but how this guy died, we know that he was still performing in America about three or four months before his skin showed up in Scotland. Like, how his skin's in Scotland, why it's there, how, who, who dissected him, what none of that information we've yet discovered.

I'm sure some of it may be out there, some of it isn't. But basically, unless some Victorian or Edwardian person wrote it down and for whatever reason, those records have been preserved for the present day, we'll never really know what happened there. And we're building up these pieces of where his back is and if it's still out there yeah, it's, but that's the kind of thing we deal with all the time.

Ben: Yeah. That's amazing. But at least you know why it's, why it probably was important, why they kept it and may- maybe of the time.

Matt: I don't think they even knew. I just think, I just think- It's interesting they just didn't, so many museums, you hear, I've had a few of these in my career where it's like, "Oh, we found this in our museum.

Where does it come from? No idea." This is professional museums, let alone private collections and family collections,

Ben: maybe it's no, no surprise then if the professional memory keepers are doing this that we're losing so much.

Matt:  And a friend of mine, a friend of mine who's a historian of like protest and political protest he went, he was doing a book and he went looking for images of some posters and they were from a, I think they were from a Native American group in the '70s or something.

And he found the person who owned them as far as he knew and they said, "Oh, we donated them to this particular museum." And so he wrote to the museum, they said, "No, we haven't got them. No, that's not ... " He said, "Look, can I just come and look for them in your stores?" And he basically went there knowing that they were there, the muse- and found them in a box labeled uninteresting catalog last.

Ben: Oh, crazy.


Matt: This is systematic.

Ben: I would- maybe we'll mention museums in a little bit, and I know we're pressing on in time. I'd be interested in teasing today a little bit and your thoughts. I guess two things come up on social media or particularly Instagram because I guess that's visual social media, but in, in general.

And I guess another one will be what you think AI might do. And I guess there may be a tiny bit interrelated as well, but I was interested in how you think Instagram has changed or not how we pr- how we present this. And I, you know- Yeah. ... I've only flicked onto it, but there's a whole seemingly another subculture of where Instagram meets tattoos or maybe it's just an.

Matt: Yeah. No, 100%. Yeah. I think so, I, again, came of age at the, this is, I think also part of the reason I have a career. I came of age, at a particular moment in the 90s when the internet was nascent and I was a big early adopter of online culture. I got a modem for my 15th birthday in 1995 and the first thing I did was seek out information about tattooing and piercing on a web, on a, on bulletin boards, on usernet groups and on websites that didn't have any pictures on them, or at least I couldn't afford to see them if they were pictures because they were, it was like 60P a minute.

I remember my mom on my 14 four board mode. But even that early, even that early moment of the late '90s, early thousands tattooing culture, being online, started to change how people thought about it. But more, more so perhaps with piercing and body mod stuff. So we're talking about things like subdermal implants, tongue splitting that, things like that basically

And I've talked to a really good friend of mine who ran one of the most important very hardcore archives of subcultural body modification practice on the internet in the early 2000s. And he's now, as a much older and wiser man, a bit worried about this question, about what it was that making visible this stuff to people who would perhaps not have encountered it on their own did, for example, so I have a split tongue.

Ben: Oh, wow. Yeah. For those that are seeing the video, that's quite amazing.

Matt: Tongue splitting is the only body modification that we have no anthropological antecedent for until 1997.

Ben: Really?

Matt: Yeah. So there were rumors about it and it being possible from the mid '90s onwards but no one had seen it or proved it was possible until 1997.

And then, some, basically a guy in Italy sent an anonymous photograph of his tongue split to this website, in the middle of 1997. And then instantly, about three or four weeks later, four more people had copied it. And then, I got my insight six years after that, partly because I didn't understand it, and I think the only way to understand it would be to do it.

But would I have independently come to the idea of cutting my tongue in half? Probably not, right? And then you come to the question of the ethics of that proof for another podcast. But this kind of thing, there have been people doing stuff, their body's tattooing and everything else because they had some kind of innate uncommunicated desire.

They didn't see it in magazines. Obviously, it wasn't something they knew was po- possible, but they were trying it out in the privacy of their own homes. And those people are the, men and women are the pioneers of our scenes, if you like. But there is a question about, it's also relevant for lots of other conversations, things like anorexia, body dysmorphia, fashion in general.

Would, if you didn't see it, would you desire it? And if you didn't, is that a bad thing? I think what Instagram's done, really, all it's done is ... and other people differ on this, and this is a sociological question as much as not a historical one. But I think as an art- art historian, I would say what Instagram's done is speed up the cycle.

And I think that's true of all kinds of other forms of cultural production as well, of music and of clothing and of, everything else.

 

Matt: Before, I think tattooing was the kind of thing where and again, this is something that I think is quite obvious from historical record, but wasn't really articulated.

People get tattoos that are linked to the visual culture of their moment. So civilian tattooing and, 300 AD, those, the tattooed images they have match the images we find in their metal work and on their leather work. The same is true in ancient Peruvian mummies. The designs we found on preserved mummies in Peru matched the kind of images that we have on stoneware, for example.

And people in the 19th century after the opening of Japan are getting Japanese style tattoos or tattoos of their favorite paintings. And so I think what Instagram does is just accelerate that. Trends that used to maybe persist for a decade or most of a decade and now over in a couple of years, but it's still just like people getting tattoos that they see that are trendy and cool and that feels, some tattooers feel that is a cheapening of tattooing, but I think in some forms, it is just a version of what's always happened, more or less.

Ben: I can see that with a sort of less controversial example, back to my very first one on dancing, like a lot of people have an impulse to dance. You could say everyone, maybe not everyone has an impulse for body art but some do. And then we've gone into these TikTok and Instagram dances.

So- Yeah. ... you do them.

Matt: Great.

Ben: Some people systemize them and, but they live and die very fast.

Matt: Yeah.

Ben: But presumably we've all wanted to dance. Some of us wanna put it out there and then we copy we've copied dances all through the real- ... that they used to last for longer and now a TikTok dance might last for a month or two or not even.

So I can really see that happening. Now, whether it's true across perhaps smaller impulses, it does seem like we've had an impulse to body mod for a while, maybe not everyone and surfacing that this …


Matt: Things become, even if they're not normative in mainstream society, as they as body modifications and tattoos are in certain places and have been at a certain place in certain times in history they will become normative in subculture, but subculture's much more complicated in the age of the internet.

One of the things that happens in the, basically, and one of the reasons why you'll notice both my books slightly cowardly end around the turn of the millennium and I need to start grappling with that really is because after the turn of millennium, the story is much more difficult to tell because ev- I'm interested in influence in a way and stylistic evolution.

And in, in the era of post-modernity in the 21st century, everything's flat and you can't trace ... There's a really popular style of tattooing now that is called cyber sigilism. People call it spiky tribal. And I can't find any ... Someone may know this, but I haven't found anyone and I've looked, I can't find who started that, that style…  It's everywhere now.

It's very trendy amongst young people. People like me hate it. I don't like it, but that's fine.That's good. If I liked it, it would be bad, as I said- Couldn't be cool. Yeah. Exactly. It's the stuff that's very cool or was, probably was until about five minutes ago. But there must have been, there must have been even if it's not one person, there must have been a kind of subculture somewhere.

I think maybe in Russia is my best guess where that came from, but it doesn't, there's not one person that I can identify or happen to yet to identify who is the originator of that style. And there isn't even, as far as I can tell, a mythology for that other styles in Western tattoo history like black and gray, for example, there is a mythology about who invented it.

So this is just what's happening with the internet. It's too fast, it's too diffused, it's too flat and there's less kind of depth. And I don't mean that critically, just as a fact in, where these styles come from. The other thing as well is about removability. And I think Gen Z have become increasingly comfortable with the idea that tattoos are removable, which is more true than it was when I was younger, but certainly not true.

And there's been a lot of interesting kinds of brouhaha recently about ephemeral tattooing and tattoo removal and how much it costs and stuff. So I think that there's something cultural about that's also lends itself to Instagram. I think Gen Z has begun to think about tattooing as less permanent, which I think is a problem.

And one of the reasons why tattooing, one of the reasons people get asked why, what will you think of when you're older is a weird question for a tattooed person because we, I think most of us are quite, especially heavily tattooed people are very comfortable with the idea of being an old tattoo person.

On AI, and this is it fits into a lot of controversy rightly so about AI use by tattooists which I don't think was quite your question. I think the A- the AI, and we did a whole episode of the podcast about this. What's interesting is that there is a kind of aesthetic of AI now and you will see there are some really incredible tattoos clearly done with AI.

There's lot of bad tattoos done with AI by tattoo artists. And I'm really no fan of it. I'm a very, quite military anti, actually. But one of the interesting things, for example, is that if you look at photorealistic tattooing ... So photorealistic tattooing, again, has its detractors. It's incredibly interesting to me as a technical feat because I've just got all traditional, which is just black lines and color in it.

I don't really understand how it even works. But photo realistic tattooing, obviously, up until very recently was limited by what the customer could bring a photo of, particularly if the artist was not particularly skilled in collaging or drawing photo realistically without direct reference, right?

What you see now is really big, very good, well-executed tattoos that have clearly been composed using AI because you can ask it to put photorealistic details into a, that you can give it into a composition that will work. Now, there's lots of really terrible AI tattoos and I don't even like the ones I'm talking about, but technically they're great tattoos.

And but, and of course, we live in an era of the AI generation, so of course, some people like that, and so some of their tattoos are gonna reflect that aesthetic. That seems like quite an obvious question, in a way, as a historian but not something that, for example, the anthropological account has given much weight to.

Ben: That seems fair. On your earlier point about not knowing where things come from and just observing that's perhaps to do with having a flat culture, I have a pet theory of change or pet theory, limited evidence, but some is that some things are almost becoming an emergent property of how people and things get together, because you have this with memes.

Yeah. So we don't really know how memes come about. Sometimes you have got a trace story, but- Yeah. ... often they seem three or four relatively weak stories- Yeah. ... which somehow morphed together and we've taken that as the narrative of how they come or even TikTok dancers. So that's another form of meme.

And sometimes we have an origin story, but sometimes when I look at them, it feels very weak and people don't really agree, but it seems to be an emergent property of these things, Yeah. ... come together.

Matt: I get I've had the, again, this has been something for a long time, and I think interestingly, one of the mistakes that popular culture and even some bits of academic culture have made about tattooing, which is to overdetermine that kind of thing, what does a certain image mean?

You'll see this a lot on TikTok of people saying "if you've got a spiderweb tattoo, it means you killed someone in prison- ... or if you've got a swallow, you cross the Atlantic or whatever." Someone that I know once who had a teardrop tattooed on his face was stopped at immigration to the United States on his way to go to, this was years and years ago, way before the Trump era, on a way to go to Disneyland on his honeymoon and the border guard basically said "Why haven't you declared your, incarceration history?"

Yeah. I know that having the tattoo, tattoo of a teardrop means you killed someone in prison or whatever it might be. And he was like, "No, I'm just a guy with a tattoo from England who thinks that it looks cool." And this is, again, the story of that chapter in Painted People. But yeah, that overdetermination of thinking about tattooing as non-arbitrary, what we might call in art history iconological, is a real mistake.

I also once got, this time how long ago it was because it was on Tumblr. I once got a Tumblr DM a long time ago from somebody that was, like, obsessed with One Direction, the boy band, and was asking me if Liam's tattoos meant he was really in love with Harry, and I had to go doesn't really work like that, not straightforwardly, at least.

But that's, but that, as you said, that's a mistake that people make, I think, are overdetermining origin or making, understanding this, again, what we might call an academic thinking on this topic extreme intentional theory, like this idea that you only communicate what the author intends.

And I don't, this just can't be true can't be true.

Ben: Wrong question.

Matt: Yeah.

Ben: Maybe coming to the last two or three questions, I thought I'd do a very short section and maybe, because I actually got a sense of where it would be of overrated, underrated. So I'll name something- ... And then you can tell me whether you think it's overrated, underrated.

But we have touched on most of these, but just to clarify but overrated, underrated, then AI. So I'm assuming this is overrated for you- Oh, over, yeah. ... terms of AI as a- way overrated AI as a tool- Yeah. ... is that in fact- Yeah, way

Matt: overrated. ...

Ben: even a little bit sus- not suspicious, but that yeah the output of it, particularly in the world with a two is, is definitely overrated.

Matt: Yeah, dangerous. Yeah. Again, that's, I listen to my podcast I've said about that, because I could learn about that for an hour. Overrated.

Ben: And then and then laser removal. So I got the sense that this was overrated as well, or rather the concept of that, I guess the core idea of it too is that it does last through time.

So m- maybe if you get one with the fact that you're going to remove it later, then that's maybe something else. I don't know. So laser removal, overrated, underrated.

Matt: So I think it's ... So I don't know. I'm somewhere in the middle of that. I think actually s- some people do ascribe a kind of moral weight to that phenomenon that you're talking about.

The idea that actually, getting a tattoo removed is somehow a bad thing. I think that the increasing improvements of lasers is actually a pretty good thing. If you've got a tattoo that's bad, if you've got a tattoo that you don't want anymore, if you have a tattoo, if you've just run out, as a friend of mine did run out of space, because she, her whole body was tattooed, like head to toe, and she just ran out of room wanting to get tattooed more.

So she got basically a whole bodysuit removed and is going over it with new stuff. She happens to know the tech- the se- laser technician, so I don't think she's paying full price for those sessions and the tattooers as well. But I think the technology's, it's really interesting. I think there's gonna, I think there's real interesting health implications and I think, I, there are some people, and I probably would include myself in this to some degree, actually who think that if tattoos became instantly or easily in cheaply removal, it would slightly detract from what makes them interesting and important in the first place.

I think I probably would count myself to some degree in that camp.

Ben: Okay. Interesting. So yeah, a bit more pots and takes than that. And then tattoos in museums, overrated or underrated?

Matt: Underrated I'm doing a big exhibition next year in collaboration with the National Museum of Wales about female tattoo artist Jesse Knight who's an incredible woman.

And I've worked very hard over the last five or six years. I did ... I collaborated on an exhibition at the Museum of London in 2017. I did a big touring exhibition between 2017 and 2020 2021, and then I'm doing this show next year at the National Museum of Wales. And I've worked very hard to get collections into museums and archives.

So Jesse's collection, I helped ... I convinced the Arts Council that it was a nationally important ar- art historical collection and was saved for the nation by the National Museum of Wales. And I'm the trustee of an archive called the Bishops Gate Institute which now has two major archives of queer tattoo history that I helped them acquire.

And I think it's important that, especially as actually loads of the big collectors who have big intact contingent collection, con- contiguous collections are starting to die off or disperse their collections, that we find ways to keep tattooing ephemeral history in institutional collections because once they're dispersed to private collections they disappear.

Private collectors are amazing. The reason that, that the history of Western Tattooing has been preserved as well as it has done, but it's very fr- we're in a very fragile moment where most of the big collectors are, coming, getting on in, in age, some have already died, and there's very diff- very difficult in the state of how museums are funded, how museums work to understand what's gonna happen to those collections-  in the next decade or so.

Ben: important to archive, as we said, in, in collect- collect, yeah.

Matt: Yeah, but I, interestingly, I think partly because of my work, but just in general, due to the kind of cultural changes that's been happening in the museum sector around the world, there is an increasing interest in, history be- beyond the kind of standard things that museums have tended to do, and tattooing has felt like something, that, that can attract, and it does work to attract new audiences.

I think it has to be done carefully and properly. But yeah, I think the challenges of actually preserving tattooed skin is a real issue, obviously and morally and ethically and legally increasingly complicated even those human remains that are tattooed that are in museums already. But it's an inter- it's an interesting time and an interesting problem and I think we're trying to find ways to get around these issues.

When I did my exhibition in Cornwall, we worked with a friend and went to Alice Snape who ran a tattoo magazine at the time to basically get tattooers in around the country. We did a hundred tattooers in Britain to tattoo rubber hands-

Ben: Wow. ...

Matt: to create an archival stylistic index, three-dimensional stylistic record of the kind of tattoos that were happening in Britain in 2017 that will now, that are now permanently part of the collection of the National Museum of Cornwall that hopefully will be there for some tattoo historian in a in a century or so to come to go back and have a look at those, three-dimensional objects.

So yeah, it's interesting. And of course now with digital preservation and things, there are ways of preserving this stuff in a way that hasn't been before.



Ben: Last one in this one, just because I listened to your recent podcast on this and was amazed would be eye tattoos, do you think-

Matt: Oh, yeah.

Ben: overrated, underrated.

Matt: Oh, over, overrated entirely, terrible idea. Even people I know that were early pioneers think that they were a terrible idea not really tattooing in a conventional sense. Yeah. Yeah, we did the whole episode about, about t- again, TikTok led trends for Irish tattooing and then subcultural te- tech trends for corneal tattooing, both of which strike me as just a terrible idea.

I've got bad enough eyes anyway- Yeah. ... I'm not gonna risk doing

Ben: Anything. I have to see, yeah, like Franco B- visceral, but it didn't make me queasy. Hearing about eye teas, I don't know whether something about the eye did actually make me feel a bit queasy-

Matt: All people are funny about eyes, aren't they?

Yeah. Yeah. I think what's interesting about that, again, the eye tattooing was something that there was a small group of people in the early 2000s, the same, literally in some cases, the same people that were doing the tongue splitting stuff, who really had a kind of very gonzo attitude that they were at the frontier of some really interesting corporeal hacking, which I find very interesting again, a topic for another day and very brave.

And those guys and gals were, like, they knew what they were doing in some senses, even though their risk reward ratios were calibrated- Yeah. ... in a particular way that I think is good. And there's a difference importantly in a lot of this between brave and reckless, they were brave, not reckless.

I think anyone roaring their eyes or towing anyone else's eyes these days is pretty reckless. And we talked about in the episode, some really egregious examples of that where people have blinded themselves and blinded others. It just doesn't seem like a good idea. And even people I know that have done it, as I said most, nearly all of them would agree that it's not a good idea.

Ben: Gotta know where you draw the line. Okay, last couple of questions. What current and future projects, anything you'd like to highlight? Obviously, you do your lecturing, you still curate, organize exhibitions, not sure if you're working on other book projects or anything, but anything you'd like to highlight for listeners?

Matt: Yeah, there's a couple of interesting things. I'm still trying to nail down the next big solo publication. I've got a couple of things in the fire. I wanna write more about this tattoo and Mr. Sebastian, who I talk about in Painted People and Tattoos, was involved in a really interesting court case called RV Brown in the late 80s, early 90s about gay men and sadomasochism.

So I wanna write a book about that. I'm doing a law degree in the service of trying to write more about that. I'm doing this exhibition with the Nationation of Wales as a consultant opening next year. I'm assisting a p- a a, on a big kind of coffee table anthology of global tattoo practices.

I'm not writing, but I'm assisting on. And with some colleagues in Japan, we're trying to do a kind of almost version of Painted People for Ja- Japan. So we're trying to do a kind of history of Japan told through the history of tattooing books, but that's in discussions at the moment and it requires some thought.

So I've always got more stuff on the go than I've got real time to do, but I'm always trying to keep up with things. There's, and there's lots of interesting smaller things happening as well. But those are the big ones. This summer's gonna be mainly working on the Jesse Knight exhibition that's gonna open in Cardiff in March 2027.

Ben: That sounds amazing. And the last question is do you have any advice for listeners? Thinking about this, perhaps the question I would ask is if you're interested in somebody's tattoos, what should you ask them? Or I guess you could also, we could also do people who are interested in having one.

Are there any reflections- ... that you might have? 'Cause there seem to be a lot of obvious questions that we probably shouldn't ask I think we mentioned a couple d- maybe don't ask-

Matt: Does it hurt?

Ben: Yeah. Does it hurt? What is it gonna look like in 20 years and like all of those obvious ones, but I'd be interested in, what's the question you would like to be asked.

And then maybe one of the people listening to this at night thinking "Oh, I have, I do have this impulse." Yeah. Where should they lead themselves with that impulse?

Matt: I think, so when I started out, and one, again, one of the reasons why I became so obsessed with tattooing anyway is that it was quite hard to find good tattoos to and by that technically and competently execute as much as anything else.

Like when I was in my late teens, the tattoos that I was seeing in tattoo magazines that I was importing from the United States didn't look anything like the tattoos that my mates were getting underage at the local toy shop in Essex. That's less true now. A quick kind of Instagram search will, if you're going to a reputable studio, we'll rev- they're really incredibly good, technically good tattoos in ev- in any, in every town in the country.

So if you want something small or a single tattoo you're really spoiled for choice now in a way that I wasn't before. I think a lot of people imagined, and this is partly, I think also one of the problems with AI, people think you have to bring the thing you want, like the image you want tattooed with you.

Most tattooers are, especially increasingly now themselves artists and are able to draw you something which will work to your brief. So I think the thing is to look for tattooers whose style you like and then just go and meet with them, go and have a, go and have a conversation with them and talk to them about the kind of thing you want, l- look at their portfolios online, look at look for heeled work, because I think a lot of people, particularly if you're interested in very small tattooing or very kind of complex tatting, a lot of the stuff on, online is photo edited these days.

So the best tattoo is all post healed work. So ask to see that. But really find a tattoo who you're comfortable with, whose work you, you're interested in and who who you wanna spend some time with because obviously, every second of every tattoo you get, you're gonna have to be sitting there with them so it's important to get towed by people you get on with.

In terms of asking questions about other people's tattoos, I think those, in a way, these questions are the same. When I was younger, I got groped, even as a kind of man I got groped by people in public. They'd come up and they'd pull my sleeves up or they'd start tugging at my collar.

That happens less now, at least to me. I'm sure there are people who can report this happening to them. But I think if you wanna talk to someone about their tattoos, I think they, I think just say, "Hey, your sales are really interesting or cool, the, I think the best question to ask is who did them," right?

Because that gets you into the kind of questions that I'm talking about, which is where are they based, what kind of styles do they do? What kind of person are they? How long ago did you get it so you can see how things heal, for example, I've got tattoos on my hands, you see online, they say… don't get tattoos in your hands because they'll fade.

These are, like, 20 years old and they're still more or less the same color they were made.

Ben: Yeah.

Matt: Yeah, those faded a bit. But I think that's the thing. And for me, this is also, to circle right back to the start, one of the key insights of my work, which is actually to think about the tattoo artist, because there are whole books, and certainly socio- sociology and criminology less anthropology, really but certainly

Oh, not a bit, but cer- certainly sociology of tattooing was r- and psychology of tattooing was really premised on the person with the tattoo, and I was like, "What about the tattoo artist, who have their portfolios, even back then, had their portfolios in printed form, now have Instagrams." They don't care about what the person's tattoo is, the person on whom the tattoo is, their story or their motivation, they just wanna present it as their interesting artwork.

And so I think thinking about the tattoo artists, their skill, their history, their interests, their style their art, their training artistically all of those things are gonna be interesting questions, or at least, if not questions, kind of facts about them which will help you as a customer find the tote you want, the thing we say, the thing we say in the two inches, go bold go big or go home, bold will hold. So if you want a little tiny tattoo, that's fine, but I'd always say get a big cool tattoo. Yeah.

Ben: Be cool. Oh, that sounds great. So first advice, don't grope anyone. Yeah, don't, yeah. That's

Matt: Just, that's just blanket advice.

Oh, yeah. Throw it here first, people.

Ben: Don't grope anyone.

Matt: Don't grab at people's clothes.

Ben: But the other one that's interesting is to ask about the artist. 

Matt: The artist. Yeah. Ask who did it.

Ben: Yeah. Great.

Matt: Yeah. And some people ... O- o- for small tattoos, people won't necessarily even remember because it was just a little Stevenier tattoo or something that took 50, 50 minutes or something.

And that's fine too. But certainly for bigger work, certainly for more elaborate work, I think the right question is always the first question's always who did that. Then you can ask, does it hurt in that part of the body, for example? And the answer is always yes, right? Of course, it hurts.

Some places are more painful than others. But the first question should always be, I think, who did it. And that's what, when I go to conventions, when I talk to tattooed people that I meet, that's always the first question I wanna know is who did that.

Ben: Great. That's amazing.

With that, Matt I will once again say you've written Painted People, get the book, and also the Untold History of a modern art. And with that, Matt, thank you very much.

Matt: Thanks so much, Benjamin. Before we finish, have you got any tattoos?

Ben: No, I don't. 

Matt: A Blank.

Ben: Yeah, I am blank and no body mods either. I have, yeah, I have been fascinated about it, but I haven't I've like a small impulse, but there's other lots and bits of fear which I've not met I've I haven't crossed the Rubicon yet, but-

Matt: Yeah, the first one's the hardest one. The first one's the hardest one, so that's good.

Ben: My art teacher always used to say that the first stroke is always the deepest.

Matt: Great. Thank you for having me. I really appreciate it. Great questions. It's really wonderful.

Ben: Thank you.




Social media bans for children: do they make sense?

Social media bans for children: do they make sense?

Governments are beginning to reach for big levers to deal with the perceived harms of social media. Australia’s decision to bar under 16 year olds from major platforms is one of the boldest examples so far. The intention is clear enough: protect children from an environment that looks increasingly hostile to their attention, self esteem and mental health.*

This essay looks at three questions:

  1. What does the evidence actually say about social media and youth mental health.

  2. How different philosophical traditions would think about this type of regulation.

  3. Whether a blanket under 16 ban is a sensible policy instrument, even if one accepts the aims.

My conclusion is that the evidence for serious average harm is weak, the harms are concentrated in subgroups, and that this specific policy is an extremely blunt instrument compared with the alternatives.

1. The evidence: how harmful is social media for adolescents?

The political story is simple. The data is not.

There are now several big reviews and meta analyses of the link between social media or “screen time” and adolescent mental health.

A widely cited review by Candice Odgers and Michaeline Jensen concludes that most studies find “a mix of often conflicting small positive, negative and null associations.” The most rigorous large preregistered studies show small associations between daily digital use and well being that are “unlikely to be of clinical or practical significance” and do not distinguish cause from effect. (PubMed)

Amy Orben and Andrew Przybylski use specification curve analysis on three large datasets of around 355,000 adolescents and find that digital technology use explains at most about 0.4 percent of the variance in well being. (PubMed) That is trivially small. You can detect it in huge samples, but no clinician would treat it as a major driver.

A broad 2022 review by Patti Valkenburg and colleagues sums up the field in almost comically cautious terms. They note that most reviews interpret the association between social media use and mental health as “weak” or “inconsistent”, a few call it “substantial” and “deleterious”, and they spend the rest of the paper explaining why the same underlying numbers are being described in such different ways. (ScienceDirect)

More recent meta analyses tighten the picture without really changing it:

  • A 2024 meta analysis by Ahmed et al finds weak but statistically significant associations between social media use and depression, anxiety and sleep problems in young people, and stronger associations for “problematic social media use” that looks more addictive. (PubMed)

  • A 2024 JAMA Pediatrics meta analysis by Fassi et al covers 143 studies and more than one million adolescents. In clinical samples they find a correlation between time spent on social media and internalising symptoms of about r = 0.08, and between engagement based metrics and symptoms of about r = 0.12. Community samples look very similar. (JAMA Network)

Translate that: r = 0.08 means that about 0.6 percent of the variation in symptoms is associated with time spent. r = 0.12 gives around 1.4 percent for engagement. That is measurable, but tiny.

There is stronger evidence that teens with existing mental health conditions use social media more and experience it differently. A 2025 paper by the same group shows that adolescents with diagnosed conditions spend more time on social media and are less satisfied with their online friendships than peers without conditions. (Nature) That is compatible with a story where vulnerable teens are drawn into patterns of use that do not help them.

On top of the correlational work there are a handful of randomised experiments, mostly in young adults, where people are asked to deactivate or sharply cut back on social media for a few weeks. These tend to find small improvements in life satisfaction, loneliness or depressive symptoms, especially for heavy or distressed users, but the effects are modest, the time frames are short and the participants are volunteers. (sarahdomoff.com)

Across this literature, there are consistent methodological problems:

  • Almost everything is correlational, not causal. Depressed kids may be more likely to spend time online.

  • Measures of “time on social media” are mostly self report and inaccurate.

  • “Social media use” lumps together very different behaviours and content.

  • Many studies are low quality by basic survey standards and are not preregistered. (NC DOCKS)

The one place where the signal looks meaningfully stronger is for clearly “problematic” or “addictive” use. Systematic reviews of problematic social media use in adolescents and young adults find much larger and more consistent associations with depression, anxiety and stress than for simple time based measures. (mental.jmir.org)

So a fair reading of the evidence is something like:

  • For most adolescents, total time on social media has a small, probably trivial association with mental health.

  • For a minority of adolescents who use social media in compulsive, distress driven ways, the association with poor outcomes is larger and may be clinically relevant.

  • We have some experimental hints that cutting use can help, but not enough to support confident large scale causal claims.

By contrast, the evidence linking alcohol, drugs and gambling to harm in adolescents is overwhelming. There is no serious debate about whether heavy drinking, early drug use or adolescent gambling increase risk of bad outcomes. The argument is about the best mix of taxation, regulation and treatment, not about whether the harms exist.

If you are ranking risk factors purely on evidence, “time spent on social media” is not in the same league as alcohol, drugs or gambling.

2. Philosophical lenses on social media bans

Given that empirical backdrop, how should we think about something as heavy handed as an under 16 social media ban?

Different philosophical traditions put the emphasis in different places. Three questions keep coming back:

  1. How bad is the harm, and for whom.

  2. How much do we trust the state compared with parents and platforms.

  3. Do we want to train citizens for autonomy inside a flawed attention economy, or shield them and hope to fix the system before they enter.

Classical liberalism.

On a Mill style harm principle view, the state should step in only to prevent serious harm to others, not to protect people from themselves. Children are a partial exception, since their autonomy is limited and the state already sets age limits for alcohol, sex, driving and so on. A classical liberal could accept targeted rules that deal with clear harms, but a blanket ban on whole platforms interferes with freedom of expression and association, and overrides parental judgment. Given that the evidence points to small average harms, it is hard to argue that the high bar for coercive state action has been met.

Child centred rights.

Taking the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child seriously means treating children as rights holders, not simply as passive objects of protection. They have rights to seek information, express views and associate with others, as well as rights to protection. A ban can be cast as a right to protection from manipulative platform design. It can also be criticised as sacrificing the rights of competent 14 or 15 year olds to participate in online culture and politics, and as cutting off lifeline communities for queer or otherwise marginalised teens. On this view, the state should be very reluctant to impose blanket restrictions that do not distinguish between different young people.

Strong paternalism.

A more paternalistic philosophy is comfortable with the idea that the state should sometimes override individual or parental preferences “for their own good”, particularly for vulnerable groups. If you see social media as the new tobacco, the temptation is obvious: just keep children away until they are 16, whatever clever workarounds they manage. This view puts less weight on fine grained evidence and more on a general sense that the environment is toxic and that firms will not self regulate. The cost is a long list of knock on restrictions, since once you admit broad paternalism it is hard to draw principled lines.

Consequentialism.

A consequentialist asks only: what policy optimises overall welfare. If you assume that the ban sharply reduces harmful use, reduces anxiety and self harm, shifts kids toward healthier activities and does not create serious new harms, then you support it. If you accept the small average effect sizes, the likely workarounds, the privacy costs of age verification, and the loss of positive online communities for some groups, the picture flips. On realistic assumptions, the net impact of this particular ban is at best unclear and quite plausibly negative compared with more targeted design regulation plus mental health support.

Virtue and autonomy.

A virtue ethics angle is interested in the kind of character we are helping to form. Constant algorithmic stimulation is not a neutral backdrop. It shapes attention, patience and self control. You can argue that a period of protection from the worst attention factories during adolescence gives young people room to develop better habits. You can also argue that a pure ban denies them practice in managing temptations and learning to live well with technology. Either way, if the policy simply delays exposure until 16 with no education or scaffolding, it is an odd approach to cultivating responsible digital citizens.

Across these perspectives, there is no single correct answer. But they sharpen what the real disputes are about. This is less a fight over whether children deserve protection, and more a fight over how much power the state should wield, how much respect we give to child and parental agency, and whether we think design level interventions are preferable to blunt prohibitions.

3. How well does an under 16 ban actually work?

Even if you think the harms are serious and the state should lean in, you still have to ask whether the instrument works.

There are several obvious problems.

It is easy to work around.

Any enforcement scheme relies on age verification. Platforms will use self declaration, age inference, selfies, third party age assurance services or some combination. Tech literate teenagers will route around this with VPNs, burner accounts, older friends’ details, or by moving to smaller, less regulated platforms. You end up in the familiar pattern where compliant families follow the law, non compliant ones exploit loopholes, and the most vulnerable teens are often the most determined to find side doors.

It has privacy costs for everyone.

To keep under 16s out, platforms have to get better at knowing who is under 16. That pushes the system toward more pervasive data collection and profiling. The state can prohibit mandatory use of government ID, but the pressure to build or contract age verification infrastructure is obvious. There is a real risk that a policy justified as “protecting children” accelerates a wider surveillance trend.

It undermines parental agency.

Parents already have direct control over phones, devices, app stores and home rules. They can deny smartphones entirely, delay social media for their own kids, or allow carefully supervised access. A ban removes the option where a thoughtful parent allows their mature 15 year old to use locked down social media for specific purposes. It also encourages a culture of quiet evasion, where parents and children collude in breaking rules they consider unreasonable.

It ignores the design problem.

The deeper issue is not simply that teenagers exist on social media. It is the recommender systems, infinite scroll, notifications and engagement incentives that shape what users see and how long they stay. The ban hardly touches the design of the system. It simply says “come back when you are 16.” That might delay exposure for some. It does nothing for 16 to 25 year olds, who are also vulnerable, and it does not reward platforms that redesign their products to be less predatory.

It has opportunity costs.

Political and regulatory bandwidth is finite. A big symbolic ban that dominates the headlines can crowd out quieter but more effective reforms: algorithmic transparency, ad restrictions for minors, design standards for feeds and notifications, funding for school based digital literacy, and expanded youth mental health services. Once the government has “done something big”, the temptation to declare victory is strong.

None of this means the policy has no upsides. It probably will reduce usage for a segment of younger teens whose parents are not particularly engaged. It sends a clear signal to platforms that governments are willing to take tough action. It may shift norms so that parents feel more confident delaying smartphones or social media and can say “the law is on my side.”

But if the underlying empirical signal is small and highly heterogeneous, and if the harms are concentrated in subgroups with problematic use, then a policy that is both crude and easily circumvented looks poorly matched to the problem.

4. Where does that leave us?

Start from the evidence. The association between social media use and adolescent mental health is real but small for most, more serious for a minority with addictive patterns of use, and entangled with a long list of other social and economic changes. It is nowhere near as clear or as strong as the evidence for harms from alcohol, drugs or gambling in adolescents.

Layer on the philosophy. If you care about child rights and liberal freedoms, you are naturally wary of blanket bans that override parental judgment and erase the difference between a competent 15 year old and an 11 year old. If you are strongly paternalist, you may be more comfortable, but you still need a policy that works in practice and does not generate worse side effects.

Finally, look at the instrument. A national under 16 ban on social media is easy to explain and politically attractive. It is also leaky, privacy heavy and tangential to the core design problems of the attention economy.

A more proportionate response would focus on:

  • Serious enforcement of under 13 rules that already exist.

  • Tiered protections for 13 to 17 year olds that change how platforms can target, recommend and notify, rather than simply whether they may exist.

  • Binding design standards for addictive features when minors are present.

  • Investment in digital literacy and mental health support rather than only constraint.

Personal addendum

On first principles, I lean toward child centred rights and liberal freedoms. Children are not simply passive objects to be protected. They are emerging citizens with their own interests in information, expression and association. Parents are not simply obstacles to be bypassed by the state. They are usually the best placed to calibrate what their particular child can handle.

From that perspective, I am sceptical of any blanket ban that excludes all under 16 year olds from major online spaces, regardless of maturity, context or parental consent. When you add in the weakness of the average evidence, and the practical workarounds, this particular policy looks like a bad fit: rhetorically strong, empirically underpowered and structurally clumsy.

There is a serious problem to solve. But if we care about both children and freedom, we should spend less time congratulating ourselves for simple bans, and more time doing the harder work of reshaping the digital environment they are growing up in.

*Note. Drafted with input from GPT 5. I have not double checked the evidence review but aligns with what I have read. Also see Peter Gray for a child rights centred view and critique of evidence.


Deirdre McCloskey: Liberal defence of queer, Permission to be queer: the case for liberty

McCloskey on liberal defense of queerness

Summary of McCloskey’s lecture and the Q&A, focusing on queer issues, liberalism, and the state. My bullets edited by AI and summary (end), and long form start.  (Based on YT )

Deirdre McCloskey talk about queerness and liberalism at the LSE. It was part memoir, part political theory, part hand drawn graph in the air. McCloskey is funny and sharp and also quite blunt about who scares her.

She used to be Donald. She transitioned in the mid 1990s, in her fifties, and became Deirdre, keeping the initial D so librarians could follow the trail. Economist by training, historian and philosopher by practice, she situates herself with Adam Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft and Thomas Paine rather than with modern technocrats.

The talk was anchored around a simple phrase she is turning into a book for Chicago: equality of permission.

Equality of permission

McCloskey’s claim is that the best version of liberalism is not about equal outcomes, and not even about fully equal opportunity, which is impossible to deliver in any serious sense. It is about equality of permission.

Everyone should be allowed to have a go. The law removes formal obstacles. You can speak, trade, worship, move, love, change your gender, write obscure economics papers. The state does not promise you a result, it simply gets out of your way.

She calls this primary liberalism and dates its breakthrough moments to Jefferson’s 1776 “all men are created equal” and the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. She reads both as demands to be allowed onto the pitch, not demands for the state to fix the scoreline.

Then comes a second wave in the mid nineteenth century. On the Continent this shows up as European socialism. In Britain and the United States, as New Liberalism and Progressivism. It is the moment when people become proud of using the state from the top down. Clear the slums, rebuild Paris, plan the city, regulate the poor. Urban planning and social engineering are born.

The first liberalism is bottom up. The second starts to say, we know best.

You do not have to guess which one she prefers.

“Do anything you want, but do not spook the horses”

She grounds this in a line from her grandmother that she clearly loves:

Do anything you want, but do not spook the horses.

In other words: be queer, transition, live strangely, write odd books. The line is not drawn at what offends taste, it is drawn at serious harm. No dynamite in the town square. No big externalities.

She links this to her Christianity. She became Anglican in 1998. She quotes both Jesus and Rabbi Hillel. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Do not do to others what you would not want done to you. Very basic ethics. She is happy to say this is not sophisticated political philosophy, it is simply “let us just get along”.

The obvious problem is that this kind of liberalism can be vulnerable to people who are perfectly willing to use free institutions in order to destroy them. Liberties for those who want to end liberty. She knows that, and still thinks the liberal starting point is right.

The personal story

She does not just argue from theory. She anchors it in her own body.

At eleven she says she fell asleep praying for two things: to wake up a girl and to stop stuttering. Roughly two percent of boys stutter and around half a percent of girls, the ratio is surprisingly stable across cultures. At fifty three she jokes that she got half her wish. She transitioned in 1995 in a liberal enough society that she could.

Her mother’s reaction matters here. You have had a man’s career, which was an advantage, she told her, now you get to be an old woman, which is better. McCloskey repeats that line a few times, with a certain relish.

She also pushes back on a neat narrative that she was always an obviously feminine boy. She presents herself as macho. Captain of her high school American football team. Married to a woman for thirty years. Attracted to women. Gender identity sat underneath that life, not on the surface.

One of the biggest discoveries after transition was female friendship. In her view, men think they have many friends but mostly do not. Women form lots of light friendships quickly and then a small number of very deep ones, which are emotionally costly. Transition changed who befriended her and how. The social pattern shifted along with the hormones and clothes.

Queer life, DEI and the state

On queerness she is clear. Contact with “the queers, the immigrants, the others” is one of the gifts of the modern world if we let it be. Reading queer memoirs, or simply having queer colleagues and neighbours, expands our sense of what a human life can look like. It makes us wiser.

She defends diversity, equity and inclusion as practice and ethos. She also draws a line at state enforcement. She wants universities, firms and individuals to practise inclusion out of ethical conviction. She does not want a bureaucracy writing quotas and detailed mandates into law. It is very McCloskey: change hearts, remove legal barriers, be wary of giving the state more coercive tools.

Here she moves into economist mode. She draws a graph in the air.

On the vertical axis: human flourishing. Income, wellbeing, spiritual growth, however you want to define it. There is a zero line. Below it sits Orwell’s boot on a human face forever. Above it sits ordinary decent life. She adds Cadbury’s Whole Nut as a small but important component of British flourishing and complains about what Hershey has done to the US version.

On the horizontal axis: amount of coercion, especially state coercion.

Her argument goes like this. At zero coercion, life is not great. If your three year old runs into the road, you physically restrain them. You do not hold a seminar on autonomy. Some state coercion is essential. Police, courts, basic criminal law.

The problem, she says, is that many economists and technocrats behave as if you can keep adding regulation and nudges and always climb higher up the flourishing axis. More tricks, more programmes, more control, always more.

A liberal who believes in diminishing returns should be sceptical. In her picture the curve rises at first, then flattens, then turns down. At some point extra state power starts to reduce human flourishing. For her, using the state to police bathrooms, clothing, pronouns or consensual sex is well into the downward part of that curve.

She is also insistent on a bright line between words and violence. Harsh speech and physical coercion are not the same category. Words hurt, of course. As a trans woman in the Netherlands who could not pass well in early years, she knows what it is to be read as “a man in a dress”. It is painful. But she can live with insults and misgendering. What she cannot accept is being arrested for using the women’s loo. The legal system should focus on actual violence and the threat of it, not on policing speech.

Where she draws lines

She spends time on Kathleen Stock. McCloskey treats Stock as intelligent and as a friend, not as a cartoon villain. They have debated on trans women and single sex spaces at the University of Austin.

McCloskey disagrees strongly with Stock’s view that trans women should be excluded from women only spaces such as changing rooms and toilets. The implied logic is that you end up with a police officer and some kind of gender inspector outside every public bathroom. She finds that absurd and dangerous.

On elite sport, though, she draws a different boundary. She agrees that post puberty male bodies should not compete in women’s events. Physiology matters. Heart size, muscle mass, frame. If you care about women’s sport at all, you have to protect the category. Her compromise is that someone who blocks puberty early and never develops male secondary traits is a different case from someone who transitions at eighteen and wants to race in the women’s 100 metres.

Bathrooms yes. Women’s Olympic finals no.

On affirmative action she is blunt. Programmes are easy to start and hard to end. The better route is to remove explicit legal barriers and then let people compete. She uses Ruth Bader Ginsburg as an example. Ginsburg graduated near the top of her class and still could not get hired because she was a woman. She became a professor and then a lawyer who spent decades chipping away at formal barriers rather than lobbying for engineered outcomes.

Equal outcomes are impossible. Perfect equality of opportunity is impossible. Equality of permission is feasible. Let women be pilots, lawyers, MPs, and stop the law saying no.

Queer rights, populism and making liberalism cool again

A student asks what really shifts queer rights: culture, law, or economics. McCloskey points to same sex marriage. In 1990, in the US, gay marriage was politically unthinkable. Within about twenty years it was law. Spain, not Britain, was first in Europe. The key, in her view, was framing it as equality of permission. Your soul and my soul have the same worth. You marry the person you love. I marry the person I love. The state should treat us on the same terms. Once phrased like that, change can be fast.

The end of the session turns to the backlash. In the US, MAGA politics has made trans people the new hate target. In Britain she sees hostility to trans women more from some segments of the left. She thinks the United States is now sliding down the wrong side of the coercion curve toward more authoritarian reflex and less liberal instinct. She calls Trump a bad man, quite straightforwardly, and notes that he is not even a particularly clever authoritarian. The smart ones raise the temperature on the frog slowly.

How to respond. Her answer is mostly cultural. Make liberalism cool again. She jokes about calling it adultism. Other ideologies treat the state as parent and citizens as children. Liberalism treats people as grown ups. Invite young people into that. Do not just write papers. Ask artists, musicians, filmmakers to tell stories of freedom and responsibility.

…for McCloskey queer lives and liberalism are not in tension. They belong together. Let people live as themselves. Change hearts faster than you give governments new tools. Watch the state like a hawk. And, in the background, keep her grandmother in mind: do anything you want, just do not spook the horses.

This is bullet point version.

1. Who she is and how she frames herself

  • Trained as an economist, now works as historian, philosopher, social and political theorist. 

  • (I found it interesting, she started as a socialist, and now would be a Christian liberterian or liberal - as opposed to Randian. Difference, she cares about the poor (like she did as socialist), but Randian’s dont so much. That why she would defined capitalism, as good for poor people)

  • Self description:

    • “Once a man until 1995”, previously Donald McCloskey.

    • Transitioned in a liberal society and chose the name Deirdre to keep the initial D for librarians and because of its Irish roots and feminine connotations.

  • Jokes that she is “Donald’s smarter sister” and that she has become wiser through experience.

  • Strong identification with classical liberalism in the line of Adam Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Thomas Paine, Thoreau.

  • Calls herself a “classics groupie” and positions herself explicitly as an eighteenth century style liberal.



2. Core thesis: “Equality of permission” and primary liberalism

  • She is finishing a book called Equality of Permission.

  • Key idea:

    • Liberalism at its core is about equality of permission, not equality of outcome or even engineered equality of opportunity.

    • Everyone should be “allowed to have a go”, to try things, without artificial obstacles.

  • She calls this “primary liberalism” and dates its political breakthrough to:

    • 1776: Jefferson’s “all men are created equal”.

    • 1789: French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

  • Primary liberalism:

    • Bottom up.

    • About removing legal barriers and giving people permission to act, speak, trade, migrate, love.

    • Not about micromanaging social outcomes.



3. Secondary liberalism, socialism, and progressivism

  • She distinguishes a second wave of liberal or progressive thought around 1848:

    • Continental revolutions and the birth of European socialism, including Marx but not only Marx.

    • In Britain and the United States this second wave appears as “New Liberalism” or “progressivism”.

  • Features of this second wave:

    • Top down use of the state to “help the poor” and redesign society.

    • Urban planning and clearance (for example Haussmann’s reconstruction of Paris).

    • Strong belief in state capacity to engineer better outcomes.

  • Her verdict:

    • Primary liberalism is bottom up and permission focused.

    • Secondary liberalism and socialism are top down, state heavy, and prone to overreach.



4. Her grandmother’s rule: “Do anything you want, but don’t spook the horses”

  • She builds a lot on a family motto:

    • “Do anything you want, but do not spook the horses.”

  • Interpretation:

    • People should be free to be queer, change gender, write economics articles, live as they like.

    • The boundary is significant external harm to others, not mere disapproval.

    • No metaphorical “stick of dynamite in the town square” that panics society.

  • She treats this as a simple, humane formulation of liberal ethics.



5. Christianity, Rabbi Hillel, and the ethics she claims

  • She became an Anglican Christian in 1998.

  • She anchors her liberalism in:

    • Jesus’ formulation: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.”

    • Rabbi Hillel’s older formulation: “Do not do unto others what you would not want done to you.”

  • She calls these “gospels of love and justice”.

  • Political ethic:

    • “Let us just get along” is how she characterises modern liberalism at its best.

    • Minimal, non sophisticated politics that simply aims at peaceful coexistence and mutual respect.



6. Personal narrative about gender and stuttering

  • Childhood:

    • As an eleven year old, she prayed at night for two miracles:

      • To wake up as a girl.

      • To stop stuttering.

    • She notes that about 2 percent of boys stutter and about 0.5 percent of girls do, across cultures.

  • At age 53, in 1995, she transitions:

    • Interprets this as finally getting half of her childhood prayer.

    • Credits the freedom of a modern liberal society for making transition possible.

  • Her mother’s reaction:

    • Mother viewed it as Deirdre gaining both experiences, a career as a man and old age as a woman, which she presents as a kind of enlargement of life.

  • She emphasises:

    • She was a very “macho” man, captain level high school football player, straight, married to a woman for 30 years.

    • Transition was not about being a feminine gay man, but about something more basic and persistent in gender identity.



7. Discovery of female friendship

  • One of her biggest surprises after transition:

    • She claims men rarely have many true friends, even if they think they do.

    • Women often have many light friendships formed quickly and a small number of very deep friendships, which she found “costly” but profound.

  • She paints her transition as a revelation in social and emotional structures, not just clothes and pronouns.



8. Queer people, DEI, and diversity as human enrichment

  • She defends diversity, equity, and inclusion in a “sensible” form:

    • Accepts that DEI can be taken too far, as can drinking water.

    • Argues that contact with “queers, immigrants, other people” enlarges our humanity.

    • Reading queer autobiographies, novels, and meeting people different from oneself helps produce wiser adults.

  • She jokes that “DEI” is literally her first name, so she is sensitive about attacks on DEI.

  • Crucial distinction:

    • She wants individuals and institutions to practice DEI out of ethical conviction.

    • She does not want the state to coerce DEI policies as a direct programmatic mandate.



9. The diagram: human flourishing vs coercion

She presents her central policy intuition in a simple diagram:

  • Axes:

    • Vertical axis: human flourishing, which can mean income, spiritual flourishing, or broader welfare.

    • Horizontal axis: amount of coercion, especially state coercion.

  • Starting point:

    • Some coercion is clearly necessary and positive, for example grabbing a three year old child away from traffic.

    • She accepts police, criminal law, and the state’s monopoly of violence as necessary.

  • Main claim:

    • Most economists act as if more regulation and coercion always increases human flourishing.

    • In that view the curve keeps sloping upward as you add regulation.

  • Her liberal view:

    • There are diminishing returns to state coercion.

    • The curve rises at low levels of coercion, plateaus, then falls.

    • Past a certain point, additional regulation makes things worse.

  • Application to queer and gender issues:

    • Using the state to police bathrooms, dress, gender identity, or consensual sexual behaviour is beyond the optimal point.

    • That kind of intervention is on the downward part of the curve, reducing human flourishing.



10. Physical coercion vs words

  • She rejects the idea that harsh speech is “coercion” in the same sense as physical force:

    • Argues for a bright line between physical coercion and verbal persuasion.

    • Says equating “verbal rape” with physical rape trivialises actual violence.

    • Uses the childhood line “sticks and stones can break my bones, but names can never hurt me” to capture the distinction, while admitting words do hurt.

  • Practical implication:

    • She can tolerate being misgendered and insulted.

    • She cannot tolerate being arrested or physically coerced for using the women’s bathroom.



11. The state as a danger to queer people

  • Cites political philosopher Judith Shklar’s “liberalism of fear”:

    • Liberalism centrally concerned with fearing the state’s coercive capacity.

  • Historical examples:

    • Northern Europe had a century long terror against male homosexuals, with criminal sanctions.

    • Southern Europe often treated homosexuality as a sin but not a crime.

  • Central argument:

    • States get captured by hate coalitions which then use law against Jews, Catholics, blacks, queers and other minorities.

    • Therefore a liberal should be deeply wary of giving the state new tools to regulate queer lives.

  • She stresses that states have “never been the friend of queers” in the long historical record.



12. Trans issues, Kathleen Stock, and “the bathroom problem”

  • She credits philosopher Kathleen Stock as serious and intelligent but disagrees with her on policy.

  • Stock’s position as she presents it:

    • Trans women should not be allowed in women only spaces such as changing rooms, possibly toilets.

    • Stock worries about safety and violation of sex based boundaries.

  • McCloskey’s critique:

    • Says this would effectively require a police officer and a “gender assigner” outside every public toilet, which she finds absurd.

    • Sees it as an unnecessary expansion of state coercion into intimate life.

  • Her own position:

    • She uses women’s toilets simply to pee, not to assault anyone, and sees herself as no threat.

    • She does not want the state involved in deciding where she may urinate.

    • Thinks gender issues for children should be handled by families and professionals, not parliaments.



13. Sports and fairness: where she agrees with Stock

In the Q&A, she draws a clear line on elite women’s sport:

  • She fully agrees with the view that:

    • Post puberty male to female transitioners should not compete in women only elite sports such as swimming or running.

    • Male puberty creates lasting physiological advantages in heart size, muscle mass, and frame.

  • Her principle:

    • If a child has consistent cross gender identity and uses puberty blockers early, and thus never develops male traits, they might fairly compete as women.

    • But allowing a mature male body to enter women’s competitions destroys the point of women’s sport.

  • She calls this “a no brainer” and treats it as common sense fairness, separate from bathroom and changing room issues.



14. United States vs United Kingdom, and the new “hate group”

  • She claims in the United States:

    • The MAGA movement has made “transgenderism” the new hate target.

    • She explicitly likens the pattern to the classic “first they came for the Jews” escalation sequence.

  • She distinguishes:

    • Conservatives she respects (for example George Will).

    • A “hateful crowd” currently wielding power who use trans people as scapegoats.

  • In the United Kingdom:

    • She says hostility to trans women currently comes more from segments of the left, especially some feminists.

  • She sees both right wing and left wing variants of illiberalism that weaponise queer issues.



15. Affirmative action, DEI, and changing hearts instead of laws

  • Question on affirmative action for women and minorities:

    • She opposes affirmative action as a permanent state policy.

    • Argues that once a program starts, it rarely ends, even when no longer needed.

  • Uses Ruth Bader Ginsburg as an example:

    • Ginsburg faced direct discrimination as one of a tiny number of female law students and could not get a job.

    • Ginsburg’s legal work sought removal of barriers, not guaranteed equal outcomes.

  • Her distinction:

    • Equality of opportunity in a strict sense is impossible, because humans are varied in talents, preferences, languages, and histories.

    • Equality of outcomes is impossible and undesirable.

    • Equality of permission, which focuses on removing legal and institutional obstacles, is attainable.

  • On DEI:

    • She wants DEI to be practiced voluntarily by institutions and individuals, not enforced top down by the state.



16. Family, gender, and power

  • She emphasises the importance of the family as:

    • The place where we learn love, care, and basic social relations.

    • Also a possible site of serious oppression.

  • Examples:

    • Romanian dictator Ceaușescu forcing women into the labour market and placing children into state orphanages to raise GDP, which she calls devastating for mental health.

    • The Roman paterfamilias having legal power of life and death over his children.

    • Bolsonaro’s remark that he would execute a gay son, which she treats as an example of family based cruelty.

  • She insists:

    • Liberal analysis cannot ignore the family simply because libertarians often focus only on state and markets.

    • Care work and parenting are real work and central to human flourishing.



17. Queer rights traction: culture, law, and economics

In reply to a student asking why queer rights rise and fall and what drives progress:

  • She argues progress is highly culture specific and can change fast.

  • Example of same sex marriage:

    • In 1990, the idea of two men or two women marrying was completely off the table in mainstream US politics.

    • Within a short time, reframing it as a simple matter of equal civil permission transformed public acceptance.

    • Spain is noted as the first European country to legalise gay marriage, ahead of the UK bureaucracy.

  • Her view of drivers:

    • Cultural frames and narratives are key.

    • When queer rights are framed as basic fairness and equal soul value, they become more acceptable.

    • This is aligned with major religious traditions that treat souls as equal.



18. Access to hormone therapy and who should pay

  • Question: should state provided hormone therapy be seen as equality of permission or opportunity, and should the state fund it?

  • Her answer:

    • She does not think the state should pay for transitions.

    • Believes transition is cheaper than many imagine, roughly comparable to a small car.

    • States that female to male transitions are particularly inexpensive in biological terms because male hormones quickly change voice, muscle, and personality.

    • Male to female is harder because male secondary characteristics cannot be fully undone.

  • Her principle:

    • Gender change should be a private matter financially.

    • She does not see a strong case for transition as a public expense, in contrast with her strong case against the state banning or obstructing it.



19. Populism, authoritarianism, and “making liberalism cool again”

  • She worries about:

    • The decline of liberal norms in the last 10 to 20 years due to populism and anti liberal politics.

    • Citizens losing “popular liberal consciousness”.

  • Response strategy:

    • Change hearts, not only policies, by making liberalism attractive, especially to the young.

    • She jokingly rebrands liberalism as “adultism”, since other political philosophies treat citizens as children and the state as parent.

    • Argues that many young people want to be treated as grown ups, not as dependants of the state.

  • Role of the arts:

    • Calls for artists, novelists, filmmakers, musicians to carry messages of freedom and adult responsibility.

    • Cites Mick Jagger as a symbol of cultural influence and jokes about his LSE connection.



20. Trump, the US, and where she thinks the curve is now

  • She is explicitly alarmed by Trump:

    • Says he moves towards authoritarianism with new outrages almost every week.

    • Believes he has a strong instinct for exploiting resentment among Americans who feel bossed around by the state.

    • Calls him “a bad man” in straightforward moral language.

  • On the coercion curve:

    • She believes the United States is currently on the downward part of the curve, where increased state coercion reduces human flourishing.

    • She compares “smart” authoritarians, who move slowly like the metaphorical frog in heating water, with Trump, whom she calls not smart but still dangerous.

  • Prescription:

    • Maintain a single, accountable state with a monopoly of violence, but watch it very closely.

    • Resist expansions of coercive power, especially those targeting minorities like trans people.





That is the gist: McCloskey mixes personal trans narrative, queer experience, Christian ethics, classical liberal theory, and a blunt distrust of state power. Her through line is simple: let people live as they are, do not bring coercive law into toilets and gender, accept limits on what the state can fix, and fight like hell to keep the coercion curve from bending downward.



Save the Cat, Snyder's movie structure outline

I was explain how Save the Cat worked to a friend and thought I’d outline it in more details (with GPT) and summaries it here.

Save the Cat! by Blake Snyder is a cheeky, brutally pragmatic breakdown of Hollywood storytelling.

1. The Core Philosophy

Snyder’s thesis is simple:

“Audiences love heroes who do something selfless early on — they save the cat.”

That small, human act earns audience empathy.
The rest of the book expands that logic into a system: structure, genre, theme, and tone must all serve audience connection. Snyder’s genius was to codify that connection into an easy-to-follow, relentlessly commercial structure.

2. The “Save the Cat” Beat Sheet

This is the skeleton for nearly every Hollywood movie Snyder reverse-engineered. Each “beat” roughly corresponds to a page count (assuming a 110-page screenplay).

Opening Image – The first impression of tone, world, and protagonist before transformation.

  1. Theme Stated – Someone hints at the story’s moral or central question, often in dialogue.

  2. Set-Up – Introduce key characters, show what’s missing in the hero’s life, and establish stakes.

  3. Catalyst – The inciting incident: something disruptive happens that kicks the story into motion.

  4. Debate – The hero resists the call, doubts themselves, and weighs options.

  5. Break into Two – The decision point where the hero commits to the journey and enters a new world.

  6. B Story – A relationship subplot, often romantic or emotional, that carries the theme.

  7. Fun and Games – The “promise of the premise”; the central gimmick or joy of the story.

  8. Midpoint – A false victory or false defeat; the stakes sharpen, often with a twist or revelation.

  9. Bad Guys Close In – Internal and external pressures rise; allies fall away; antagonistic forces strengthen.

  10. All Is Lost – A moment of seeming death or total failure — mentor dies, plan collapses, love lost.

  11. Dark Night of the Soul – The emotional low; the hero confronts despair and the deeper meaning of their struggle.

  12. Break into Three – A new idea or insight emerges from uniting the A-story and B-story; the hero regains purpose.

  13. Finale – The protagonist applies what they’ve learned, overcomes old flaws, and resolves the main conflict.

  14. Final Image – A mirror of the opening, showing transformation and emotional closure.

3. The “10 Genres” (Snyder’s Story DNA)

Snyder hated traditional genres like “rom-com” or “thriller.” He created story function genres instead — types of emotional engines:

  1. Monster in the House – Evil + sin + confinement (e.g. Jaws, Alien).

  2. Golden Fleece – A journey or quest story (The Wizard of Oz, O Brother, Where Art Thou?).

  3. Out of the Bottle – Magic wish or transformation (Liar Liar, Shrek).

  4. Dude with a Problem – An ordinary person vs. extraordinary circumstance (Die Hard, 127 Hours).

  5. Rites of Passage – Life transitions: age, death, divorce (American Beauty).

  6. Buddy Love – Relationship as central conflict (When Harry Met Sally, Toy Story).

  7. Whydunit – Character-driven mystery (Chinatown, Gone Girl).

  8. The Fool Triumphant – Underdog wins by being authentically themselves (Forrest Gump).

  9. Institutionalized – Individual vs. system/group (MASH*, The Devil Wears Prada).

  10. Superhero – One extraordinary person in an ordinary world (Spider-Man, Erin Brockovich).

Each genre has required “ingredients” and emotional arcs.
For example, Monster in the House always involves:

  • A confined space

  • A monster

  • A sin or transgression that “invited” the monster

4. Key Structural Rules & Mantras

  • “Give me the same thing… only different.”
    Audiences want fresh spins on familiar setups — not pure novelty.

  • “Double mumbo jumbo.”
    Don’t introduce two different fantastical premises. Stick to one “magical” conceit.

  • “The Pope in the Pool.”
    Hide exposition in an engaging scene (Pope swimming laps while revealing plot).

  • “The Covenant of the Arc.”
    Your hero must change. Endings must show emotional evolution, not just victory.

  • “Watch out for the Deadly Logline.”
    Your movie’s one-sentence pitch should express irony and hook emotion immediately.

5. Why It Works (and Why Purists Hate It)

Why it works:

  • It codifies what audiences unconsciously expect.

  • It’s short, funny, and usable tomorrow.

  • It creates rhythm: change every 10–15 pages keeps attention.

Why critics groan:

  • It can breed formulaic storytelling.

  • It’s obsessed with commercial beats rather than aesthetic or psychological nuance.

  • It prioritises structure over voice.

But used intelligently — as a skeleton, not a straitjacket — it’s an immensely effective framework for both screen and game narrative.