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Alex Petropoulos: Europe 2031, AI, Power, and the Future We Actually Want

October 18, 2026 Ben Yeoh

What happens if Europe gets AI wrong? Alex Petropoulos is Chief of Staff at Arq Foundation and one of the authors of Europe 2031, a speculative story imagining Europe's technological, economic and political future in a world of transformative artificial intelligence.

We start with the predictions behind Europe 2031: from severe shortages of AI computing power to the possibility that compute becomes abundant and today's infrastructure investments lose much of their strategic importance. Alex explains why he and his co-authors chose speculative fiction rather than another policy paper, and the power, and danger, of making people feel a possible future rather than simply understand it intellectually.

Can Europe compete with the US and China? Or should it concentrate on its own comparative advantages: industry, data, infrastructure and supply chains, while accepting continued dependence on American AI?

Alex argues that Europe's deeper problem may be institutional. Its commitment to democracy, consensus and constrained power is part of what makes it worth defending. Yet those same processes can make change painfully slow. Which European values really matter? What trade-offs should we be prepared to make? And can politicians offer a positive vision of the future that brings people along?

We explore the opportunities and catastrophic risks of AI, including why scientific progress might accelerate dramatically in mathematics and other verifiable domains, while biology, clinical trials and the social processes of science remain more difficult. If intelligence becomes abundant, what becomes scarce?

Alex also explains why he has changed his mind about a publicly funded European frontier AI laboratory, the challenge of sustaining successive generations of increasingly expensive AI models, and what we can learn from institutions such as ARIA and the Institute for Progress. We discuss scientific moonshots, tolerance for failure, and why we urgently need better measurement of AI's capabilities and effects.

We then turn to some of Alex's more personal interests. What did captaining a successful university Overwatch esports team teach him about teamwork, learning and comparative advantage? How does he use AI as a thinking partner? And why does writing remain such a painful process?

In our overrated/underrated round we cover recursive self-improvement, universal basic income, AGI, compute taxes, open-source AI, prediction markets, effective altruism and science fiction.

We finish by imagining an ordinary Tuesday in a better future. For Alex, it involves friends, a bakery, a park, good health, affordable travel, meaningful work and perhaps a little whimsy and mischief.

A useful reminder that the point of economic growth, technological progress and better institutions is to make possible lives we actually want to live.

Key takeaways

  • Europe's greatest risk may be institutional, not technological. Individually sensible decisions can produce collective failure when incentives, bureaucracy and political processes are poorly adapted to rapid change.

  • AI sovereignty is not the same as AI self-sufficiency. Europe will probably continue importing American AI. The important question is how to retain influence, resilience and bargaining power.

  • Comparative advantage matters more than winning every race. Europe's factories, industrial expertise, data and infrastructure may provide more realistic opportunities than attempting to replicate every frontier AI laboratory.

  • Values require trade-offs. If Europe wants to preserve what makes it distinctive, it needs to decide which principles are essential and which existing practices can change.

  • AI progress will be uneven. Mathematics and other verifiable domains may accelerate rapidly. Clinical trials, physical experiments and the social organisation of science could remain substantial bottlenecks.

  • Publicly funded AI labs need a sustainable model. A government might fund one frontier model, but competing over successive generations requires an economic and organisational structure that can keep going.

  • Measurement is badly neglected. Confident predictions about AI are often built on unreliable benchmarks or inadequate evidence. Better policy needs better information.

  • Competitive gaming can teach surprisingly useful lessons. Teams can outperform by leaning into unusual strengths rather than trying to approximate an idealised strategy.

  • The ultimate test of technological progress is human flourishing. A better future should mean more agency, more opportunity, better health, stronger relationships and lives that young people can look forward to.

Further reading

  • Europe 2031 — the speculative scenario, including an audio version.

  • Arq Foundation — research on preparing Europe for transformative AI.

CONTENTS, TRANSCRIPT AND PODCAST LINKS BELOW

  • Listen: Spotify, Apple or wherever you get podcasts

  • Watch: YouTube

Contents

00:00 Meet Alex Petropoulos
00:28 Europe 2031: Which predictions might come true?
01:32 The compute crunch — and a world of abundant compute
04:01 Why speculative fiction can change policy
06:46 Is Europe waking up to transformative AI?
10:53 European values and difficult trade-offs
14:47 Is AI a normal technology or a national security issue?
16:14 Where Europe could have a competitive advantage
20:09 Can Europe move faster without sacrificing democracy?
25:24 Catastrophic AI risks: Loss of control and misuse
29:52 AI optimism and breakthroughs in science
33:29 What becomes scarce when intelligence is abundant?
36:53 Why Alex changed his mind about a CERN for AI
40:12 Institutions that work surprisingly well
43:01 ARIA, moonshots and funding ambitious science
45:16 Risk tolerance, failure and feedback loops
47:09 What should ordinary people ask about AI?
48:14 Bottlenecks, comparative advantage and better measurement
50:40 What Overwatch teaches us about leadership and teamwork
54:55 Video games, strategy and recommendations
57:24 Writing, creativity and thinking with AI
01:01:22 Overrated / Underrated
01:06:24 Imagining a future worth wanting
01:11:18 Future projects, writing in public and final advice

Transcript

AI-assisted transcription; errors are possible.

Ben: Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to Alex Petropoulos. Alex works on AI science and the institutions we need to make progress. He's chief of staff at Arq Foundation and one of the authors of Europe 2031. A speculative story about Europe's technological future. Alex, welcome.

Alex: Thank you Ben. Very, very good Greek pronunciation for me.

Ben: I've been practising! Of all the things you imagined in Europe 2031, what do you think is most likely to be true by 2031?

Alex: This is a difficult question because already some things in Europe 2031 have come true. Or rather, small versions of them have come true. You know, we sort of predicted access controls and predicted the US cutting off access. And a small version of that did happen with the Department of War, Anthropic and Mythos. Although I would say it's a hint at what could come as opposed to an actual thing coming true. And the other thing that makes this question difficult is that, in general, when I talk about the predictions we make in Europe 2031, I'm like: don't index on any one particular prediction.

We're not necessarily trying to get them exactly right date-wise. In fact, we fudged dates in, [I ] in order to keep things working in a way that would keep the reader happy, especially certain audiences that we had in mind when we were writing it.

I would say the prediction that I think is still looking to be on track is that we will hit a compute crunch. Compute capacity will just be incredibly constrained. And especially if you hit a capability threshold, people often say that data chips are depreciating in value, but actually in many cases chips have appreciated in value because the AI models have gotten better, which only just keeps pushing demand up and up and up.

And so if we suddenly got a big capability breakthrough, demand could go through the roof and we could be in an even more compute-constrained world than we are now.

Ben: And you can see that in some market prices, particularly upstream of compute. So the bottlenecks you need to make compute are still, I mean, they flip-flop a bit, but they're still going crazy.

Well, I don't know if this will be an easier question on the other side, but what's probably wrong by 2031 or maybe even not the date, but directionally wrong, but still really useful to consider?

Alex: I'm going to be very cheeky and I'm going to give the same answer, which is the compute predictions. In general, I think people should internalise that we might not be compute constrained forever or that compute is important.

The reason we focus on compute is because we talk about ways countries can be important on AI. And normally, to do all this really difficult R&D, you have to spend billions. You have to compete in capitalism, it's difficult. You probably will lose by default. Or you could build a data centre and suddenly you're important.

And so you are, you've got the lowest-hanging fruit possible for becoming important on AI and having some sort of relevance. Great, we should do it. However, we should also remember this relies on compute being constrained. And there are worlds in which even in five years time compute isn't a constraint.

Like Elon could have massive breakthroughs with SpaceX. The cost per kilogramme of launch capacity could come down sufficiently. There could be a couple breakthroughs and suddenly we have orbital data centres and all of your ground-based compute doesn't matter anymore. And all this investment that you did and you're like, 'We're fine.'

We've got the compute, but it doesn't matter any more because now it's all being made redundant.

Ben: That seems like a good idea. Look at, in some ways, the left tail and the right tail: compute is really cheap and abundant anywhere, or there's a crunch and you can't do anything about it. Those seem to be quite useful extremes to speculate about.

And I'm interested, so there is a horizon scanning future scenario-type industry and academic literature out there. But I was interested in what made you think speculative fiction or say scenario planning seemed to be a better way to examine this and potentially examine this for European policymakers rather than just another white policy paper, 40 pages.

I'm going to give you part of the answer already, that no one really reads apart from three people in a little room before it gets shelved. But anyway, speculative fiction: is it a better way, and how did you come to this?

Alex: I mean, in one sentence, you want people to feel the AGI, you want to create an emotional response.

I sort of talk about what we did as wielding a very dangerous tool using scenario writing to create buy-in to a problem that you think exists is epistemically impure. You are violating some of these, I don't know, purist rationalist norms. When you sort of wield this weapon, you have to be really, really confident that your take is correct and that you want to achieve.

And I think that we were confident enough that we're like, 'We're going to do this.' But the point is that it makes people feel something, you know? We had hundreds of people messaging us, having read it, people who said that they were lying in bed, listening to it, and they started crying when they got to the end. We had a mother who messaged us saying my daughter is three years old. There's no way in hell that she's going to wait, be eight years old in the world that you described, what can I do to stop this happening? And so as a side effect, you have this virality, but we never really intended it to go viral. The theory of change behind it was. Convince or sort of be heard by the 2000, 3000 most important people within a country that the elites basically. And that would've been sufficient. I think that it sort of reached an order of magnitude or a few more people than that. But that's the basics of why we chose to use this dark, magic, forbidden weapon.

I would look at it in that sense.

Ben: That's an interesting theory of change. I think there's quite a lot of truth to that from my way of thinking. Obviously you have to feel 110% that you're going to be correct, but on big moments in human history, maybe just taking the last a hundred to 200 years, I always think about the movement, which where society overall went from being pro-slavery or slavery in society to being anti-slavery and the anti-slavery movement started small and had to do these things to convince people otherwise.

But obviously you're going against the majority grain. So if you're wrong, you can do a lot of damage. So it's kind of interesting. So maybe taking some of your premises within that. I guess in my mind the paper argues Europe has been making several misjudgments around how fast AI is advancing.

Maybe we could say almost everyone is making these misjudgments also misjudging its impact and the ability for Europe or maybe even countries overall to catch up. We also make the point that a lot of people on the frontier of say policymaking and government or even the person in the street is not actively using frontier models.

They're not solving Millennium Prize Problems. They're not solving [ ]. So we're a little bit behind the curve because the curve, or the frontier, is going so fast and we are ahead. [ ] I'd be interested to think, has anything happened in the last few weeks, few months since you've written the paper, which has made you change your mind on any of that?

Or if anything, has this emphasised the arguments that you were making? Speculatively, even if the dates are wrong or at least in the direction of travel.

Alex: A couple of things. On the high level, people sometimes ask me, 'Are you optimistic, Alex? Are you pessimistic?' And you know, we wrote quite a doomy scenario. It's doomy for me under the assumption that we do nothing. And I've never believed that we will do nothing. I've always believed, we like to wake up and smell the coffee.

The question has always been: how quickly do we, how fast do we sort of viscerally internalise what is going to come or what might come and then act in accordance. And so I think there has been this visceral reaction faster than I would've expected it. So, bullish. You know, Ursula von der Leyen in her state of the Union, this is the EU version of the US State of the Union.

She gave it to me on Wednesday. She talked about recursive self-improvement and the possible risk that this could bring. And the fact that our enemies might have this technology and we won't. If you told me a year before that she'd be talking about that, I would've, I would've laughed at you.

That being said, I think that, you know, that there are these three assumptions that we talk about, right? Miscalibrating how fast it's moving, how important it'll be, how well positioned we are. But then there's this third meta level thing, which is at play, which is at every step in the scenario, everyone takes what feels like to them, the sort of locally rational action.

They sort of act within the limits that they perceive themselves to have. And the incentive structures within, like the bureaucracies within the institutions are set up in such a way that people aren't able to take the correct action. And not much of that has changed there.

Things that would make me maybe be more optimistic would be people who really get it, choosing to go into government, choosing to put themselves into these positions of power and next to the people who take the decisions to help inform them. And then also like broader reforms to how these institutions work.

And this is, this is by and large why I'm more bullish on European member-state policy than EU policy, if that makes sense.

Ben: Yeah. We can come to that maybe Europe has to be a tiny bit less consensual in terms of getting all member states around and have, well, what I would say is perhaps a tiny bit less democracy even though there's this strange paradox where in order to defend democracy, maybe you have to be a little bit less democratic.

And I see some analogies with climate movements, maybe even within COVID pandemic, particularly within climate. It's interesting, if you go back 20 years, the median, in fact even maybe 10 years, the median scenario was looking at perhaps a four degree world. And today we're looking at between a two and three degree world and still on a downward trajectory you can argue about speed.

So that's one of the really tricky things. Because humans generally moving at speed is not our default scenario, but actually we've done quite a lot within climate and certainly within climate have now taken out a lot of the negative tail risks. I mean, there's not exact analogy because of the tail risk in AI, so I kind of get a little bit cautiously optimistic around that given some of our other complex wicked problem type things.

Bringing it back to Europe, I was interested if you think it, well, for Europe it should not really become simply a slightly worse version of America or China. That seems to be, again, what the paper's suggesting. It can't really be America or China in terms of compute or frontier labs and things like that.

So I'd be interested now also a few months after the paper, what do you think Europe should optimise for or Europe should be doing if it can't be America or China? Or do you think it genuinely should try and catch up in certain domains?

Alex: So, on catching up, I think it has to just be really realistic about where it can and where it can't catch up. And then you maybe take a calibrated bet and say, I'm going to put a bet on this moonshot. I'm going to put some amount of money. Maybe it'll work, maybe [ ]. By default it won't.

You should be aware that it's like a big risk. What should Europe try to emulate? I think that Europe needs to have like a conversation with itself about like what makes Europe great and then how is that a threat and how is that at risk? And I think in general, I sit in the position of why care.

I guess that's a question one might ask, which is why are we even talking about Europe? Why do we care about Europe? And one reason I care about Europe beyond the fact that my friends live here and my family live here is the fact that I think the US have a set of values and these values are quite good and Europe has a set of values and these values are also quite good.

But I think that regardless of whose values are better, I think there is some weighted combination of both of those values that is superior to either. And I would like to see a world in which those values are represented into the future, if you want to say that, or at least represented within AI systems and within the way we develop this technology.

And so then you should be really okay, you're, you need to do a better job of exporting your values. But then the question is which values are you willing to give up? Which values are you willing to import? So it's sort of like a question of what do you want to take from the us?

Like what actually matters where are your trade-offs going to happen? And I think that for all the talk that people in Europe do about values, I think it's quite an immature conversation still because there's never any conversation about trade-offs and what they'd be willing to give up. Like where, what is the ranking order?

You can't value them all equally. That doesn't work because you're going to lose them all. A bit of a fluffy answer. But I think it's like a prerequisite to actually be oh, why do we care about this? What model are we going to follow? What should we do? We can still be good at many things.

Ben: I, in some ways that echoes just overall thinking around industrial plans. Like should you have them, you've got to figure out, you can't do them for everything. You need to figure out where you are good or not. But specifically for AI. But I guess one, if you're quite purist about some of these things from say a market or say your anti industrial plans at all, you'd maybe argue why can't Europe simply just be very good at using American AI or Frontier AI?

I guess I already think of one of the counters because of what's happened with defence or defence pacts recently. But you could maybe say, well, we become really great at something else. We keep mostly European values and we just import American AI and that's it. Spill below has happened that way. Is that not a cogent argument because of all the other European values, things that we need to maintain or argue for.

And also, I guess, the specific different industries and values that different countries have.

Alex: So I think it's first important to acknowledge that some version of that will be the version we end up in. There is no world in which we don't import American AI just as there's no world currently where we don't import part of the US security umbrella, right?

Europe isn't independent, Europe isn't sovereign. It shouldn't pretend that it's totally sovereign. And so I think it's silly to pretend that we could get there on AI within 10 or 20 years anyway. I think that there are like two stories that I tell when I talk about, AI policy.

The first is like if AI timelines, the pace of AI progress is sufficiently long. If AI is a sufficiently normal technology, whatever that means nowadays then what you should be doing is basically just copy progress studies and just look at what, like the [Rhine Group] people, look at what Mario Draghi is doing.

Do the Draghi report. Listen to Patrick Collison probably, like read Works in Progress. And just do all of that. And you'll probably be fine. And that's like your normal baseline. If AI were a normal technology, if timelines are really long, you have your adoption, you have your market effects just like unfuck the European economy, great.

I think the disagreements in AI policy come from okay, but AI isn't necessarily like perfectly normal technology. First, it might be very important. It might be securitized and treated as a national security asset and there might be a US administration which isn't operating in a perfectly positive sum view of the world or you know, willing to take very negative-sum trades with partners, even allies.

And two, if AI progress moves really, really quickly, these reforms take five to 10 years to kick in. So you need things to bridge that gap. And so you have to be thinking about okay, I'll do these reforms, I'll fix my economy, I'll be fine in 10 years maybe. But what are you doing over the next 10 years to make sure that you're relevant?

Make sure that you're not slapped about by the US or China.

Ben: And what do you think European countries should do, either as a European blob or you could choose one or two countries, UK or Greece or, maybe one of the bigger ones like Germany and France. I get the reading from the paper. There's some suggestion that potentially industrial AI, whatever that might mean, might be an area or robotics or some other part of applied AI.

But then I was wondering, is there a European comparative advantage in any of that compared to American or Chinese companies capturing most of that value. But I guess Europe has got to place some of its bets somewhere within that. So I'd be intrigued if there are any suggestions that you feel Europe can explore or is it still at that higher level where they have to just figure out what it is they're not sure and they're just too slow and figure that out.

Even if they don't get all eight correct things, if they get two correct, that's going to be much better than where we are now.

Alex: Yeah. So three things. First, you got to do the reforms to make sure you can actually do all this properly. You got to set the groundwork such that a trillion dollar European company can be created in the future.

That's your long-term play. Get that out of the way. Second, I think that some of these things you mentioned are up there. There are some competitive advantages. It seems like Europe does actually have quite a good data advantage. There are just like European data sets. We have big European companies, we have industry.

We still are, we haven't completely deindustrialised. We still have lots of factories. So there are lots of places where we are strong and have valuable things to offer. I guess the question is can you use that well enough to ensure that you are, that if access is what you are worried about, ensure that you retain access.

I guess an example is: make yourself the person that produces and builds things for the Americans. If you think the Americans will get to do powerful AI systems very quickly, we can be the ones with the factories, right? It is a version of that world. But then the third thing I will say is Europe 2031 is a, go, to go back to the analogy like we use the dark magic. We dabble in ideology. We point all of these faces and attention towards a problem. It is an exercise in problem defining. There is some amount of work and we've done our best to think about solutions.

But I will just say the field of people solving this problem, there are two bottlenecks and one of those bottlenecks is ideas and just people, like a community of people thinking about solutions. I don't think we have very good solutions at the moment. I think our solutions are, to be honest, crap.

And I would like to see more people, more ideas flooding in about what we can do. Because I think that, yeah, we just haven't had enough tokens on it, so to speak.

Ben: I think you're going to make a very good policymaker or politician because that is a three-point plan, right? They like that. I think there may have to be an odd number, like a seven-point plan or 11-point plan, but that's not quite as sexy as a three-point one.

So we need more people thinking about this. Not enough people. Because we can see that not enough ideas at the moment might be happening. I feel the vibes are there, but I guess we're a little bit slow. Europe may have some comparative advantages though. We have to think about that. Maybe supply chain into America, something like that.

And then the long term reform, which is kind of win-win. Even if you think this AI stuff, they've just gone completely crazy. Yeah. What are they doing? Well, this just, you should have it found foundationally. And actually it's an interesting edge, just the glass half full is because Europe can potentially unlock that more than say, some places in the US and potentially unlocks maybe more easily.

There's a, there's a chance that it can actually jump up. Like some parts of America can't actually deregulate that much more. They've reached the frontier of that. Whereas I don't think you could claim the same in Europe. But it's interesting on that first and third point, maybe to some degree there seems to me a little bit of a tension in terms of, and I mentioned this before, the argument essentially is Europe's consensus and procedures are somewhat too slow that needs unpicking speeding up more people in it.

But part of the European values of all of that seems to me that they have this: liberal democracies constrain power. Now you can see that's tipped too far and Works in Progress are very good on this, where you've seen like it's really reasonable for the fire department to say we need access for our ladders to go into the buildings.

But when each individual stakeholder does that, it means you can't build any buildings, or they're not really suitable or are very expensive. So I'm interested is at that higher level, do you think there is this throughput where we can become dramatically faster, we can get more people within this new industrial AI policy or long-term reform without destroying enough of these European liberal values that actually we so and I got the impression from your answer earlier, is that yes, there might be some trade-offs within those values, so we do need this hard conversation.

But if you come with a call, I'm going to make it up to 10 or 20 of them, you know, a good eight to 15 of them survive and that still feels sufficiently European that's what we should do. Is that the right way of thinking about it and that there is a tension there? Or actually is there some other through line that we could pursue here?

Alex: I think there is a tension. And if you don't do this right, you fail. An example is look at the way that the US have done their data centre policies. And they've had this laissez-faire approach and now they have this massive backlash. And so this is an opportunity for Europe. Because Europe hasn't built as many.

They've imported a little bit of the US data centre politics, but it's still very nascent. We can take a lot of lessons, we can learn how can we do it well? So you bring people along so that you are actually making sure that the communities benefit from the data centres being built, that they get some of the tax revenue that the data centres are building in electricity production and not using water even though that's, you know, made up. But in general, I think this touches on what you said, which is glass half full. I'm an optimist. I think you have to take many of these things and frame them in the optimistic sense. There is a world in which you can say, Tyler has this saying, you know, what is it the Europeans are so culture, they can tell you about porcelain.

They can tell you about all this and that, but if the world was run by them, negative 1% growth rate and we have all these bottlenecks and if AI sort of becomes so important, the bottlenecks means Europe is doomed. And, then that's the reason to freak out. It's like also, ah, if we get rid of all these bottlenecks, Europe has so much to gain.

Like there is quite a strong compelling win-win of oh, we can get the growth in the short term from doing the deregulatory stuff or, and whatnot. And then we get like the AI growth in the long term. Or maybe the AI growth kicks in first and the long-term reform. So there are some interesting political economy packages that you can put together.

I think the ultimate question is, are you presenting a compelling vision of the future that is positive, and that you can bring people along with, because I think it's fair to say that people, I think most politicians have failed at this and, most politicians are like failing to rise to the challenge of like presenting a vision to the people of the future. And saying, this is how your life is going to be better because of this thing. I think this is especially true with young people. And they sort of have this negative-sum view of the world. Because the world has been negative-sum towards them. Now you have to do politics. There's like the difficult stuff.

And find ways to create your coalition to take, pick the set of policy choices that give you wins and give you win-wins across the board. Make some trade-offs. I think that's possible. I think I've seen a way that you can do that. I don't think necessarily politicians are catching up to this quite yet, but I think that there's a festering, I think something's festering in regard to youth politics and disenfranchisement and that this will extend and sort of blow up around AI. And so I think if you don't sort of get on this early as a politician, it will sort of consume you.

Ben: We

Alex: Need, or how does that relate? Yeah,

Ben: I say we need the storytellers back. Well we need in some ways like the force, the Jedi side of the force because you're probably going to dabble in these dark arts. So yeah, you might fall the way of the Sith with these very charismatic storytellers, but you are going to have I guess the Yoda-like characters hopefully coming through and saving us.

Well perhaps zooming out. I mean we can come to other policy bits if they occur to you or come up. And I do wanna talk about the opportunity side as well as the risk side, but maybe touching on the risk side first and zooming out because I think that's what, a lot of things came very cogently in 2031.

I still think we need some good positive speculative futures and I know people are trying, but we're just not coming towards it. I don't know why. Maybe, maybe humans are just inclined to look at dystopian sci-fi more readily. But in any case opportunities and risks. Maybe on the risk side I tend to hear two different categories of catastrophic risk arguments.

So one goes, we create intelligence vastly beyond our own and we can't control it. It's like we are humans or, and they are mice or I prefer to think like octopus and you just can't understand it. Like the mice don't know what's going on and they just all disappear because humans don't really care about them.

And it'd be the same for this vastly superior intelligence. That seems quite sci-fi to a lot of people that I know. Some people take that argument seriously. The other which seems more cogent to sort of everyone is that you just get a very powerful AI tool, say, and it gives certain humans, maybe quite a few humans who may want to do harm or some version of evil, much greater capabilities at much lower cost.

And they can simply just do that. So you don't even need to get super intelligence of any form to just kind of see okay, that could be quite a bad risk. And so that comes in a cluster of manmade pandemics or all of these other things that you could do with super intelligence. I'm interested, do both of those categories of risk worry you?

Does one of them worry you more? Should we be thinking about that in the AI risk world? Do they worry about certain things too much? But how should we be thinking about AI risk and what some people would call X risk or existential risk?

Alex: Maybe I should start with an epistemic status. I don't think about this maybe as much as I should in terms of I'm quite pragmatic and I think about things through the lens of what could Europe do? But I'll, I'll like to indulge the question. And I think on like the first and octopus risk if you wanna call it, I think it would be foolish not to hold some amount of huh, we should think about this. That I'm not confident that this is impossible. I think I'm more optimistic in the sense that I can definitely see or smell like technological pathways that lead to good outcomes there, right?

it is not like I'm oh, any possible version of like super intelligence or like powerful different intelligence you build will always, do you, I think that you have a lot of agency over like the direction of the technology that you, build, but you have to exercise that agency and you have to be really cognizant of it.

These are like my priors and I sort of see like most of my takes, like informed by tweets that I see, but it seems that we have taken decisions in different directions that have been both negative and positive in terms of our ability to shape these intelligences in the way that would be desirable.

And the misuse risk, I think this is basically a force multiplier to possibly other misuse risks. Like if you're already worried about bio risk, many of your friends who were worried about bio risk, they're now just really, really worried about bio risk.

I think it's something that we should clearly pay attention to. I think maybe the thing that should make you worried is the pace and whether or not you feel like your governments are sort of on the ball and whatnot. But, you know, in this State of the Union address that the president of the European Commission did, she talked about how she opened her AI section talking about risks and talking about loss of control.

The equivalent of the Secretary of State for technology of the EU has talked about loss of control multiple times before. I think they think about this, they think they care about it alongside a bunch of other things they care about. The question is what can Europe even do about that?

And that sort of gets you towards I guess some of the things that we work on and whatnot. But that's, I sort of employ some of these like mental tricks in terms of I don't think about the fastest possible takeoff scenarios because there's nothing Europe can do about those takeoff scenarios.

So it's not useful for me to think about that. And I sort of limit the amount I think about certain risks because I'm more focused on what is within the realm of pragmatic and the possible within this operating theatre that I exist in.

Ben: Sure. What is tractable? What you can only control what you can control, even if you can distantly control it.

I mean, I remain pretty optimistic on that. Part of it is because actually we've had pretty terrifying capabilities for quite a while. And actually, I don't wanna give too many hints, but you could think about it and you, if you wanted to do evil, evil people could have actually done quite a lot more devastating things in the last 10 or 20 years than even that they've managed to achieve.

And they haven't for a complicated set of reasons, which I think should still hold. But maybe let's flip to the other side. So, AI optimists, and the opportunity side. What do you think AI optimists are getting most right, or what should we be hopeful about? And there's a lot we could cover.

Everything, I think around science is pretty good. Second order things. I actually think that because I do some work a little bit in climate and health, all of the climate people are underestimating what kind of gains this could give us in solving some climate things. The health people actually are beginning, they're actually already beginning to see it, so I'm not sure they're underestimating it.

They're kind of seeing it and not sure where that goes. But I'd be interested in your view, what are AI optimists getting right? I guess you can lean to Europe if you but it could be anything in the world that you are seeing.

Alex: I come from a maths background, so I'm just like incredibly excited about everything happening in maths at the moment.

It's just: wow, what a time to be alive. Right? We're like solving all of these. I mean, we solved the (I can't remember the name) the [Millennium Prize Problem], Navier–Stokes. We solved Navier–Stokes. There's like rumour that two and a half other ones have already been solved.

Ben: P versus NP or whatever it's called.

Alex: P versus NP. Yeah. You know, like register your predictions now. You don't have much time left. So incredibly exciting time, to just be a nerd like mathematics. And sort of you can extrapolate along. I do sort of hold this opinion, you know, like the verifiable areas will move faster than anyone thinks they will.

And then the non-verifiable stuff will move slower. So I think on like the, health side and on the biology side, I think all of this really sort of annoyingly just reinforces like how important all the other sort of science reforms you're going to make will be of like our clinical trial reform now actually is like a lot, lot, lot more important because you could do so much more with it, but it's still going to be the bottleneck. And so I'm curious where the bottlenecks end up arising in science. physics will pop, like maybe with physics we'll also see some crazy progress. But I sort of have an ongoing debate with colleagues and friends about how much transfer you will get from the non-verifiable domains.

And I think even in, even within mathematics, it's interesting because there are branches of mathematics that have easier to formalise than others, essentially like it within Lean. It was written by algebra people. It's written in a way that makes algebra very easy to formalise. I have friends who are like graph theorists who are this is very annoying.

I can't write my stuff in Lean because it's written by people who speak like a slightly different language. It's it's like your alphabet was written in French and you're Italian, you are like Greek or something. And you're trying to use the programming now because you're well I don't speak Italian or French.

And so I'm paying attention to will the AI model solve problems in those? Like the AI models have been trained in French for maths. Will they solve problems in Greek as well for maths? And this is like a thing that I'm  paying attention to. And maybe I'll get a hint of whether that happens then I'm way more excited about the future of science.

Ben: I think there's something with that point in particular, I agree, they, the AIs, the code will have to, I think, invent the French. So they'll have to do their own version of lean, which isn't for algebraic things, but I think they're now fully capable of doing it. Even my sense, this is just vibe really, but if GPT-6, [Astra'] has already trained seven to be able to do Navier–Stokes and we've got some self-recursive, then it seems to me that seven or eight is going to be able to build those things.

But I'm then interested just to dig one level deeper. So if AI is really good at these verifiable domains as you call them, and if intelligence becomes really abundant, what becomes scarce or what do you really think are the bottlenecks? So we, you've kind of blobbed it as non verifiable, and I'm going to expand that to say some of this, what I guess the economists or social scientists would call tacit knowledge.

Some of it is called Polanyi knowledge. So these are things like how a carpenter builds or all of the things you get in a meetup as opposed to what's written in code. I guess all that goes into Polanyi-type domains is the type of stuff which becomes scarce. And I guess the bottlenecks, if we talk about clinical trials, I as yet don't quite see how you're going to get around putting the drugs into humans to make sure they are safe.

And actually some of this efficacy and clinical trials are quite a big bottleneck, although I do think we should be substantially faster. Clinical trials take on average eight to 10 years from first in humans, six to eight years should be, I mean, should be a no brainer. And we should have already gotten there in one to two years.

Seems to me like a very big jump, which is where we ought to go. But I'd be interested if you've had any thought when you've seen about that, about emerging bottlenecks or because your bottleneck is still, ah, we haven't got enough people in policy thinking about this. This might not be a domain you've thought about too much, but interested in bottlenecks or what becomes scarce in a high intelligence world.

Alex: Yeah, I have a colleague who's thinking about this. I should talk to her more often. I think even though you talked about this like tacit knowledge, I think even the non-verifiable stuff is stuff you are just trying to learn about like biology and stuff and you have to prepare everything.

Like you don't have a fully self-driving lab. Even within, like, I am still deeply confused about recursive self-improvement and whether that's actually happening and whether you've cleared the bottlenecks. Because I'm not convinced that you haven't cleared all the bottlenecks and there might still be some bottlenecks.

But on science itself, I am.

I think that, and maybe this is just from like a metasciencey direction, but there's a lot like the way that. Scientific information is communicated between scientists and the way that the social dynamics of science that seem like hard to replace and hard to get that serendipity from.

But maybe we'll get there. I sort of find myself often thinking oh, I'm so grateful that my job is safe because all I have to do is talk to people all day or have face-to-face conversations. AI's not going to take my job.

Ben: Yeah, communications. I actually think humanities in some ways should be less worried than they are.

I mean, they're, they're really not going to disintermediate theatre for instance, or albeit not many people actually make that much money in theatre. And yes, maybe you will speed up some aspects of script writing, but people really don't like that. I mean it is half of art, or at least some bit of art is all of the tacit knowledge, which comes with the artist and everything around that.

That's let alone before we get into questions of or style and taste on that, about whether it can do that. And even when it matches that, I think human audiences will not find that as satisfying. But I'm interested then also in what you maybe changed your mind about, we could do this on any level. Because I think you're involved in this proposal for a type of CERN for AI and institutions and kind of how institutions work and then subsequently you've kind of moved away from that form of thinking. So perhaps specifically on that, what changed your mind and then anything else over the last two or three years that you think that you've changed your mind about or as they say in some communities updated your priors on, but anything you've changed your mind on.

Alex: Yeah. I changed my mind so many times, like the whole CERN for AI journey. Like the main one is like any sort of publicly supported effort, needs to answer, answer the question of okay, you train like GPT-N, what's the plan for GPT-N plus one? Because you can corral all this public funding.

You know, in the most recent transformative AI strategy for the EU that a bunch of these experts, some of my colleagues included, published, they're to train a competitive model to get to the frontier now would cost 780 billion euros. Okay, you spend the 780 euro billion, now what?

Because do you have a competitive company? Are you going to create like the revenue loop that OpenAI, Anthropic have to train the next model? It just all falls apart if you are trying to directly compete at the frontier. So then the idea evolved more and I think the CERN idea evolved more into like what sort of R&D areas you could work on that could still be quite important.

That could still be quite important for resilience and still be quite important for competitiveness. And I think there are versions of these ideas that I'm still standing behind and still keen to push and you know, I'd be very keen for the EU to do something like a DARPA, maybe.

Other things that changed my mind on that. Just like priors around like centralization of power. I used to think within the terms of like one big AI, like the big super intelligent AI and I'm much more like actually that's like there's a cognitive bias that you're employing there when you think about that.

Like it doesn't have to be that we don't have to build the technology in that way. We could have multi-agent systems and have lots of different personalised AI. And so that's like another place I think. I think I've softened and nuanced my opinions about governments and bureaucracy and there are good people within the government who are trying very hard, but incentive structures that allow them to do the things they want to do.

And then there are also some people with just some horrendously outrageously wrong opinions. And if I was a dictator, I'd send them to [ '] or whatnot. But, so people contain multitudes.

Ben: Yeah,

I heard Tyler Cowen recently somewhat defend bureaucracies, which was quite interesting.

He was taking the other side of the view and said, well, maybe they're doing something that we don't know about it. I think this was more like in America saying, well actually, the fact you've got to fill in a lot of bureaucratic forms means that some aspects of fraud go down. Because if you want to claim benefits and you're on the margin, you're not going to put all of that effort in until you're really doing it.

I mean, I guess that was on a, on a different level and we spent quite a lot of time, I guess, softly critiquing institutions and bits by that not understanding your little softer aspect or some good people working on that. But maybe taking the flip side is there any institutions or organisations that you've accounted for that you think work surprisingly well and can we learn anything from that?

I mean, and on the other side, I do think institutions have been surprisingly robust or even anti-fragile in this current world of geopolitics that we've seen that, not many of them have imploded. Not as many of them as I thought could have done. I'm not sure whether that says that they're good, but they certainly seem to be somewhat resilient.

But I'm, I'm interested if, yeah. Do you think anything has worked really well and can we learn from that?

Alex: Be really bad if I didn't have an answer.

Ben: It might be you've not really come across one, which has worked super well. I mean, I guess in governments, people sometimes say Singapore or Estonia. I think they have advantages of working really on a small city state level. So that's kind of interesting.

And then some other organisations tend to have been maybe shorter lived or more nimble or specific small institutions. And I think it's interesting that I've detected actually, I guess from some of these foundations, which are actually being funded with AI money that they're starting to do institutions, which are just tackling one particular subset area.

I can't even remember the areas, but it's something just health data or that's it. They wanna solve Alzheimer's, so they're not going to do anything else, but they're going to start an institution and foundation just on that because they've thought that those sort of more time limited, purpose-driven, mission-driven, driven, but with a more well-defined mission have gone well.

Although I do think you can still critique that, I'd be interested. Have you seen anything?

Alex: I think that my interactions with the Greek state have been like much better. Everything's been digitised. You can get every form online. Previously you'd have to go to some dusty office.

You'd have to go to the thing. no, you need this form. You have to go to another office, the other side of Athens to get this form. And then go back and no, you also need this form. Spend hours and hours going back and forth. There was a minister, Pierrakakis, who championed a lot of these digitization reforms.

And now he's the governor of the European Central Bank, I think. And so, yeah, they can make your life better, make the burden on your life less bad. Another example is, is it Taiwan that have little lottery tickets on receipts so people hold onto the receipts?

Alex: Is it cheating if I just fanboy about the Institute for Progress for like 30 seconds? 

Ben: You can do that.

Alex: Sure. I just think they seem to have just been insanely impactful and both in sort of very short term, let's do a thing. And in these like long term bets and building something of like over five years that has been really, like long lasting and has moved the needle in a really positive direction. I sort of look at them, and I'm like, 'That's ambitions for what we could be doing in like five years.

And then yeah, so I think that they make me bullish that you can do things that are like sort you know, they're, they're, they're basically an extra branch of government and, whatnot. A meta branch of government. And then there are things within the focus research organisation space.

Like ARIA has good vibes. I don't know if it has more than good vibes, it's like it's still too early to tell. In some sense,

Ben: You've got to start with the vibes, you've got to start from somewhere. Yeah. I mean even, exactly. Even if they all fail. And in some ways, I think actually it'll be fine if every single one of their projects fail at the meta level.

Just saying we are going to actually try some moonshots and things is, I think, I think good. And I also do think they've taken Economics 101 and they are funding things that private markets basically can't fund as in private capital. They still won't be that. So I think if every single one of those fails are that, and also I know people complain, but actually in the grand scheme of things, it isn't actually even that much money.

Alex: Marginal.

Ben: Yeah. People really struggle with hundreds of millions and billions. It, you know, we're fine in the thousands of pounds and even tens of thousands and whatever, but once we get into the millions and billions people just, that's one thing that investors and markets do have a sense for, because we have to wrap our heads around billions and now actually trillions.

But it's a completely different scale of things.

Alex: Yeah. I am also an ARIA fanboy but I, you know, I will say the vibes are immaculate and one should be careful as to whether that is, how much of that is motivating your enthusiasm.

Ben: Yes. That's true. But I also think, so this is, some, so, you know, I've had a podcast with Alec Stapp and we talked about startup things, and I've also had a podcast with Stian Westlake who's talked about funding and how you make decisions and actually Michael Nielsen on metascience and how to make decisions.

So putting all of that together, one of my things is that people claim they do high risk things and then they go, oh, look, two thirds of these projects worked out. Actually, that must mean that your first statement was wrong. Because if you have even moderately high risk, then you cannot be more than a one out of 10 success, which you can see in biopharma and you can also see in VC.

So I do think that most of those projects should actually fail, or at least only advance a little bit. So I think maybe we will only have vibes to go on, but at least as we said, the vibes are good.

Alex: And it's so weird when you get to politics. Because if you're like a political operator, nothing is guaranteed, right?

You have to hedge, hedge, hedge, hedge hedge. You try like a bunch of things. You put in all this effort and it fails and you put on. So in some sense, like people working in bureaucracies, people working in politics, are operating in this high risk environment where lots of things fail and only few things succeed.

But they seem to have internalised it in the wrong direction. I haven't thought enough about what's going on there. But you would think that. That it would maybe go in the opposite direction.

Ben: Yeah. I think in my mind there's a mismatch on the timing of when you get feedback. So Mm-hmm.

The thing about at least shorter term R&D projects, or even within biopharma, which I know quite well, and this is your whole point about what is verifiable or not, your trial fails after a year. So you get quite good feedback quite quickly in the political cycle. Not only would you maybe not know within your political cycle, but your KPI might not be that clear.

So you start something you vaguely think you want GDP to go up. I'm going to slightly make it up, but you have no idea really what your intermediate KPI was pointing in that direction. In any case, we've been talking for a while like people who spend far too much time thinking about AI and policy. Maybe my pivot question should be to the person in the street who probably maybe doesn't even particularly care too much about AI or policy or any of this stuff. What should maybe be one thing or something that they should be thinking about here?

Alex: Interesting. Because the person on the street now comes up to me and asks me about AI safety and I went, I was in my dad's office the other day and they're like, 'Is AI going to kill us?'

And I went to a wedding and two people asked me, is AI going to kill us? So that's the wrong question.

Ben: And what data? The wrong water and data centres is also the wrong question. So what are the and that's what, and that's what obviously the mainstream media or even not even the mainstream media, media is all around that.

So yeah, we get a chance to communicate maybe one or two things that they could be thinking. And I also, I would quite like it to be not, oh my god, they're going to take on jobs as well, which I don't think is helpful. I'm not quite sure why they focus so much on that. You might not have anything, but if you do, what, should the person in the street maybe be thinking?

If it isn't worrying about data centres, isn't AI's going to kill us or take our jobs?

Alex: I think it's bottlenecks and sort of reiterating this thing of if something is automated, it just moves to the bottleneck. Please think in terms of bottlenecks and start thinking about where the bottleneck is, and it's sad that you have to do this. Because the government shouldn't have to be thinking about where the bottleneck is because that means the system's broken normally. Like the market does that. But, I digress. So bottlenecks are probably one comparative advantage. And this notion that even if AI is much better at you than something like at everything, if it's much, much better than you at something else, it will only do those other things, right?

And so, comparative advantage of countries and different countries should do different things. And then finally like we are not measuring enough, like nearly enough. Like everyone, everyone who's talking to you about AI's going to do this, AI's going to do that. Like we have no numbers.

We don't know, like we don't know how many jobs, all vibes, like taking away all vibes. It would be great if we had some numbers. But we don't have any numbers on the safety front, numbers on like the employment front numbers on like even the capability front. I don't know if you saw how Epoch AI did a benchmark.

They basically evaluated, meta, evaluated a bunch of benchmarks. And more than 50% of the top benchmarks are dubious and 20 to 50% of them have false positives and false negatives. The answers flipped the wrong wave round. Like there's data contamination so we're operating with a bunch of bunk numbers or could be better numbers.

Ben: Yeah, what's the aphorism? You only manage what you measure but if you're not measuring it right. But we've got this whole thing because the UK has just come out with new data from our statistical agency and it turns out productivity wasn't quite as bad as we thought for all sorts of reasons. And they don't even really know what's happening in the job market.

So there's definitely something on the measurement front and I like the comparative advantage, which I guess is Economics 101, but with this split between the tacit knowledge bit or the non-verifiable bit, which humans are still going to be somewhat good at to maybe very good at. And there's definitely going to be a comparative advantage versus AI and other people.

Great. Well I'm going to pivot to maybe some more personal thoughts or personal creativity thoughts before then going to a more quick fire round and rounding up. So you were also Cheese Lord, captain of Warwick's Overwatch team. So, yes. Why Overwatch? Why not Valorant? And what do you learn from being in competitive video games and being a captain?

Is there anything we could learn apart from the fact that it seems to be fun or maybe stressful?

Alex: Fun and stressful and very rewarding. Valorant hadn't come out, up until that point, but I really don't like Valorant. I really dislike games that require you to stand still while you have to shoot.

It's just a very, there's something about me that's no, why am I standing still? I want to be jiggling left and right. What's the, where's the fun in that? I quite enjoy games with movement. And so that's why I guess Overwatch drew me and I had to be, it was again one of those things where a friend would be you have to play this game.

You would love it. You have to play this game.  I ignored them for so long. They eventually bought me the game just so I'd play it and I was oh, I love this game. On like the esports side ka there's like this whole like video games and being good at like competition teaches you a lot about starting in a domain, being really shit at a domain. Starting off and being like bronze or silver or gold and slowly you'll kind of like platinum and then diamond and masters and Grandmasters and maybe you'll now like top 500, you say I am one of the top 500 people in my country, in my region. And you have this very clear reward signal and that I think you can generalise out from that and be ah, I can like get better at things.

There's also a lot around it like team competition and being able to. So I think what's really nice about university esports is the fact that you play with what hand you're given, right? You have a bunch of students that show up. You have to find the best that you can get, and then you get like a freaking Roadhog one-trick, and you get a Symmetra one-trick, and you're like, 'What the fuck am I going to do with this?' And you make it work. And I think that we were very successful. We went back to back years. And what made us successful was playing to these strengths and being a really weird team that was very okay with the fact that we are not playing perfectly. We wouldn't be world champions, but we can be good enough to beat every other student team by leaning into these weird niches.

And I think that in games and in life, if I'm, if I dare to philosophise, briefly, like the people haven't explored the space of ideas nearly enough and haven't sort of tapped into the market's not efficient. They haven't tapped into like all the alpha and how far you can take an idea and how far you can stretch and optimise something. So have you just tried winning?

Ben: Yeah. It's amazing that I'm going to loop together so many of our thoughts with that because leaning into your team is essentially leaning into your comparative advantage. If you've got some oddball technique, which I, that's they're the best at two things.

They can't do anything else, but you're going to have to lean into that. So that's really interesting. And I only discovered a few years ago that Elon Musk, for instance, still plays a load of video games. I was seeing him play the recent Diablo game, which isn't even that complicated game. And then I don't, there was something else, which I thought was really fascinating.

And I do think generally I've, I've got a bit old, so in my youth, the first-person shooter was Doom came on. It was like the first thing within that and it seemed so incredible, but it's gone down a little bit. But parents still, I think, fear too much about children in gaming because they are learning an amazing amount of things, particularly if they're just something on like Minecraft that they're doing all of this stuff.

Yeah. We haven't pushed the frontier of this. So, I was listening to a philosopher who was making some very, leaps of faith arguments around what can speedrunning games teach you. Mm-hmm. Because you're losing all of these. I never, I'm, you are obviously we would know, but people who speed run these Mario games or these quite complicated games where.

A standard person would take a standard, really good gamer should take days to play through these like hundreds of hours and they cut it down to four hours using these like crazy methods of which we're definitely not on the frontier of what all of that. So I think that's all really fascinating.

So, I mean, maybe putting it together, what, any games that you would, you, like playing now or you would say, oh, if you, if you've never really thought about video games, this is, something that maybe you should, you should trial. And maybe while you're thinking about that, because I think games is another aspect where we don't have to be that worried about AI.

I mean, AI [is] kind of solved chess and go, or in the sense that they are now much better at chess and go than the very best human. And chess is at an all time high in terms of people playing. I mean, people didn't play that much go, but I'm sure AI is much better. I mean, obviously it can control other, other things.

If you had an AI bot it would be better at the shooting game. So that's not why we're going to play shooting games. But anyway, any games on your mind at the moment or anything we can learn.

Alex: A few different directions. It feels more like a puzzle person. Like another thing I put in a variant of Sudokus in my free time because I don't do enough maths-y logic-style stuff.

So I just like to sit and I play my Sudokus. They're very satisfying. There's this YouTube channel called Cracking the Cryptic. They blew up in the pandemic. There's a game called Blue Prince, which is like a puzzle game, if you like puzzles at all. It's an, it's a phenomenal game. I'd recommend it.

I think as I've got less time,  older and I can't, I don't have time to be good at muscle memory or grind away. I'll play more strategy games on my phone or whatever. My vice is Clash Royale, but I would not recommend that there's a game called Super Auto Pets, which is an auto battler.

It's a bit like chess. I still think Overwatch is fun as like a competitive game. I think that there are games like Civ VII or like Age of Empires. I can't play those games anymore because, you know, I stopped playing them and I recently picked up Civ again. I played it for a day. I was oh, I'd love this game.

Why haven't I played this? And then after like 14 hours of sitting in my chair, I realised why I don't play that game anymore.

Ben: Yeah, more addictive than anything else. That's a bit dangerous. Yeah. I, in general, there's I think there's a lot you can explore whether you wanna explore like the pure one-v-one nature of there is no outside force that I can blame for this.

Alex: This is either my skill difference or your skill difference. Versus like the team based games where it is like, you enter with a suboptimal hand and it's, 'How do you play this suboptimal hand?' And lean into the comparative advantages, like you were saying.

Ben: Yeah. That's all great.

So maybe thinking about your own personal creativity. So you wrote this 2031 with a team of, maybe it's about eight of you. I can't quite remember the count eight in total.

Alex: Yeah.

Ben: So, and

Alex: Many reviewers and many people behind the scenes supporting.

Ben: So do you write, so there's no correct answer to this at all, but are you a morning writer, an evening writer?

Do you write in bursts, do you think in the shower or in a coffee shop? Or do you think best through a conversation? Do you feel like you have to write it all down? Do you write long hand? Do you write straight onto the computer? Do you even voice type? How? Yeah, I'm thinking about what makes you productive or creative and, how you think about your own processes.

Alex: So I definitely enjoy a long ramble to Claude or like put Wispr Flow up. It's like working in an office. I'm able to do this less. It's quite annoying. But I usually like being able to ramble about a difficult topic for like 15 minutes to Claude and then have it chug away and process that and think through.

I've made big progress on difficult problems before doing that. So big fan of that. I'm someone and that's

Ben: Because Claude is prepared to listen to you more than a natural person or can also digest what you actually said in a more legible form back to you, which probably an ordinary human can't.

Alex: Many things. One, you're just able to provide so much more, and richer context.

Ben: Yeah.

Alex: Like the amount of context you can provide 15 minutes spoken to Claude is and it's like

Ben: Days.

Alex: Yeah. An hour. Yeah. An hour of typing at least. And you wouldn't spend an hour typing your prompt.

Maybe it would. So first context is just like so much better second, yeah. Through the process of talking. You know, you talking is a version of thinking. It's like prompting is a version of thinking. So it's more like a rubber ducky or a thought partner. And you're able to iterate on the thoughts.

While I'll sometimes talk through a problem or and, through the process of talking through it, I'll end up with a skeleton in my head. But the process of writing itself I was actually on a writing retreat recently in Barcelona. I sort of have close fresh experience.

It's laborious and painful for me. It's excruciating. Maybe it's because I get distracted all the time, but like,

Ben: And it's not just being in Basel. Too boring. Yeah. I'm just joking. Sorry. Basel, Swiss people.

Alex: No, that's really funny. I was in Barcelona, not Basel.

Ben: Oh, okay. All right. Oh, that Barcelona, you can't, you can't blame for being unfun except that the vibes I get is that they don't want any more tourists coming in, so, yeah.

Alex: Yes.

Ben: So definitely. Sorry Basel and sorry Barcelona. But anyway,

Alex: Beautiful architecture as well. But, there is, it is useful, like the pain is useful, both in terms of informing: is this actually a tweet, not a blog post. But also in terms of why is it painful? Like what is the idea that I'm trying to articulate that's like struggling to be, born.

And. I think I'm, the one thing stuck with me was there's like this curve of like enthusiasm about an idea. And you got to start writing about it at a very specific point on the curve. Because if you start too late, you're going to be fall off the curve. But if you start too early, like you haven't had the process.

So being able, like if you have the flexibility to clear time, you're like, 'At this point in the curve, I'm going to write about it now.'. Otherwise you ends up in like draft jail. Yeah, but the writing retreat was great. I showed up to it thinking I was going to write about Europe and AI and ended up writing about my feelings.

So yeah.

Ben: That's great. I like your sense of that curve. It's a little bit similar when I do playwriting in some respect, which is if you show it or try and edit it too early, you definitely kill it. But also if it's too late, sometimes it's bored, like you said. Well we might touch on the end about feelings about what we might think an ordinary Tuesday might look like or what the future might hold. But we'll do maybe a little section of overrated, underrated, and then finish with a Mm-hmm. Couple of questions. So, you can go overrated, underrated, you can even go correctly rated. You can give a little thought on it. You also don't have to. We can, we can pass. So we're going to go overrated, underrated recursive self-improvement,

Alex: Overrated.

Still might happen, but everyone is way too confident. I don't know how they know. You're not in the lab, you don't see what's happening. You don't know what the bottlenecks are. Have good epistemics.

Ben: Yeah, that seems fair. I think a little bit of it's happening, but way, no, over, like I would not put it over 50% at all.

Like probably 5% or, something like that. Great. Universal basic income. UBI overrated or underrated?

Alex: Overrated. I used to be in the Yang Gang. But I think the political economy of it breaks. You know, a new politician comes in and says, I will raise it. I will raise it. I would be happy if we could magically fix it at the optimal threshold.

I mean, I don't think you can do that.

Ben: Yeah. Not protect from politicians. Also the latest small trials haven't been quite as good as we thought they were. So disappointing, but, okay. Overrated. So, AGI, although I guess we don't even know what it is, but say artificial general intelligence or I guess we could do ASI artificial super intelligence.

Either one of those, some something like that. Overrated or underrated?

Or no

Alex: Rating. I have conflicted views. Overrated in the sense that I think that there are some wrong—overrated in the way that most people talk about it. Like constrained to the set of people who talk about AGI and ASI overrated because too confident about certain ideas, too confident about like the nature of intelligence and whatnot.

Underrated in the sense that not enough people are talking about this and everyone, everyone should be talking about this if this is even remotely possible.

Ben: Yes. I think that's fair. I have the same view on expected value. The people who think about expected value think about it way too much and apply it to too many areas of their life, but an ordinary person doesn't think about it at all, and so they need to think about it a little bit more so it becomes both overrated and underrated.

Okay. The idea of taxing compute or taxing tokens underrated or overrated?

Alex: Super overrated. I think it's a terrible idea. I think we should just tax consumption and tax land in Alex's utopia we tax both these things we're fine. Maybe, we're fine ongoing debate, but I think the burden is on the tax compute people to really rebut why we can't do those other two taxes first.

And why their taxes are better than those.

Ben: Sure. Consumption taxes. Pigouvian taxes. Very classical Economics 101, right. They still argue for that. Hasn't been put in. Great. Open source AI. I guess this could also be open-weight, open tokens, but open source AI overrated, underrated.

Alex: I think that the people who boost them are overrating them. I think the reason they're doing that is because they haven't realised just how much they are at the whim of the direction of technology. Like the people who want open source to be prolific the most for that world to exist, we have to develop a bunch of technologies that improve resilience, that improve safety, that make this open stuff deployable.

And these people are the ones who are least caring about this stuff. Guys, come on.

Ben: Yeah, that's fair enough. Prediction markets overrated, underrated. I mean, I guess you can, normal markets are forms of prediction markets, but I guess overall prediction markets.

Alex: Does sports betting count?

Ben: Yes.

You could put sports betting in that. So you could do a sub, but I, this is more, I guess, political and other betting Manifold or Kalshi and things like that.

Alex: Yeah. Without the sports betting underrated. With the sports betting overrated.

Ben: Yeah. We don't need more sports betting. We have all of that.

Great. Final couple, I guess, effective altruism has a probably slightly bad rap at this very moment in time, which is where September 2026. But generally, do you think overrated or under—

Alex: Overrated. Definitely within the European continent. Like the version of EA, the sort of continental EA, which is, a specific shape of EA that I, that I think we need to move past and, build something else to replace it.

Ben: Yeah. Overrated. Great. And then last one, science fiction. I guess you could do science fiction as policy, but science fiction. Overrated or underrated?

Alex: Saying underrated because I've been, I've been reading some Harry Potter fan fiction recently and I've been enjoying them.

Ben: Yeah, it's got to be underrated, right?

Anything which makes us think more broadly. Although I do think we do need to shift as I was, we talked earlier about to the Jedi light side rather than any more dystopia. But I guess, we'll have, we have something, we've got to have our villains as well as our heroes. Great. So, we spend a lot of time imagining a future Europe, particularly a future Europe, that we should avoid.

What's the future that Alex actually wants?

Alex: Vending machine on every street corner. No, I think the future I want is one where young people can like look into their own future and be ah, this is a future that I'm excited about. This is a future that I want to live in. And for that to happen, we got to radically restructure the way that society and the social contract has been like playing out.

We've got to get a bunch of things right on technology, because this is like the most important thing that is important for young people's futures, but also government in the way that government has like stacked the book against them. And so I think about the future, like within the frame of what would an a, would an 18-year-old Alex be happy to live in like 20 years from now or 30 years from now?

And currently, no. Because I don't think 18-year-old Alex would be happy to live in like right now. And we keep going in the wrong direction then, but we're going to fix it and we're going to we can fix it and I believe we have to fix it. Sorry for vague bursting.

Ben: Yeah,

no, I'm optimistic on that as well.

Well, maybe I'll push them one. Maybe you could think about a detail. So we assume we have fixed it into, I don't know, 2050, or you can go even further if you want 2100 sometime in the future. And we can forget GDP and compute and geopolitical power. We've somehow solved that at least. To Europe's somewhat satisfaction, we've, we've got to somewhere.

What does an ordinary Tuesday in that future look like? What are two or three things that ordinary Alex, 18— So this is a really interesting dilemma because it's your future self, but you're back at 18 years old. So what does, what does that look like?

Alex: I think it doesn't look too much different from today in the sense that that Alex wants to wake up, wants to go to the bakery, wants to walk to the park, wants to see his friends there, and bump into his friends on the way to the park and the bakery and then they go to the park and they eat their croissants or whatever. And in this future Alex has received a magic like engineering shot that makes him able to consume lactose and he is able to enjoy his croissant in the park. And he feels safe. And then maybe like he's then able to hop on a really fast train and pop over to London for the day and visit all his friends there. And it's really cheap. And he's able to have that lifestyle and I think that lifestyle is just like ludicrously out of reach and then live close to where you want to work. And I think that life and your friend, that lifestyle is likely out of reach today that feels like fantasy.

Ben: Yeah, good health.

Good health. Being with your friends. I guess just on that one you mentioned in that, do you still have a meaningful job in this? Was it just a choice that people will want to have to pursue to what sort of meaningful job for them and therefore they have the opportunity space that if they want that they can pursue it?

I guess I speak to a lot of young people who feel that is diminishing. So that, you know, that is of now, there's only a small segment which have the right opportunity space to kind of do the meaningful work they do, which is kind of interestingly why medics are still quite popular and also teachers and some others.

I guess the small niche of policy, also people going into it and, things like that. But I think this is one of the bits that some of the UBI enthusiasts have also got wrong is that they don't understand that people actually jobs have always been meaningful for humans. And it might not be this artistic creative job where you sit around and paint all day or even make video games, which will be a portion of it, but it's actually something else connected with human flourishing.

But I'd be interested if you think you've still got this meaningful job and actually what your 2050 meaningful job for 18-year-old Alex would be, assume you've solved policy, although I guess policy will never be solved. Maybe you're still in policy, but you'll, you have to do something else.

Alex: Yeah, I have two, two senses of like what 18-year-old Alex wants.

It's like part of me wants to have agency over my own future and over like the collective future of society and humanity and be able to meaningfully improve and contribute to that future and make it marginally better. I don't know, send me up, on the space elevator. I want to go supervise asteroid mining Belt 12.

Another part of me really just wants to create whimsy and joy for other people and see smiles in their faces and just have lots of bits. And lots of like stupid jokes. And pull a bunch of pranks on people all day. And that also sounds quite nice. I would be miserable without either of those.

Ben: They sound like two great things to have. Great. Last couple of questions then. Anything you are working on now, current projects or future projects that you'd like people to know about?

Alex: Yeah. I don't know like when this will be ready, but I can tease it. I talked about how we, don't have ideas.

Our ideas suck. So we want to fix this. So we're, we're doing an essay competition or writing competition or something of that sort. Basically okay, you read Europe 2031 or something else. You care about this problem now you want Europe to be prepared for transformative AI, whether it's for its resilience or it's flourishing or its agency what you're going to do about it. What should we do about it? Write a letter to someone who has have like an audience or recipient and outline your idea of how we should get out of this mess. I don't know when that will go live. Probably not for a while, but you can already start thinking about your solutions.

Ben: That sounds like a good idea.

I do think you need to get a celebrity to front it. So I've seen a couple of writing ideas, this year. In fact, there's one which has Neal Stephenson and Gwern on GPU. 

Alex: So there's, you've got to write a story It has to be AI-generated.

Ben: Yeah. Or no. I think

Alex: The Gwern one has to be an AI-generated piece of literature, I think.

Ben: Does it have to be AI? I thought you just had to disclose it. 

Alex: I think it, I think it has to be fully AI-generated. [Ed: No, only disclosed]

Ben: Interesting. But regardless, so that had some publicity. So when you do send it out, that would be my, but I think it is quite interesting. I do think we need to incentivise the storytellers to be involved.

For sure. And so then the last question is, do you have, I guess we have given quite a lot of advice out for listeners, both the ordinary person or the person being involved in policy and you have a big call to just get involved and do more thinking on that. But any other advice that you wanna leave for listeners? It could be, what character they should choose in Overwatch or more general life or career advice or any final thoughts that you want to leave

Alex: Arq Foundation/careers we're hiring.

Ben: That's a good one.

Alex: We also have referral bonuses. So if you find someone we should hire, we'll pay, we'll give you a thousand euros.

Maybe it'll be more my generic career advice. Write, please have a Substack. Even if there are only three posts on it, I want to see the way you think. I think the agents would also appreciate seeing the way you think. I think people need to be founding new things. And you don't necessarily have to have a good idea. There are [fuders / organisations] that can bring you money. So, don't let that shy you away from founding something cool and impactful.

Ben: That's great. So do build, write in public, check out Arq Foundation. Apply if that's a good job or make your friends apply even better, and get a bounty.

And with that, Alex, thank you very much.

Alex: Thank you.



In Arts, Podcast, Science, Politics Tags Alex Petropoulos, Ben Yeoh Chats, Europe 2031, Artificial Intelligence, AI Policy, AI Governance, AI Safety, European Technology, Future of Europe, Technological Sovereignty, Industrial Policy, AI and Science, Scientific Progress, Institutional Reform, AI and Society, Human Flourishing

Matt Lodder on Tattoos, Memory and the History Written on Skin

May 28, 2026 Ben Yeoh

Matt Lodder on Tattoos as Art History

Art historian and author Matt Lodder joins Ben Yeoh to explain why tattoo history is not a niche subject, but a way into art history, class, colonialism, gender, fashion, technology, archives, and the stories societies choose to preserve or forget.

Matt is the author of Painted People: Humanity in 21 Tattoos and Tattoos: The Untold History of a Modern Art, and co-host of Beneath the Skin, a podcast that explores history through the lens of tattooing.

In this episode, Matt argues that tattoos have often been misunderstood because the historical record overrepresents people whose bodies were monitored: sailors, soldiers, prisoners and other surveilled groups. Meanwhile, tattooing among women, the middle classes, queer communities and “ordinary” people was often hidden under clothing, poorly documented, or preserved only in private archives.

The conversation moves from Matt’s childhood fascination with tattooing to the art-historical questions that animate his work. Rather than asking only whether tattoos are “art”, why people get tattooed, or what a tattoo “means”, Matt asks what tattoos reveal about style, taste, authorship, technology, reception and power.

They discuss myths around Captain Cook, the strange archival afterlives of tattooed skin, the invention of electric tattooing, Instagram’s acceleration of trends, AI-generated tattoo aesthetics, eye tattooing, and why museums still struggle to preserve an art form carried on living bodies.

It is a conversation about tattoos, but also about how culture gets remembered, flattened, misread and rediscovered.

Key takeaways

  • Tattoo history is a way of reading wider human history, because tattoos sit at the intersection of image, body, identity, fashion, technology and social judgement.

  • Many tattoo myths persist because archives preserve the bodies of people who were surveilled, while more private or ordinary tattooing often left fewer records.

  • Matt pushes against the narrow question of whether tattoos are “art”, arguing that art history is more useful when it asks about style, authorship, taste and reception.

  • Tattooing was not simply “discovered” by Europeans through Captain Cook. That story reflects later colonial myth-making more than historical reality.

  • Instagram has not changed the basic fact that people copy visual culture, but it has radically accelerated the life cycle of tattoo trends.

  • AI tattoo imagery is technically influential, but Matt is sceptical of its aesthetics and ethics, especially when it shortcuts artistic authorship.

  • Matt’s practical advice: ask tattooed people who did the work, look at healed portfolios, choose artists by style, and do not treat people’s bodies as public property.

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.

Contents

00:00 Meet Matt Lodder
00:36 Why tattoos tell history
03:27 Misunderstood tattoos
10:49 The art history lens
19:48 Performance art and the body
23:12 Writing Painted People
28:28 Unfinished tattoo mysteries
31:59 Myths, Captain Cook and cultural amnesia
39:28 Archives, access and private collections
42:02 Medical curiosities and preserved skin
42:31 Lost tattooed skin
43:56 The electric tattoo breakthrough
45:23 Museums misplacing history
46:32 How Instagram speeds tattoo trends
52:13 The internet and flattened styles
54:23 AI tattoo aesthetics
58:38 Overrated / underrated
01:00:50 Tattoos in museums
01:03:55 Eye tattooing risks
01:05:42 Current and future projects
01:07:13 Better questions to ask about tattoos
01:12:44 Closing and Ben’s tattoo confession

Transcript (lightly edited with AI so mistakes are possible)

Ben: Hey, everybody. I am super excited to be speaking to Matt Lauder. Matt is a historian of art. He's the author of Painted People: Humanity in 21 Tattoos, and also the author of Tattoos: The Untold History of a Modern Art. Both are brilliant books, which I found fascinating in how they treat tattoos as a story of being human.

He co-hosts his own podcast, Beneath The Skin, which looks at the history of everything through the lens of tattoos. Matt, welcome.

Matt: Hi, thanks for having me.

Ben: When and how did you first realize that tattoo history and tattoos in general was a way of telling the history of almost everything?

Matt: That's a good question.

I think when I, ... i- I've been fascinated with tattooing, tattooing itself and tattoos for a long time. And I didn't do history at school. I didn't do GCSE history or eight level history. I didn't ... I've got a PhD in art history now, but I didn't have any undergraduate or master's degree in art history.

So I had no ... It wasn't like I had a big wide ranging interest in history per se that then translated into a histori- into a historical interest. It really was the other way around. I got fascinated with tattoos from a very young age, and wanted to figure out as much as I can about them. And then I found my way through a kind of fairly circuitous, although it makes sense in hindsight the route to doing a PhD in art history.

And I think what you realize when you start understanding what art history is exactly that, right? We're not just art historians, not just interested in pretty pictures from the past. It's different from art criticism in that way. We're not just interested in whether a painting or a sculpture is good or bad.

But we're interested in what we would call, the indexicality of a work of art, right? So the basic kind of practice of art history is to figure out what works of art tell us about people and places in the past. And I realized, without really, cynically sitting down to, to do it this way, my, my questions about tattoos and where they came from or what they told us about tattoo people were also then really, interesting ways into thinking about human stories and cultural historical stories from a wide range of the human past, right?

If you can ... the way I used to explain it, if you can tell something about the past by looking at paintings in museums and churches and country houses, that must be also and perhaps particularly true for the images that people carry on their bodies. And yeah, when I sat down to write my first book and I was talking with the publisher and the agent about what kind of thing would work telling a story that wasn't just about the history of tattooing, but was about what tattooing could tell us about people and places in the past was a way into it.

But I came here really initially from a very ... literally childlike. I was literally a child who thought that tattoos were cool, and like 40 years later, here we are.

Ben: And they're still cool.

Matt: Yeah, exactly. Or people could tell me they're not, which is also part of the interesting, trajectory of tattoo history, whether

Where ... People ask me often. I speak to journalists and people ask me if tattoos are cool and I said, look if I could tell you answer that question, I wouldn't be a historian. I'd be a presentist, a- and I certainly wouldn't be a middle-aged man. You don't ask middle-aged men what's cool.

Ben: Yeah. I guess that's the problem is that some Facebook and social media isn't cool because now your dad is on it. And if your mom and dad are on it, how c- how can that, by definition, be cool? Exactly. I'm interested in how you came to it, partly because I have the impression that tattoos are still misunderstood.

I'd be interested if you think that they are misunderstood. And if they are, why in your mind are they so persistently misunderstood? And I don't know whether you'd hint at some of the biggest misunderstandings that you think you come across.

Matt: Yeah. It's, again it's mis- it was misunderstandings really that dr- that drove me here.

I've told this truth before, but I'll tell it to your listeners too. When I was a kid I got told ... I, basically, I was born in 1980. I was growing up in the early 1980s and seeing basically WWF- WLF wrestlers like The Undertaker, with cool tattoos and rock bands like Guns and Roses with cool tattoos.

And started as many young kids still do today to start scribbling on my arms with Byro and Felt Penn, and explaining it slightly to my mom and dad what called tattoos I wanted to get when I was older. And my grandparents sat me down and told me two stories, both intended to, to put me off, right?

One was the story of my grandfather, who was a Dutchman, submariner in the Dutch Navy in the then Dutch East Indies in World War II, and he told me a story that he was drunk on his rum ration somewhere in Jakarta in the early 1940s as they ... And he woke up just as they were about to tattoo a fly on the end of his nose.

So he told me and he woke up just in time and escaped the ignominy of having a facial tattoo, which is even more hilarious. It would be even more holistic if you knew my grandfather. He was a very austere, very stern, sensible kind of guy. And so that, in a way, is a quite familiar story.

I think that the drunken sailor and the regretful, youthful mistake i- is a fairly familiar story. My grandmother, though, told me another story about her mother, so she was born in England, but grew up in Australia. Her mother was the, grew up in Kent, the daughter of a tenant farmer in the early part of the t- early part of the 20th century, late part of the 19th century.

And she'd said that her mother, so my great-grandmother had a tattoo, which came about because one day her brother came home one day with a tattoo machine and said, "Hey, sis, can I tattoo you? " And she said, "Will it come off?" And he said, "Yes." So she apparently had her initials tattooed on her wrist and obviously hated it and regretted it.

And again, in a way, it's this story of a kind of youthful regret. But as I got older and jumped in those puddles, so to speak, you tell a kid not to do something and they'll get obsessed with it, as at least I did. I, as a bookish lad, I went looking for books about tattoo history and the late, the 90s in particular was what I now know as an academic of this period, we call the culporeal turn in the humanities, lots of real interest in the body in the 90s, lots of gender theory and racial theory and that sort of interest tallied into interest in tattooing as well.

And so when I got to university and I was starting to get tattooed and pierced and body modified as well I was just getting all the books I could find from the library at the university I was at and then on interlibrary loan about tattooing. And they all hinted at least in some senses towards that drunken sailor story of my grandfather, but didn't

The story of, like, where my great uncle got a tattoo machine from as a tenant farmer's child in Edwardian Kent I was like, "Where's that story?" And then moreover, as I was getting more and more tattooed and hanging around with tattooed people, the kind of only tattoos, t- only criminals and tailors get tattoos kind of thing I was reading was making less and less sense.

And I think w- to properly answer your question, I think the misconceptions have come from really a lack of visibility of the kind of stories of my great-grandmothers. I now know that, for example, tattoo machines were sold in Edwardian London in essentially department stores.

Whether or not that was the kind of machine that my great uncle had, I don't know, but, th- those catalogs, for example, were not in any museums I looked for, or libraries. The vernacular history in general, let alone tattooing, is not very well preserved and tattooing, of quote unquote regular people, is just not recorded anywhere.

It's not, you have to look very hard for it, at least. But what you do find if you're an academic who's interested in tattoo history, and this has been going on really since the middle of the 19th century when tattoos became a kind of important part of various branches of anthropology and criminology and sociology research.

If you're looking for tattoos in libraries and museums, what you find is tattoos on surveilled populations, criminals, because their bodies get recorded because if you run away, they wanna be able to check that they've got the right person and on sailors for similar reasons. So I think a huge part really, and we're talking, I'm talking about with, Western tattoo history a huge part of the misconception is just that most of it has not been visible.

Literally, it's been under clothing a- as well as being subcultural, and it hasn't been recorded in a way that was available to academics of prior generations. I think the other thing as well, to complete that thought is that tattooing is something that I think if you ha- if you are tattooed, or even if you understand the desire to be tattooed it's not that weird.

There is something ... I hesitate to use the words inherent, but it will do. There's something inherent about that desire to get tattooed if you have it or even if you don't, I think you can understand it. But for someone who doesn't want or have that desire to be tattooed, it looks painful.

So, it looks like why would you get something permanent on your body when you're gonna be, it's gonna be out of fashion in whatever time, and it's gonna make your life more difficult, it's gonna interfere with your job prospects. The questions that non-tattooed people ask tattooed people, does it hurt?

What will your mom think of it and what will you do when you're older? I think they are saying psychological insights as well into the kind of misconceptions about this practice. 'Cause as I talked about in both books- there's the wrong question to ask.

Why do you wanna get tattooed is the wrong question, at least for me.

Ben: Yeah. Reflecting on that, it feels a little bit like, I think people will probably understand if you say, why do people wanna dance? You dance from young, you have this impulse, probably quite a hard thing to put into words, but people, people- Yeah.

would get. And I'm interested that you come at an art history lens because like you say, there's being anthropologists, sociologists, blah, blah, you've got a high art, low art, what gets documented, what are the untold stories element to it? And I'm interested in looking at it as a cultural form, this art history form.

Yeah. What do you see or the kind of ... To me, it seems like a broader lens that perhaps anthropologists or sociologists have missed or this whole telling of the story, which seems it ... There's a sort of irony that I feel that it is art on your body or too on your body. Yeah. And yet some of it seems to be hidden and untold.

Yeah. Whereas it seems to be, I guess it, tends to be la- last for the life of the person, although we have mummified and other things, so it doesn't go into museums at some art, but you have more ephemeral art practices- Yeah. ... which do go into the art conscious, from my practice, performance for sure- Yeah.

but a lot of other ones. So it seems to me really intriguing this and how it got picked up by the sociologists and things maybe first and through potentially a narrow lens and where we've ended up.

Matt: Yeah. I think ... So this is really at the core of ... I think this is really where I got to. It wasn't really the starting point of my PhD, but it's where I got to.

So my PhD, which I started in 2005 on the back of a master's degree that touched on some of the same topics a couple years earlier I wanted to write really in this kind of, l- in the light of this late '90s work on embodiment, I wanted to think about what it meant to be an artwork in the world, right?

Like what was the kind of ... This is a kind of very pretentious, philosophical thought, really, commensurate with scholars in their 20s and what academia was like in the late '90s anyway. I wanted to understand, I think, the phenomenology and ontology of an artwork, right?

Because tattooing's an art practice body art, we all know what that is. So I thought then I'd be interested to know what it means to be what's the ontology or phenomenology really of being an artwork in the world? And it turns out that the first premise of that question, which is tattooing an art form anyway, was actually way more complicated

In some senses, not complicated at all, I think, but it was certainly understudied. And so I'm still working on what was gonna be really the first chapter of my PhD that I started 20 years ago, right? The ... What I think is really important about art history as a methodological set here is that we don't care what is and isn't art, right?

Whether something is or isn't art is for us a kinda contingent question, right? So we will take it as a given in a historical moment or, the classic kind of formulation of if an artist says it's art. That's really the position that art history as a discipline has taken since the least 1970s, probably e- even a little bit earlier.

For philosophers of art, aestheticians, the question of is something art or not is interesting, but art historians, we don't really care. In fact, I have interesting conversations with my philosophy colleagues at Essex who keep telling my students that there is a definition of art, and I have to tell them off telling them that.

So art historians can skip over the thing that I think a lot of other disciplines get hung up on. Anthropology is really important here. Anthropologists and I've written an academic paper about this particularly the work of a guy called Alfred Gail although there are predecessors as well to him in the '90s wrote basically a kind of series of books about what has n- now become known as visual anthropology, right?

The anthropology of making things, making images and objects. And Gail basically based that initial thinking because he was largely anthropologist of the Pacific on tattooing, right? He wanted to think about how tattooing could be art in an anthropological sense. And in a well-meaning way, he wanted to avoid this idea that he understood art Western art history to have, which was a kind of chauvinism, right?

Which it can be art if it's good, if it's beautiful, if it's technically proficient, if it's normative, none of which is particularly true. I don't think of contemporary art history as a method but probably is true of art history as a cultural thing. So Girl and others then came up with this idea that to, to get away with that the way that anthropologists should, would think about tattooing and other forms of, i- indigenous art making, for example, would be to think about, not about their style, not about their beauty really, but to think about their function.

And this was and Gail himself says "I'm methodologically Philistine, Philistine, I'm a methodological Philistine." He said, "I'm anti-art necessarily," right? And what he meant by that is he didn't wanna get bogged down into questions of beauty, which he understood as hierarchical, and he wanted to think about form.

So that's why it functions. The point of making a shield with a lion's head on it, this is an example that he gives, is because it's scary for the, for example, the scary for your enemies. So there's a kind of functional thing here. And so anthropologists who've been thinking about tattooing after Girl, and it's also implicit in work before him too, we're asking basically, why do you get tattooed right?

Which for a nice story, and I, as I just said, I think it's the wrong question. We don't ask. In fact, it's completely uninteresting to tell a night story and why people paint, or if we do ask that question, it's only the beginning of our inquiry. There are functional art objects in the Western Historical Canon, things like altar pieces and stuff.

But, like, why people do it is only the first kind of layer. And then we get into things like, which I think are much more interesting, which are questions of style and taste and reception. And weirdly although it seems really obvious to me that tattooing is a, can be understood in the same way as a painting.

Crucially, I don't ever wanna make the claim that tattooing is art for reasons I've already explained. What that was- wasn't present anywhere, surprisingly enough to me when I started up my research. And it feels a bit like an open goal to me, because most tattoo people understand it.

It's natural, right? But the implications of that question, so things like who is the author of a tattoo, for example, is it me as the person who has it on their body? Is it the person who puts it on my body, the tattoo artist? Is it some combination of us? These are things that art history has tools for and theoretical arguments about.

We talk about things like patronage and architecture. For example, there is a lot of interesting literature on collaborative making, but anthropology and functionalism can't do that, don't even think about that. And I think I have been asking the wrong questions. And there are similar examples for sociology as well.

The sociology of tattooing comes out of criminology, really, which was designed in a moment of scientific racism to try and diagnose how primitive you are, right? So I think ironically, art history, particularly art history as it developed in the back end of the 20th century, was just a method set that was increasingly interesting, let, uninterested in the things that had bogged down and I think impeded other disciplinary approaches to the same set of questions.

But it seems, it's ... I talk to tattooists sometimes and have my whole career who go, "Yeah, obviously." Obviously it's an art form or obviously we can think about style, taste, authorship, fashion, technique, the relationship between technology, machines and inks and the kind of tattoos people get.

All of those things for people who are doing it, it's almost a bit obvious to them.

Ben: Yeah.

Matt: And it's very rarely that I say stuff and publish stuff that hasn't in some form been articulated by a tartarist amongst themselves in the last century.

Ben: That's fascinating. That brings up so many things, but the simple answer is yes but then you go on and then also that it might be completely the wrong question.

I recall speaking to someone who essentially studies photography as well through this lens. I don't think they quite called themselves a historian of photography, but maybe ... And they also answered, there's a question, from philosophers is photography art and they were completely- Yeah.

uninterested in whether it was art or not art or how you might ...

Matt: It's interesting as a historical question. So as a contingent question, when galleries start treating photography as art and photographs as artists, is it a historically interesting question because it tells us something about the cultural moment, but whether the object itself is or isn't art is exactly, as you say, a weird question.

Anthropologists also, some of my students take a module with my colleagues. We have a really great set of anthropologists  and I'm not shitting on them really although it sounds often like I am. I don't mean to. I've got some of my best friends who are visual anthropologists.

But some of my students take visual anthropology classes which focus on photography in visual anthropology and that, and they're quite astonished actually the methodological divergence between those two approaches because those first photographs will be te- treated as functional or as documentary or even if they're not, even if they have a kind of aesthetic dimension, that aesthetic is itself taken as functional, which is just not how art historians think about images,

Ben: Yeah. I guess it's the same on, I guess what we call cave art it's got, it's, completely, obviously we have, we'll never, ever know what the people who made those things were thinking, and it's just impossible. Yeah. So exactly. You gotta start from a complete-

Matt: Yeah. I cited an art historian in, in, in this paper that I wrote about who pointed out that art historians still, or maybe now especially, don't have a theory of intention.

We have to import theory. We, if we need them for our questions we're asking, we have to import them from i- from psychology and art and anthropology. But since the 1960s and 70s, art historians haven't had a theory of intention, which for me is interesting because, so many things about tattooing pa- have boiled down to what does that mean or why would you do that?

So why would you choose a tattoo in the first place and it, why did you choose that tattoo? And I think for that really makes sense, it really cuts off a lot of potential areas of inquiry which an historical approach enables, you know?

Ben: Yeah, that feels very narrow. I'm really fascinated essentially by what word would I use?

The interdependencies, the interdependency of the tattooist, your choice, how you present, and that's for a lot of creative human endeavors, interdependencies in music, when we make things together- Absolutely. ... collaboratively, particularly in performance art where you have a script and then it's embodied and then it's ephemeral, all of these types of things.

Matt: Performance art for me, performance art for me was a real clique moment as I was doing my ... I did a master's, so I did an undergraduate degree in languages. I've been really interested in ... I did a theater studies MA. So I was really interested in my teenage years in Brexton and in fact my A- level theater teacher hated theater theory, and I ended up teaching my class Brett when I was 17.

But I went and did a degree in French and German, and in my final year, had a module in European cinema about remakes. And all, in that, we started reading again some of the things that I'd been interested in, including Brecht actually in, in, in my theater studies degree. And then I started realizing

I did a master's degree in the body at Reading, interdisciplinary master's degree in the body. And on that, we had lessons, lectures from theater studies and performance studies people. And all of a sudden, someone said to me like someone like Lee Bowery the fashion, club kid and performance artist who I'd seen on a genes ad, in the late 80s and thought was incredibly cool.

Or like all these people that I was seeing, like Ron Athey who were getting in trouble for doing kind of very bloodily performance art. Someone said, That's called art, right? All of these bands that I liked were doing very bodily, shocking performances, the fact that there was a kind of lens to understand that stuff as art, as I said, my parents didn't take me to art galleries.

I didn't really have a frame for knowing what art was. And when someone said, "That stuff that you like that is performative and performance is art in some senses," I was like, "Oh, that really clicks for me. " But I didn't know it was art, when I saw Franco B bleeding, until he fainted and when I saw I don't know, Gina Parney, all of those very extreme, if you like, or very kind of intense performances from the late '90s that just crept into my subculture as a kid who was like reading heavy metal magazines.

When s- when it turned out to me that was art, I was like oh, okay. Now I can start making the connections." And performance art for me was really, a real cornerstone of how I think about all of this stuff.

Ben: I remember seeing Franco B, I think a performance cutting and bleeding on a white paper roll in the room 


being so viscerally impacted and thinking if I have this visual impact from all of these kinds of things, I can see why these things we're putting in the realm of art." I'm interested that through the lens of history, I guess a typical person thinks of history chronologically within time, but when I read Painted People and your choice of that, you went through individual tattoos, I think 21 of them, rather than a straight chronological history.

Yeah. And alluding to that, I'm interested why you chose to do it that way via, versus time, essentially a linear time thing, although I guess historians would argue that. And also then how did you choose, and maybe in that choosing and choice and investigation, did the, was there anything which you discovered or your mind was changed a lot about what you thought about it?

So it's a little bit why through individuals rather than say a strict timeline and how did you go about ... thinking and choosing that?

Matt: So I'm a big fan of chronology in general, partly because we talked about misconceptions earlier. One of the misconceptions that really bugs, for example, the history of Western tattooing is this idea that it quote unquote only recently became, not just for sailors.

I have a whole lecture that I give on this and the re- more, most recent book was a bit structured about this too. This idea that tattooing is over now and is far too fashionable and it was better and it was underground, and it goes back to the 1880s. There's examples from every single decade in the la- from the late 19th century to the present, saying that tattooing only recently, became fashionable, which I think is hilarious when you're finding examples from the the, from 1905 saying that, ta- tattooing used to be confined to seeming only, so when I did my exhibition, I did a big exhibition called British Tattoo Revealed, that doing that chronologically is really important because it helped people understand, I think, when we started out telling, what early modern antiquarian historians were saying about tattooing in the 16th century it was able to instantly give people an idea that everything they thought they knew about the recency of tattooing as a presence on British bodies wa- was misconce- misconceived.

So where tattooing can, where chronology can serve a rhetorical purpose, I think it's really useful. The painted people is laid out chronologically, but I also really wanted to A, tell as much of a geographically diverse story as I could, although I because I'm not an anthropologist, something else I'm really, I try and do that, that other people haven't done in the past is I try and not go, get out over my skis.

So painting people I talk about, for example, Inuit tattooing and a couple of chapters. I talk about tattooing in Fiji, I talk about tattooing in ancient Siberia. But I do so as much as possible from a lens of, like, how the people from outside those cultures encountered them, wrote about them, en- en- engaged with them, I can't write and wouldn't wanna write an anthropological account of what those practices really quote unquote mean, because to do that requires, much deep expertise and I don't.

And this is, this comes down to this sort of cl- one of the cliches that I repeat a lot, which is, tattooing as a medium, not a phenomenon. I wanna, so I wanna try and ... So the painting of people approaching having an individual sort of character tattoo for each chapter was a way of de- anthropologizing the practice in a way.

It was also a way of trying to break up this idea that again, is a problem, I think, in the historograph- historiography of tattooing in the West, which is that people think increasingly less now. I think the message has been getting out there after me and some of my predecessors were shouting about it for a long time.

People thought, like Gail himself did, that tattooing was discovered in the Pacific and there was no tattooing in Europe prior to the late 18th century. And so deanthropologizing those stories and having individuals from dif- disparate parts of the world from a broader period of time, I hope, try

I wanna sever the connection between that and the idea that Western people stole tattooing from indigenous people, because that itself is a kind of racist lie. And in fact, there's a chapter right in the middle of Painted People about Mecock, this Inuit woman who was brought to England basically commissioned with the departure of Cook's fleet to Tahiti for the first time.

And her portrait with her facial tattoos was hanging on the wall of the Royal Academy in London the day that Captain Cook and Joseph Banks first set foot in Tahiti in 1769, which I think is a remark- it was a remarkable piece of like final nail in the coffin of that, what my colleague and friend Anna Friedman called The Cook Me.

So the approach was just a way of yeah, de- anthropologizing, ta- tattooing in a way selecting the stories there are annoyingly actually, and we only, I, only 20 chapters, because the 21st was supposed to be the prologue, which was the story of my great-grandma that I've already told you.

But the editor basically thought that it was taking too long to get to the first chapter, which was fair enough. So we incorporated her story into the book, and by that point it was too late to change the title. So there actually are only 20 chapters although I, the 21st is my great-grandma and I got that into the introduction.

But the way we chose them really, I wanted to tell cool stories. I wanted to tell stories that represented as much kind of global tattoo history as I reasonably could with my skills and what I thought was interesting. There were some things we had to get in, all good popular history books need a bit of ancient Rome and ancient Egypt and ancient Greece and ancient China, these are great.

But they were also opportunities to tell, I think big stories of the kind we were alluding to about colonialism, about myth making, about cultural normativity and each of those individual stories were ways into specific problems. There's a, there, there's chapters which also deal with things that I wanted to myth bust.

There's a chapter, for example, about two criminal, two Victorian s- sex working women who were presumed to be part of this gang, the 40 thieves, and it turned out that, the jailer in that case basically pointed out that not every single person who has a tattoo is in the same gang, a mistake that the FBI is still making 200 years later.

So there were a few stories I wanted to tell in there, stories that needed to be told and stories that kind of worked in the context of a trade book. In terms of things that I learned there were two stories in the book that are unfinished and they're ones that I've written errata for on my website and are still unfinished.

And with them, when we did the paperback there wasn't enough room to fully include the bigger stories and both of them kept developing. So this is a long answer, but we'll just go quickly into both of them. One is the story of this young girl, which I think is also a really good example of what the book's trying to do.

The story of a young girl called Madeline Altman, who was a middle class girl from Brooklyn in the early 20th century, 1906. She ran away from home and they found her a few days later cheering gum and covered in tattoos, basically. And she's linked to tattoo history because one of the people that tattooed her was the guy who invented the electric tattoo machine, a guy called Samuel O'Reilly.

But as far as recorded history goes, she was in the papers for about three days, four days. She, and she just seems cool. Like she's 15 and sassy and I always wonder what happened to her. And what happened to her becomes a story of that chapter and it's, the book becomes a story about children's homes and how young women are treated in America in the early part of the 20th century.

And when I wrote the book, I wasn't able to find her. She disappeared into the historical record. And then in subsequent years some more genealogical documents were uploaded to various databases that allowed me to finish her story. And long, long story short, after a sad life marrying into a wealthy family in Texas, she ended up running away with a cowboy actor who's one of the most famous cowboys in drugstore cowboys in Hollywood history.

So that was nice. Her her ha- she got a happy ending anyway. And then the other story, which is a story that is also interesting and ongoing, was the story of whether Picasso was a tattoo artist. And there were stories essentially in the Icelandic press in the 1950s. So that chapter becomes a story about basically prop- propaganda, communist propaganda in the 1950s.

I was researching the Argentinian beef trade, for example. There were a couple of things that I missed in that story and a couple of things that came to light later on. And anyway, it turns out the story was that he was, as a joke, Picasso tattooed the wife of an Argentinian beef magnate with a hammer and sickle in 1953 and this became a diplomatic incident.

None of that is true at all. So then the question became like, where did it come from? I think it was pretty likely a CIA plot. And then a paper was published by a guy in Sweden who pointed out that the author of the original article in the Swiss, in the Swedish papers was basically a kind of undercover Swedish intelligence operative.

So my kind of instinct played out there, but it's still quite murky. But then subsequently, I have found through some private archives and some really digital stuff that there is evidence of Picasso discussing tattooing with George Brack in about 1917. The, those two stories, which both of those chapters almost were written as I'm going through these very weird and strange archive trails and both of those trails continue to roll out,

Ben: That's amazing.

It just really reflects your other tagline, the history of everything or certainly the history of humanity. And it seems all entangled. And I was, it was really interesting that a lot of the ideas we're grappling with now are ref- are reflected with that, or been grappling with, since forever.

And I'm interested in some of those myths. How important do you think it is that we have these origin stories and they're apocryphal or wrong and where they are. You mentioned a couple sort of the Captain Cook one. Yeah. The class one, through the British lens of class, but you can see it through money or call it aristocrats or not, which seems to also reflect this low art, high art kind of thinking around and what respectable women to tourists seem to be- Yeah.

like women in art and also women in novels, although perhaps a little bit less at least as writers, mostly forgotten or not. And that seems almost amazing as well. And then obviously the Western traditions versus all non-Western. Do you think that just reflects how human culture is developed or do you think there's something specific around this where you think about it through class and women and what's been forgotten?

Is it just unsurprising to you that we have this history which just reflects through tattoos?

Matt: Yeah. It becomes, I think it becomes essentially a historiographical question as much as a historical one, right? So the Cook example is really interesting. So as I said, you will still find books and even scholarly books written. I said fewer now, because I think we've got better at getting the story out, but certainly up until very recently, books that said Captain Cook discovered tattooing in the Pacific.

Now, Captain Cook didn't even believe that. That story s- so the Cook Voyages, between 1769 and 1776, that story appears, that said not long after the Voyages, the first examples I think are in the early 1800s. So then the question becomes, why does that story happen, right? Why is it that people believe that Captain Cook discovered tattooing and there was noticing on Europeans?

And of course the ar- I pause that I say, of course, I posit the answer to that is essentially, scientific racism, that it becomes the story of the colonial era of the 19th century that non-Western people, the people of the, global majority who were colonizing are different to us in a quite profound way.

And tattooing is one way to articulate that. So the narrative of history is a way of cultural storytelling. And that's really just, and I don't mean that in any kind of conspiratorial way, really. It can be, but it's just a way that, it's just the way that history and historians work and the way that knowledge works.

The Anisia question for me was so interesting and why the story of Meacock was one of my favorites to write in Painted People because I was like, how did people forget that there was, a tattooed Inuit portrait on the wall of the British the role of the Royal Academy in 1769.

And prior to that, not even hidden away in ... there is some tattoo history that we're discovering that is very buried and quite obscure back into the 16th century and stuff at the moment. But every major history of the British Isles, for example, talks about tattooing amongst the ancient Britains.

Now, it turns out, ironically, it probably, it actually probably wasn't true but certainly antiquarian Britons believed that there was tattooing happening in the British Isles, and these are in all of the classic histories of British tattooing. It's in all of the major Roman histories and of Britain, it's in Tacitus.

So how did we miss that? What, why did people think that? The same is true of, and again, to pick my great-grandmother's example, right? It was really amazing to me to learn that you could buy tattoo machines in essentially Edwardian Debenhams, a place called Gamages, and we've since found out they were also available elsewhere.

Not, not hidden away. One of, one of the catalogs is basically tattooing, comma, telephones, et cetera. It was a fairly normal part of the offering of this particular store and some others like it in the Edwardian period. But the story of the 20th century and World War II, et cetera, a- and the intellectual histories doesn't really allow for that to be an understandable, perceptible truth.

The same is true across all kinds of historical thinking. You see all this outrage in tabloids about storytelling of people of color in British history, for example, and it gets slandered as rewriting history, as if that's a bad thing. But what all rewriting history is doing is basically going, "Let's go back and actually check.

Let's go and see if we've missed anything. Let's see if those of our prior generation look..." And of course, we do this ourselves, we're looking, we're always looking through the evidence we have through the lens of our own politics and experience to some degree. Yeah, I think for me, tattooing's really interesting because so much of its history has been told by i- in particular ways and also much of it's been invisible.

So much tattooing has been under clothing, particularly marginalized tattooing. Gay, I write a lot and do a lot of research on queer and gay tattoo histories- so much of that would be hi- hidden away. And I never wanna kinda also say that and this was a problem in the newer book, really.

I, I, in a way, the new book's a bit re- it feels a bit regressive historically because it is, someone did write this in a review, but it is a story of largely white men, right? But unfortunately, I have to say, that is what happened. The tattooist who was in ... There were loads of tattooists who were women, people of color doing stuff, tattooing, but the people who were influential, the people who were popular, people who were known about, the people who actually made an impact on the history per se, were white men.

Some of them gay, not all of them straight white men but were white men. And it's a fair criticism, but as a c- a friend of mine once said, he's a historian of piercing, he's or he's where are all the kind of trans, diasporic piercers from the 1950s?

And it's they didn't exist or they did exist, but they didn't exist in a way that is relevant to the overall big story of the tattoo and piercing industry story. So we found these individual people who were doing cool stuff o- on their own time, and there were some interesting archival lens problems that we got into.

L- lesbian history's much worse told than gay male history, for example, partly b- largely because of social reasons.

Ben: That's really fascinating. That, that whole idea that what, what gets told, what gets hidden, all of the reasons, all of the reasons behind that, I think that's really, that's really fascinating about what remains not.

And on the whole, we forget the amnesia point the more I speak to people, it's interesting how we seem to do this across all domains. So we seem to have forgotten science ideas. Yeah. Like even just because Captain Cook's been mentioned a couple of times, but the whole lemon scurvy thing, it's an idea- Yeah.

we seem to rediscover two or three times within a period of 50 to 100 years because we forget it. And even scientific method ideas, like we come to this idea of today, this controlled trial, which is a very core science idea, you, we could have discovered it ages ago and it seems to have popped up and then disappeared again.

We humans seem to be very good at forgetting stuff. 

Matt: Yeah, for getting stuff and getting stuff wrong, and again, I'm, we're all guilty of this just necessarily as human beings. And part of the structure of academic thinking and scientific thinking is meant to correct for that or meant to kinda, mitigate those things as much as possible, things like peer review and things like just, academic rigor in general footnotes and citing your sources and stuff, like that's meant to as much as possible work against that.

But also a big part of it for me has been the institutional history that I alluded to earlier on as well. Historians of tattooing in the past have those who've been academics have either come to tattooing really because they were bored with what else they were doing and they thought tattooing would be a fun hobby and they'd ring someone up and basically, "Hey, you're weird.

Can I come and interview you, whatever?" And they get told to, to go away. But also this institutional history of collecting. Tattoos are not easy to collect because of their ephemeral nature. But more than that, just the ephemeral history of tattooing, the things that I study a lot, machines, drawings, photographs self-published, small run magazines, letters between tattoos, they're not the kind of things that have any institutional history anywhere in the world, right?

Some are collected peripherally, but the big collections of tattoo history are all in private hands which comes with its own challenges, but with its own joys. And it's, I think it took a generation ... So there was a ... I came, as I said, of age as an academic in this period in the late '90s and the 2000s, which coincided with a general interest in the body, which I'm very fortunate to have.

Lots of my colleagues who did PhDs in tattooing are now not working in academia, they're doing other things. But nevertheless, I think we all benefited from having been tattooed, from knowing tattooed people, from understanding it from the inside to some degree but even, it's taken me as I've been doing this, however you wanna count it, for somewhere between 25 and 30 years.

And it's taken me that long in a way to really start to get credibility and access to material that, let alone the things that people don't know are out there, that people know and just don't wanna share with people. And there still, I'm sure there's still things out there like that too. And that's important.

Huge amounts of my work is premised on, in a way stuff that the tattoo industry in, in part already knew, but it's based on documents, images, stories that just weren't accessible to conventional academic methods.

Ben: I think that's really important. I remember viewing the photographs of Nan Goldin and part of her work is the fact that she's essentially documenting her community and coming through that and you have that.

And it's this really interesting question of, who gets to collect, who gets to decide, who documents, and in the past, like you say, l- the lesbian community wasn't documenting anything for l- lots of reasons- Yeah. ... or were being purposely marginalized, and then even coming through it.

Matt: Let me give you another example from, that's in both books, but again, I found out more about this in the time since. During COVID I was, putting together Painting People and I came across this report in the Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons and it talked about in 1891, this group of, group of surgeons, as they do, get together, and they basically meet up once a, a few times a year or whatever, and they'd bring along a cool thing.

They'd cut off a patient recently, essentially, show and tell, right? And there's a story in there of this guy called Jay Biggs, who brought along I'm not, I'm quite from memory here, but some, something like a most interesting specimen of a tattooed Irishman, right? I have been doing this a long time. As I said, my colleague, Gemma,  is a historian of specifically preserved tattooed human remains. I said, "Have you heard of this, Gemma?"

No, I looked at the University of Edinburgh's human remains record. It wasn't there. And, no one had seen or heard of this since. So I presumed it must be lost, but I wrote to the librarian and said "I know you haven't got this skin anymore, but do you have any records of where it might have gone or who it might have come from in the first place?"

And a few days later, he was like, "Yeah, I think I've seen that. I think it's in the storm." Anyway, there were two freestanding dry preserved skin specimens, one of basically a whole front of a man, a young man, and then one another of two rib panels. The back piece must still be out there somewhere or always lost.

And it's just been sitting in this library since it was, or archive, since it was donated to them in 1891, and no one had looked at it or recorded it or seen it since. And I went to look for records of ... So now I know a bit about big things and stuff. I went to look for more records. And basically, the records are just had a meeting, people bought stuff.

It wasn't even officially interesting to them to write much down about it which I find amazing. And it turns out, and here's the kicker, something that isn't in the book because I found out subsequently, that, those skin, that skin is basically the first tattoos ever done with electricity.

That man was the brother of Sammy Lo'Riley, the first electric tattoo artist in the world, and I only spotted that because someone on Reddit had posted a picture of this guy, John O'Riley, that I'd seen before, but had upped the up the contrast of the image, and I was looking for something else, and I was Googling it, getting something else.

I think I was looking ... I was looking for a story about another, a different tattoo Irishman, actually. So I was Googling how to tattoo an Irishman, this image came up, and I've seen the picture, but I hadn't seen it with the contrast made up. And I was like, instantly you only see the top part of his chest, but I was like, "Oh my God, that's the skin."

And now all the story makes sense, but how this guy died, we know that he was still performing in America about three or four months before his skin showed up in Scotland. Like, how his skin's in Scotland, why it's there, how, who, who dissected him, what none of that information we've yet discovered.

I'm sure some of it may be out there, some of it isn't. But basically, unless some Victorian or Edwardian person wrote it down and for whatever reason, those records have been preserved for the present day, we'll never really know what happened there. And we're building up these pieces of where his back is and if it's still out there yeah, it's, but that's the kind of thing we deal with all the time.

Ben: Yeah. That's amazing. But at least you know why it's, why it probably was important, why they kept it and may- maybe of the time.

Matt: I don't think they even knew. I just think, I just think- It's interesting they just didn't, so many museums, you hear, I've had a few of these in my career where it's like, "Oh, we found this in our museum.

Where does it come from? No idea." This is professional museums, let alone private collections and family collections,

Ben: maybe it's no, no surprise then if the professional memory keepers are doing this that we're losing so much.

Matt:  And a friend of mine, a friend of mine who's a historian of like protest and political protest he went, he was doing a book and he went looking for images of some posters and they were from a, I think they were from a Native American group in the '70s or something.

And he found the person who owned them as far as he knew and they said, "Oh, we donated them to this particular museum." And so he wrote to the museum, they said, "No, we haven't got them. No, that's not ... " He said, "Look, can I just come and look for them in your stores?" And he basically went there knowing that they were there, the muse- and found them in a box labeled uninteresting catalog last.

Ben: Oh, crazy.


Matt: This is systematic.

Ben: I would- maybe we'll mention museums in a little bit, and I know we're pressing on in time. I'd be interested in teasing today a little bit and your thoughts. I guess two things come up on social media or particularly Instagram because I guess that's visual social media, but in, in general.

And I guess another one will be what you think AI might do. And I guess there may be a tiny bit interrelated as well, but I was interested in how you think Instagram has changed or not how we pr- how we present this. And I, you know- Yeah. ... I've only flicked onto it, but there's a whole seemingly another subculture of where Instagram meets tattoos or maybe it's just an.

Matt: Yeah. No, 100%. Yeah. I think so, I, again, came of age at the, this is, I think also part of the reason I have a career. I came of age, at a particular moment in the 90s when the internet was nascent and I was a big early adopter of online culture. I got a modem for my 15th birthday in 1995 and the first thing I did was seek out information about tattooing and piercing on a web, on a, on bulletin boards, on usernet groups and on websites that didn't have any pictures on them, or at least I couldn't afford to see them if they were pictures because they were, it was like 60P a minute.

I remember my mom on my 14 four board mode. But even that early, even that early moment of the late '90s, early thousands tattooing culture, being online, started to change how people thought about it. But more, more so perhaps with piercing and body mod stuff. So we're talking about things like subdermal implants, tongue splitting that, things like that basically

And I've talked to a really good friend of mine who ran one of the most important very hardcore archives of subcultural body modification practice on the internet in the early 2000s. And he's now, as a much older and wiser man, a bit worried about this question, about what it was that making visible this stuff to people who would perhaps not have encountered it on their own did, for example, so I have a split tongue.

Ben: Oh, wow. Yeah. For those that are seeing the video, that's quite amazing.

Matt: Tongue splitting is the only body modification that we have no anthropological antecedent for until 1997.

Ben: Really?

Matt: Yeah. So there were rumors about it and it being possible from the mid '90s onwards but no one had seen it or proved it was possible until 1997.

And then, some, basically a guy in Italy sent an anonymous photograph of his tongue split to this website, in the middle of 1997. And then instantly, about three or four weeks later, four more people had copied it. And then, I got my insight six years after that, partly because I didn't understand it, and I think the only way to understand it would be to do it.

But would I have independently come to the idea of cutting my tongue in half? Probably not, right? And then you come to the question of the ethics of that proof for another podcast. But this kind of thing, there have been people doing stuff, their body's tattooing and everything else because they had some kind of innate uncommunicated desire.

They didn't see it in magazines. Obviously, it wasn't something they knew was po- possible, but they were trying it out in the privacy of their own homes. And those people are the, men and women are the pioneers of our scenes, if you like. But there is a question about, it's also relevant for lots of other conversations, things like anorexia, body dysmorphia, fashion in general.

Would, if you didn't see it, would you desire it? And if you didn't, is that a bad thing? I think what Instagram's done, really, all it's done is ... and other people differ on this, and this is a sociological question as much as not a historical one. But I think as an art- art historian, I would say what Instagram's done is speed up the cycle.

And I think that's true of all kinds of other forms of cultural production as well, of music and of clothing and of, everything else.

 

Matt: Before, I think tattooing was the kind of thing where and again, this is something that I think is quite obvious from historical record, but wasn't really articulated.

People get tattoos that are linked to the visual culture of their moment. So civilian tattooing and, 300 AD, those, the tattooed images they have match the images we find in their metal work and on their leather work. The same is true in ancient Peruvian mummies. The designs we found on preserved mummies in Peru matched the kind of images that we have on stoneware, for example.

And people in the 19th century after the opening of Japan are getting Japanese style tattoos or tattoos of their favorite paintings. And so I think what Instagram does is just accelerate that. Trends that used to maybe persist for a decade or most of a decade and now over in a couple of years, but it's still just like people getting tattoos that they see that are trendy and cool and that feels, some tattooers feel that is a cheapening of tattooing, but I think in some forms, it is just a version of what's always happened, more or less.

Ben: I can see that with a sort of less controversial example, back to my very first one on dancing, like a lot of people have an impulse to dance. You could say everyone, maybe not everyone has an impulse for body art but some do. And then we've gone into these TikTok and Instagram dances.

So- Yeah. ... you do them.

Matt: Great.

Ben: Some people systemize them and, but they live and die very fast.

Matt: Yeah.

Ben: But presumably we've all wanted to dance. Some of us wanna put it out there and then we copy we've copied dances all through the real- ... that they used to last for longer and now a TikTok dance might last for a month or two or not even.

So I can really see that happening. Now, whether it's true across perhaps smaller impulses, it does seem like we've had an impulse to body mod for a while, maybe not everyone and surfacing that this …


Matt: Things become, even if they're not normative in mainstream society, as they as body modifications and tattoos are in certain places and have been at a certain place in certain times in history they will become normative in subculture, but subculture's much more complicated in the age of the internet.

One of the things that happens in the, basically, and one of the reasons why you'll notice both my books slightly cowardly end around the turn of the millennium and I need to start grappling with that really is because after the turn of millennium, the story is much more difficult to tell because ev- I'm interested in influence in a way and stylistic evolution.

And in, in the era of post-modernity in the 21st century, everything's flat and you can't trace ... There's a really popular style of tattooing now that is called cyber sigilism. People call it spiky tribal. And I can't find any ... Someone may know this, but I haven't found anyone and I've looked, I can't find who started that, that style…  It's everywhere now.

It's very trendy amongst young people. People like me hate it. I don't like it, but that's fine.That's good. If I liked it, it would be bad, as I said- Couldn't be cool. Yeah. Exactly. It's the stuff that's very cool or was, probably was until about five minutes ago. But there must have been, there must have been even if it's not one person, there must have been a kind of subculture somewhere.

I think maybe in Russia is my best guess where that came from, but it doesn't, there's not one person that I can identify or happen to yet to identify who is the originator of that style. And there isn't even, as far as I can tell, a mythology for that other styles in Western tattoo history like black and gray, for example, there is a mythology about who invented it.

So this is just what's happening with the internet. It's too fast, it's too diffused, it's too flat and there's less kind of depth. And I don't mean that critically, just as a fact in, where these styles come from. The other thing as well is about removability. And I think Gen Z have become increasingly comfortable with the idea that tattoos are removable, which is more true than it was when I was younger, but certainly not true.

And there's been a lot of interesting kinds of brouhaha recently about ephemeral tattooing and tattoo removal and how much it costs and stuff. So I think that there's something cultural about that's also lends itself to Instagram. I think Gen Z has begun to think about tattooing as less permanent, which I think is a problem.

And one of the reasons why tattooing, one of the reasons people get asked why, what will you think of when you're older is a weird question for a tattooed person because we, I think most of us are quite, especially heavily tattooed people are very comfortable with the idea of being an old tattoo person.

On AI, and this is it fits into a lot of controversy rightly so about AI use by tattooists which I don't think was quite your question. I think the A- the AI, and we did a whole episode of the podcast about this. What's interesting is that there is a kind of aesthetic of AI now and you will see there are some really incredible tattoos clearly done with AI.

There's lot of bad tattoos done with AI by tattoo artists. And I'm really no fan of it. I'm a very, quite military anti, actually. But one of the interesting things, for example, is that if you look at photorealistic tattooing ... So photorealistic tattooing, again, has its detractors. It's incredibly interesting to me as a technical feat because I've just got all traditional, which is just black lines and color in it.

I don't really understand how it even works. But photo realistic tattooing, obviously, up until very recently was limited by what the customer could bring a photo of, particularly if the artist was not particularly skilled in collaging or drawing photo realistically without direct reference, right?

What you see now is really big, very good, well-executed tattoos that have clearly been composed using AI because you can ask it to put photorealistic details into a, that you can give it into a composition that will work. Now, there's lots of really terrible AI tattoos and I don't even like the ones I'm talking about, but technically they're great tattoos.

And but, and of course, we live in an era of the AI generation, so of course, some people like that, and so some of their tattoos are gonna reflect that aesthetic. That seems like quite an obvious question, in a way, as a historian but not something that, for example, the anthropological account has given much weight to.

Ben: That seems fair. On your earlier point about not knowing where things come from and just observing that's perhaps to do with having a flat culture, I have a pet theory of change or pet theory, limited evidence, but some is that some things are almost becoming an emergent property of how people and things get together, because you have this with memes.

Yeah. So we don't really know how memes come about. Sometimes you have got a trace story, but- Yeah. ... often they seem three or four relatively weak stories- Yeah. ... which somehow morphed together and we've taken that as the narrative of how they come or even TikTok dancers. So that's another form of meme.

And sometimes we have an origin story, but sometimes when I look at them, it feels very weak and people don't really agree, but it seems to be an emergent property of these things, Yeah. ... come together.

Matt: I get I've had the, again, this has been something for a long time, and I think interestingly, one of the mistakes that popular culture and even some bits of academic culture have made about tattooing, which is to overdetermine that kind of thing, what does a certain image mean?

You'll see this a lot on TikTok of people saying "if you've got a spiderweb tattoo, it means you killed someone in prison- ... or if you've got a swallow, you cross the Atlantic or whatever." Someone that I know once who had a teardrop tattooed on his face was stopped at immigration to the United States on his way to go to, this was years and years ago, way before the Trump era, on a way to go to Disneyland on his honeymoon and the border guard basically said "Why haven't you declared your, incarceration history?"

Yeah. I know that having the tattoo, tattoo of a teardrop means you killed someone in prison or whatever it might be. And he was like, "No, I'm just a guy with a tattoo from England who thinks that it looks cool." And this is, again, the story of that chapter in Painted People. But yeah, that overdetermination of thinking about tattooing as non-arbitrary, what we might call in art history iconological, is a real mistake.

I also once got, this time how long ago it was because it was on Tumblr. I once got a Tumblr DM a long time ago from somebody that was, like, obsessed with One Direction, the boy band, and was asking me if Liam's tattoos meant he was really in love with Harry, and I had to go doesn't really work like that, not straightforwardly, at least.

But that's, but that, as you said, that's a mistake that people make, I think, are overdetermining origin or making, understanding this, again, what we might call an academic thinking on this topic extreme intentional theory, like this idea that you only communicate what the author intends.

And I don't, this just can't be true can't be true.

Ben: Wrong question.

Matt: Yeah.

Ben: Maybe coming to the last two or three questions, I thought I'd do a very short section and maybe, because I actually got a sense of where it would be of overrated, underrated. So I'll name something- ... And then you can tell me whether you think it's overrated, underrated.

But we have touched on most of these, but just to clarify but overrated, underrated, then AI. So I'm assuming this is overrated for you- Oh, over, yeah. ... terms of AI as a- way overrated AI as a tool- Yeah. ... is that in fact- Yeah, way

Matt: overrated. ...

Ben: even a little bit sus- not suspicious, but that yeah the output of it, particularly in the world with a two is, is definitely overrated.

Matt: Yeah, dangerous. Yeah. Again, that's, I listen to my podcast I've said about that, because I could learn about that for an hour. Overrated.

Ben: And then and then laser removal. So I got the sense that this was overrated as well, or rather the concept of that, I guess the core idea of it too is that it does last through time.

So m- maybe if you get one with the fact that you're going to remove it later, then that's maybe something else. I don't know. So laser removal, overrated, underrated.

Matt: So I think it's ... So I don't know. I'm somewhere in the middle of that. I think actually s- some people do ascribe a kind of moral weight to that phenomenon that you're talking about.

The idea that actually, getting a tattoo removed is somehow a bad thing. I think that the increasing improvements of lasers is actually a pretty good thing. If you've got a tattoo that's bad, if you've got a tattoo that you don't want anymore, if you have a tattoo, if you've just run out, as a friend of mine did run out of space, because she, her whole body was tattooed, like head to toe, and she just ran out of room wanting to get tattooed more.

So she got basically a whole bodysuit removed and is going over it with new stuff. She happens to know the tech- the se- laser technician, so I don't think she's paying full price for those sessions and the tattooers as well. But I think the technology's, it's really interesting. I think there's gonna, I think there's real interesting health implications and I think, I, there are some people, and I probably would include myself in this to some degree, actually who think that if tattoos became instantly or easily in cheaply removal, it would slightly detract from what makes them interesting and important in the first place.

I think I probably would count myself to some degree in that camp.

Ben: Okay. Interesting. So yeah, a bit more pots and takes than that. And then tattoos in museums, overrated or underrated?

Matt: Underrated I'm doing a big exhibition next year in collaboration with the National Museum of Wales about female tattoo artist Jesse Knight who's an incredible woman.

And I've worked very hard over the last five or six years. I did ... I collaborated on an exhibition at the Museum of London in 2017. I did a big touring exhibition between 2017 and 2020 2021, and then I'm doing this show next year at the National Museum of Wales. And I've worked very hard to get collections into museums and archives.

So Jesse's collection, I helped ... I convinced the Arts Council that it was a nationally important ar- art historical collection and was saved for the nation by the National Museum of Wales. And I'm the trustee of an archive called the Bishops Gate Institute which now has two major archives of queer tattoo history that I helped them acquire.

And I think it's important that, especially as actually loads of the big collectors who have big intact contingent collection, con- contiguous collections are starting to die off or disperse their collections, that we find ways to keep tattooing ephemeral history in institutional collections because once they're dispersed to private collections they disappear.

Private collectors are amazing. The reason that, that the history of Western Tattooing has been preserved as well as it has done, but it's very fr- we're in a very fragile moment where most of the big collectors are, coming, getting on in, in age, some have already died, and there's very diff- very difficult in the state of how museums are funded, how museums work to understand what's gonna happen to those collections-  in the next decade or so.

Ben: important to archive, as we said, in, in collect- collect, yeah.

Matt: Yeah, but I, interestingly, I think partly because of my work, but just in general, due to the kind of cultural changes that's been happening in the museum sector around the world, there is an increasing interest in, history be- beyond the kind of standard things that museums have tended to do, and tattooing has felt like something, that, that can attract, and it does work to attract new audiences.

I think it has to be done carefully and properly. But yeah, I think the challenges of actually preserving tattooed skin is a real issue, obviously and morally and ethically and legally increasingly complicated even those human remains that are tattooed that are in museums already. But it's an inter- it's an interesting time and an interesting problem and I think we're trying to find ways to get around these issues.

When I did my exhibition in Cornwall, we worked with a friend and went to Alice Snape who ran a tattoo magazine at the time to basically get tattooers in around the country. We did a hundred tattooers in Britain to tattoo rubber hands-

Ben: Wow. ...

Matt: to create an archival stylistic index, three-dimensional stylistic record of the kind of tattoos that were happening in Britain in 2017 that will now, that are now permanently part of the collection of the National Museum of Cornwall that hopefully will be there for some tattoo historian in a in a century or so to come to go back and have a look at those, three-dimensional objects.

So yeah, it's interesting. And of course now with digital preservation and things, there are ways of preserving this stuff in a way that hasn't been before.



Ben: Last one in this one, just because I listened to your recent podcast on this and was amazed would be eye tattoos, do you think-

Matt: Oh, yeah.

Ben: overrated, underrated.

Matt: Oh, over, overrated entirely, terrible idea. Even people I know that were early pioneers think that they were a terrible idea not really tattooing in a conventional sense. Yeah. Yeah, we did the whole episode about, about t- again, TikTok led trends for Irish tattooing and then subcultural te- tech trends for corneal tattooing, both of which strike me as just a terrible idea.

I've got bad enough eyes anyway- Yeah. ... I'm not gonna risk doing

Ben: Anything. I have to see, yeah, like Franco B- visceral, but it didn't make me queasy. Hearing about eye teas, I don't know whether something about the eye did actually make me feel a bit queasy-

Matt: All people are funny about eyes, aren't they?

Yeah. Yeah. I think what's interesting about that, again, the eye tattooing was something that there was a small group of people in the early 2000s, the same, literally in some cases, the same people that were doing the tongue splitting stuff, who really had a kind of very gonzo attitude that they were at the frontier of some really interesting corporeal hacking, which I find very interesting again, a topic for another day and very brave.

And those guys and gals were, like, they knew what they were doing in some senses, even though their risk reward ratios were calibrated- Yeah. ... in a particular way that I think is good. And there's a difference importantly in a lot of this between brave and reckless, they were brave, not reckless.

I think anyone roaring their eyes or towing anyone else's eyes these days is pretty reckless. And we talked about in the episode, some really egregious examples of that where people have blinded themselves and blinded others. It just doesn't seem like a good idea. And even people I know that have done it, as I said most, nearly all of them would agree that it's not a good idea.

Ben: Gotta know where you draw the line. Okay, last couple of questions. What current and future projects, anything you'd like to highlight? Obviously, you do your lecturing, you still curate, organize exhibitions, not sure if you're working on other book projects or anything, but anything you'd like to highlight for listeners?

Matt: Yeah, there's a couple of interesting things. I'm still trying to nail down the next big solo publication. I've got a couple of things in the fire. I wanna write more about this tattoo and Mr. Sebastian, who I talk about in Painted People and Tattoos, was involved in a really interesting court case called RV Brown in the late 80s, early 90s about gay men and sadomasochism.

So I wanna write a book about that. I'm doing a law degree in the service of trying to write more about that. I'm doing this exhibition with the Nationation of Wales as a consultant opening next year. I'm assisting a p- a a, on a big kind of coffee table anthology of global tattoo practices.

I'm not writing, but I'm assisting on. And with some colleagues in Japan, we're trying to do a kind of almost version of Painted People for Ja- Japan. So we're trying to do a kind of history of Japan told through the history of tattooing books, but that's in discussions at the moment and it requires some thought.

So I've always got more stuff on the go than I've got real time to do, but I'm always trying to keep up with things. There's, and there's lots of interesting smaller things happening as well. But those are the big ones. This summer's gonna be mainly working on the Jesse Knight exhibition that's gonna open in Cardiff in March 2027.

Ben: That sounds amazing. And the last question is do you have any advice for listeners? Thinking about this, perhaps the question I would ask is if you're interested in somebody's tattoos, what should you ask them? Or I guess you could also, we could also do people who are interested in having one.

Are there any reflections- ... that you might have? 'Cause there seem to be a lot of obvious questions that we probably shouldn't ask I think we mentioned a couple d- maybe don't ask-

Matt: Does it hurt?

Ben: Yeah. Does it hurt? What is it gonna look like in 20 years and like all of those obvious ones, but I'd be interested in, what's the question you would like to be asked.

And then maybe one of the people listening to this at night thinking "Oh, I have, I do have this impulse." Yeah. Where should they lead themselves with that impulse?

Matt: I think, so when I started out, and one, again, one of the reasons why I became so obsessed with tattooing anyway is that it was quite hard to find good tattoos to and by that technically and competently execute as much as anything else.

Like when I was in my late teens, the tattoos that I was seeing in tattoo magazines that I was importing from the United States didn't look anything like the tattoos that my mates were getting underage at the local toy shop in Essex. That's less true now. A quick kind of Instagram search will, if you're going to a reputable studio, we'll rev- they're really incredibly good, technically good tattoos in ev- in any, in every town in the country.

So if you want something small or a single tattoo you're really spoiled for choice now in a way that I wasn't before. I think a lot of people imagined, and this is partly, I think also one of the problems with AI, people think you have to bring the thing you want, like the image you want tattooed with you.

Most tattooers are, especially increasingly now themselves artists and are able to draw you something which will work to your brief. So I think the thing is to look for tattooers whose style you like and then just go and meet with them, go and have a, go and have a conversation with them and talk to them about the kind of thing you want, l- look at their portfolios online, look at look for heeled work, because I think a lot of people, particularly if you're interested in very small tattooing or very kind of complex tatting, a lot of the stuff on, online is photo edited these days.

So the best tattoo is all post healed work. So ask to see that. But really find a tattoo who you're comfortable with, whose work you, you're interested in and who who you wanna spend some time with because obviously, every second of every tattoo you get, you're gonna have to be sitting there with them so it's important to get towed by people you get on with.

In terms of asking questions about other people's tattoos, I think those, in a way, these questions are the same. When I was younger, I got groped, even as a kind of man I got groped by people in public. They'd come up and they'd pull my sleeves up or they'd start tugging at my collar.

That happens less now, at least to me. I'm sure there are people who can report this happening to them. But I think if you wanna talk to someone about their tattoos, I think they, I think just say, "Hey, your sales are really interesting or cool, the, I think the best question to ask is who did them," right?

Because that gets you into the kind of questions that I'm talking about, which is where are they based, what kind of styles do they do? What kind of person are they? How long ago did you get it so you can see how things heal, for example, I've got tattoos on my hands, you see online, they say… don't get tattoos in your hands because they'll fade.

These are, like, 20 years old and they're still more or less the same color they were made.

Ben: Yeah.

Matt: Yeah, those faded a bit. But I think that's the thing. And for me, this is also, to circle right back to the start, one of the key insights of my work, which is actually to think about the tattoo artist, because there are whole books, and certainly socio- sociology and criminology less anthropology, really but certainly

Oh, not a bit, but cer- certainly sociology of tattooing was r- and psychology of tattooing was really premised on the person with the tattoo, and I was like, "What about the tattoo artist, who have their portfolios, even back then, had their portfolios in printed form, now have Instagrams." They don't care about what the person's tattoo is, the person on whom the tattoo is, their story or their motivation, they just wanna present it as their interesting artwork.

And so I think thinking about the tattoo artists, their skill, their history, their interests, their style their art, their training artistically all of those things are gonna be interesting questions, or at least, if not questions, kind of facts about them which will help you as a customer find the tote you want, the thing we say, the thing we say in the two inches, go bold go big or go home, bold will hold. So if you want a little tiny tattoo, that's fine, but I'd always say get a big cool tattoo. Yeah.

Ben: Be cool. Oh, that sounds great. So first advice, don't grope anyone. Yeah, don't, yeah. That's

Matt: Just, that's just blanket advice.

Oh, yeah. Throw it here first, people.

Ben: Don't grope anyone.

Matt: Don't grab at people's clothes.

Ben: But the other one that's interesting is to ask about the artist. 

Matt: The artist. Yeah. Ask who did it.

Ben: Yeah. Great.

Matt: Yeah. And some people ... O- o- for small tattoos, people won't necessarily even remember because it was just a little Stevenier tattoo or something that took 50, 50 minutes or something.

And that's fine too. But certainly for bigger work, certainly for more elaborate work, I think the right question is always the first question's always who did that. Then you can ask, does it hurt in that part of the body, for example? And the answer is always yes, right? Of course, it hurts.

Some places are more painful than others. But the first question should always be, I think, who did it. And that's what, when I go to conventions, when I talk to tattooed people that I meet, that's always the first question I wanna know is who did that.

Ben: Great. That's amazing.

With that, Matt I will once again say you've written Painted People, get the book, and also the Untold History of a modern art. And with that, Matt, thank you very much.

Matt: Thanks so much, Benjamin. Before we finish, have you got any tattoos?

Ben: No, I don't. 

Matt: A Blank.

Ben: Yeah, I am blank and no body mods either. I have, yeah, I have been fascinated about it, but I haven't I've like a small impulse, but there's other lots and bits of fear which I've not met I've I haven't crossed the Rubicon yet, but-

Matt: Yeah, the first one's the hardest one. The first one's the hardest one, so that's good.

Ben: My art teacher always used to say that the first stroke is always the deepest.

Matt: Great. Thank you for having me. I really appreciate it. Great questions. It's really wonderful.

Ben: Thank you.




In Arts, Life, Podcast Tags Matt Lodder, tattoos, tattoo history, art history, Painted People, body art, visual culture, tattooing, cultural history, archives, museums, Captain Cook, colonialism, tattoo myths, Instagram tattoos, AI art, body modification, Beneath the Skin, Ben Yeoh Chats

Dan Wang: Silicon Valley Culture, London’s Building Crisis, and China’s Cultural Squeeze

April 21, 2026 Ben Yeoh

Dan Wang joins Ben Yeoh for a conversation about what different societies are good at, what they neglect, and what that reveals about culture, ambition, and power. Starting with Silicon Valley, Dan argues that tech has become thinner-skinned and less funny as harder-edged founder culture has replaced its more playful countercultural roots. That narrowing shows up beyond humour: San Francisco still has legacy cultural institutions, but newer tech wealth is often far less willing to support the arts unless it can see a direct return.

“You have to have a sense of which rules to break. If you break no rules ever in life, you will absolutely get nowhere.”

From there, the discussion opens out into a broader comparison of California, London, and China. London, in Dan’s view, is almost Silicon Valley’s opposite: culturally rich, socially sparkling, and full of serious artistic life, yet held back by pessimism and a deep inability to build.

“The UK has the housing prices of California and the per capita income of Mississippi State.”

 Ben pushes on whether Britain could reverse that decline if it fixed planning, housing, and energy bottlenecks. China, meanwhile, is presented as a place of extraordinary physical achievement but increasingly constrained cultural production, where censorship, weaker reading habits, and even food delivery systems are flattening parts of public life.

“The discussions on AI seem to have quasi-religious tones. Either this is going to be utopia or this is going to plunge us all straight into hell.”

They also explore why AI debate has taken on a quasi-religious tone in California, with utopian promises on one side and apocalyptic fears on the other, while more immediate problems such as propaganda, low-quality content, energy supply, and permitting constraints receive less attention. The second half of the episode turns more personal and literary: neurodiversity in Silicon Valley, cadet training and discipline, opera, Shakespeare, Tom Stoppard, writing craft, and the underrated practice of retyping great prose or reading plays aloud with friends.

“The immigrants are best able to appreciate what works and what works badly in every particular culture.”

It is a wide-ranging conversation about how people think, what institutions reward, and why culture matters more than technocrats often admit. 

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.


Contents

  • 00:21 Why Tech Lacks Humor

  • 02:09 Silicon Valley Arts Funding

  • 05:28 London Versus California

  • 08:31 China Culture Censorship

  • 12:56 Food Culture US China

  • 18:58 AI Utopia Versus Doom

  • 23:04 UK Building Energy Bottlenecks

  • 30:58 Fixing UK Planning Housing

  • 34:28 Neurodiversity In Silicon Valley

  • 37:04 Cadets Discipline Rule Breaking

  • 39:15 Modern Opera: Mozart. Verdi Debate

  • 42:04 American Shakespeare Picks

  • 45:31 Book Tour Reflections

  • 48:09 Retyping Great Writers

  • 52:56 Reading Plays Together

  • 58:29 Playwrights And Prose

  • 01:01:38 Overrated Underrated Round

  • 01:10:21 Advice For Your Twenties

Transcript (lightly edited, transcribed by LLM AI, so mistakes are very possible)

Ben: Hey everyone, I'm super excited to be speaking to Dan Wang. Dan has written an excellent bestselling book on China and America called Breakneck.

Dan, welcome.

Dan: Great to be here.

Ben: In your recent annual letter, you suggest it's nearly as dangerous to joke about the top Silicon Valley venture capitalist, as is to joke about a Chinese CCP party leader.

Why does Silicon Valley have no humor? And did it ever?

Dan: at one point it probably had a little bit of a sense of countercultural humor. In the days of Steve Wozniak perhaps Steve Jobs, there were slightly playful act personalities back in the eighties up until the nineties.

And then these much harder core nerds took over. Does Bill Gates have much of a sense of humor? Does Mark Zuckerberg have much of a sense of humor? Perhaps so in private but certainly not in public. And so I think that there is this progressively thinner skin where every generation of founders loses a little bit of humor and funny points.

And then they also shave off a little bit more of their skin. And I think that is really well represented now by Elon Musk, who maybe it's not his fault now he's trolled to insanity three times a day before breakfast by all of these crazy people on the internet in a platform that he controls.

I think that this is also, perhaps he is a little bit funny. He certainly thinks of himself as being very funny, but I don't think that there are many sparkling personalities in the tech world such that it is pretty difficult. And I've tried this exercise going up to tech friends and asking who is the funniest founder out there?

It's a pretty thin list of names.

Ben: And they started off in the hippie world. I guess that wasn't necessarily the tech bro. So it is interesting that they do seem to have lost their sense of humor. Also Silicon Valley. And the CCPs seem to me to be less involved in cultural production.

Standup comedy would be one thing, but it also seems to be the case in art and music with some exceptions. So for instance, Patrick Collinson of Stripe fame seems to be very interested in beauty, but do you sense this too, of overall cultural production? And is this narrowness a big problem for Silicon Valley or not really?

Dan: San Francisco has a certain amount of elite culture. And so I am thinking about the art museums. I'm thinking about the opera and the ballet where the old rich, the old money in San Francisco has given fairly generously to the symphony, the opera et cetera. The arts, which makes it look quite a lot more like New York City.

And there is some new money that is also involved in some of these pretty traditional art forms. But generally speaking it seems like these. New billionaires that have been created over, let's say the past 10 years, have become significantly less interested in funding the arts.

Broadly speaking the movie theaters, the indie movie theaters have been closing down in San Francisco. Downtown is generally a mess. There's very little foot traffic. And even the art museums are not necessarily doing super well. And so when you combine all of these things and you have the fact that Silicon Valley billionaires are much more eager to fund the next generation of technology than anything else which has been one of the great factors of Silicon Valley success that you had, the semiconductor people funding, the telecom, people funding the internet, people funding.

Now the AI people. And so I think that has generally been pretty positive. But when creatives go up to billionaires and ask for money for the arts, the billionaires are often asking for a return as if arts could ever be productive. As if the arts could ever be profitable almost anywhere. And so you cannot possibly generate a real return on the arts, whereas it seems like the rich people in New York and LA are quite a lot more forgiving of the fact that if they give money to a documentary filmmaker, they'll never see a scent back of it.

Ben: I think it, Silicon Valley seems to understate that intangible return, the sort of cultural reputational value, social capital, or however you would put it. So do you think if you were to add a cultural institution in San Francisco around Silicon Valley, that would be a good idea and what would it be?

Dan: I'm not sure if I could add a new cultural center. I think it is. It's hard to figure out what the right format is. Could it be something in visual arts? Could it be something in the theater? Perhaps. But I think that something has to grow, probably out of the tech world out of something that the tech world really embraces.

And the challenge is that I don't think that many of these tech people want to go to the opera except as an affectation. Or really see very many plays because the play going audience in the US is generally fairly smaller. Even in somewhat larger cities like Boston or dc or la.

There is a scene, but it is quite a lot more difficult to find than in a place like London. So here's my case to you Ben, that if we had to find the polar opposite in terms of culture to Silicon Valley, is it not London? In Silicon Valley, you speak to a lot of engineers and they don't necessarily have many jokes to tell as I've established.

They don't have much culture that they want to go to in London. It is much easier to find to chat with people where those conversations sparkle. And the plays and the classical music and the visual arts are completely off the charts for even I think for most Americans, even perhaps for a lot of New Yorkers, the cultural scene in London is really amazing.

And whereas the weather in the Bay Area is pretty, pretty perfect the weather in London is by default, fairly gloomy. So isn't London the opposite end of the world from California?

Ben: I think it's, I think that's almost correct. So London or the UK as well, you've said you've argued it's very good at clever sounding industries.

But the offshoot of that is maybe we're overweighted in journalism, also accounting and legal, but we're also overweighted in theater arts, visual arts, music and all of that. So it makes us extremely happy. Culturally rich and actually there's a lot of soft power cultural events. So even nearby there's Glastonbury, you've got the tennis and the rowing and the sporting events and all of those kinds of things as well as that soft cultural power.

On the other hand, we don't build anymore. We've got poorer. Millionaires are still leaving us, although actually non millionaires are still wanting to come to the uk. So I think a lot of Chinese millionaires are leaving China and going all over the place, but some of them are still coming to the UK so that's interesting.

On the other hand, And it also means that I think London in some ways has a little bit like the US some fixable problems because some of the stuff which is around there is more fixable. Then it would seem, but I'm interested. So if San Francisco has maybe this cultural problem, it'd be interesting whether we think that's broadly in some spots of America, and I wonder whether China also has some of these cultural problems as well.

So I'm not sure whether you find, I think in your letter you did say Beijing and Singapore were, Beijing and San Francisco are a little bit similar in that respect, but whether you think that is also a problem of narrowness across a lot of their Chinese cities.

Dan: Yeah there's also something else that Californians have that Londoners and British people do not have, and that is optimism.

And so I think that there is a little bit of this sense. Even among Brits are the first people to say that, yeah, they're all very cynical. There's not that much hope for the future. I find it a little bit odd that there is just this self-professed pessimism gloom within the national culture.

And I think that is probably not a healthy trait when everybody kind of jokes about it. I think I am a little bit more constructive, at least in a lot of parts of culture, in the US relative to China. Chinese culture such as it is, has been very severely squeezed by the censorship apparatus.

Very few art house films anymore. Not that much by way of very popular groundbreaking fiction. That, there's a lot of really creative short form videos and they can AI slop with the best of them. I think in terms of broader culture, I think that China has not done super well, not much in terms of journalism because that has been the part that has been strangled the most.

And so maybe some people are really impressed by dancing robots on really big bridges. But I'm not sure if that is going to be the sort of culture that you and I are very much drawn to. Now, you and I are quite different, but I think that Chinese cultural production has been pretty disappointing.

And I think in general fewer and fewer people read and read books in China these days. That's my sense that the book sales are really falling. At least in the US the book sales have been holding steady over the last few years. Now a lot more people are reading. Romantic and fairy smut, which is fine and whatever.

But I think that it is still pretty striking that book sales are holding up in the US where they're falling in China. So at a first approximation, people are just reading far less in China these days.

Ben: And I think if China does end up stumbling, it will be because they've tried to engineer on the social side, all of their physical engineering, which you described very well in your book, has been so successful.

But the social political engineering has been such a disaster. And I know you're very critical of the one child policy, but reading it over, I wonder whether we understate how catastrophic that could be for the medium term in China. So it'll be interesting to see where that holds.

And I do think you're right that actually Brits in general are a little bit pessimistic for those who've been around, but those who come to London. Immigrants first, second, even third generation, actually remain optimistic. And this is the kind of interesting thing about where they've left and they think of all the great parts of London and the uk and just to really perplex that Brits don't really value that as much.

And I find this is a little bit in Americans as well, they don't quite appreciate what they have yet. The immigrants who come and say this is amazing. Why don't you, why don't you appreciate it? And I'm also immigrant

Dan: immigrants are the best people to assess. I think they're the best people to appreciate local cultures.

The left I think generally is too critical of cultures and the right are too critical of the immigrants, whereas the immigrants are best able to appreciate what works and what works badly in every particular culture. But I do find it a little bit sad.

Immigrants arrive in the UK feeling quite optimistic and maybe that effect persists. But generally the people, the culture around them is trying to drag down their mood or that just happens that most people are, have a bad mood or over the longer term, that feels a little bit sad to me.

Ben: Yeah, I completely agree. I do think London's a little bit of a special exception of, versus the rest of the uk. But I do think that is the general vibe and that it's

Dan: more optimistic or less optimistic.

Ben: It's more optimistic. But then London isn't, probably half of London even something like that has English as a second language or a co language.

It's every immigrant, either first or second generation. So perhaps it's a little bit different and it has such strong agglomeration effects in London, which you really don't see in any other cities, which actually is a real problem for the UK versus even Germany or France.

But particularly versus the us I was in Nashville not too long ago, and Nashville can just go and do their own thing. They're a, I think they were half a million people when I saw them last time, which was maybe 15 years ago. And now they're almost a million person city and growing with their own culture and vibe, and they can stand alone in that.

Whereas a place like Leeds can't even put in a tram or a metro system. And all the best people from Leeds, not quite all, but a lot of them end up in London. So that's one of the UK specific issues. On the other hand, the thing about the immigrants coming in is that means that the London food scene has got, amazingly better over the last 10, 20 years, even the last two or three. I was interested, do you think the differing food cultures coming back to the US and China have anything to explain about how similar or different the US and China are? Obviously China has got quite a monumental headstart on the US which I don't think America will ever close up.

But maybe it might, and I would be interested in what you think the most underrated US food is and whether food cultures explain anything around the US and China differences.

Dan: China has a monumental lead on food production. Perhaps the only other arrival to Chinese cuisine is Indian cuisine.

Now I still prefer Chinese over Indian because I find that there is more variety and better use of better ways to prepare vegetables than Indian cuisine. But I think that China is already at the peak of various ways to prepare, whether these are vegetables and greens or duck and rice and almost anything else.

We care to name the Chinese who have perfected it. Perhaps the only exception is alcohol. They don't integrate alcohol quite as well into the food, but. I think that the Chinese have represented some sort of perfection. On the other hand, if you are in a state of near perfection, it is really hard to grow beyond that.

And I think that there is a little bit of a sense among some foodies in China that food culture in China has gotten just a few percentage points worse over the last five, 10 years. There is just much greater emphasis on these central commissaries to produce food outside of restaurants and then ship it into restaurants for them to essentially reheat.

And that has grown because people value speed over taste. There is just much more of a takeout culture because it's super, super easy to have food delivery. There's something, there's some figures now that the number of people working in food delivery just part-time in China could be north of 200 million people is what I saw in the Wall Street Journal because the job market is so bad.

So what could be really amazing for getting food is not so good for the job market and perhaps not so good for the cuisine itself because people are just so optimized for making food work well inside a box and a container that could be delivered in 25 minutes or less. And as China's grown richer people are more interested in different varieties of foods.

But I think that there has also been quite a lot more standardization within the foods as more chains have taken off as well. And given that the US is so far behind China there's tremendous room to grow. And over the last two decades in the last few years, I think that all sorts of food in the US has grown better.

There is even more of a migration culture into the US where, you know. A lot more Nigerians settle around the Houston area. There's all sorts of different varieties of people bringing their cuisines to the US. I think that Americans are learning to eat better themselves.

They have greater demand for seafood or fruits and the US also has, the US perhaps has very good recreations of let's say a Parisian croissant or anything else. It is just a little bit hard to get to. And so I think that the US has this dynamic churn even though it might perhaps never quite converge to Chinese levels of perfection.

Ben: Yeah, I agree. And I would probably add to that, that I've seemed to sense China because of this. Influenced modern tradition I guess, and the food influencer, they are now slightly cooking to how it looks on the plate over taste. Yeah. So obviously presentation is something. And so that has also maybe taken a couple of points down because they are so good at engineering, like you say, this central planning of food delivery.

That means that maybe the speed and efficiency's gone up, but also at the cost of, at the cost of taste. I also think maybe the most underrated American food for me is barbecue. So they've got this huge barbecue tradition in lots of different ways of doing it. And that seems also to me obviously influenced, but quite quite American.

But do you have an underrated American food?

Dan: I like barbecue, but I think that the challenge with barbecue is that you really should not have it multiple times in a row. Yeah. And for me, that is one metric for thinking about food. I have no hesitation about having Indian food multiple days weeks in a row.

The same goes for many other types of cuisines. If I eat barbecue twice in two days, I think that would be a little bit too much for me. I think that. Probably overrated is Californian cuisine. There has been so much of this emphasis on Californian cuisine, which started with Alice Waters and all sorts of other big chefs in Northern California.

To me that is not very distinctive if we wanted to look at another sort of cuisine. I haven't spent much time in l Louisiana, but I would really like to eat much more in New Orleans which seems to have a very good local cuisine. But just generally, I think what I would bet on is, immigrant cuisines in the US whether that is, the Austin food scene getting quite a lot better, whether that is the Nigerian food scene in Houston. I think that Chinese cuisine still has room to grow. In the US there's a lot of excellent Taiwanese in the, let's say the LA area.

There are all sorts of fantastic Chinese in the flushing area in Cupertino even. I'm getting better and better Chinese food, which is not too far away from where I am at Stanford University. And so I think that there is always room for growth in the US so long as we are still welcoming of people.

Ben: Yeah. Okay. I should move on from food, which we could probably, we should do a long chat just on food. I think we could do two or three hours on that. But I have to mention ai, which is all over everything. And you even mentioned it in your latest letter, and it's interesting when I hear Silicon Valley people or maybe Americans in general they all seem to either talk about existential risk of losing jobs or everything going completely wrong.

Or they talk about a tech utopia where AI solves everything from climate to poverty to manufacturing. And there doesn't seem to be a middle road discussion and maybe not even that much thinking of the kind of economic bottlenecks and things like that. What do you make of this, and do you sense this as well and do you think central planners have any edge in AI because of the energy supply chain and Americans are just too much focused on these kinds of really strange tail risks on either side.

Dan: It is a very strange thing in California. The discussions on AI seem to have quasi-religious tones. Either this is going to be utopia or this is going to plunge us all straight into hell and the machines are going to torture our minds for eternity. And you know what, if we just get a scenario in which which will be amazing in which productivity growth TFP growth goes on for 5% five percentage points for a very long time, I think that would be a pretty positive scenario.

But, when we talk about AI safety in California essentially what that means is how do we stop the machine God from torturing us for eternity rather than, oh how are people engaging with this very strange information ecosystem in which there's gonna be. A lot more slop and perhaps a more adversarial propaganda that is going to turn us all insane.

That to me feels like a very tangible sort of product, that project that we perhaps should discuss and tackle and try to solve. But this might be doing to teenagers. And, but instead, we can only talk about the antichrist. And that feels very strange to me. But tell us about the tenure of AI discussions in London.

Obviously London is one of the big AI hubs in the world. How do folks in London talk about it? Is it more the California variety or in, is it the variety of how do we control the harms and increase TFP?

Ben: I guess there's a little bit of both of that Californian variety and there's a little bit of the harm piece, particularly the bias piece and a little bit we've got a little bit of regulation or start up in terms of regulation in terms of as of now, are there biases?

Is it just gonna do utilitarian decision making? How do we incorporate other forms of thinking in that? But I would say there's another strand which kind of leans towards what I see in Asia, all to do with energy infrastructure and supply chain infrastructure, which slightly crosses over with. The climate conversation, which obviously is really diminished in America for other reasons, but there is this kind of very self-interested saying we've got a real problem if we don't have a supply chain.

If we can't build, we don't have energy infrastructure, and if this is gen, just basically a way of turning energy into some form of intelligence how do we deal with that? Which is this kind of more European wide issue of the fact that we can't build. We can definitely see that China seems to have a headstart in that and America is forming.

So that's the other part which kind of fills in London a little bit. And maybe that's because London is a little bit more connected to old world economies that I guess everyone except the US is underweighted technology versus some of these old world things. And that particularly in the last two or three months has started to come as a conversation, as people go, oh, this bottleneck seems to be these data centers and the energy.

And then they go why can't we produce the energy? And it's not that we don't have the technology as we don't seem to have the permits. We don't seem to have the regulatory things. And they're going, why is that? And why can China build like the equivalent of all of us? Domestic energy in six months or something like that.

And America had taken seven years just to build 10% of that. So those are the questions which are starting to come up, which is intersectional with that AI question. But is coming up with that on the supply chain? So maybe that's somewhere where central planners might have an edge because of all of that?

Dan: Yeah. Generally I think every year China builds about as much as one or two UK's worth of total energy every single year. And I used to collect these figures more actively, but I think that's the rough pace at which they are going. And it, it should, we expect that London can hold on to AI leadership in the longer term if it is impossible to build much more power and really difficult to build transmission lines and really difficult to build data centers because we take a look at some of these headlines around the uk.

The FT has recently written about the fact that home building in London has essentially collapsed. And I wrote this line, which is not quite right, but roughly accurate that the UK has the housing prices of California and the per capita income of Mississippi State. And the third runway for Heath Row, which has been planned for about 20 years now.

Yes. Yeah. It's supposed to cost 30 billion pounds. And so if we can't get the basics right, how can the UK really hold on to leadership for a pretty important technology?

Ben: I think on a 20 to 30 year view, unless we fix a couple of those things leadership will definitely lag. Maybe it's okay being, I think the uk depending on how you score, it's something like.

Number 10 as a kind of power, but slipped. So 10 years ago you probably could have said it was number eight or number nine. And in aggregate it's maybe slipped a place or two, it slipped less than Italy, somewhere like South Korea. Which metric are you

Dan: looking at?

Ben: Which next? You do a blend of things like soft power, GDP education and some of these things.

And if you aggregate it, there's a soft slipping of the uk. Some of it has slipped, more cultural powers probably have probably held on. And so I would see that continuing. But on the flip side, we have got some tail optionality. I wouldn't put it as too high probability, but some and maybe things will still have to get worse to look better because for instance.

If the country changes its mind on things like mini nuclear power or also particularly onshore wind. So we've got the planning for wind, not the interconnections and not the final planning. And actually we've got mini nuclear power SMR technology through British industry. So this is a thing 'cause it can come through some of our engineering, so it won't feel like, oh, we have to rely on foreign technology.

That is possible because you could put mini nukes next to smaller data centers and London could keep up. I'm not sure it will go through with this, but there's been a nuclear power review with, puts it as a possibility. So you really rely on that coming down on the cross curve. Otherwise I Do

Dan: Do you think politically and in terms of permitting people will accept having these mini nuclear reactors spread throughout the country?

Ben: I would say at the moment it's unlikely, but not zero. So we'll have to see where it goes. But there's enough places which are maybe far enough away from cities that it's possible. And also the miniaturization is getting smaller. And there's an argument for building British, there's a couple of British companies which could do that.

So I wouldn't give it a high probability, but I would definitely say it's more than, it's more than zero. I think America's own reassuring attempts are quite Trixie. And so this is where, oh, this is where China might actually have a lead if some of their other things go there.

But there are possibilities.

Dan: Tell me more about a British optimistic case about how they may be able to, instead of slipping through these ranks, how does it regain its position?

Ben: Oh, okay. I guess you would have to have some political consensus. I guess there is a technocratic consensus.

So the number one thing is I think we would need to try and unblock planning both domestically by building buildings. Which we could do. So it's just a legal policy coordination problem. It's not a technological problem. So that's the upside. But we haven't been prepared to burn our political capital to do that yet.

So we shall see. And then on the infrastructure side as well, so this would be building power, putting data centers next to things. So those two things I think are plausible. I also think we might get a one-off. Bonus in our health system because of weight loss medicines, GLP ones coming through.

So they'll be generic in 2031. And we are now seeing there's a lot of second order cost to chronic illness of which the UK isn't quite as bad as America, but it's not brilliant. And that is actually gonna be billions of both first order and second order savings. And if we can use those savings a little bit better, both in terms of making our NHS better and putting a little bit more investment within that and on blocking some of these more pro-growth elements, I think that is actually a possible fix because we've got the capabilities to build more.

And we've all got possibilities of infrastructure and we've got an agglomeration effect of London. Some of our second cities might continue to suffer. So I'm not sure on the UK side whether that is true, but as Americans tell me, the fact that Manchester's only two hours away on, on the train or two, two and a half hours, or even driving, they're like, that's just a suburb in America.

We would, we would drive there. They don't understand why Brits don't drive to like these centers of excellence in that same sort of way. So because it is solvable by political coordination I think there is. And then because there's still a lot of cultural soft power, you've still got finance here, although it's maybe not quite as great as New York or maybe equally as great as New York.

And you've got all of these things where you're second best, maybe not the very best. Biotech, some technology and the like. That still means that you're gonna be a really important non-US hub. And because you're at such a low, because of some of these regulatory issues, you can turn it around.

So that's the optimistic case.

Dan: And are you optimistic about London's agglomeration effects? If millionaires are leaving, is it still going to be a growing city that is growing in population and wealth?

Ben: I'm a little bit more neutral on this. I probably was more optimistic and that has down rated somewhat is not quite as bad as what I think the media has said.

Some are definitely living in millionaire status. But what is also happening is that although they're leaving in terms of permanent domicile, they still come here for three to six months of the year or a few weeks anyway. And particularly actually, if you are in the a hundred millionaire status, who often don't stay in one place that long, they're still passing through London somewhere between four to 12 weeks a year, which actually is enough if you're getting all of these other things going through.

So maybe they come to an auction event, maybe they go to Henley or to. Children go to Glastonbury or they do some of these other things, or they strike a deal. And then if you've got these other things right, they only have to be here a couple of days to sign some kind of check or something like that.

And we've got huge capabilities like around Cambridge, Oxford, there's lots of fields, there's lots of empty fields, which we could build on very quickly if the regulations allowed us to do that. And Cambridge is still only a 40 to 50 minute train ride from central London.

And then that literally is a suburb of the US so you could build out that whole corridor with labs and tech and all that type of thing. And you can get the flying millionaires to visit and you're still getting. The Middle East, some Russia, some China who are still doing business in London and actually in preference to America at the moment because of the politics of the situation.

So there's some hope still for London. I haven't given up my optimism,

Dan: I wanna believe Ben. But let's get building in London started first and then we can build out the corridors. Like why has it that the home building has completely collapsed in London when it is such an urgent thing that we have more homes.

Ben: So the primary reason is our planning system works on a political veto. Actually, this goes back, this is gonna get a little bit boring and technocratic, but post-war 1948 when we put in the British planning system, and you can compare this to France and Germany, which are built more in kind of similar things or even the Nordics.

Their house building is still about double R rates and have always been higher than the British rates. But essentially what happens in France, Germany, even the Netherlands, is once you've passed the planning rules and everyone's got some sort of zoning and guidance, you basically are allowed to build, no one can stop you.

So that has crept forward in all of those nations. But essentially if you pass the zoning and you meet the pattern book or whatever you can build in the uk, not only has our regulations got a little bit quite a lot worse, as has Germany and France. But even once you've passed all the technocratic, tick boxes, you can be called in either by your local politicians, or even worse, even if your local politicians don't call you in or even if they pass it, it can be pulled in by central government. And so your builders can never have a hundred percent certainty. And that is the core is the big difference between actually the British system and all the other systems which are built more.

And I think they didn't realize in 1948 this would be the case when they wrote the law. Any government who really wanted to do this could rip up that planning law and rezone much like Germany, France, or the Nordic countries. So you wouldn't have to go and do it somewhere like Brazil does it, where you wouldn't have any sort of planning and some of that and you could at least jumpstart those rates.

Then there were other issues to do with capital and we had a big fire disaster, so some of our building regulations got tighter and we didn't give it capital. But all of that is actually secondary to the fact that we've got a political veto. The only other way you could do it is you could convince the people doing political vetoes, which are essentially local residents, that it's in their best interest.

In order to do that, you could pay them off. So there are some things like street zones and things like that, where if you give them more money to allow them to build, that is also a possibility. I actually think that's a little bit harder. Some people think that would be easier, but either of those two things could get building going again.

Dan: But the law has been there for a while and there's been like a change, which is that there's basically no new homes in London. I understand that there was this disastrous fire and maybe capital is getting tougher, do you think that, let's say two years from now, that number will be quite a lot higher than it is today of new housing starts

Ben: Not in two years, not on current trajectory.

There is some stuff actually clogged up with our current government, which might pass, in which case that might unclog. I'm currently not too optimistic about that, but potentially after that, if people really sense okay, new young people really can't live where they want to live. And old people are a little bit more willing to give up the fact that they need buildings next to them and that Vata power, again, not high probability, but certainly more than zero.

That's what I would say in that. Anyway, moving on from building, perhaps I'll move on to a couple of other softer things. I have a question here. So someone we're both keen on as a mentor, Tyler Cowen, he once interviewed Temple Grandin in part on the ideas on neurodiversity. And I tend to see some neurodiverse at the head of some big US companies, arguably Microsoft, arguably Tesla, arguably Palantir and a bunch of others.

So there seems to be the silicon subculture which embraces this positive nerd culture. Do you think that explains anything about the US or Silicon Valley, maybe vis-a-vis China or anything out that, or I'm interested whether neurodiversity might be a key unlock for America.

Dan: Yeah, certainly it does feel like there is a lot of neurodiversity in Silicon Valley and not just among these people who make it to the top in terms of these companies, but also just in the rank and file. I think that many more narrow neurodiverse people manage to thrive in the San Francisco Bay area relative to a place like Washington DC or Boston or London or New York City for that matter.

So there is a little bit more of a reward for neurodiversity or at least tolerance for it. But I'm not sure whether it could constitute an unlock. Maybe this has already been unlocked, maybe there are some ways in which the people are able to, people just know that Silicon Valley is a good place for them.

On the other hand, Perhaps the reason that the neurodiverse can't necessarily make it in these East coast cities like DC or New York, is that people generally don't tolerate the neurodiverse very well. Maybe there's a reason that we call Washington, DC Hollywood for ugly people.

We don't have to focus on the ugly, it is like Hollywood, which feels like a much more popular contest from high school. So if maybe most people are intolerant of Neurodiverse, and maybe this is part of the reason that Silicon Valley just isn't very funny, then who's gonna win the neurodiverse?

Throwing their culture out into the rest of America? Or is the rest of America going to engulf Silicon Valley? I'm not sure.

Ben: Yeah, I'm not sure. I guess that's maybe more of a lever for China, not necessarily on neurodiversity, but if they could just loosen up, like embrace some more of their subcultures overall, I think that would be potentially a really big unlock for them.

Obviously that's probably the nightmare of central planners to let loose what your population actually thinks. Maybe turning to a few more personal thoughts. I was interested to pick up that you were a cadet, an army cadet and quite a successful one. So I was wondering what did being a cadet of the year teach you when you were growing up?

Dan: When I was growing up in Canada, I was part of the Royal Canadian Army Cadets and it was a tremendous fun for me. And this is essentially just a big after school program. This is not that much different with Boy Scouts, although we were handed real rifles to do target practice with.

And so that part is a little bit more interesting. And I remember having to go to these drill camps on a formal army basis to run around at 6:00 AM and do a lot of pushups. And so I think that I was definitely more fit in those days than I am today. And I think what the army Cadets Program really taught me was first, you have to have a sense of which rules to break.

If you break no rules ever in life you will absolutely get nowhere if you break the wrong rules. You might be tried for treason or whatever it is. And so you have to have a sense of which rules to break and being in that sort of a formalized system in which rank matters and hierarchy matters, but also moving ahead matters.

I think it is a good thing to have to think about which is the room for creativity. Otherwise I think that it is really good to be part of the Cadets program, just to know, learn a little bit of discipline and I'll learn how to, focus on having a long-term program and figuring out what's important.

And all of these are banal lessons which most of us should not know as an adult. But I, when I say most, there are still many of us who have never properly internalized a lot of these lessons. And so it was a major part of growing up for me to figure out what is important, how do we set priorities and how do we actually work towards them.

Ben: I think SBF should definitely have done that, maybe more effective altruists, but yeah, if SBF done, that would be in better

Dan: shape

Ben: For sure. Much better shape. What do you make of the operas of Philip Glass? Can any modern opera get close to Mozart?

Dan: I guess the only opera of Philip Glass that I've seen on video not live was which is his interpretation of.

The Egyptian Pharaoh. And I've only seen licks and selections of that particular opera. Now has Mozart been superseded? I would argue yes. And I think the peak of opera is represented by Wagner and Verdi. The German great and the Italian Great.

I would say it's mostly downhill from there. And one can identify these perfect in Mozart, but perhaps Mozart is a little bit too now. I see. And perfect. And you have these superior tones of a lot of Mozart, but. But you see a little bit more in Verdi and Wagner is just this total emotional conviction in which they, there is no doubt that the protagonists are feeling as they do, whereas there are some of these climactic scenes in Mozart, which.

Don't feel quite mature. If I'm thinking about something like the marriage of Firo in which the count of ama viva confronts the Countess over allegations of infidelity. And this is a comic opera in which the count is a fearful that the Countess has hidden the page Carino in her closet, and he is trying to identify and find that page this climactic confrontation actually sounds not that he doesn't quite have the conviction in order to not make this as apocalyptic, as it could be.

Whereas there is no doubt if this was in this opera, was in Verdi's hands, the music would be quite a lot more dramatic than faintly comical. There are some things that Mozart could have done maybe a little bit better. I note that the marriage of Figueroa is the first of his three great Italian operas.

Next came Don Giovanni and then came Cozy Tuite. I think that one of these things I wonder it would be, would've been wonderful if Mozart was able to study a little bit more the techniques of Wagner and Verdi and how would he have revised the marriage of Figueroa based on that.

And one of these tragedies is that right before Mozart died for reasons unclear he was supposed to be composing an opera based on King Lear. Imagine how wonderful it could have been to a c one of the c king Lear in the hands of Mozart.

Ben: Yeah, that would've been brilliant. And I agree, Mozart, like perhaps would've been firm or more dramatic would've been really interesting. I think you wrote in your last letter that King Lear is the most Chinese of Shakespeare plays. So I was interested in that comment, but also what do you think then is the most American of Shakespeare plays

Dan: maybe a Midsummer Night's dream speaking to you from California but to be a little bit less glib about the potential drug use there?

Ben: Yeah.

Dan: What could be a very American Shakespeare play? Have you given some thought to this? I'm curious about your review. I

Ben: put it down to two, which may be a little bit more on the nose, but. Being potentially at this point in time Julius Caesar or Corey Elis. So either you've got this tension between like singly an elite or not.

And strong man politics or not. Maybe those are on the nose, but yeah, whimsical, maybe something like Matsu Knight's Dream. I guess you could also make some sort of call for the trading part with the Merchant of Venice or something like that. But as of now, I think he would maybe go for something like Caesar.

Dan: Yeah. It is quite interesting that Steve Bannon in one of his many lives produced this. Was it a Lanis movie that starred? I am Anthony Hopkins.

Ben: I didn't realize that. I'd have to look that up.

Dan: One of these major film adaptations was produced by Steve Bannon, and I believe that he was.

Really obsessed with COIs in particular. Take a look. Take a look with this Anthony Hopkins production. Now, could it be something like McBath? Could it be something like Othello, probably not this. These are not sufficiently political. These are two people. But if we take Tyler seriously, I think that Shakespeare's peak was Henri as a unit.

Now, could that, does that have a contemporary relevance for the US today?

Ben: Yeah, I guess if you take it as a unit for sure it has, for sure. It has some, I'm not sure it's an exact mapping. But yes.

Dan: That's what, and King Lear might have some contemporary relevance for the US as well, which one of the interpretations I have of King Lear is that violence can really spiral and there is no limit to political chaos.

You can have a political figure not really be aware of what he's doing. And then a lot of other people are simply bewildered at what's going on. At least in the case of King Lear. You have these two Dukes, the Duke of cornball, who is married to Reagan. And then the duke of Albany who's married to the other sister, not Cordelia.

And the Duke of Albany seems to be the good guy. He's just bewildered about what is going on and at the very, and come to a census where he has a Cornwall is just a kind of brutal and evil and completely ruthless. And there, there is no limit to the sort of political spiraling of a collapse.

I'm not sure that describes contemporary America right now, but it might, and that's part of the scary part.

Ben: Yeah, and I guess maybe that also shows the similarity between China and America, that actually maybe kingly is also an American play. And particularly you could think about the relationships between the old and young within kingly also could apply to America and actually the politicians in America particularly getting elderly as well across the spectrum.

So it's interesting to think about it from that point of view. Okay. I was also interested in coming off all the book tours and all the many amazing podcasts that you did over last year. Having done all of that, is there anything that you might have changed your mind about in terms of what you've written in the book?

Or maybe not completely change your mind about it, but maybe overweight or underweight compared to when you first rated it?

Dan: I've learned that people can be a lot more kind than I expected, and I've learned that people can be a lot more mean than I expected. There's all of these tanky who love to roast my ass on Twitter, and I think that it is just, there's all this misreading of what I say.

There's nothing an author can do about that. People might say that. Oh, I have forgotten to say that America has been ruled by lawyers forever, but I do say that in my very first chapter that the US used to be a little bit more of an engineering state, which is why I was able to build.

But people either forget to read that part or pretend that I never wrote it. And these are one of these things that authors everywhere have to deal with. And that is just one of these taxes of being of writing that there is just a lot of malicious, creative misinterpretation of one's work.

Now, I don't feel like I have it especially bad relative to a lot of other authors. And it is fine. It doesn't bother me that much. And I also have learned that there is a lot of great interest in this topic. That there are a lot of people who are, who enjoyed this book, who tell me that they enjoyed this book and who are rooting for my success.

And I think that is also a very heartening thing to have. I am surprised that people are still asking me to do podcasts. Generally now I am happy to do podcasts only with people I already know and are friends with like you, Ben. And so all of that is quite positive.

I'm curious for your feedback on my conversation with Tyler. Do you think it worked? What, what did work and what didn't work?

Ben: I thought it was great and I thought you both really enjoyed yourselves and obviously Tyler's got a really large audience, so you did have to cover some of the topics in the book again, I guess in the first half.

But for me, the sort of second half where you both talk about more personal and perhaps esoteric things maybe like this, our conversation here today where we touch obviously on China, but not for the main thing I thought was really interesting and I loved you challenging on, I still haven't heard his list of popes in order which should be, which are the best popes or which not 'cause you could imagine, you can imagine to do that, but I thought it was a very it was a very good conversation.

And I think you mentioned in that one as well as in some of your podcasts that I think maybe you still do this, that you type out. Sentences or write out sentences for writers you admire. So actually I did this with some of your own work recently this week to see what that feels like.

And it was actually pretty good, I noticed. Sometimes you have a good, very good way of using a kind of trilon, a series of three things within your sentences and when you use it, unfortunately chat has made this something that we don't see as much anymore. But you've got a very good use of M Dash generally, and actually when you write that in the pause, it's interesting.

I actually wrote this out by hand because it's not as it's not as emphatic as a, as a.in your sentence, but it is this little dash. I always think of Emily Dickinson within it, but it does punctuate another point. Normally a few words. And then again, I did think that technique was interesting.

I last generally for poems, like writing out poems is really interesting because of where you have the slashes and ate, but I hadn't done it for essays or nonfiction, and I read plays out aloud. I think that's quite interesting. But do you still type out writers that you admire and you still think it's a good technique?

Dan: Not so much anymore, but I keep a running scrapbook of my favorite phrases. And when I sometimes pick up a very nice turn of phrase and either a book or a magazine or wherever else, I paste that in. And every so often I looked through my scrapbook and it. Find some new forms of syntax that I want to play with.

I think it is good that you picked up my tricho as I myself am a Trinitarian, so anything that goes in threes would be really good. Have you tried the exercise of trying to re type rewrite play and has that what has that exercise given you insight into?

Ben: Yes. I haven't done it.

Greatly I've done it particularly on Harold Pinta work and also for some bits of waiting for Gado. And this is because both of them are very interesting, and this is where it started. Essentially pauses and silences, which are quite hard to judge. But in the writing out, and then also when you say it, it does give you this real sense of ah within that pause and what's it be?

And it gives you a stronger sense of the rhythm of language. So writing it, in fact, I would suggest if you're doing this, you actually write it out by hand as well. It tends to be a little bit slower for people versus typing. And then also to speak it, I think for essays and other things, probably not speaking it, but for plays, which will eventually be a vocal form as well, that is quite an interesting write up.

And so you, you are writing the dialogue and then you'll speak it. And it gives you the sense of rhythm and also the pausing. And another thing that shows you both in Pinta actually and in great playwriting overall is punctuation and the use of punctuation. And actually we have some unusual punctuations which have developed over the last few decades, but we use a slash quite a lot as well as hyphens and on and on dashes.

And also this is to try and get overlapping sounds and rhythms. And you only pick that up really by trying to write it or also speak it which you don't. Even just listening or seeing it on the written page isn't quite the same. I'm not sure 'cause I don't really hear music in the same way.

Maybe some people would have the same when they can read sheet music and then also have to play it out or practice it out. But there is something within that. And I also think it's interesting 'cause a lot of art students will, they will have a phase where you just copy what old masters did you, even if you're doing life drawing, you will start out with that to just see, okay, this is what drawing a Michelangelo kind of feels like.

Even though in very modern art, obviously we don't do that, but from that roots. 'cause it does give you that, that sense of feeling. So I think it is an interesting creative practice.

Dan: Yeah, I mean I think it is still a kind of an underrated practice. The reason that I started with sheet music is because I used to be very into reading music and holding a score as I listened to a string quartet or something.

I remembered copying out, I believe it was a Mahler symphony, just like writing a page or two of that out. And you really see what the choices a composer made when you do something like that. And when you retype a story, an article, whatever it is of another writer, you really become much more hyper aware of the choices that they make of particular punctuation or adjectives or syntax.

And you have to start thinking a little bit more about what might you do in that scenario? And that is actually a really good exercise. And it doesn't, it feels surprisingly underrated of a thing to just get into the minds of other people. So this kind of inspires me to ask you.

I've never played, but I haven't really been a big part of my life, although last year I attended I think just two plays. There's a David Henry Huang play on called Yellow Face, which I saw on Broadway. I also saw this new production of Oscar Wilde's importance of being Earnest on the West End, which had this very camp production starring Stephen Fry as Rael the starches of the Victorian matrix.

And I'm thinking of getting into plays more, but is there some sort of analogy where instead of writing out a play can we scare up, let's say two, three other friends to just read out all of these parts and just read these things out and for pleasure? Do you think that is actually a good exercise or that doesn't really work?

Ben: No, it's a really good exercise. Let's do it. So particularly in pandemic times, that is actually what a lot of playwrights and actors ended up doing. So you do it across your favorite plays but it is also the one of the very earliest ways of work shopping your own work is to get people to read it out.

I do these performance lectures, so you like standup. Sometimes you just have to test it with a live audience because you've got this interaction. But certainly simply just reading it out and also reading it out as the parts of others could be can be really good. And I'm sure amongst our group we'll have some to do that.

And then you can do it also. You can go and watch the production or something like that. But yeah, it's definitely worth doing.

Dan: So let's say that I am on holiday next week with three other friends who are as interested in plays as I am. Probably Shakespeare is not the right answer.

But is there some, I don't know, stopper play or something else in which we should just read out the parts to each other? Is there a good kind of starter play if none of us are very familiar with plays to try to have this sort of fun?

Ben: Ooh, I, so with just three, it's interesting that I might start with four, four

Dan: people total.

Ben: I might start with Harold Pinter 'cause they've got really interesting pauses and they're a little bit simpler. And it's also the birth of a lot of. Where Modern Drama goes, or Samuel Beckett, I think I would do Pinter. But actually the one that you maybe do is now, and also 'cause I think it might be his greatest play, although has more characters, I don't think it really matters would be Tom Stoppard's Arcadia, maybe start with Rosen Krantz and Gilden Stern, which is his most philosophical play and actually needs less dramatization for it and has fewer characters.

Rosen Ks and Goldstein are dead, has a slight Shakespeare connotation, not really. And then do Arcadia 'cause Arcadia you get this multilayered time effect where if you are reading it out. And it's really funny and I think it will probably still prove to be as great as play. Yeah, that's why I suggest, what's

Dan: the appeal of Arcadia?

Ben: So Arcadia Whoof. I think it is just a very good reflection of humanity and thinking overall, but also has concepts of time and quantum physics, also chaos. Also maybe the complexity, and then inexplicably inexplicable, of human life. But also has overtones of this reverse of are there patterns?

Are there things which reverberate through time? Are there these narratives that we feel? And he packages up that really well. So not only touches on chaos theory, complexity and quantum ness. So the cutting edge of some science thoughts, which are not fully captured, but also has these characterizations of narrative and pattern and then puts through some of these other obscure things like the patterns of English gardens and French gardens and these other things that humans are grappling with and shows and shows some of that through time.

So I just think it's really neatly wrapped up. And obviously as he's recently died, it's probably the moment of that. So that's why I would highlight that. But it's actually quite quick to do. So Pinta plays are probably, some of them are only for an hour and a half, so you can definitely do that over an evening with some tea.

Arcadia's a little bit longer. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern [are Dead] I think is only about an hour and a half as well [Ed: actually runs 2 hours]. So you could do that quite quickly.

Dan: Let's say that the chaos and quantum and time are just a little bit too philosophical and complex for a starter group. Is there an easier stopper to play?

Ben: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead. It's okay. It is philosophical. Comedic as well. So in that sense it could actually be harder than Arcadia because Stoppard  is really good at explaining these concepts of chaos theory and butterfly flaps its wings and things like that. So in that sense, I don't think you will struggle whereas Rosenstein and Gilda and have some of these more philosophical overtones.

But structurally and character wise it is simpler. So that's potentially there, but you could just flick the first chapter or two, or sorry, scene or two. And that will give you a sense

Dan:What about Leopoldstadt ?

Ben: So I think I'll have to see it again. I liked it but I wondered whether the first showing may, or may not be definitive and I think maybe we need a little bit more time as it will prove to be his last great work, whether that will prove to be greater.

I still prefer some of the concepts on Arcadia. I. Your podcast dub obviously had a little bit more of a personal connotation. So I would like to, I would like to see it again. I should reread it actually to make that sense. Maybe actually there's a really good biography of him also by Ion e Lee, so maybe putting all of that together, it would give me a more complete sense.

I think it's interesting because playwrights in general, or I guess right in general, tend to lean a more complicated left, say I know it's more complicated than that, whereas Stoppard lent a more complicated and I would say that just because he was very interested in notions of freedom and liberalism because of where he of how he grew up.

So I think that makes it really interesting. And I do think playwriting is one of those things where even. If you're successful, say leftist or rightist. Most successful plays always have very strong and nuanced arguments arguing for the other side, whatever position you have. And in fact, for some of the greatest, you're not even sure within the play where the playwright's actual position might be.

So that's one of the reasons I still think performance is really interesting on that level. And reading it out you get to inhabit a character who might not think well, almost certainly doesn't think like yourself. And so though I think that is a really good way of inhabiting something else, which obviously fiction gives you performance, gives it to you in a very live manner which I think is one step up in importance.

Dan: Do playwrights tend to write distinctive pros in terms of essays? Can you tell who is a playwright based on their essays?

Ben: Oh, I don't know about that. Some playwrights have gone on to write. Quite interesting essays as well. I would have to think, my guess is maybe yes but I can't think offhand.

Maybe more interesting or equally as like some players, like Tom Stoppard famously wrote some very successful Hollywood stuff. Like I think Steven Spielberg used to ring Stop Pod up when he had a problem in his script and sometimes Stop Pod would say, I think that was fa, I can't remember what film it was some famous film and Stoppard said, no, I'm working on this small play.

And Spielberg says what? But this is a million dollar multi thingy hit. And Stoppard was like that, but I'm more interested in this. But I think that's quite interesting in some of those crossovers. But I have to think about the essay question. I'm not sure about that in terms of essayists.

Dan: I've been reading a little bit of this Auden collection of essays called The Dyer's Hand, and this is his only collected series of his essays. And I'm not sure that one can really tell that, oh, this is a poet. I don't know if when poets write essays in prose it, I'm not sure if it usually generally turns out necessarily very well.

I was also, I also read David Mamet's Was it Three Uses of the Knife? And I thought that was pretty good, but it didn't, I also didn't feel like I learned a ton from it. So maybe we should mostly stay in our lanes. But I am still curious if there is some sort of a distinctive training that they can bring into our pros Essay writing.

Ben: Yeah, I'm gonna think about that. I'm gonna, I'm gonna look at my bookshelf and see some of the essays, because I think of more of their memoirs, things like Edward Alby or something like that. But some of them have written some essays some have written quite interestingly about. Theater, although, and now I'm thinking about Peter Brooke and Empty Space, and that was a director writing about theater in general.

So I'm not, yeah, I'm not completely sure. Unanswered. Okay. Maybe we'll do a short last, final section and then some of the things that you're working on in any advice you have, but I guess in honor of Tyler Cowan, he doesn't do this so much anymore, but I thought we should do a short section of overrated, underrated in terms of the podcast.

There's some quick hits and some on some things so we can give this a go. Overrated or underrated US suburbs

Dan: correctly rated, I think correctly. I think that the suburban life, I think that this is, I recognize that this is the dream for a lot of families. Absolutely. To have a lot of space and then to be able to try a kids swimming pool. That's great. There is a lot more culinary diversity in suburbs because the rents tend to be cheaper.

And the people like Costco and those gigantic super stores. I like Costco myself. I don't mind visiting like once every two months or so to buy a lot of Kleenex tissues or something. I think that these things are quite fine. But let's not overdo our enthusiasm for them.

Ben: Yeah. Great for parents, I think. I still think they are too boring for teenagers, but Yes. I think Tyler likes the suburbs a lot though. Great. Hedge funds, overrated, underrated.

Dan: Overrated. These are compensation schemes masquerading as an asset class. And maybe you are more familiar with this data, but I remember reading a while ago that catch fund, quote unquote hedge fund performance has been pretty bad over the last couple of years.

They're not overperforming. And I think where the energy seems to be for a lot of smart people, they're going into these quant funds, and that seems to be where a lot of them are, where the action is. Hedge funds were never very well defined up until, after you moved on from long, short.

But so it feels like it's mostly a marketing category, right?

Ben: Very good for employees. Yeah. I'm not sure about it, I'm not sure about anyone else. Okay. We, I guess we briefly covered this, but I would say AI existential risk is overrated or underrated.

Dan: Maybe correctly rated may probably be overrated by all the Californians.

If we take this view that, okay maybe we will be tortured eternally in our minds by machine, God forever that seems pretty bad. I wouldn't like that. So maybe it's good that we have some people worrying about this. Maybe it is great that we have some people worrying about biotech security, but let's also worry about all of these other things, like what sorts of harms that this might be doing just to our minds every single day.

Ben: Yeah. I think that's the problem with a lot of these things. Yeah. The people really deep into it could probably do with thinking about some other things, but the people who've never thought about it at all could probably do with at least thinking about it a little bit. Okay. Overrated, underrated five year plans.

Dan: Overrated, the Chinese don't take this all that seriously anymore. Maybe the first two or three, five year plans were important. Right after the first the conclusion of the first five year plan felt that he was being excessively constrained and then he essentially did away with much of this concept.

So the gap between the first five year plan and the second five year plan, they didn't do this immediately afterwards because Mao hated them. I think that they are overrated. The Chinese have never paid that much attention to their own five year plans. I think something like this could be more centrally planned than high-speed rail?

High-speed rail arose in reaction to the global financial crisis, which was outside of the plan. So they built this enormous rail system without even planning for it. Yeah. And so that just shows, it's just this sort of aspirational marketing statement because they have to praise marks on his birthdays and sing the internationale to after the party congresses.

But this is actually not all that serious for, at least for the Chinese. Yeah. And if it's not that serious for the Communist Party, I can't imagine that being serious for anyone else.

Ben: Yeah. Mostly signaling. I think non-Chinese analysts are probably the people who read it the most. Okay.

Dan: It's worth reading.

It's an aspirational document.

Ben: Board games underrated or overrated. Yeah.

Dan: Correctly rated. I believe in the efficient market hypothesis. I think that most things are correctly rated. I

Ben: do.

Dan: And I like board games, but I have, it's been, I think, like years since it's really been part of my life.

I think a couple of board games can be great and perfect, but one doesn't need to keep learning new board games. And so in that sense it's not a very vital industry, just like opera. No, I think that it's good for some nerds. Maybe more people should hang out and play board games.

But people just should just find some way to be more social, whether that's to go to plays or to play some board games or just to go on dates more.

Ben: Yeah. I guess I mentioned it 'cause Silicon Valley doesn't have opera, but it does have more board games. But yeah, maybe correctly rated space exploration.

Underrated, overrated,

Dan: overrated. There's. Basically nothing out there within a reasonable timeframe. It's good to serve as an inspirational device. And I think that, maybe we should go find it. I think it is a scandal that there's very likely life within one of the moons of Jupiter and maybe of Saturn as well.

We're not even really trying that hard to go look for it. Now it's like right here within our solar system. What sorts of Moby Dicks lie within the moons of the Moon of Europa. So why don't we go, why don't we, why don't we go find Moby Dick?

Ben: Yeah. But then we've got a lot of problems on Earth as well, so yeah, I guess there's difficulties on that.

And last one then, venture capital. Do you think overall it's underrated or overrated?

Dan: Incorrectly rated. I think that it has definitely been a major factor in discovering the capital market ecosystem in general. What is venture capital exactly anymore? Maybe these are just marketing agencies with an insurance policy attached.

But I think that the general capital ecosystem has been pretty efficient in the US. But also people love to say that VCs don't work very hard, so maybe they also need to be working a little bit harder.

Ben: Yeah. Okay. That's very good. Yeah, I was interested in financial valuations and BC and the, in your letter you mentioned something you've talked about a little bit for looking at, for instance, the valuation of something like AppLovin, although it's actually fallen quite a lot since you wrote the letter. 

Dan: Really?

Ben: And you compare that to something like


Dan:, I hope it wasn't  because of me.

Ben: No it, there's been this whole revaluation of what software might mean, I think might even be down about 50% since you last wrote it. Wow. But it's still got a larger market cap than Xiaomi, although not by such an incredible amount or more, or something like BYD is maybe more well known for people in terms of EV makers.

But I was thinking that. When you think about it, maybe if you think about it purely in terms of capturing consumer surplus or wealth for the nation, certainly BYD and Xiaomi are doing better for their respective nations than Afin. But that's maybe what the financial shareholder equity people are looking at is that Apple vendor's better for the equity holders, but isn't adding so much more value to the United States.

And so that's part of this disconnect that we have with the financial market cap thing. And where is the actual value going? I think about this a lot in healthcare because actually within biopharma, a lot of the value actually goes into a. Into people, into patients who live longer and some value goes back to the biopharma, but not as much as you might have thought.

And certainly probably less than in, in tech companies. But that's partly because society demands that they might need to capture more of that value. And I think that's an interesting kind of tension between who, who is really getting the value from that.

What are you working on at the moment? Any current projects or any questions you are obsessed over?

Dan: There's two books on my shelf that I really want to read. One is a history of the Royal Navy, actually by a historian named NAM Rogers. It's called The Price of Victory.

This mega long history book and the Royal Navy has inspired a lot of excellent historians. Another is a novel:  Middle March. I'm deficient for being a bad California and not having read George Elliot and I'm also, I've also just picked up Dublin nurse. So I'm starting to read a little bit of the short stories of James' Choice, which are pretty charming and not as difficult as I imagined as something like Ulysses.

Ben: Great. And then the last question for a smart 20 something, deciding where to live and what to learn and what to do, what would be your advice for them?

Dan: I think that it is really important to be with ambitious people. I think that the default is to not be ambitious people. And certainly I've felt that my own ambition has ebbed as I've entered as I've crossed into the wrong side of 30.

Certainly, your ambition will get lower and lower, and so it is a good thing to have when you are younger. And this is, and it seems to me like some very ambitious people are in San Francisco as well as New York City. This is where I am a little bit more glum about London, where.

If the default national culture, it's just this cynicism and cleverness about people who are absent and then there it feels like a country in a national decline, even if London is delightful. I think that it is probably a good thing from a civilizational perspective not to be super cynical all of the time.

And so I have many friends in London. I love visiting. It is a superb city, but maybe it is also good to get some optimism and get some sun.

Ben: Yes. So raise your ambition and surround yourself with great people. I will make one further plea for London, although I do think we are a great museum like the rest of Europe.

Good to visit, but not. I think maybe so percentage wise, like we said, there is some doom and gloom here, but there are. Ambitious young people and then all were young, some are a little bit older and they are forming groups. So there's a big emergent venture cluster here. So this is Tyler Cowen’s venture philanthropy.

You've got British progress, you've got abundance for London. So you have got a cluster of young people who are there. There may be absolute numbers numbering in the hundreds and low thousands as opposed to tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands. But I still think you do have it here, partly 'cause of where the agglomeration effects are.

But I do think surrounding yourself, the people you surround yourself with, you tend to go, I think, what's the quote? If you want to run faster, you run with the antelopes. So if you want to be a fast antelope, you run with them some quote like that. That's the idea. And I think that has a lot of truth to that.

Dan: Antelopes may have to run really fast because they're being chased by lions. So I've put more emphasis on the lion rather than the herd. And having a bit more of a sense of threat is important too. And I think it is really good to prepare these lists of ambitions… just in case we have to medevac them into California at some point if the gloom pervades too deeply into their hearts.

Ben: Yes. Although the California's aren't they all going to New Zealand instead? So maybe we'll come round full circle.

Dan: Okay. That's right. Just a global tour of the angles here.

Ben: Yeah. Great. With that, Dan, thank you very much.

Dan: Thank you very much. This was a lot of fun. I'm glad that I got to hear more of your thoughts, especially on place.


In Arts, Podcast, Life, Politics, Writing Tags Dan Wang, Ben Yeoh Chats, Silicon Valley, London, China, AI, tech culture, culture, housing, planning, infrastructure, censorship, urbanism, ambition, writing, Shakespeare, opera, food culture, neurodiversity, politics

Salima Saxton: Cancer, ‘Bad Patient’ Honesty, Estrangement, and Writing Without Waiting

February 24, 2026 Ben Yeoh

Salima Saxton on cancer, honesty, estrangement, and creative work in real life. Salima is Ben’s longtime friend, and they talk about her cancer diagnosis and what she calls an unexpected new “year of undoing”, a return to herself rather than a neat reinvention story.

“Be the sky, not the weather. The weather passes through.”

They discuss why the language of “brave” can feel wrong, why “What can I do?” often misses the mark, and what Salima means by being a “bad patient”.

The conversation turns to Salima’s Substack essay “Builder Dad” on estrangement and what outsiders routinely misunderstand.

“‘Blood is thicker than water’ is not advice I believe in.”

Salima also shares the hardest things to write in memoir: telling the whole truth, including the parts that do not flatter you.

The chat then touches on anti-heroine storytelling, friendship breakups, social media’s double edge, and what creative work looks like without romantic routines: write where you can, start small, “plod”, find mentors, and build community.

“There’s never a perfect moment. Start with something tiny and plod.”

A lighter finish includes an overrated/underrated game (champagne, dressing up, height, hustle culture, social media, coconut oil), Salima’s plan to audition again, and why dark humour matters when things get rough.

“A sense of humour is absolutely vital. You either laugh or you crack.”

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.

Contents

00:00 30-year friendship,  Himalayas, coconut oil
01:23 Cancer diagnosis and a new “year of undoing”
03:41 Returning to the 18-year-old self
05:07 Illness clarifies relationships, energy is finite
07:29 Why “brave” and “What can I do?” can land badly
09:02 “Bad patient”: performing “good” on an overstretched NHS ward
13:05 Honest female voices, dissonance, anti-heroine truth
15:28 “Builder Dad”, estrangement, and searching for father figures
17:57 What people get wrong about estrangement and friendship breakups
21:29 Hypervigilance and the hidden inner life
23:31 The hardest memoir scene: dad’s death and anger at mum
26:15 Writing about mum: respect, friction, truth
29:44 Childhood contradictions: hippie roots, no heating, love of glamour
30:37 No perfect routine: writing around kids, work, real life
33:09 Ditch the artist romance: money, time, and the true cost
35:00 Tiny wins: one sentence still counts
36:49 Bed writing, socks, and self-trickery
38:06 Overrated/underrated game
41:31 Social media love/hate and quiet communities
43:59 2026 as the “year of saying yes”, auditions, dark humour
46:37 Advice to creatives: start small, “plod”, mentors, community
50:15 Long friendships and gratitude

Transcript (lightly edited, transcribed by LLM AI, so mistakes are very possible)

Ben: Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to Salima Saxton. Salima is a brilliant writer, performer, and podcaster herself. She has her memoir the Year of Undoing, which should be out in 2027. She's also my friend of 30 years or maybe more. Before we had mobile phones. She was my friend. She was my first friend I know to actually have had a mobile phone.


I've directed her for the London stage. I've climbed mountains to go and visit her and we still argue about who is taller. Salima welcome.


Salima: Thank you so much. Just to clarify one thing, I am certainly tall now I cannot believe we've been friends for 30 years. That's terrifying.


Ben: Says something about our age.


You are also gonna shrink more than me.


Salima: Oh God. You have to get that in, don't you? All I remember is that you arrived exhausted halfway up the Himalayas very early one morning when I was living there


Ben:  I carried coconut oil. Do you remember that? .


Salima: Yes. I remember that very clearly. [ ]



Salima: As a proper friend, someone who carries coconut oil halfway up the Himalayas. 


Ben: You are having a year of undoing or maybe more than in a year. What are you undoing this year and what are you trying to rebuild in its place and why are we undoing anything?


Salima: Oh, great. Just give me five questions in one, why don't you? So this year was unexpected, so this year I got quite unwell. I had a cancer diagnosis, which  has involved two massive surgeries and a lot of chemo. And I'm on the, I'm on the mend now, so I'm, very blessed in that it was caught in time and everything.


But I wasn't expecting this latest year of undoing the year of undoing that I write about in my memoir, which by the way, you are in was about changing our lives when we left London, when Carl's mental health had gone up in the air, is the politest way of putting it. And we changed our lives radically overnight.


One lesson I have learnt in these last few months with the further I'm doing and I'll get more into what I'm doing actually means in a minute, is not a midlife crisis. Is what? Which is what many people seem to think it means. Is that, I thought that year, that neat little memoir year would be it.


I romantically thought I would get through this year and then it's plain sailing until my hundredth birthday and I'll die in my sleep. The end. And what I have really learned over these last few months, and perhaps a little bit too late in my life, considering I'm in my late forties and I've known you for a hundred years, is that we're constant.


There's going to be. There. There 's that old saying, isn't there about, be the sky, don't be the weather. The weather just passes through, right? We're the sky. So we just have to be, we just have to remind ourselves that we are that big blue sky and that the weather will pass through no matter what.


And I think I've always thought that for other people, but I didn't include myself in that rather childishly. So I always assumed that, yeah, that can happen to other people, all these things, but it's not going to happen to me. And then it did.


Ben: And so are you rebuilding anything or We just undoing like a midlife crisis would've been easier.


That's like standard.


Salima: Yeah. Midlife is just buying a motorbike. Or I don't know. Yeah. Leaving your marriage or just like turning a table upside down. No, this is slower. This is me coming back to myself. This is me coming back to the 18-year-old that, like I feel like I lost that girl for many years.


And that girl who wasn't intimidated by Mark, I arrived at Cambridge, didn't I? State school kid. Wasn't intimidated by the fact that you all knew each other and you did, all of you knew each other and was just interested and you know how I was just curious and enthusiastic and pretty optimistic.


Still always worried about everything as you remember, but I just assumed everything would work out, and I think I lost that a bit over the years and got closer to catastrophizing about everything. You know this more than anybody.


Ben: I still thought you had it, have it even, although, I guess perhaps that's one of the things we're just growing older with all of these things is more, we get more baggage to catastrophize over.


We've got 30, 31 years of it.


Salima: Yeah.


Ben: Compared to when we were 17, 18. But I guess what's, is there any small or maybe weird detail from the last few weeks then, which is captured? How has your life changed from that in terms of capturing back the younger you?


Salima: This is gonna sound quite brutal, but I'm not gonna talk about the beauty of walking through the fields and living in the moment because I haven't found that has happened for me.


And I think for a lot of people when they have health scares, they fall in love with the everyday and domesticity and the normal stuff that hasn't happened for me. What has happened for me though is that I. I'm really aware, first of all, of who I want to talk to or spend any time with.


And you know this about me. I've collected people over the years where I've just hung on to friendships for sentimentality. But over this period, some people you included, have appeared for me and. And just being, and just speaking very truthfully and reminded me of who I was.


Other people have disappeared, have totally disintegrated in these people I wouldn't expect. And in observing all these new dynamics in my life, which I wasn't expecting over illness, I've really realized I've had a, I've got a real awareness of that. My energy is finite and I must only spend energy on the people that I really love or the people that I'm very energized by, or who really see me.


But I used to compromise a lot more. So I've done the opposite. I haven't become like that. Sanguine wise little owl over these last few months. As you know from reading some of my essays, I've become like a pretty cantankerous bad patient, but I see real beauty in that.


Yeah, for my own take.


Ben: I think there's actually really relatively few people who do this mindfulness thing. Maybe they write about it on Instagram occasionally, but that's probably fake, I reckon. You've got a handful of monks dying breed. Yes. And some mothers because I remember now, this is ages ago now, this is over 30.


This is over 30 years as well. When my dad had cancer, he got a bit annoyed when people used to say, oh, you're being brave. And he was like. It's just, there's no bravery stuff about it.


Salima: Yeah, exactly. I can't, there are certain words and phrases that I haven't been able to stand over the last few months.


Yeah, so definitely you are being brave. You are so courageous. You're and also, the, what the famous, what can I do, which I think is the worst question to ask anybody who is unwell, what can I do? Really puts the onus on that person. And I think when, whether you've just had a baby, whether you are unwell, whether you're going through divorce, like you just need people to turn up.


Just to call you or just to check in or just to send the thing or whatever that you haven't got space in your brain to know what to ask that person to do.


Ben: If you'd figured it out, you'd be doing it.


Salima: And I think it's a little bit of a get out of jail card for people because then they feel they can give themselves a pat on the back.


They've said to the person, what can I do? And so they've done their duty, but actually, yeah.


Ben:I don't even remember. In Cambridge one of my close friends Nadia died and it was a little bit like that. Although you're surrounded by 18 and 19 year olds, they don't really know how to react.


Anyway, although it hasn't changed that much in 30 years, 'cause most people don't come close to death for quite a long time. COVID changed that a little bit, but you've written this series, I guess this is your sort of second year titled bad patient. I'm interested, what does being a bad patient mean, mean to you?


'cause it isn't just really being cantankerous, it's like you say, being a little bit more you, but with these different elements to it. Why did you decide to write about being a bad patient and what, what does bad patient mean? Because actually it isn't being bad. It's bad. That sense of, again, when we were young, when bad was actually good.


Salima: Exactly. I suppose a bit of it is like. Because I didn't feel that I was being good enough, or grateful enough, because people told me early on, while I was lucky, it was lucky it's been found, it is lucky that we've, we were doing this. It's lucky this is happening, and I didn't really feel lucky at all, until very recently.


Since I've had, since it's out. There's a bit of me that feels lucky. Now I can see how that is. How I will feel more like that in six months time possibly. But back then I didn't. And also I gave the impression in my NHS ward that I was a very kind and kindly patient, but I wasn't, I was doing that in order to make sure the nurses took care of me.


So I knew I needed to be charming and kind and ask after their son and ask whatever, so that they came back and checked on me because I could see how overworked everybody was and I could see what they were fighting against. So I knew they had to remember me, remember my name, and they had to like me so bad.


Patient was also outta that, in that I was very consciously being good.


Ben: There is no altruism. Maybe we are kind to others, so others are kind to us.


Salima: I was buying biscuits for everybody and everything, but that again, that was to be like, oh, the lovely lady in bed one A, so that they come back and check on me because I could see what happened when you didn't behave.


I am, I had to have this nasal gastric tube inserted, which was horrendous. And another lady in the ward was arguing about why I should get this special window bed because that's like the best bed. And she was so rude about it. But then she effectively got punished because.


The matron came to see her and then like they weren't checking on her as much I could see, so I could really see things, really see, that's no one's fault. It's just natural


Ben: They're all overworked already, right? So


Salima: They're all exhausted. They don't get paid for their lunch break.


They don't get paid for their breaks. As I met incredible gems there, I was also working the system. So I was really aware from very early on there was a real dichotomy between who I was perceived to be and who I actually was.


Ben: But I think maybe you're just being honest about it. I think the majority of us, most of the time are like that and there's only small glimpses of when I think we're feeling particularly 150% good, then we can have that excess and it spills over into the spills over into the world.


Salima: Yeah, because also I was humoring people all the time, but then that's how I got an extra blanket, or that's how I got a bit longer with the consultant or whatever.


And also look, I'm, I was very lucky in that I had a combination of private healthcare and NHS healthcare for all of this. So like straddling the two systems and and obviously I'm incredibly privileged to be in that situation, but, but


Ben: You're also really unlucky that you had to be in that situation at  all.


Salima: Yeah, and also, but just like how much work, how much emotional work I had to do whilst in the NHS, whereas that didn't exist for me within the private sector. I didn't have to do any of that work.


Ben: Do you think there's do you think people are more receptive now to this, I guess honest writing about how things really are, not how we would want them to be or how we wish them to be, but how things really are.


Salima:  I think so. Particularly from women. I think they might have received it from men, but I think it's a much, it's much newer that we'll receive this from. A female voice.


Ben: The lived experience of women. I guess you, you explored this on your own podcast that it's been so undertold for so long. We don't have those boluses of stories and they're not what they tell us in the movies or the books, or at least the bestselling books.


It's actually the range of experience and what you can feel is just it's a myriad of everything. Yes. And that hasn't really been expressed.


Salima: And also that there's going to be a constant dissonance between what you are feeling. There, the heroine doesn't exist.


Like the, he, the heroine is made up of the villain and the heroine always you like for all of us. And I think we've only been ready to hear that. From Women's Voices relatively recently. So I, and for me, is really the cornerstone of my writing. When I'm writing memoir or fiction, I'm just finished I'm just finishing a novel as well about a kind of anti heroine, and that's really important for me because I cannot stand it. That's part of the reason that we get on so well because you are so blunt, cannot stand people, what's the word, Ben? When someone's not ready.


Ben: They're pretending


Salima: They just pretend. That's as simple as that, right?


Yeah. You can dress it up. Not so ways, but like I know if I ask you a question, you'll answer me truthfully, even if I don't like hearing the answer.


Ben: Yes.


Salima: That's right, that's why I married Carl. Carl's similar, right? In that he'll, that's, I always say that's part of the reason I married him, because he'll say things to me and I don't like the answer, but.


Answer, then I feel safe. But I think that is a direct result of having been raised by someone like my dad, where I never knew where I was.


Ben: Yeah. Never got the answer. That's a good segue. You wrote this long essay memoir piece, build a Dad.


Salima: Yes.


Ben: I'm interested in what you were trying to understand in that piece, writing from your perspective?


Salima: I was estranged from my dad for the last 10 years. I chose to be estranged from him. He was a kind of alcoholic, he was an alcoholic. And I had a very difficult relationship with him. Not really, I think anymore because of the alcoholism, but because of who he was, which was an overused term at the moment.


But, a kind of narcissistic self engrossed. Artist who didn't really, beco didn't become the artist that he thought he deserved, he should be, and was very angry and bitter really, and bored. He was a very bored man. And he wasn't really cut out for fatherhood. I can see that really clearly now.


So builder dad has fed really into my memoir. I write a lot about it because in the year of undoing, my dad also died and left explicit instructions for me not to be invited to his funeral, and he cut me out of his will. So it, my relationship with my dad is ongoing, even though he's dead. And


Builder dad. That Substack piece was really about the fact that I have looked around for years. Other examples of father figures, not necessarily even fathers in the traditional sense, but people who are playing that kind of role and were always seeking edges of that even…. Don't you remember that very much older boyfriend that I had?


Like that was definitely part of it, seeking that kind of like male elder reassurance, and trying to work out for me what a father was because I didn't really know what a father was meant to be. Luckily I've married somebody who I think is an amazing father.


And he's had to work it out himself 'cause he wasn't fathered in a traditional sense either. But I am quite obsessed by the ideas of motherhood and fatherhood and what they mean to all of us, and, and what we all come from. They're dominant themes in my life.


Ben: And what do you think outsiders misunderstand about what estrangement is or what estrangement is in, in your experience, although I guess this was two ways you chose first, and then in some ways he was making a point in his will. But is there anything you think on the outside looking in, it's just oh, this, these are the pieces that you just really don't get?


Salima: Oh yes. And I've had many people's opinions over the years. Normally really well-meaning, but just not understanding, so the most obvious. People literally have quoted blood is thicker than water at me so many times, which I don't believe. I don't believe in that. And many people ask me, what will happen to you when your father dies if you don't?


Resolve it. But look for me, and I can't speak for other people, I would say that my father died many years before he actually died. So there wasn't a big moment when he actually passed away, and I heard that he had done. I didn't disintegrate into some big thing and if only, I felt really sad.


He had just never been able to be the father that I had wanted. But I had been grieving for my dad probably since I was a teenager, to be honest. So I think that's an odd thing to hold above someone's head. It's like holding someone's finger to a flame, but what if they die?


What if they die? I don't believe in mending, fractured and often harmful relationships. Just because somebody might die. That makes absolutely no sense to me.


Ben: And I guess this points to the fact that the family we choose, or the friends we choose in some ways then are more important and could be more painful if friend, I've seen this now, getting a little bit older that I've seen some friendships have broken up, and I look at that and say, actually that's more painful than other things.


Salima: I've had friendships dissolve and it's been really painful. I was very good friends with somebody and. I think I kind of misunderstood that friendship because we became friends when our kids were tiny. And she was a school mom. And I, somebody once said that when they saw us together, it always looked like we were having a party.


Wherever we were, we were always laughing and things. And that friendship, she walked away from that friendship. It wasn't me at all, and I was heartbroken. I was completely heartbroken. I never quite understood it. Nothing there, there wasn't a big argument or anything, and who knows what it would be from her point of view, but I was really blindsided by it.


And, but also look, when you've got tiny kids, I had three tiny kids who knew where my brain was at that point. But yeah. But coming back to people misunderstanding, estrangement, everyone's obsessed at the moment about Brooklyn Beckham.


Ben: Yes.


Salima: And sure, okay, writing on your Instagram stories. And it's all very public.


But even though that's all he really understands, isn't it? That's how he's grown. That's his language. He doesn't understand privacy and handwritten letters. Obviously, that's not how the Beckhams have brought him up. But who knows, who knows? And I think that's the main thing that I would say to anybody who judges quite harshly about estrangement, unless you were there. It's very difficult to know what's happened in the


Ben: Yeah. Understanding that in the li well, understanding one's own inner life is hard enough, right? Like, how am I actually feeling, let alone other people's inner lives?


Salima: And also, Ben, if you think about it, you were around, like you were around when I was 18, 19.


And you wouldn't, I didn't talk about it then. So you wouldn't have seen me, we had that nice house, didn't we? It all looked quite pretty. I dunno whether I did ever mention anything, but I think I kept it all fairly,


Ben: not until we are flatmates in our twenties, then it,


Salima: right exactly.


You do it, we had that lovely thatched house and I had piano lessons and then I went to Cambridge and I was head girl and it all looked very beautiful and in control. But things were very out of control actually. Things were really out of control. That's partly why I loved school so much.


I would never have shown that to people wouldn't have believed it at the


Ben: time. Yeah. Even if you did, it would be like, this is the thing about some nonfiction is if you wrote it as fiction, nowadays, people don't believe you.


Salima: Yeah.


Ben: It has to be written as well, no, this is my inner life. This is how this


Salima: course, what, and also look, I think with alcoholism as well, it was all kinds of things. I became a very hypervigilant kind of kid because I could just sense things turning in the evening or I knew and things wouldn't go the wrong way at home when, when it was all gonna explode. And then everything would be fine in the morning.


Nobody would talk about it. Like I remember going to a birthday party when I was about 10 and my dad was really drunk and I was very upset. And my mom just said, put on a party dress. Here's the present. And we just left. And she called me to blow my nose. And then I went to the party and I was completely fine at the party and I remember enjoying it.


There was a magician, I remember really loving it, but I was very used to, from quite early on, just going, okay, that's happened. Blow your nose. Don't tell anybody. Get on with it.


Ben: Wow. So what's your story? E either bit of the story, bad patient or build a dad or anything which you've most resisted writing down, but I guess have written down or there's something which is resisting at the moment and you think, oh, maybe I'm, it's not even gonna make it in.


Salima: The hardest thing to write about has been the day of my dad's death, not because of the news, but because of my behavior with my mother on that day. So mothers,


Ben: mothers do it to us, right?


Salima: They do. So my mom, although she's been divorced by that point for nearly 30 years, was catatonic with grief and I lost my temper.


And behaved really badly. You'll have to read my memoir to see just how badly, but I just


Ben: but you did manage to write about it then if you're not gonna


Salima: leave it out. No, I'm not gonna leave it out because I think it's a really important thing for people to read about. If you're going to write about estrangement and you're going to write about difficult dads that I think you are owed, you owe the readers like all of it.


Yeah. 'cause if anyone's reading this that has any overlaps with this kind of thing, I want them to know that they're not imagining it or by themselves. I think that's what I felt for years. Oh, I'm making this up slightly. Yeah. Drunks drink whiskey for breakfast and they beat their children, don't they?


Black and bloom. But when it's emotional stuff, like I hit my dad never hit me. When he was very drunk, I pushed my dad. I hit my dad as a teenager in a very out of control way. And know, we hear about the extremes, don't we? We hear about, yeah.


You are beat in black and blue by a parent, or you hear about the other extreme, the kind of like the best of the best parents, but this kind of murky middle, which left me. Pretty I was always worried really as a kid, and you knew me from the tail end of that, where I was so happy to be at Cambridge and be meeting people and doing all these exciting things.


But


Ben: and as part of your point that it's. I guess it's not that it's okay to behave badly, but that it happens and it happens. I'm guessing you're still talking to your mom and life also goes on and we have to admit that these things happen. And put it where it is and potentially learn from it, or at least acknowledge it and see what happens in the future.


Salima: And also look, you know my mom, mommy has had a very difficult life. She came here at 16 from Pakistan Scholarship to Guda and Lama. Amazing, but a fish outta water, obviously. Then even had, got, had an arranged marriage, then left that it was an abusive relationship.


Then married my father and was with my father for years and years. Living in the middle of the eighties British countryside, where she really was like the only South Asian for a hundred miles and everyone thought she ran like the local Indian takeaway. And my mom. I owe my mom a lot.


'cause my mom kept everything going. Always. And you know what she's strong at. She's got some overlap with your mom, hasn't she? Actually. In terms of what they demand of us, what they expect from us. But it hasn't always been easy with my mom, you know.


She's not an easy woman. But I also admire my mother and I do respect my mother. But we don't always get on.


Ben: Is your mother as present in the year of undoing as your father or,


Salima: Yes, she is. Although that's the interesting thing about writing a memoir, isn't it? Because I also feel that I want.


Look after my mother.


Ben: Yeah.


Salima: She's alive.


Ben: She's gonna read it. Probably.


Salima: Yeah. Although I've told her not to read it because of my dad and everything, but no, I, because no more, not because she's gonna read it or even, because even if she wasn't alive, I would feel the same about my mom actually, because for all the difficulties and complications my mom has.


Really, I, I know. My mom would always do anything for me or my sister. We might not agree with it. We might not agree with oh, the way she thinks about it, she is, she's a very strong, a strong woman who's also pretty blunt, yeah, I'm truthful about my mom in the year of undoing, and we went to live with my mom for the first few weeks when we left London, and that wasn't always easy, particularly she's got a much more traditional Pakistani way of like bringing up children compared to my EZ fair, more relaxed way of being with kids.


So that wasn't easy, but


Ben: I still remember. Your mum is teaching me how when you put things in a bin, you can eke out a little bit more volume depending on the way that you turn around your cartons. And I think about that sometimes when I reverse it goes, oh, you know what? That's crazy. Silly was who was, mum was the one who advocated this way of bin filling.


So there you have it. I don't think that says anything about anything, but I do remember it


Salima: also. But you know what, my, my parents were, before it was fashionable, like in the eighties and nineties when all my friends had immaculate Kneehigh white socks and like fabric conditioned, school uniforms.


My mother knitted my brown socks. We lived on dhal and rice and stew. Everything was composted. She didn't believe in heating, so being a child around my parents wasn't the most cozy experience. We lived in this massive house that we couldn't really afford, so we only heated half of it. And the other half was just absolutely, I like, icy basically.


And my dad would run over pheasants and then pluck them at the kitchen table. They were like hippies in many ways.


Ben: Does that make the book? 'cause I guess that's not the year, but that's the background.


Salima: Yeah, it does because it also explains how. Why I am me and what, what creates the contradictions within me.


Like I am more material minded. Partly because of that, because there's a lot of discomfort


Ben: Yeah.


Salima: In childhood. As I like glamor.


Ben: Yeah. We often go the other way, don't we?


Salima: Yeah. So I like the aesthetic is really important to me, I think because my house was just full of books.


Ben: Yeah. Still filling your teenage hole.


Salima: Yeah, exactly. Exactly.


Ben: And as in your creative process then, are you more of a procrastinator or do you get it all out? Are you a morning writer? Evening writer, 3:00 AM writer. Anything goes. And from your performing stuff, has that informed how your creative process works?


Do you have things or rituals you go to? What? What is your writing process?


Salima: I have no writing process. I, and I think that is informed from being an actor. So I'm really aware that like sometimes you're just not in the mood and sometimes it's just impossible. But you've gotta get, I don't know, 2000 words done by the end of the day.


So maybe we start at midnight or maybe I'll write it in the morning or maybe I like it, so I try to be quite instinctual about it. And obviously I've got three kids. I'm so busy with my family, home life, so I'm not, like I'm not a single white man who can just go to my office. And write for.


I don't… that's nothing to do with being white. 



Ben:  But sometimes I was thinking about this famous sculptor, about a hundred years ago. Giacometti was really famous, but he had essentially two women running after him. So he could do sculpture 12 hours a day.


They would literally feed him and make everything, everything goes, and it can work fine and no. Consensus genius art, but the enablement to have that genius art done to dedicate yourself to art is a strain on everything else around your life. Yeah. And that is really interesting how many artists are like that.


I wouldn't like to say it all because it isn't always like that, but it is interesting when you look at those that there is a cost to all of that.


Salima: And also I'm not willing to sacrifice family life for that. So I could be more boundaried and say to the kids, when you come home from school, mommy's in her office.


I don't know. I have Carl's office. Don't disturb me until 5:00 PM or whatever. But I don't, I just, that for me just doesn't feel right. And I've always wished, like even when I wrote a novel that didn't get published, but they got me a literary agent. When I was writing that, the kids were tiny, so I would just write, I'd write it even in the car at pickup, I would just have my laptop.


I'd get there half an hour early and I'd just do an extra half an hour of cafe bits and pieces like that, so I think also. There's a romance that people attach to writers, to actors, to artists, but I think we need to really get rid of that romance because I think it's quite damaging for a lot of people.


Ben: It's really rare. There's some who have that in them, like Giacometti, but it is really rare.


Salima: I was gonna say, let's say you're a trust fund baby, and you've. You don't have to think about money or anything like that, then of course, great. And then you can go and writers retreats and you can write your novel halfway up, a mountain on a beach, Bali, whatever.


But the reality is 99% of people that I know who are doing anything creative are, if not struggling, are very aware of finances, right? Because increasingly. These kinds of lines of work don't pay huge amounts. And you have to


Ben: fit it in with the rest of your life,


Salima: fit it in. And also if you want other elements of your life, do you want a long term partner?


Do you want children? Maybe not, but if you do want those other things, you also take up time and energy. Yeah. And some days, your 16-year-old comes home, she says, pulls up from her boyfriend. You can't just disappear. And go back to, you've gotta just sit on her bed with her for that.


That's the end of your day. There's no way around that.


Ben: What's the best advice you have that you've subsequently just ignored?


Salima: The best advice I've had, but then I've then ignored why is it the best advice?


Ben: It doesn't need to be best, but there's some, like I'm I'm always ignoring this whole, oh, you've got a show, not tell.





Salima: oh, I see.


Ben: Let's just ignore that, or I don't know. It could just be advice. Yeah. It might be more funnier because it's like classic advice and then actually it's not reality.


Salima: So I think you make a good point about the routine thing. In that, I would say, let's just blast out to smithereens, because you're never gonna start, if you are a normal-ish person, that's just never you.


There's never gonna be the perfect moment and the perfect space to do it. Yeah. But often people write their first novel whilst they're in the office, and then they get, eventually get a book deal, and then they realize maybe they can write full-time or whatever, and that's like the lottery winning writer, so yeah.


Ben: I ignore sometimes the thousand words a day thing in the sense that sometimes I just do one sentence and that's you know what? That's a win. I've managed to even get a sentence like, I was just sitting on the loo and I thought of one sentence. Yes, I'll take that, that


Salima: I've just noticed something down.


Or I just know I noted down something about or what's it called that the Japanese way of repairing things with gold.


Ben: Yes. [Kintsugi]... Something


Salima: like that. Exactly. I just noted something about it the other day and I was like, okay, yeah. And then I will write more on that, but I haven't …


Ben: One day….


Salima: I've just added it to my manuscript and I might expand on it or I might not, who knows?


Maybe that just that thought in a week's time could end up taking you somewhere interesting. So I think that's it. Like not waiting for the perfect. Moment to start anything and also remembering as well, much like we remember as actors, right? Or directors that like when you're in the rehearsal space or when you're in your early drafts, just get something down or just do something.


Just play with some words. Pick up the script that's already written or write your own thing and it can be absolute gobbledy gook, but then that gobbledy go will become something. 



Ben:. Do you have any rituals or quirky rituals or even quirky rituals? Just generally. I still remember, so this is the coconut oil.


Again, it was coconut oil with green socks. Like I don't remember why I remember the green socks, but there was a for skin moisturizing. But do you do anything? 


Salima: These are socks your wife actually sent me. They're very cozy pink socks I live in. I still have to convince myself that I'm not working. I still have to trick… Do you remember when I was revising finals and things like, I was very much like never in the library. Like handles buy cookies, like incense has been in my bed. Like I still write often in my bed under a duvet on the sofa. I've always made it very nice.


So I'm like, oh, I'm just opening my laptop and Oh, I just happen to be writing. Yeah. It would be disastrous going to a library every day.


Ben: Then it feels like work.


Salima: I had to kid myself.


Ben: I remember advising, spending a lot of time just sleeping.


Salima: But you got that kind of super brain for those kinds of things you didn't need, you didn't need to do what the rest of us needed to do…



Ben: Let's do, I dunno if you played this little game, we'll just do, it's, we do overrated or underrated. So I give you a thing and you say whether you think this is overrated or underrated or maybe even correctly rated. And you can just say, you can just say why or not. Okay. Champagne overrated or underrated?


Salima: I think you know what I'm going to say. Underrated, but vintage champagne overrated.


Ben: Okay. And that's 'cause vintage champagne just doesn't taste very good


Salima: Exactly as you found out.


Ben: Okay. Alright. Dressing up. Overrated or underrated?


Salima: Underrated. Always feel better when you're dressing up. You can never be overdressed.


Ben: Never overdressed. Very good. Being tall, is this overrated or underrated?


Salima: Overrated. There's no need.


Ben: Yeah. What is With all these tall people


Salima: There's no need.


Ben: Your head on the doors


Salima: There's heels, there are step ladders. Many ways to get around things.


Ben: Hustling, hustle, culture.


Salima: Underrated, underrated.


Ben: We've all gotta be doing something. Side jobs.


Salima: Yeah. Always. Even if it's just to keep you awake, like even if you don't really need to just, I think it's like you are really great at that, right? If you think about what you cram into your life. You managed to hold down this very serious job.


I don't really understand what you do. And you do things like this. You are always doing creative side projects and things that you always have done right?


Ben: Yeah. So hustling is also underrated. Okay.


Salima: Yeah.


Ben: Social media


Salima: quick aside, do you think that's partly being second gen immigrants?


Ben: They might be attached to it. I think there's also a little, for me, it's a little bit. Money, although a lot of these things aren't money, but it's like you're doing things, then your opportunity might happen. Yeah. You're not doing anything. Opportunity won't happen particularly creatively where


Salima: yeah,


Ben: It doesn't, and then a little bit actually was not quite death, but Nadia dying and my dad dying.


But the little bit, just knowing, if you want to get on and do things, you should need to do it because you don't know. What's, you dunno what's gonna happen. Yeah. And then a little bit I think is the immigrant thing, but I think that just, you just get that from your parents so it,


Salima: Yeah.


Ben: It doesn't necessarily have to be that, but obviously if you think about why people tend to immigrate or tend to leave their home country, there will tend to be a bit of hustle. Because if you were very comfortable where you were in your home place, then usually you don't wanna move. Because it's comfortable.


So why are you moving? So I think there is like a little bit of that and I guess I'm probably, I get bored a bit as well. Yeah. And then it's what do you do with boredom? Am I sometimes being bored for a tiny bit and then it would be like, you gotta do something.


Salima: Yeah, I agree. I think that's heavily linked to the immigrant experience though. Like your mom and my mom, neither of them are still people.


Ben: Yeah, they're not, that's true.


Salima: No. So both of us have grown up with mothers who were like, busyness is a necessary part of existence.


Ben: Yes. I think that's true, although it is hard to know whether that's just our sort of mothers, but then you get them from immigrant mothers, don't you?


Okay. Last couple on overrated, underrated social media. Overrated or underrated?


Salima: I would say neither. Okay. Because I love it and I hate it.


Ben: So it's correctly rated or it's like it's both.


Salima: Both. It's both. Yeah. Yeah. I'm confused by social media. I've met some great friends over social media and actually it helped me get my publishing deal because of that moth talk that I did.


It went viral and then the publishers were very interested in my pitch, I think partly because of that. So it has really helped benefited me. But I'm not immune to comparisons and forgetting. Like you were saying about my bad patient writing and how people write about having realized certain things on social media when they become unwell or something.


Ben: Yeah.


Salima: So often it's just curated.


Ben: We're not immune to the algorithm and the things. I think that's all true. I do think that we do sometimes underrate other communities that it can bring, I see this in autistic communities and other special interest communities and 'cause they're not loud, right?


Yeah. Groups of communities which are interested in street food or buses or landscape or geocaching. And I think so. If you've just got a geocaching Instagram, that's all you are seeing, you don't actually complain about it much 'cause it's doing your thing so it's not noisy. So I do think there are actually, quite a lot of those quiet communities there probably are overshadowed by all of the other noisy stuff, but there are interesting things happening.


So it is, it's a complex one, which just reflects humanity, right?


Salima: Yeah, exactly. Although I love seeing your newest foodie things.


Ben: Yeah. I'm going into food again, yeah, I'm just really interested about food com and particularly London. I think London is underrated for food and if you want to eat cheaply you can, but you generally have to go out of zone one and you have to go for slightly more interesting food.


Okay. Last one, because it's been our recurring theme. Coconut oil. Is this now underrated or overrated?


Salima: Underrated. I still absolutely adore coconut oil. Still good. I cook with it. I eat, make chocolate from it. I moisturize my sculpt with it once a week. I use it as a body moisturizer. I pretend to my kids.


It's a medicine. I'm still pretty obsessed with coconut oil.


Ben: Okay. So it is a magic ingredient. All great. It's,


Salima: Yeah.


Ben: Okay. And so in terms of current projects, you have two books on the go, the Substack, you do your own podcast. Yeah. Anything else you wanna mention in terms of current and future projects?


Salima: Yeah, so I've recently agreed with my acting agent, I'm gonna start auditioning again actually. So although I took a break from acting, with all the health issues, yeah, I've just thought, I'm just, this is the year of saying yes. So I'm just gonna go for everything and see and see what happens.


And also my energy is very up and down. I've still got a few more weeks of treatment, so I'm just trying to say yes to whatever I can and what, yeah, what works. If I have to not be able to do it because I'm still not feeling a hundred percent fine, but yes is 2026 for me.


Ben: What do you think, if you look back on this year, last year, are you gonna look back and find anything funny about this or oh, that was a thing, or you're still too much in the middle of it?


Salima: I sat because Carl, as his sense of humor is incredibly dark, already laughing at lots of it.


Listen, only three and a half weeks ago, I was dragging the drain from my wound along the corridor of an NHS ward to try and get someone to change the dressing. And Cole was just appalled, but I just knew that was the only way to make things happen. So we were laughing about that last night.


So I do think a sense of humor is absolutely vital for life, even more so than I even thought. Like I found, I've had some of the funniest moments. Over the last six to nine months, in really in situations that appear very dark. Yeah. And gruesome. I had some very funny moments.


Ben: Yeah. You either laugh or you crack.


Salima: Yeah. And also, look, I think the funniest things about life tend to be on that kind of precipice, right? Is it horrendous and are you going to sob or is it very funny? Like those. That they're the highest stakes, aren't they? So actually they can be the funniest things about life because actually most of life is pretty ridiculous considering we'll both be forgotten in a couple generations time.


Ben: Yeah.


Salima: We all think we are, these kinds of our egos as humans generally are pretty inflated considering what kind of little dots we actually are.


Ben: Yeah. Who's remembered from a hundred years ago? Like virtually nobody. Yeah. Famous people then. Great. Last couple of questions then. What do you think you've got anything to tell someone who's in the middle of a thing, which they're trying to do?


Find it hard to fix or maybe that they can't fix. And maybe we can broaden this out as also, do you have any thoughts to people who wanna be creative? Or I guess you've got lots of bits to talk about, like being a bad patient or building a dad and estrangement, but is there anything you'd like to offer as thoughts?


Salima: Yeah. I'd like to say plot. I think it's really important. Okay, so let's say you have a burning ambition to write a novel, for example, like lots of people do, they'd love to write a novel. They just dunno where to start. So start with the tiniest thing. So start with like a hundred words a day, like 50 words a day, like whatever, like on your bus route home.


Write 50 words. 50 times, seven times four. Oh God, I don't know. But that's up, that's 1400 words a month. So and that's with barely any effort whatsoever. So these little micro habits I think are really very vital. And like you were saying, you've just written one sentence that day, great.


So I think plot is a, is actually a word that can be used. In a way that we don't normally use. Like the mechanics of creating something are just like habits. It reminds me of how when you were in your twenties, you had on your computer these screensavers. Do you remember?


Ben: Yeah.


These are my, like lifetime goals.


Salima: Yeah. Yeah. Do you remember? Because I really remember that. I won't say what they were, but I do remember what they were.


Ben: I've hit a few of them. On


Salima: done. Yeah. Yeah. I think anything like that appeals to you. We've gone peak, manifesting peak, manifesting boards and all of that, but there's lots of different versions of that.


It doesn't have to be pretty. Collage that you put on your wall. It can be a screensaver or it can just be like some, like random notes that you make to yourself. So starting small I think is one massive thing. Start


Ben: small and plod.


Salima: Plod. And lastly, there's no. I need some help.


'cause I think these things are rarely created in a vacuum. So for example, years ago I did a favor and favor, those courses? Just an online writing course. 'cause my kids were tiny so I couldn't do the one that was like in their offices. And I just did a mini six week course of that.


And that got me, I think that was like how to write the first three chapters of a novel. And I think I wrote a few chapters from that. So whether you have a friend who is a writer or an actor or or you can find a mentor, I think that's really key to, rather than just taking yourself off and doing it.


And it also holds you accountable. Somebody who's gonna check in. It doesn't have to be something expensive. There's lots of versions of this, I think the collective, the community is really important when you're doing something creative.


Ben: That sounds excellent. So just start, plod keep going.


Find a mentor.


Salima: Yeah, exactly. And whatever that person is,


Ben: Excellent. Anything else you'd like to say?


Salima: I want to thank you for being my friend for so many years.


Ben: Let's hope it's gonna be we're, we could go for another 30 that should be within…..


Salima: Come on.


Ben: Yeah.


We'll be approaching 80 then…


Salima: I'm just living to a hundred remember


Ben: Yeah. Okay.

Salima: So I can, we can do another, we can do another 30 to 40. Yeah. I think, 'cause look. On a serious point, it is rare that you find people who then know you in that way. I can use a shorthand with you. We can pick up when we haven't spoken for a long time, and I can speak to you very directly and in a shorthand that I can't with very many people.

Ben: That's true. Cherish your long term friendships. On that note, Salima, thank you.

 Salima: Thank you so much.

In Podcast, Life, Arts, Writing, Theatre Tags Salima Saxton, Ben Yeoh Chats, cancer recovery, NHS, patient experience, estrangement, memoir, writing process, creativity, dark humour

Clearing the Air: Hannah Ritchie on Climate Honesty, Hope, and the Future

October 26, 2025 Ben Yeoh

Hannah Ritchie, one of the most lucid and data-driven voices in climate and sustainability, returns to the podcast to discuss her new book Clearing the Air: 50 Questions and Answers about Climate.

Together, Ben and Hannah explore how honesty builds trust in climate science, why the 1.5 °C target is probably out of reach (and why that’s not the end of hope), and China’s complex role as both the world’s largest emitter and clean-tech powerhouse.

They dig into how abundance, not austerity, could define the next phase of climate progress; how to handle renewable energy variability and mineral demand; and why “net zero” may need a more realistic framing. Hannah also shares personal reflections — what she’d say to her 16-year-old self, how she balances optimism with realism, her daily running routine by the Scottish coast, and advice for those hoping to make an impact in sustainability.

The conversation closes with a look at smart philanthropy, innovative climate projects, and the creative habits that keep her hopeful, curious, and effective.

Expect an hour of evidence, insight, and grounded optimism — a conversation about how to think clearly, act practically, and stay inspired in a warming world.

🎧 Listen now on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or on YouTube.

What We Explore

Honesty & the 1.5 °C target

  • Most scientists quietly accept 1.5 °C is out of reach. Pretending otherwise risks trust when “nothing magical” happens the day we cross it.

  • Better framing: climate risk increases gradually; every tenth of a degree still matters.

China’s climate paradox

  • China burns coal but leads the world in renewables, batteries, and EVs (over half of new car sales are electric).

  • Coal capacity ≠ coal use: many plants run fewer hours.

  • When China peaks, the world peaks—and that moment may be close.

Population and the “should I have kids?” question

  • Fertility changes now barely affect mid-century emissions; per-capita emissions must be near-zero by then anyway.

  • Humans create solutions as well as problems—population fear is misplaced.

Abundance > Degrowth

  • People want prosperity and clean air, not enforced austerity.

  • Electrification flips efficiency: combustion wastes ~80% of fuel; electrics convert ~80% to useful work.

  • More energy services with less energy use—a politics of optimism.

Can we transition fast enough?

  • Not for 1.5 °C, but likely for ~2 °C.

  • Unlike past transitions from one fuel to another, this is a move from commodities to technologies, which scale exponentially.

Intermittency & minerals — the pragmatic view

  • Short gaps in renewables handled by batteries; longer ones by mixed low-carbon sources, grid links, and storage.

  • Most nations can hit ~80% clean power; multiple paths exist for the last 20%.

  • Mineral scarcity fears are overstated: exploration, efficiency, and substitution will keep supplies stable—and clean energy extraction is orders of magnitude smaller than today’s fossil mining.

Rethinking “Net Zero”

  • “Net zero” has been politicised and sounds implausible to many.

  • A realistic goal: 85–90% cuts by 2050, then solve the remaining 10%. Honest ambition still changes the trajectory.

AI’s energy footprint (and upside)

  • Chatbot energy use is trivial compared with daily habits (like eating a steak).

  • AI could speed up climate solutions—from better weather modelling to new materials and drug discovery.

Philanthropy that moves the needle

  • High-ROI causes: global health and direct cash transfers, which show dramatic real-world results.

  • Ben adds: fund long-term health studies, decision-making research, and “venture philanthropy” that backs thousands of risky ideas—most will fail, but the outliers can transform the world.

Summary contents, transcript, and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Watch the video above or on YouTube.

Contents chapters

00:33 Why honesty matters in climate communication
03:51 China’s role in climate progress
09:34 Population growth and climate impact
13:38 The concept of abundance in sustainability
21:15 Hope and optimism for the future
26:50 Can we transition fast enough?
35:17 Decarbonising electricity and transport
41:03 Cement and other climate challenges
45:28 Rethinking “net zero” goals
49:09 Individual action vs systemic change
52:26 AI’s role in sustainability
55:48 Personal insights and creative habits
58:20 Philanthropy and high-impact giving
1:11:50 Current projects and career advice

Transcript (helped by AI so errors possible)


Ben: Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be welcoming. Back to the podcast, Hannah Richie. Hannah is one of the most thoughtful, smartest, and lucid writers on climate and sustainability matters. She has a new book out clearing the Air, which looks at 50 questions and answers around climate. It's available in the UK now and in the US from March, 2026.

The book, just like her last one, is Excellent. Hannah, welcome. 

Hannah: Thanks very much. That was a very lovely intro. 

Ben: You are most welcome. How important is honesty? I ask because one and a half degrees, which I'm not sure is properly understood as a point target, but in any event, one and a half degrees when I speak to a lot of scientists seems to be off the table, but a lot of them seem to be really reluctant to be publicly talking about it.

And there's a question of sort of white lies and things like that. And the first question you tackled in your book is whether we are too late and what does it mean to be a three degree, four degree, five degree, six degree world. But I'm almost interested in also how important you think honesty is among scientists when communicating and what do you think about our communication around the one and a half degree target?

Hannah: Yeah, I think that, I mean, I. I would obviously say, I think honesty is, is, is very crucial here. I think that, um, I think especially when it comes to scientific communication, trust in science, especially when you're talking about issues like climate change, where there are the risks of climate change, but on the solution side, you know.

That requires large investments, that acquire, requires large policy changes that requires large, uh, behavioral changes from individuals. And there is a sense that you people need to be able to trust in the science and, and what is being told to them if they are to back the solutions and policies that are needed for us to actually tackle climate change.

And I think when it comes to the one and a half degree target, I think you're right that if you actually ask most climate scientists, is this in any way plausible that we manage to stay below one and a half degrees? The vast majority would say no. Right? The reality is it's too late for us to reduce emissions quickly enough to stay below one and a half degrees.

And from my perspective, I think we should be honest about that and I think we should be honest about that for several reasons. I think one is that the way that often that the one and a half degree target has been framed is that I think now many people in the public having their heads once we pass one point.

Five degrees, you know, there's this cliff that we're gonna fall off, right? And something really dramatic is gonna happen 'cause they see it as this kind of threshold that we should never, ever pass. And the reality is, I think from a public trust perspective, the reality is that we've all passed one and a half degrees and nothing dramatic is going to happen, right?

Climate risk will gradually rise as we increase in temperatures, but nothing huge is gonna happen exactly as we pass one and a half degrees. So you're gonna have the situation where the public who starts to believe, um, that, that, that something dramatic is gonna happen, um, is living in a 1.52 degrees C world.

And they're looking around and they're thinking, we were told this is gonna kind of be the end of the world. And it's not. And I think that there is that risk that they start to lose trust and credibility in science, which is so crucial. If we, again, if we were to get people to, to actually act on this.

Ben: Agreed. I think that seems really sensible. And, and I think without honesty, 'cause we get enough about people not trusting experts or not trusting politicians. So the more you damage that, the, the harder it gets in the book. You answer 50 questions, but I was wondering, is there a favorite question you like to be asked or is there a question you always want to be asked but no one does?

Hannah: I'm not sure about the latter one. I think the, the one that I think is most interesting when people ask it, because there's so many tangential questions and, and and discussion points that come off of it is what about China? Right? So, uh, often it is a very, very common in countries like the UK actually there are two questions in the book that are linked.

In the UK for example, what's often brought up is that, you know, the UK is now only 1% of the world's CO2 emissions. What we do doesn't matter. Why should we really do anything at all? And the follow up to that is. Yeah, that's because China is emitting so much and it's purely on China to, to, to reduce and tackle this.

And, and those two questions are very much linked. And I think the question of what's happening in China is so rich in detail and, and tangential discussions that I think it's, it's, it's always a, a good one to get asked. I think we can, we can go into more detail here, but I think the, there's just an interesting paradox of China where, um, the reality is it is by far the world's largest emitter.

Um, it does burn a lot of coal. It does still build new coal plants. So on the one side, it looks like this kind of climate villain, if you want to frame it that way. But on the other side. You could argue that it's one of the countries or the country that's actually taking clean energy deployment and decarbonization, uh, the most seriously.

So domestically, the rate by which it's deploying solar, wind, electric cars. So last year more than half of new cars sold in China were electric. You know, that's way ahead of many countries in Europe, way, way ahead of the us. So it's, it is moving really quickly domestically, but is also really seeing the energy transition and clean energy as this kind of, uh, I guess new economic transformation for, for its economy.

So they're, they're really leaning to the manufacturing of the minerals. We'll need the solar panels, the batteries, to also export to other parts of the world. So there's this very, very interesting dynamic in China where it's this paradox where, uh, on the one hand it looks like a climate villain, but in the other maybe looks a bit like a climate savior.

Ben: We might as well touch on China as you've raised it up. I, I think that's a really interesting framework and they do seem to be committed. They have targets and they're doing things. My two kind of little interesting factoids is, although they are building new coal, they have stopped funding, uh, new coal outside of China.

So they used to be one of the largest funders of that. And that's, uh, gone away and actually regular, uh, finances don't really wanna finance that all, so that's disappearing. And then I was just looking up, I think in the first six months of this year, so 2025, they built over 200 gigawatts of, um, clean power.

And that's more or less, I think if you translate to that's 200 million households. So it's kind of a small country that, that they've powered. And it's about the same amount that the US wants to build in the next five years. Um. On the other hand that is actually just enough to offset the growth in energy that they need.

So they're doing it, but it's only just, uh, it's just bending, which is this, uh, push and take that you have with China. But I do think, the question I always ask myself is, at the end of the day, do we really think that China's gonna be part of the problem or part of the solution? And I think in the round you are tilting it to being part of the solution and you need to try and nudge it even further along that path.

Hannah: I think there are a couple of like interesting points again to elaborate on China. So yes, China's building new coal plants. What's interesting and people under appreciate is that coal plants. Are running less often. Right. So the reality is I actually don't, just don't care how many coal plants China builds.

I just care how much coal it burns. Um, and the reality is that even though it's building new coal plants, those are running less often. So you can have the scenario where it still is adding new coal capacity, but actually it's burning less coal and nicotine less CO2. And as you said, part of the challenge here is that.

China's electricity demand is growing so rapidly, even though it's building huge amounts of clean power as just about making up that entire growth. Um, so over the last few years there's been this kind of, it's always kind of just been on the edge where solar and wind deployment are just about enough to cover electricity demand, but not quite.

So that's why coal has increased still. But as you see in the last year, in particular, in the last six months, um, actually that has outpaced electricity demand. So there are estimates that that China's CO2 emissions have actually fallen from, from power in the first six months of this year. Um, and, and I think, I think in terms of a, a really key, I think, I think often it's useful to have a kind of pivotal.

You know, point, milestone, point at some point. And I think that will be, you know, global, a global peak in CO2 emissions where we can say, this is peaked, let's now get emissions down. And what's absolutely crucial to that is China's emissions peaking, right? Basically when China peaks, the world will peak, right?

Um, and it's very hard to predict peaks, but I think people are now starting to get a little bit cautiously excited that we could be on the brink of this, this peak in, in, in emissions. 

Ben: Yes. So part of my job is forecasting, and I would say that within five to 10 years, my probability of peak is very high.

Maybe not one, two, and I can't name you the exact year, but if you say five to 10, uh, it, it does very much look like, uh, we are gonna peak and, and potentially, uh, sooner. Um, I was trying very hard in the book to find a question that I'm asked a little bit, uh, which you don't address, and it was really hard.

So those both 50 are really good. But one, which doesn't appear in the book, maybe it's slightly sociopolitical in some regard is about whether our decision to have children should be influenced by our thinking on climate. And I think to some extent this is actually mostly an accounting quirk or static models that people don't quite understand.

But I also have a kind of pragmatic technologist answer. That's what I call it, about how that humans are the ones which will need to create the systems and technological change. So we really shouldn't be, uh, worried about that. Um, but I was wondering what do you think of this question and human flourishing and, and whether it should, uh, whether decision to have families or not should be influenced by any of our thinking on climate?

Hannah: Yeah, so I think there are often two reasons that people bring up if they are concerned about having children, uh, as a result of climate change. And one is like an input and one is an output. So one of the key concerns is that by bringing another human into the world, they will increase environmental pressure.

They will use energy, they will. Uh, consume fossil fuels and they will just increase amount of CO2 emissions and, and the, and the challenge with climate, um, and, and this often leads to the notion that, you know, actually the root of the problem here is population growth. And if we could dramatically reduce population growth and that would lead to individual decisions to have fewer children, then we would be on a much, much better path going forward than where we are.

And I think the reality is, when you break down the numbers on this, any demographic changes we make today will have almost no impact on emissions and global temperatures going into the future. And the reason for that is if you change fertility rates today, there is often. Quite a significant lag before that actually has a meaningful impact on total population numbers.

Right. Um, and and the reality there is that by the time we've reached a stage where it has a significant impact on population numbers, emissions will be extremely low, or emissions per person will be extremely low, right? So let's say we change fertility patterns. Fertility patterns today, it takes by 2050, for example, or 2060 for that to have a meaningful impact on the total size of the global population.

And the reality is that by 2050 or 2060, um, emissions per person should be extremely low, if not close to zero. Right? And if we're not there, then we will have failed quite badly on our decarbonization. So at the point by which. Population could have any meaningful impact on emissions. Uh, total emissions and per capita emissions should actually be very, very low.

So, and, and the, and, and I actually covered this on a post on my substack looking at, uh, there was an interesting paper that came out trying to model this and, and I think the, the, the end result was that, you know, a change in many billions of people in total population, um, by the, by 21 hundreds would have a, I think it was 0.1%, oh, sorry, 0.1 degree, uh, change in global temperature.

And that was for, you know, having billions of people difference in the total population. So I think we're actually past the point by which. Uh, demographic changes are gonna have a, a meaningful impact. And that also goes in the opposite direction, right? I think there are projections that global population peak might not be that far away, right?

Mm-hmm. The timeline keeps coming forward and forward, and I think some people see that as a kind of, again, a kind of climate blessing that if, um, population peaks way earlier than we thought, then, you know, we'll be able to drive down emissions much more quickly. And again, I think that's not right. I think any other direction, I don't think at this stage population is gonna have a huge impact on, on emissions.

Ben: Yes. And it's a really interesting observation that our consensus models for that comes in and in and in. And I think I also point that to one of the issues, or, or just one of the challenges, the fact that we are, we are using models and models aren't necessarily the world, and you've gotta take a lot of these things into account.

But I'm, I'm very much with you on, on the population front. On, on the flip side of that, in the last year, one of the most talked about ideas, I guess particularly coming out from the US but is going around globally, is this idea around abundance. So, Ezra Klein, Derek Thompson have been talking about it, but it's been floating around for a little bit.

Um, they kind of really talk about the abundance of everything really. But for sustainability, in particularly in particular, they talk about the abundance of clean and green energy and electrification. What do you think about the ideas of abundance? And I guess on the one hand some critics would say, uh, this is too, uh, techno optimist.

Um, that would be one sort of criticism. On the other hand, people might point out to say, well, actually this is a way that you can kind of raise everyone and get a kind of consensus coalition for the things that we need to do. 

Hannah:  I think there's a, a question of whether I think that's a positive and something we should aim for.

And then there's a political angle of, um, you know, is that the type of, I guess, messaging and narrative and goal that is most politically salient if we want to tackle environmental problems and climate change. And I think my answer to both is, yes, we are. I think if you are to. Look at the political situation today in terms of how people think about climate change, how leaders talk about climate change, um, how people, what people's concerns are about the climate solutions.

And I come to I go through many of them in the book. I think the reality is that for a lot of people, the sense that in order to tackle environmental problems, what we need to do is, um, cut back. We need to reduce our standards of living. We need to go back to a way of living that we had in the past.

'cause that's when we were sustainable and now we're unsustainable. I think the reality is that to most people, that's just not that appealing, right? I think the reality for most people is they want to live a good life. They want cheap energy, and you generally get cheap stuff when you have abundant stuff, right?

That the, those tend to go, go hand in hand. And, and they are, uh, looking for credible alternatives to many of the technologies and stuff that they. They use today rather than just saying, let's just cut that out completely. Um, and I think the way you do get there is by emphasizing the, not just the climate benefits of this transition, but importantly the economic, the lifestyle, um, uh, and, and, and knock on benefits that that, that this transition has.

And I think the reality, I think when you're often talking about, you know, energy, I think what a lot of people miss is how much we can increase energy services to people while also reducing energy use. At the same time, I think people conflate these two, and I think that's a mistake to conflate these two.

So I think the reality is when you blow up what the global energy system looks like, most of it is just wasted energy, right? And that's wasted in two ways, right? When we burn stuff. We just chuck away a load of energy away, right? So when you burn coal, only a third of it actually gets converted into electricity.

For gas, it's maybe half, right? So you have huge losses in that part of the system, but then you have huge losses and basically in using fuels rather than electricity, right? So for your petrol car, 80% of the petrol you put in your car. Is actually what we'd say is wasted, right? Because it's actually not delivering energy services.

Only 20% is delivering the energy services, which is moving you from A to B, right? With electrification, you get rid of huge amounts of those energy losses. So for an electric car, it's basically the inverse where 80% is going from moving you to A to B, and only 20% is wasted. So when you blow it, when you blow this up and then look at the models for the the energy transition, what you realize is that we could get rid of huge amounts of that energy at the top of the chain, which is not doing anything for us or proving our lives in any way.

And you could keep the energy services the same or actually increase the energy services while still reducing that bit at at the top. So I think that's one one key thing to get across is that, you know, trying to provide more abundant energy services does not necessarily mean you need to use more energy.

You can actually use less energy and get more output. 

Ben: Exactly. Um, and this touches on, I mean, we spoke about this in our last podcast, so we won't rehash it. So if anyone can go this about that, um, this is one of the, uh, critical things you pick up in kind of degrowth ideas that actually by focusing too much on that you miss all of these things.

And I, I would assume you still have the same, uh, critiques around, uh, the ideas that they had, that you had last year into this year. 

Hannah: Yeah, I mean, I think it's actually just got stronger based on the political situation where I think there is. May, I don't, I actually don't think this is necessarily reflected in public opinion, but at least in kind of political rhetoric.

Um, I think there, there, over the last year or so, there has been a shift to what, less away from climate change to either not talking about it whatsoever or talking about climate action in a more negative framing. Right. And I think that's true of many countries. It's obviously true of the us you even see it in the UK and many other countries in Europe.

And I think the, the notion that, you know, the way we should try to progress and push climate action more is therefore to say, well, we should just shrink the economy or, uh, um, even just reduce energy consumption. Like even if you just put that message, we should just reduce and do less, um, in order to tackle climate change.

I think there's just politically, it's just a non-starter, even more so than, than when we discussed this last time, uh, last year. 

Ben: Yes, I would've probably said, uh, a few years ago, I was 99% sure of that. Uh, position for forecast is really never like saying 0% or a hundred percent, but it even in increased.

And the thing which switched me was actually, uh, the pandemic because essentially we did have a version of Degrowth during that time and everyone found it really awful. So, uh, I just don't think, well, and emissions  just dropped (only) five or 7% or something?

Ben: Some something tiny, right? not of the scale required.

Hannah: I mean, I think one, when there's been discussions on Degrowth previously, I think, um, there's a criticism that, uh, actually not what de growers are not advocating for is reduction in GDP or necessarily like economic growth. Uh, it's aimed at particular sectors and in particular reducing energy, right? So shrinking energy and resource consumption.

And I think my response to that is that, you know. Trying to be, I guess, pragmatic about it. The, the easiest way or the, what I see as the most effective way, if you want to actually just reduce energy, again, that energy at the top of the chain is just to promote decarbonization and electrification. To me, that seems a much more effective route to reducing energy use than to tell people that they should cut back on energy use.

I think the last one, you might get marginal gains from that. I don't think they're gonna be dramatic or across whole populations, just decarbonizing and electrifying, uh, gets you much, much further, and, and to me just seems much more politically feasible. 

Ben: Yeah. Much, much better tool. Exactly. Um, okay, so before we tackle, um, a handful of questions from the book where I ask some people about which are the ones that, that come up, um, I thought we could do a, a kind of past and future, um, exercise slightly.

Um, although I guess this one's also a little bit answering the climate anxiety question, but if you could speak to your 16-year-old self, um, I guess the Hannah who loved, uh, science but was worried about the planet's future, uh, seemed to really love water. Um, what would you say to her now about hope via finding your voice, what to do about climate anxiety?

Hannah: Um, I think I'd tell her first, I would tell her to, I guess go wait and look at some of the trends in. Human's ability to solve other problems. Like I think the, my, one of my issues at the time, I was very concerned about the environment, environmental, uh, change and I think quite rightly, um, but the issues that I conflated that also with human development challenges.

So the environment stuff was getting worse, but also all of the human development challenges were getting way worse. And we were kind of living in the worst times on almost any dimension. And the reality is, if you look at the data, especially on human development measures like health, child mortality, poverty, hunger, et cetera, over long time scales, you know, we've, we've made huge amounts of progress on that, right?

So humans are capable of solving problems when we put our minds and, and resources behind it. So that's one, one thing. And I think on the kind of emotional side, I think I would try to get across that a balance of. Concern and hope is good and fine. Um, I think often we are told to push in either just one or the other direction or that's the way, at least the way it's framed.

So now I'm relatively optimistic and you could call me hopeful in some sense. Um, but I think people then conflate that as me being unconcerned in some way or not taking the problem seriously. And I think the reality is you can actually, being hopeful and optimistic about our ability to solve challenges has a prerequisite that you have to believe in the challenge in the first place, right?

You have to acknowledge there's a problem or an issue or to solve, but then also, uh, have some sense of optimism and hope that there are things that we can do to tackle it. And I think at the time I was only in the, the fear anxiety, uh, there's no way we can get out of this box. And I would try to, to instill that, that bit of optimism, that there are things that we can do.

Ben: And let's take Hopeful Hannah and put her into the future. And now hopeful Hannah is maybe 70 or 80 years old in that is likely to be 90, uh, 90 to a hundred years with the kind of life expectancy cohorts that we're looking at now. Uh, what do you think Future Hannah, future Hopeful Hannah, say write, write back in a postcard to us today?

Hannah: Oh, that's a very good question. That's one of those kind of end of history illusion questions, right? Where, when maybe not quite, I think people assume that they're, they're growth trajectory is finished and I'll be the same when I'm 90 as I am now, and that's obviously wrong.

I would, I can tell you what I'd hope we would write. Yeah. I hope what I would write back to my. Current self is, is, is trying to instill how much awe and wonder is to come. Um, I think, I think a lot of people, if you ask them now, have very much lost any sense of, I guess, excitement about the future that lies ahead, right?

Like it's either things are gonna go backwards and we're gonna regress, or we're just gonna kind of trundle along and muddle through. And it seems like there's very little to be excited about over the, in the coming decades. And I, and I don't believe that to be true. I think there's lots that we can be excited about, whether it's technological change in energy, whether it's innovations in health, which we just discussed off the podcast, uh, prior to this.

I think there are huge amounts that we. I, I would like us to be excited about and hope that we make huge amounts of progress on. So I guess when I'm 90, I hope that we write back to ourselves and I write back to my current self and say, you were right to be excited, but actually you should have been more excited.

'cause what's happened in the next, uh, 50 years has just been absolutely incredible. 

Ben: Yeah. That's a, that's a really good, um, a really good way of thinking about it. I was thinking about this question as well, and, um, I have a similar, similar view. I, I guess I do a little bit unfortunately about thinking about risks and opportunities this life to too much.

And a lot of people worry about what I would call these left ha risks, so something really bad happening. Mm-hmm. Which is possible, but quite small. But I don't think they think enough about the equal and opposite. Well, I think equal and opposite and potentially bigger and larger, I'm gonna call them Right.

Tail risks. And my example for this is actually in, in both AI and obesity, whereas if you went back 20 years ago. You ask people about the state of where we're probably talking about peak obesity and you describe what some of these AI things are doing today, they would've said, well, that's kind of fantasy and actually we have it today.

And that's actually even 10 years ago you would've said this. So when you, when you go forward, you're gonna have all of these positive surprises that we don't know. Yes, you are gonna have probably some negative ones as well. Um, but like you say, the awe and wonder of some of those positive ones, um, at least hopeful, Ben, uh, is very much hoping that I'd be writing back to talk about that.

So I was gonna ask, um, from some of the questions, um, which comes up in the book. So I sort of took a small sample and said, oh, what are the questions, uh, which you are, you are kind of asking, and one which came up, which was essentially, can we transition fast enough? So what's your thoughts on that? Um, I guess you answer it in the book, but I dunno if it's been updated and, and what would you say to that question?

Hannah: Yeah. So I think, um, it's maybe worth thinking about what enough means, right? Like everyone, like it's a very subjective term and everyone will have their own definition of what enough means for some people. Um, actually the answer to that is just no, because enough for them was steam below one and a half degrees, and we're obviously not doing that fast enough to, to achieve that.

So I think that it's, it's a somewhat subjective question. I guess my, part of my opinion on it is, you know, could, can we potentially transition quickly enough probably for around two degrees, right? So for me now, two degrees is the kind of. Ambitious, but potentially achievable target. And that's kind of what my enough is kind of measured against.

And I think the, the, the, the, the framing in the background here is that, you know, we do need to undergo these huge, or actually several huge energy transitions, well that's moving away from fossil fuels and electricity, but also the kind of electric electrification transition in industrial transition. So a huge range of different transitions.

Um, and the framing here and argument put forward is always that, uh, historically, if you look at the long run data, you know. Well, some argue that there's actually never been an energy transition. 'cause any fuel or energy source that we've used in the past, someone in the world today is still using it, right?

So, uh, we've not even passed, uh, the transition away from wood because some people in the world, that's their main source of energy is wood, right? So that's the first argument. But the second argument is that even if you do look at, um, uh, energy transitions in different regions, you know, it takes 70 years to transition from coal to gas, or it takes, uh, another 50 years to transition from, um, gas to oil.

So these tend to take, you know, half a century or more in the relative. We don't have that amount of time. And I think the, like even there is, if you look at the speed of the rollout of. Clean tech today is much, much faster than the rollout of any of the, any of the fuels or technologies that came before it.

Um, so solar in particular is, is, is, is accelerating extremely quickly. Uh, wind is in second. Nuclear is now not growing very slowly, but it did in the, uh, kind of sixties and seventies. It was growing extremely quickly, and then you got coal and gas, which were rolled out much more, more slowly. I think the key point there is that we, as part of these transitions, what we are doing is we're transitioning from.

Our energy source being commodities. So coal and gas or oil is stuff you dig out the ground that has some sense of fixed economics behind it. It has some sense of fixed, um, speed behind it, and we're transitioning to basically. Uh, from commodities to technologies and technologies follow learning curves, they can follow much more exponential rates, um, of growth, both in terms of drops in prices, but also the speed by which you can can roll these out.

They're much more modular, right? So you can deploy them much more quickly in many different places rather than waiting for this, you know, one coal plant or one nuclear plant in a given location. So I think we, I don't think it's appropriate to necessarily use the models of transitions in the past to therefore say, because it took 70 years, um, to transition from one fossil fuel to another.

That means it's gonna take another 70 years to go from fossil fuels to, to clean tech. I don't think that's an appropriate, uh, extrapolation to make. 

Ben: Yeah, I think that's really clear. And I think you also make the point that, you know, again, depending on what you think is, is enough, it's still that every point, 1.2 counts over, over that, you know?

Yeah. It lowers your risk. Uh, and for all of those type of things, there was, there was also a set of questions in the book, which essentially, um, was around resources and, um, sort of, um, the technical capacity of, of things. Um, I'll put them together. And so one was what happens when the wind doesn't blow? Is there even enough land for the wind turbines?

And what happens if we run out of, uh, resources like minerals or things to build the wind? Is, isn't that a huge, um, challenge for us? 

Hannah: Yeah. So the, the first one that comes up is, well, it's fantastic to move to solar and wind, but like sometimes it's night and sometimes the wind doesn't blow. And what you're gonna do when that happens and.

I think what's key to get across here is the different options we have at different timescales, right? So we actually have now very good technology, IE batteries, just standard lithium ion batteries, um, to basically store energy and dispatch it over the timeframe of maybe errors, right? And the reality is actually when you look at models across the world, many countries, especially those closer to the equator, can actually get extremely far if you just do a pairing of solar, wind, and batteries.

And there's much less variability across the year. And also there's a, there's relatively abundance on such that, uh, that combination can get you extremely far right. That is much trickier in a country like the UK for example, where we have less abundance on, and we do have quite abundant wind resources, but we have what's called.

The Duncan float, um, which is basically these much longer timescales where, uh, the amount of wind produced can be extremely low, right? So there you could be talking about days to weeks with very little wind. And the question is, what do you do to fill in the gap there? And there are a range of different options for this longer term, um, kind of intermittency or variability problem.

One is just to fill in the gap with other low carbon technologies, right? You can fill the gap with nuclear or geothermal, um, biomass that has mixed reactions, but there are other low carbon fuels by which you could fill that, that gap and build in more diverse electricity mix. Um, there is the, the opportunity for long range transmission, right?

So, uh, even if it's not windy or sunny where you are. There is somewhere else where it is windy and sunny, right? So, um, there is this possibility, especially across the US like large countries, you know, even, uh, domestically can, uh, dramatically increase internal transmission and, and trade of electricity.

But even across Europe, like I think there's lots of scope for Europe to do a much better job of managing this load across the entire country rather than every single country building an energy system purely for themselves. There you, in that scenario, you massively overbuild, right? So you build, if the UK was to, or any country was to only build energy supplies to power itself and it couldn't trade with anyone else, you would build more wind and more solar and other, uh, resources than you actually need, right?

So that's one option. There are other forms of heat storage. Um, uh, um. So thermal storage, for example. Um, there's storage in bricks. There's lots of different longer term storage options. And then there's options like hydrogen, um, which is a relatively expensive option relative to batteries, for example.

But for these longer timeframes would be necessarily that you just cannot build enough batteries to cover this. So my, my, my main point is that there are a range of different options to manage this variability. And I think the reality is, again, is that most countries can get pretty high rates of penetration, of renewables, 80% or more.

And then there's the question of how do you fill in the final 10% or 20%? And I think the, the, the not knowing exactly how we're gonna do that shouldn't stop us from getting to 80% now. And, and I have a lot of confidence that we will solve that final 10% or, or 20%, um, in the future. 

Ben: Yes. 80% extremely plausible.

And the last 10 or 20%, um, pretty likely. And you have also a sort of set of questions around the hard to abate sectors. So, uh, cement, I guess you could put aluminum fertilizer, maybe long distance flying. Um, you know, and what are we going to do about that? Isn't that too large a residual? And how much of a problem is that?

Hannah: I'm gonna come back to the, I'm gonna come back to the resource one 'cause I didn't properly 

Ben: Sure, yes. On the minerals, the resources. I guess that's also, yeah. Are we gonna run outta minerals? Well, we can do that either, either way. 

Hannah: Yeah. 'cause as a question I get a lot, like, are we gonna run out of minerals and, you know, aren't we just substituting one problem for another because we need to do huge amounts of mining for clean energy.

And I think on the first question, are we going to run out in the long term? Almost every, like long-term analyst says no. Right. So whether it's the i a or the Bloomberg or like a range of, of, of, of analytic organizations that say basically, no. And there are a couple of reasons for this. One, we can model basically how much of these different minerals we're going to need under a range of different decarbonization scenarios.

And for some, it's already very clear that if you look at how much we have and how much we'll need. We have enough, right? For, for, for many of these minerals. And then there are, there are a couple of other things that play into that dynamic, which makes me, uh, not that concerned that in the long term we're gonna run out.

And one is that, uh, we are extremely good at finding new stuff when we are motivated to find new stuff. Right. And this has been part of our, I guess our, our, um, you could call it our course or our benefit of fossil fuels, where we just continue to find more of them. So every time there were lots of projections about peak oil and then we just found more oil.

And I think that's the case for many different minerals, whether it's lithium or cobalt or any of of them, I think we will. Continue to find new resources. Um, there's another dimension to this is that we get more efficient at using these resources for these technologies, right? So a solar panel today does not contain the same amount of silver or silicon that it did 10 years ago.

It uses much, much less. So we become much more efficient. It uses these materials and then if you look through history, when there have been, I guess, resource constraints, we've been actually very effective at substituting one for another. Right. So you, you could see some plausible scenario where cobalt constraint, uh, resources are very constrained for batteries, but that obviously will result in a price increase in that.

And then there's the motivation to switch to alternatives and naturally have an alternative in its, uh, it's either cobalt free, uh, chemistry of lithium ion batteries, so nickel, uh, nickel, uh, or, uh, sodium ion batteries, which is another potential solution. So we are, we're very good actually being quite innovative in shifting to alternatives when, when supplies are constrained.

And then finally there's a question of, you know, won't this put huge amounts of pressure on mining and, and environmental pressures? And I think the reality there is that. Yes, we will need to mine quite a lot of new, uh, minerals for these technologies. But when you compare it to the energy system we have today where we're extracting and burning fossil fuels, uh, we will need far, far, far less minerals, uh, for the energy transition.

So to give some perspective on this, the amount of minerals we'll need across the entire energy transition over decades is something like hundreds of millions of tons in total. Right? Compare that to the fact that we extract 15 billion tons of fossil fuels every single year, and we'll continue to do that every single year, if not more, if we continue with a fossil fuel based system.

So, you know, we're actually talking about orders of magnitude less mounting by transitioning to clean energy than sticking with the, the status quo. 

Ben: Yeah, that makes, that makes a lot of sense. Um, and so that's actually probably quite a good segue into the, into the hard to abate sectors as well. 

Hannah: What was, sorry, what was the specific question?

Well, so 

Ben: I guess the set of questions is, oh, what are we gonna do about the heart to bait sectors like cement, aluminum, fertilizer and the like. Um, you know, we can't seem to do anything about it. Is it going to be too large of a, of a problem? Um, and I guess adjacent to that is like, all feel really uncomfortable about carbon sequestration.

We don't have this technology coming out and you, you have a kind of cluster of questions around, um, the, the ones you get around hard to abate sectors. 

Hannah: Yeah. So I think, um, I think. When people think about hard to abate, they're often thinking impossible to abate, right? So they're often thinking there's just absolutely no way that we're gonna be able to tackle cement or steal or aviation.

And I think increasingly, especially in the last decade, I think it's moved from being a possible impossible to abate, to actually being like quite hard to abate, or I should frame it expensive to abate, right? Often there is some technical solution there. And actually the block is that it's, it's expensive and, and people won't pay for it.

Um, maybe I can take an example of where, um, I think the solution space has moved. I should make clear there. When you look at the solutions we'll need, there are some that we can do today. We are, we're already doing today at scale, we're doing it rapidly and it's very cost effective. So the decarbonization of electricity, uh.

Electrifying roads, transport, uh, they are solutions that, you know, we know they work and they're becoming increasingly, uh, competitive and they are being deployed at scale. These hard to abate sectors are, are much earlier in the kind of technology readiness level where they're often, uh, have some smaller investment, but it's still in the kind of piloting type stage or innovation type stage.

But if I take the example of cement, right, so the challenge you have with cement, um, is twofold. One, you use, um, coal, uh, energy in the actual manufacturing process. But actually the, the, the, the key challenge there is that in order to make cement, what you do is you take limestone. So calcium carbonate, you basically heat it up, uh, to extremely high temperatures and you get calcium oxide.

And the calcium oxide is basically the stuff you put in cement. But if you have fallen the chemistry, you know. Also at the end of that chain, you get carbon dioxide directly, right? Um, and the reality is there's no way that you can convert limestone to cement without producing the CO2 directly from the process, right?

So the question is how do you get rid of that? And I think the fallback solution often in the past was carbon capture and storage. So what we'll do is we'll just stick a big thing on the end of the plant that will capture the CO2 and we'll like store it underground, the, that works. And we could probably feasibly do that.

Just the reality is that it makes cement more expensive, right? If you add carbon capture storage on the end of anything, it automatically makes it more expensive. So that's been the, the challenge there. But there are like very interesting solutions coming through, which take a different approach entirely.

And um, one of those is basically saying we. Rather than starting with limestone, what we'll do is we'll start with calcium silicate. Um, and calcium silicate comes from basalt, which is an extremely abundant rock or on earthborn. No chance that we're ever gonna run out of that in any way. So we have huge amounts of this, and rather than using coal, we'll basically use this electrolysis process and that way you can convert that calcium silicate into cement without the byproduct of of, of CO2.

Um, and I actually think this is probably the cement solution. That I'm, I now, I now get very excited about cement, which I, I didn't have on my play card a decade ago. Um, but this is probably a solution that I'm most excited about because it takes a different approach entirely. Um, gets rid of the CO2 from both parts of that, right?

You're no longer using fossil fuels to process the energy, and you don't have this, uh, CO2 emitted directly. And to me that looks far more credible to get it to a cost competitive level than it does by using carbon capture and storage. And when you look across the different sectors, other hard to abate sectors.

We are kind of in a similar-ish position where, again, we haven't deployed any of these at scale yet, but there are, um, quite promising solutions coming through a range of different companies working on, you know, different I guess solutions. And it is, for some of them, it's hard to pick a winner at the moment.

Um, but I have quite a lot of confidence that, you know, within the next. A decade or two decades, um, we'll get there and, and, and these solutions will start to scale. And of course people will say, well, that's far too late. You know, we can't wait 10 years to get this. And I think the reality is that we should, or, or, or at least I think we might need to just wait 10 years or so.

And I think that's fine. I think if we make huge amounts of progress on the stuff that's easy to do today is cost effective and cheap to do today while building up these, these other technologies. The reality is that by 2050 or 2060, they'll be in the position where they're at scale and they're drastically reducing emissions.

Ben: That makes a lot of sense. And I like your phrase, hard to abate, but not impossible to abate. So that's a, that's a good one. Um, well that's great. I mean, we're not gonna have time, unfortunately, to go through all 50 questions, but that'd be great. 'cause then listeners can buy the book. Um, but it was interesting you mentioned that cement wasn't really on your bingo card a few years ago and, and now it is.

I would be interested in say, over the last year or two, um, whether you've changed your mind about anything in the sustainability space, either something that you've got, oh, I guess it was a bit like cement. It's like, hmm, don't see anything on the horizon. Oh, now I do. Um, maybe one kind of hopeful, or you could also go one the other way where you just changed your mind and thought, oh, that looked like it was gonna work.

But maybe, maybe now it doesn't. But have you changed your mind about anything in the last year or two? 

Hannah: I think the main thing. Is actually less about a specific solution or technology and is more a more conceptual level of um, actually how we frame the climate change challenge or what amount of missions reduction we should be aiming for.

And I think previously I was, uh, very much in the kind of, what you might call it, the net zero crowd, where it's like, what we need to do is we need to get emissions to zero by 2050. Right. And I think the, I think I have swayed slightly away from that. Um, and I think the reason for that is, one, I think net zero is a concept has being quite weaponized in politics and I think it's maybe not a particularly useful term.

Anymore to try to convince people to take, um, climate action. But again, I think a lot of the challenge and the framing of what we need to do to tackle climate change is that when you focus on getting to absolute zero, I think for many people it becomes totally unbelievable that we would be able to do that.

Um, like I was having a conversation with someone about Net Zero. Well, not net Zero. I was, they asked what I did and I tried to explain, I struggled to explain what I did, but I kind of talk, yeah. I did stuff on climate and, and that brought up the conversation of like what they thought about climate. And, and they're not immersed in the space in any way.

They're just, again, a regular person that's mildly concerned about climate change, uh, and doesn't have a particularly strong opinion. But what they were saying about Net Zero is like they're not in favor of net zero because they don't know what we'll do about plastics. Right. But I think if you were to hear from that person, they're not in favor of net zero.

I think immediately in people's mind when they hear that phrase is they think, well, you know, they don't care about climate change, or they're not in favor of clean energy, or they're not in favor of, you know, electrifying transport or any of these solutions. And their answer is that was really not the case for this person.

They were in favor of all of the above, but the reason they weren't in favor of net zero is 'cause they didn't know what know what we would do about plastics, which is like 2% or something. Right? And I think this, this like narrow vision on how we get completely to zero, I think in some, in, in, in some sense, um, blocks people from engaging with the, the, the issue and is maybe a bit of a distraction from the stuff we can really have a go at and dramatically do to, to reduce emissions today.

You know, I think the reality is, um. Again, coming back to honesty, I don't think we'll be at net zero in 2050, but I think we can get to 85% reduction or 90% reduction even if we go quite quickly by by 2050. And you know, if there's five to 10% of emissions left that we're still struggling with and it takes us another decade or two to be able to solve those, I actually think that's fine.

You know, once we get emissions that low, the rate of warming will be so low that we won't be under the huge amounts of pressure we're under at the moment because we have really quite rapid warming because our emissions are the highest they've they've ever been. Like. I think once you get to those relatively low emissions levels, which is like.

The remaining 5% or so, you have more time to work out what you do about plastics or what you do about aviation, which is again, just a few percent of, of the world's emissions. So I think that's been a bit of a shift for me is, uh, being less narrowly focused on how do we completely get to zero and be like, how do, how do we get nine emissions 90% down and then we'll work out the rest.

Ben: Yeah. That would be significantly good. I mean, in, in reading your book, at least in the first part, I thought, I don't think this is a change in your view, but the, the clarity of how you wrote about the interplay between, um, personal change and the system change and how yes, we need the system and so you can do your personal things and they happen and you know, there signals to the system via our consumers and the votes and all of that, but not to essentially get hung up about it.

And I know I varied, sort of simplified that, but I thought the clarity of how you wrote about that, uh, this time round was, was particularly lucid. 

Hannah: I think, I mean, I, I frame it in this way and I think it's true that I think they're often two extremes when it comes to these discussions. Like on the one hand you have people that say, you know, this is all about individual behavior change.

And you know, as individuals, if we all do our bit. Then, you know, sum it all up and we all have fixed it. Uh, and I think that's just not realistic. That's not gonna happen. Um, and at the other end of the spectrum, there's this sense that this is purely a systemic problem. And actually, um, it's, it's basically just on fossil fuel companies and some governments to take action.

Um, and, and, and if they do that, then the problem is solved and they bear all the responsibility. And again, I think that extreme is also incorrect. Like I think that's a false dichotomy that is either an individual, uh, change issue or a systemic change issue. I think the reality is the role that governments, companies, investors, et cetera, play, um, is absolutely crucial.

But what they, I think what their role is, is to make sure that there are. Low carbon alternatives available, um, that they are affordable and cost effective for people to, to adopt. And that it's made, you know, easy for people to do that, right? The infrastructure's there, if infrastructure's needed, um, that the, the, um, the grid system is stable so people have, uh, stable clean energy supplies, et cetera.

Um, but the reality is, is that that's not gonna happen. And I don't think we can expect that they're gonna put in all of that effort. If as individuals we're completely unwilling to change, endure a bit like that, of course that's not gonna work. Right? We can't expect, the example I use is on transport, right?

We can't expect governments and companies to, you know, either invest heavily in public transport and make that available or make really good cheap electric cars available and build out a whole uh, charging network so people have access to it. They're not gonna do that and there's absolutely no point in them doing that.

If we are all stubborn and say, no, I would like to stick with my petrol car. And of course I'm not gonna take the bus or the train or move to an electric car. Like very clearly, if individuals are not willing to change, that system just doesn't work. So to me it's just a false dichotomy and both matter.

Ben: Sure. Yeah. That was very clearly expressed. Um. So 50 questions. Uh, fast forward to today. Is there a 51st question that, oh, you couldn't quite fit in, or you're now getting asked and you think like, oh, if I could do the next 50, the 51st one, this would be the one, uh, that I would answer for people. 

Hannah: Um, not an additional question, but I think the, there was a question in the book on ai, and I was very honest in the book that in the first draft of the book, there wasn't a question on AI and its energy impacts.

And the reason for that is that, especially when I wrote it, there was basically no data to go on. Right. And I felt like it would, like, there was. Nothing valuable at all that I could possibly add there. So it would just be a blank chapter or just a, a kind of nonsense chapter where I wasn't saying very much over the course of writing it.

I think some of the data solidified a bit so that I could say something about AI that I hope is reasonably useful in, in framing the issue. But I think, I think my, uh, perspective on that, uh, shifts much more quickly than it does for any of the other questions, just because ai, uh, and the discussions on that are moving much more quickly.

So I think I maybe would've written the AI question a bit more differently than I did. 

Ben: Yeah. And it, and it continues to change. And I think, I guess it depends on who, who you are asking things, but I think there's a little bit too much focus on AI risk, although I guess it comes in so many different forms.

'cause you've got existential privacy data, resource use and things like that. But certainly, and you've answered this in your substack, um, over time, the resource use is really, we shouldn't worry about it. And then on the flip side, I think this is the, is this the question you flipped to Bill Gates as well?

AI's gonna enable I think a lot of technology things. I was, I was looking at the climate models that Nvidia, um, are helping, there's been this, uh, Google's stuff on protein folding within health. I know that's not directly sustainability, but it was going on to do all of that. And that's really hard to predict as well 'cause it's more of an enabler.

But I, I do think that that could, um, that could really be impactful. 

Hannah: Yeah, I think the, I mean, we didn't, even at the time when I was writing the book, have very good estimates for like, everyone's interested in how much energy a chat GBT or Gemini or one of the chatbot queries uses, and we really didn't have very good data at all at that time.

We have imperfect but slightly better data now, and I think my, uh, view on that has, has even more solidified that, you know, especially for individual. AI chat bot use people vastly overestimate how much energy it's using in the environmental impact. You know, it's really, really very tiny. Like even if you are asking chat GBTA hundred questions a day, which most people don't, um, it's still a tiny, tiny fraction over your overall energy footprint and your overall carbon footprint.

And I think to many people, you know, uh, seeing the environmental impact of, uh, asking cha GBTA hundred questions seems incredulous, right? They would think that that's, you know, absolutely horrendous for the environment. Like why on earth would you, how could you possibly ever do that? I think the, the reality when you break down the, the numbers, especially for individual use, it's, it's extremely low.

Ben: Yes. I can't quite remember it, but something like eating a steak is 10 to a hundred times worse or something. Something like that. Yeah. I mean diets, yeah. Whether 

Hannah: it's water or carbon footprint diets or, yeah, like huge in comparison. 

Ben: Great. Um, maybe turning just to, uh, a couple of more, um, personal adjacent things then.

Are you still getting time to run by the coast? How do you deal with the Scottish weather? You know, is that still part of your routine in terms of writing and and running? And, uh, do you listen to, uh, books or music or, or things to inspire you? So are you still getting time to run and what else inspires you?

Hannah: Yeah, I still run basically every morning. Um, I find it very relaxing. Uh, partly very relaxing. At the same time I find I often half draft things in my head when I'm running. Like I, it helps me kind of clear my thoughts and like sometimes I start thinking about, oh, I'm gonna write this, or, so I think that's, it is like a very sacred time, time for me.

Uh, yeah, we're coming into the like, not so nice weather in Scotland and winter, which makes, I think it's actually the darkness that makes it worse, right? 'cause you're basically going out to run in the dark, which is not that fun. Um, uh, but it's fine. Uh, I do enjoy it and I'll continue doing it throughout winter, even if it's extremely icy.

I keep that up as a regular part of my routine. I'm not really an audio book listener. Um, I. And I hope you all listen to my audiobook, but I tend to find, I find podcasts much easier to engage with and listen to than audiobooks. I don't know, it's, I think it's the back and forward discussion keeps it more dynamic than just hearing someone read something.

I tend to find, I don't really take the information in when. When I'm listening to an audio book, so that's not really an option, but I do listen a lot and inspired a lot by, by podcasts. 

Ben: Great. Um, last time we had a mini discussion around, um, essentially kind of charitable giving and, and how to think about that.

Um, and you really influenced me. So, um, I, I have, um, already sort of from many years back tried to give sort of more and kind of aim for sort of 10%, um, post-tax of, of thinking about that. Um, but you made the point that actually giving to global development and healthcare, you know, could be seen as part of the solution and things.

And I had always felt a little bit bad that I'd, I actually, although I do some work within sustainability and, and think the sort that, that more my, uh, giving was weighted that way, that way and always felt a little bit bad that maybe I hadn't done that. So I went to re-look at that. And that made me feel quite good that a lot of the human development stuff that I'd, um, decided to support, um, was quite good.

Um, but I wonder, may, maybe we can frame it the other way around this time is, uh, maybe if we gave you, um, a billion dollars or maybe 10 billion, which actually in the grand scheme of things, it sounds like a lot of money. And it is a lot of money, but it isn't actually an astronomical amount of money. But if you had say, a billion or you, you could go up to 10 billion if you like.

Um, how would you think about directing, uh, that money today? 

Hannah: Oh, that's a good question. I mean, yeah, a billion. Or even 10 billion. Sounds like a lot. I, I think on the topic of giving, I mean the reality is what was the us uh, aid budget was something like maybe 60 billion or so. Uh, so like even putting that, and that's been like mostly cut this year.

So yeah, my 1 billion or 10 billion would, would still only be a small debt. Yes. In their moment to be lost. You only get 

Ben: to do a project or two. You don't get to save a country. So, yes. Yeah. 

Hannah: Um, that's interesting. I think I would. I think people would expect me to say I would invest it in solar panels or something.

I don't think I would do that. 'cause I don't think that's where the highest cost benefit for charitable giving here would be. And a lot of people 

Ben: are working on solar panels already. 

Hannah: Yeah. I think, uh, yeah, I think again, I mean in on clean energy, every year we invest and now it's over 2 trillion. So again, my 1 billion would be a tiny, tiny fraction of that.

I think again, I would either direct it towards, uh, very, um, high, high ROI health projects. Um, or I think one thing I've become, I guess a bit more. Enthusiastic or convinced by, in the last year or so has actually been just, um, give directly. So giving money rather than saying, you know, I'm gonna spend 1 billion on, uh, high, uh, value seeds or malaria bed nets or tuberculosis, uh, medications.

Actually what I'm gonna do is just give the money directly to people on extremely low incomes. And some of the results, especially in the last year, have been extremely positive. Like, I think what there was maybe a study in Kenya where actually, and I can't remember the amount that was given to particular households, but some, the, the, the drop in child mortality rate was like quite stunning from just giving people money directly.

Um, and the argument there of course is that, you know. People, people in particular situations know far better than you or I, what it is that they need to improve their living standards or, or, or what they need from, from a health perspective. So you should just give them the money and they will make very good decision on how best to, to use that.

So I think, um, I would actually like to see, I know I couldn't save a whole country with this even, uh, a small, low, low income one, but I think I would like to see more projects where actually quite significant amounts of money are given, um, in a particular region of a country or even a, a very small country to see, you know, overall if you just give people money directly, like what are the knock on impacts and are those impacts sustainable?

Um, and I think that you could start to see extremely positive results from that. 

Ben: Yeah, and I think I was just looking it up, I think give directly, uh, which GiveWell has, uh, looked at, does that, and, and they do seem to see quite high return on, on investments for that things. Yeah. It, it is interesting some people who, who think about this particularly in philanthropy, uh, you know, look at, um, you know, whether as something is underrated and also how tractable or not it is, those are the terms they use.

And when I've been thinking about it, I've actually get, I get less, um, I'm now less worried about so-called tractability. Like, so how feasible this is because I've now seen so many things, which I would've thought were. Infeasible now happen. And so now I slightly wait is if the people or the organization or whatever seem to have a really committed, passionate idea and it makes some sense and, and then it's still underrated as in it seems to be an underfunded, um, area that people aren't looking at.

Then actually that's maybe a, a plausible, you know, for people really thinking about how to give, uh, way for that. And they shouldn't worry too much about tractability because we are very bad at trying to assess probabilities of some of these, um, technologies and things. 

Hannah: Mm-hmm. Great. How would you wait, how would I'm gonna spend on you, how would you spend your.

10 billion, 

Ben: how would I spend my 10 billion? So, um, I do think, um, direct giving is quite good. I do think, um, um, a little bit more, uh, long run health interventions, so I'm still a little bit on, I guess people talk about this kind of the, the meta layer of things. But for instance, uh, I don't think we've got a lot of data on, um, you know, how people track over time.

So these are kind of longitudinal studies or there's actually all sorts of things. And the reason for this is that, um, normal companies can't make any money outta this. And governments, because it's a long range thing, can't, don't have anything to show for it, even actually in a four to 10 year cycle. So I do think there's a, there's a lot of more long run research that we could do about what's best for us over time and, and how, and how that's followed.

Um, so that's one. Um, and then a little bit also in, in, in. So that's particularly actually in health. 'cause I think there's some of these long run health interventions, which we've got some quite strong, feasible, um, hypotheses about. We just can't test them. 'cause no one wants to track this even for 10 years.

May maybe not a lifetime. And actually there's also a little couple more on how we do, um, organization. Uh, so this is a little bit odd, but I think it's really intriguing to me that for instance, um, boards, committees are how a lot of the world's decision making is done. And actually we know very little about how to make good decisions.

You know, why is it in the world of sustainability that a lot of the. Sort of technocratic experts, people deep in the weeds actually have quite a lot of consensus on what we should do. Um, but it can't transmit into actual, um, practical action. Um, and it's just not simple. You kind of think, oh, well why can't we do that?

And it that. That seems to me a layer to slightly unpick. So I'd probably do a little bit for that 'cause I don't think it's too expensive. And then this other area, which I think is a bit, um, underserved, I guess comes on this, this idea of, of venture philanthropy. So again, it's this slightly higher risk, normally smaller amounts of money for people who, I guess they come across as these kind of moonshots, um, slightly quirky ideas.

Uh, to borrow phraseology from venture capital vc, that's kind of like a pre-seed or seed. So kind of quite early. But actually when you look at the history of how really great ideas have come about, even even things like AI and things, um, it seems to be overweighted in people who, if you looked at it, you just thought, well, that's a crazy idea that we shouldn't back.

Uh, so if that was what we thought, then actually we, we should probably at the margin be backing maybe 10,000 more of those ideas with just. A million dollars say or right, or a hundred thousand. Because if, if only just one or two of those happens to be really transformational, then you, then you've made a really big ROI, even though actually 9,000 of them, uh, are, are gonna, are going to fail.

Uh, because I, again, I thought about this. People say, Ooh, we are investing in something high risk or government say, or we, we've done this in high risk. Uh, but actually, uh, a lot of them kind of succeed at the end and they have like this written report. So it shows to me that we're not really doing high risk.

'cause high risk would say like 9,000 should have a high failure 

Hannah: rate. 

Ben: Yeah, you should, you should see a high failure rate if you were really properly doing it. And for all, all sorts of other agency problems. I mean, I don't think government's ever gonna do that. It's like, oh, well we just spent your billion and nothing happened, which is the median scenario.

But you know, there's one thing did happen and it transformed our world. And I, and I feel we're a little bit. We're a little bit light on that. So those are my quirky ways of doing it. But my base layer probably still actually is health, uh, health interventions. 

Hannah: I mean the UK government, like quite strongly backs this area program you, you're familiar and that is kind of framed around this, like, we should be going for kind of moonshot big risk things.

I dunno what your perspective is on that. 

Ben: Yeah, so I'm, I'm, I'm really, um, positive on Aria. So they talk about things like moonshots and things and they have got a lot of these interesting technologies. Uh, you should. People listening, you should look it up. They've got these program management developers and there's, there's lots of live projects on, um, and it's relatively small amounts of money.

So this is it. There's only hundreds of millions. It's not even in, in, into the billions for very underlooked at um, areas. But they also see that small things, things which are really potentially quite transformational. So I'll just talk about one small thing 'cause it talks, uh, about a lot of sense. Uh, so this is a project which is the, this round is closing in October.

So if you're listening to it later, you're gonna miss out. But they call them innovator circles. And the idea was if you look at the history of innovation, you often had tight, tight knit circles of let's say 80 to 20 people who really, um, encouraged one another in kind of an honest way of saying, this is what we know, this is what we don't know, and this is what where we could potentially do better.

And they did really transformational work, actually, not just in technology. You saw this in humanities as well, so you see it in writing circles and why is it all of these philosophers seem to get together in these small circles? And so they thought, well, maybe there isn't, that doesn't need that much money, but maybe we should try and do that.

And they did a pilot project with, um, with a couple of circles and had really, really great outcomes. People said, we've really pushed our ambition. We've started more projects. It was really great that we had open honesty with what's in the field and what's working. And they're now gonna seed with, with not that much money.

People who want to do other innovator circles in, in technology and, and the like and funding that. And so that's exactly the kind of thing that isn't really getting funded. Anywhere else with this sort of idea, a very plausible, tractable idea, which is already kind of working. Um, and then they have that on, on very many fields.

So, um, yeah, I still really positive it kind of gets a bad press because you kind of think, oh, these are the moonshot ideas. They're spending money thinking about the philosophy of Jira engineering and solar shields. Is that really a good use of our, our money and, and that type of thing. And you do have to think about it and cost benefit, but it is only a small amount.

And if some of these things really hit, they could be very, uh, transformational. So yeah, I'm, I'm generally positive on Aria and the equivalent in the US is, is these DARPA or, or particularly arpa e around, um, energy. And, and I think even Bill Gates's thinking was slightly, um, influenced by thinking around how you, how you do it and how you fund, uh, innovation and, and breakthroughs, uh, for his breakthrough energy and the like.

Yeah, I 

Hannah: was gonna say there's breakthrough energy. I mean, his. I think I coming back to the like stuff we know how to do now and do very cheaply, like, I think my, my point there is that, um, that that's where most of the money at the moment should be going. But the reality is for these hard debate sectors and stuff that we were discussing earlier, um, for them to be ready in 2040 or 2050, right?

You need some amount of investment now and it is that early stage kind of seed investment that gets innovators going. So I actually think some of the kind of calciums, so look at cement solutions we're talking about, um. Was initially, uh, funded or backed by Breakthrough Energy, uh, kind of Bill Gates as kind of incubator for energy Solutions.

I think he does a lot of this focus on this kind of hard to abate stuff or stuff that, uh, uh, is, seems less tractable. You see what I'm saying? Yeah. Um, but does need some small amount of funding Now if you want it to be at all a reality in 2040 or 2050. But the the point is that you don't need to be investing trillions in it right now.

'cause there's actually nowhere for the trillions to go right now. It needs start. Yeah, exactly. 

Ben: It's probably just tens of millions or whatever. I'll tell you my two other left field intractable, not tractable ones, but the, the things in that is I do think. Long distance electric airplanes are more viable than people think.

Half the issue is, is regulatory. And, and yes, you're gonna have a heavy battery and, and fly it. Um, but I do think we could do more to speed up that. I definitely think short shorthaul is, is plausible in early 2030s. I think the regulator actually is gonna be the bottleneck, not the technology, but we need something for long distance.

And I would really love it if we could also get a, um, cellular steak, which isn't a steak. 'cause I think if you, I know they're doing it in chicken and other things, but I think if you crack a ribeye steak for people and they did not know that it was not a ribeye steak, uh, and I know you kind of think, well, well, beef consumption should be down on things.

It's just not gonna happen in America. So what you need to do is give them something, but they didn't know it was a ribeye steak. Uh, and then, and then you would be there. But there are some people working on the food issue. But I, I do think that that may be one area where someone could do it. 

Hannah: Agreed.

Ben: Great. Okay. So la last, well maybe last couple of questions. One would be, um, any other current projects that you're working on? Obviously busy, uh, with, um, book tour and speaking, and you have your substack and you have all of the great work that you do in, in world, in, in data. So you probably don't actually have time for much else, but it'd be interesting in, in, in other, other current projects.

And maybe you could also give some thoughts, um, to advice for people who might wanna work in sustainability or even life advice, uh, generally thinking around, uh, you know, what you would, uh, advise for listeners to think about. So current projects and any advice that you have. 

Hannah: I'm not sure that would come to me for life advice.

I'll try. Um, no, yeah, I, um, at the moment I'm like always working on a range of things. Um, like obviously the new book is just out, so a lot of my time is, is doing stuff on that. I keep getting asked, am I writing another book? Not, not yet. Like I. I hope I will write another book at some point. I do enjoy the writing process and really going through the process of writing a book really clarifies your thinking on a given topic and challenges it, right?

Like once I. I think that's the case with writing in general, not just writing a book, which also comes through again, I think in my, my substack and stuff when I sit down to kind of take on a question on my substack, I think the process of going through and trying to explain it to someone on paper really clarifies or challenges what you're thinking.

Like I think it's very easy in your head to think, yeah, I understand that, and then. You go to write it down and you realize you don't understand it. So I think, uh, I find that process in general quite rewarding. So I hope at some point I'll write another book, but I, I haven't started yet. Um, I'm, yeah, I have the Substack, which I kind of do in my free time.

Again, it's. I find it fun. I find I learn a lot of stuff and clarify my thinking, doing that. I also have a, a podcast, um, where we solving for climate, where we talk to a range of people like innovators, entrepreneurs, people in policy, um, academics about different parts of the climate challenge and, and, and what they're working on, uh, and what we can do to solve it.

Like the emphasis is not on just talking about climate change, it's solving for climate. So we try to focus on the solution lens of the problem. And then my, my full-time job is at our own data and they are, uh, I work on like a very, very broad range of stuff like. Still quite a lot of climate and environment stuff, but lots on health and foreign aid, um, and, uh, demographics, like very broad.

And I really enjoy that process of being able to explore and engage with a range of, of different topics and, and, and, and work on interests outside of climate and environment. And I think on top of that, I have very little time to do much else. Um, but yeah, I like the having a diversity of things. I think in terms of like advice, I think, um, I think it's.

I think it's easy to then index on your own experience 'cause that's all you can really draw from in a real way. But I, I think based on my own experience, I think one thing that's been really key in a kind of professional level, or like finding my place in the world where I feel like I can have some impact has really been, um, finding that combination of different skills that in some way carve out a niche for yourself or make yourself a little bit unique.

Um, and that kind of niche for me has been this mix of the kind of environmental, scientific background. Um. Enjoying writing. I think the enjoyment of writing is, is a, is a key part of it, but also being okay at writing, um, and, and explaining things to a general audience. And then the kind of data science, data visualization dimension of that.

And often people working in the space will have like one of those, right? So like of there are obviously many, many goods environmental scientists and, and people, um, working on the science. There are often extremely good and beautiful writers and there are people that are fantastic at in depth data analysis or, uh, making beautiful data visualizations.

But what's quite, uh, rare is like trying to somehow combine all those free into a particular kind of career trajectory. And that's kind of where I think I've landed. I don't know if it's been deliberate. I don't actually don't think it's been deliberate. And I think that's another key part of my advice there is that like if I look back.

On my kind of trajectory. I think at no point was it really obvious what the next step would be. I think what's been really key has been, uh, it's often talked about as like trying to, um, increase your surface area of opportunity. Um, where, and a big part of that I think is actually putting yourself out there.

I think a big part of that is, uh, working in public or writing in public or building a public portfolio so people can see your work, they can judge your work, they can engage with your work. And I think, you know, if you do that and, and do that quite well, uh, stuff tends to come at you. And then you have often have like some, uh, capacity to be able to pick what you want to do.

Like that's not for me, but this is for me. And I think that's the kind of bumpy road I've been on in my. Career so far, but it's been enjoyable and I think, um, um, I hope that it's made some impact, I guess. 

Ben: Yeah, that sounds great. Uh, try and find out what you like. Don't be shy to share your work in public.

You might find, uh, some good things happen. 

Hannah: Yeah, exactly. I think another way of framing it is like, this is often talked about in kind of impact circles or kinda effective, effective altruism, uh, circles, but like trying to find a particular area where you have a very clear, like comparative advantage, right?

So like try to find an area where if you weren't doing that particular role, would someone else be doing it? Right. And I think there's a lot of kind of traditional careers where you can be fantastic in that role, but there are loads of other equally fantastic people doing that. Um, kinda, uh, um, kind of standard role and I guess this comes back to like finding a particular niche.

Often if there's no one, if you don't fill that particular niche, there's no one else that will film that instead. So I think that's another way of, of framing it. 

Ben: Yeah, for sure. And you can combine them, at least this is talking from my experience in the sense that, uh, I dunno, many other people who are an investor do podcasting and right place for theater and suddenly each one of those things are not necessarily super unique, but when you put them all together, uh, you turn out to be an an odd shaped thing.

Hannah: I didn't know you did plays for theater! 

Ben: So on that note, Hannah, thank you very much. 

Hannah: Thank you very much Ben. Really enjoy our chats.



In Podcast, Life, Science, Writing Tags Hannah Ritchie, Clearing the Air, Climate Change, Climate Science, Climate Honesty, Climate Optimism, Sustainability, Net Zero, Abundance vs Degrowth, China Energy Transition, Renewable Energy, Clean Tech, Decarbonisation, Our World in Data, Science Communication, Environmental Policy, Global Emissions, Climate Solutions, Philanthropy, AI and Climate, Hope and Climate, Ben Yeoh Chats, Podcast, Interview

Samuel Hughes: Architecture, Beauty, and the Future of Cities | Podcast

August 20, 2025 Ben Yeoh

Samuel Hughes is an editor at Works in Progress and an expert on architecture, urbanism, and planning.

“We treat age as the value, but often what people are really protecting is beauty—they just don’t want to admit that’s what matters most.”

We discuss the feasibility of mass-producing beautiful buildings through good materials and proportions, the decline of ornamented architecture, and why maintaining industrial skills matters for long-term infrastructure projects.

The conversation explores Japanese zoning and urbanism, the impact of culture and geography on city design, Berlin’s mix of rent control and street grids, and the idea of “gentle density.”

“Most individual buildings in Tokyo are pretty ugly, but the overall streetscape is often nicer than in Britain or America—urban form matters more than facades.”

Samuel also shares his views on greenbelt reform, the importance of mixed-use urban density, and how civic and institutional pride once shaped even the most mundane buildings.

“In the 19th century even pumping stations and hospitals were built to be attractive—today our institutions too often forget that civic pride shows in the architecture.”

We touch on underrated cities like Dresden and examine future solutions for Britain’s housing supply crisis.

“The real breakthrough will come when communities see that allowing development makes them richer—turning adversarial planning into a win-win.”

Finally, Samuel reflects on how policy research can meaningfully shape public infrastructure and urban planning.

Summary contents, transcript, and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Watch the video above or on YouTube.

Contents
01:02 Mass Producing Beautiful Buildings
01:43 The Decline of Ornament in Architecture
04:37 Tokyo’s Urban Design and Zoning
10:05 How Long Should Buildings Last? UK vs Japan
16:13 Philosophy, Beauty, and Emotions
25:53 Public Policy Trade-offs in Practice
31:41 Berlin: Rent Control and Urban Planning
36:32 Housing in Europe: A Historical Context
38:02 Modern Housing Markets and Trends
41:50 Rethinking the Greenbelt
44:40 Planning Authorities and Their Role
50:40 Overrated and Underrated Urban Ideas
1:02:03 Dresden: Lessons in Urban Reconstruction
1:05:03 The Future of Britain’s Housing Supply
1:08:40 Career Advice on Policy and Design

Transcript (AI assisted so mistakes possible)

Ben: Hey everyone. I'm excited to be speaking to Samuel Hughes. Samuel is an editor at Works in Progress and has been involved with the Think Tank Center for Policy Studies and the Create Streets movement. He has worked in a number of roles around architecture, urbanism, and planning, and he posts prolifically on social media channels highlighting architecture and design.

Samuel, welcome. 

In the UK or even globally. Can we still mass produce and build beautiful buildings?

Samuel: Yes we can. I mean, a beautiful building, like in a way it's not that difficult to build. You can do it with good materials, good proportions a bit of greenery, good urban form, that, that has never become that difficult.


There's some stuff, so I think I. One of the ways that people traditionally made buildings beautiful through the use of applied ornament of various kinds, that has become a bit tougher. Not because it's impossible to mass produce ornament. It's extremely easy to mass produce ornament. And we used to do it all the time, but because the mass production has stopped.


So I was talking to, um, some guys in Germany about this recently. They used to cover their buildings in, um, ornamented plaster, this automated plaster stucco work. And that was extremely cheap in the 19th century. The figure I've been told don't quite how reliable this is, but the figure I've been told is that it would add 15% to the sales value of a building and cost only 2% of the build cost.


So it was totally ubiquitous. But today, because they've stopped doing that for a hundred years and all the factories have closed and all the production chains have broken down, it's pretty expensive. It actually, actually does require expensive handicrafts today. Oddly there's been, for this particular good, there's been a technological regression over the last century as mass production has declined and handcrafts are now the only way you can do it.


So for that for that pathway to beauty, it's probably harder to mass produce it now and the costs have gone up. But that's, and that, that's an easy way of making beautiful things. That's a way in which, like, cheap job builders in the 19th century mass produce beautiful stuff without thinking about it too much.


But it's not the only way to make beautiful stuff. And you could find lots of like clever designers today who make beautiful buildings without use of applied ornament.


Ben: It's really interesting that we have, this is one of the arguments for industrial strategy or keeping industrial processes that in and itself might not be adding as much value.


But once you lose the workforce or the skills. It can be quite hard to gain back. And then you lose all of these other second order effects that they sort of say the same in in long term construction projects and in infrastructure. There is a, there's a technical level of skill which is useful to keep in the workforce even if they may not be as productive.


Samuel: Yeah, I had never thought of that connection, but that is, I mean, yeah, that's correct. That's true. Yeah. It's, um, and there are a few cases, so like there's one factory, maybe there's two factor, two small factories that still do cast stone ornament. So it's basically a kind of crush stone. You mix it with a little bit of, of, uh, cement and it looks remarkably similar to stone is much cheaper than this kind of card stone.


And I think there was one of those factories survived through the 20th century doing basically garden ornaments because people never completely stopped buying like little statues of nymphs or whatever to put in their gardens. And now, now that classical architecture has revived a bit in, in Britain.


They're mass producing quite a lot of, they, they do work for like the, um, the little towns that the king has patronized, poundbury, and sedan. But they survived through the drought years making little garden statue statues. That wasn't an industrial strategy, but it is an example where like the survival of something in a special way then meant that like a little body of skills and infrastructure was still in place, ready to be scaled up when demand for the, uh, for the primary good returned.


Ben: Yeah.


Samuel: Yeah. Very interesting.


Ben: I think you have once lived and researched in Tokyo or in Japan. What did you learn about Japanese zoning or Japanese building and, and culture and planning, either firsthand or, I know also there's been some work, uh, come through works in progress on thinking about Japanese design.


Samuel: Well, there's a lot to say. I mean, it's an amazing Japanese cities are. Basically like the type, they've got lots of problems, they've got lots of flaws there. But overall, they are basically like the Titanic success story of the 20th century cities with amazing infrastructure and with mixing of use and with, in their funny way, like high quality public space and the flourishing street life and all the rest.


But what can I say about, I think you will notice when you are in Japan, here's one starting point. Most built individual buildings in Tokyo or any, any Japanese city except Kyoto, are pretty ugly. Like they're actually worse than the average building in a, in Britain or in the United States.


But the overall effect they have, like the overall environment of walking down your average Tokyo Street is generally a lot nicer than the. Characteristic the average street in Britain or North America because of the urban density, the way the streetscape is defined, the quality of public space, the lack of car domination the, and the sort of richness and interest of urban life in Japan.


And so it does, it is the great example in favor of, this, the idea that urban form is more important than facades. I'm famous for thinking facades are quite important. I may, I really annoy people by going on, but, but like the example of Tokyo shows that although I, you know, yes, for sales matter, yes, Japanese cities probably would be nicer if they were prettier, but like you, they have basically created wonderful flourishing places out of lots and lots of ugly buildings.


And that's an interesting thing that we should bear in mind in terms of the institutions that created it. They have fairly, they do have a zoning system and have had one since 1920s, I think pretty early on that they introduced one. But it's a fairly liberal zoning system, so they tend to allow a greater range of uses and a greater level of density.


Tokyo is famous for, it doesn't really, doesn't provide on street parking off street parking. People are allowed to provide it for themselves, but because land is so expensive, they generally don't, which is why car ownership is so low in, um, in Japan. When Tokyo and rural Japan, of course, everyone has cars transit, um, and amazingly good rail systems.


They've done this thing. I'm working on this at the moment, the, um. The system that we did with the Elizabeth Lion, with Thas link, where you take these old Victorian railway lines that run to the edge of the city center and then stop. Because in the 19th century, they didn't have the technology to tunnel them under.


And then you join them together and create an integrated metro system by basically mostly you're just reusing your old, like decrepit, Victorian suburban railways. But by linking them together, you make them more interconnected. You increase the frequency and capacity. Tokyo's done this to, I think, 35 suburban railways, so they've got the equivalent of, it depends exactly on how you count them, but something like 15 or 20 crossrails that they've, and this is part of the great secret of like why Tokyo's rail system is this extra, like the best in the world, this extraordinary monument.


So yeah, I mean, I could say there are many more things I could say about, about Japan, but like, it's a very fascinating example of how. Cities can be made to work, at least given the starting point that they had.


Ben: Yes. I, I think a lot of city design of things, policy and the like, uh, influencer obviously, but a lot of it seems to me culturally and geographic specific, like Japan has come that way through a series of events which you are essentially not really gonna replicate in a lot of other countries.


Yeah, and I agree. So walking around Tokyo and, and some other places I would agree that actually the facades in Tokyo are not. People would prefer a lot of the facades in London, but you're true, there's somehow urban design and a repetition of this. And in some ways it harks to the fact that the, you know, in this country, the Georgian box house or even the Victorian box house was a pretty box and they just replicated, I think you, uh, I picked up a tweet that you said or something, which, and I replicated maybe half a million or a million times.


That's right. And lo and behold, it actually you get a kind of more interesting facade. But for them, we would've called it at the time a kind of cookie cutter approach to that. And that's kind of interesting. But in Japan, I also fascinated by, they don't necessarily think that their buildings are gonna last a hundred or 200 years, even though a bunch of them have.


And part of that is thinking about earthquakes or wood and, and part of that cultural cultural aspect. And then this interlink with transport because the rail is brilliant, but it also interlinks with a very dense bus network as well when you go around Tokyo, which then allows you to have. No cars and these very cute, walkable community neighborhoods, of which there's a bazillion because Tokyo is actually, uh, amazingly large around that.


So it's the kind of interlinked policy with all of that. But I wonder about this idea about how long you think a building's going to last. 'cause also some of our new buildings here, because of really the technology we now embed in some new buildings, they maybe not thought of trying to last 500 years and 200 years even, of which obviously some of them.


So I dunno what you think about the length of lasting of your building and how we should think about that. And both Japan as an example of where they haven't necessarily thought about it being a, a really long time, although some of them do. And where we are in the uk a thing


Samuel: that I have often thought is we, so a thing I pointed out about, I often point out about Georgian architecture is.


It's relatively placeless. And it's mass reproduced. And it's boxy. So these three things that people always say about contemporary British house building, oh, they're like boxes that could be anywhere and they've been churned out, by this company. Those were all, those things were all totally true, maybe even more true of these extremely celebrated buildings in the 18th and 19th centuries where, you know, basically there's like one facade reproduced 500,000 times all over England.


And most, yeah, if, you know, if you really know the stuff, the details, like building regulations meant you've got slightly different buildings in Bristol to Liverpool to London, but they're very similar as similar over a long period of time and over, over space and then the like. So people there, I think they are landing on oh, it could be anywhere, or, oh, it's too boxy.


Or, oh, it's. Been mass produced and they're struggling to find what they really don't like about these buildings. And they've landed on those things, but those probably don't really explain what they dislike. A lot of the time what they really dislike is just the buildings are ugly, but ugliness is not seen as a like respectable thing to talk about.


Too subjective, it sounds a bit dated or whatever. So people don't want to name that as the thing that's gone wrong. And so they find these other things which are proxies for ugliness, and they focus on those. And I think they obviously ly sincere, they sincerely believe it's those things, but if you actually test their reactions in different cases, you realize that's not what's motivating them.


I think something like that can be true with some of this building to building to last stuff or some of this fascination with old buildings. We know in, in Japan, I mean this has changed a bit, but historically in Japan, they didn't have the same idea of the continuity of materials being the important thing about a building.


And famously there's still, there's still at least one Japanese temple, which they demolish and rebuild every 30 years. And they've been doing this for a thousand years now, temple which they see as a thousand year old building and as an important piece of Japanese heritage, even though at any given time, the actual timbers will be no more than 30 years old.


And that used to be very generally the view in Japan. I think all temples were treated that way. I think Western influence has changed that to some extent, and now there's a more mixed picture. But that was, that's, that's an, an old view they had of heritage and that would probably have been closer to the view of heritage in Europe in the 18th or 19th centuries before Rus and arts and crafts and so on, which shifted it to more towards like, it's the actual materials that matter.


And I have, I can, I dunno if I can have any evidence of this, but I have a sort of a, a hunch that again, with age, part of what people really care about here is probably beauty, but they don't want to talk about beauty. So they talk about age and part of the huge support that the conservation movement has in Europe.


And this sense, you know, people really feel now, like basically any decent building from the 19th century shouldn't be demolished, uh, and shouldn't maybe even really be seriously tampered with. And that I think is probably partly because people feel like we've got a finite pool of beautiful buildings.


We can't really add to it. It's just like this pool we've mysteriously inherited. And every time we lose something from it, it's gone for good. And like our stock of this just continues to decline. So we should be extremely protective of it. And these like. What are actually like the low end of 19th century building the workers cottages from 19th century, these are, they were a huge achievement at the time, a huge step up in housing quality from what people were moving out of.


They're not great buildings. They were built to a very low standard, like in the 19th century, they would've been delighted to knock them down and put something higher, better quality in place. And yet we now feel like, yeah, I know, sure, but they're not gonna put something nicer in place, are they?


They're gonna put something worse in place. So better stick to the, grim, poorly built to up two downs. So I, I think with all of these things, I'm sure people partly care about, really do care about the it feeling local, it not being a box, its actual age. I'm sure these are all genuine values, which people care about, but I do think they all get a big injection of.


Additional support, which is in fact like concealed love of beauty that people don't want to acknowledge. And so they, um, they promote a proxy for beauty instead.


Ben: I hadn't heard it articulated so well in terms of this thinking around beauty. It does remind me of a couple of things. One is your anecdote from Japan, which I think is true about how they used to or still rebuild buildings.


Is it, is that a Greek philosopher ship? So if you have the same ship and replace all of the planks, is it really that Yeah. The ship of thesis. Exactly. Is it really that ship? And some people would say yes, and some people would say no. And it I could see that's exactly that temple if they rebuild it.


And they obviously said yes, it is the same temple. So they took that view.


Samuel: There's a whole branch of philosophy called ology about that question. Extremely boring field. But they certainly, the Japanese appear to have a different folk meteorology of buildings than, uh Yeah. And you, it works for them.


Ben: They believe it to be true. Um, and actually one other reflection is on philosophy. So I know you studied, I think, analytical philosophy, uh, in your younger years and I did skim some of your work, your thesis, and I think if it's true, if I read it correctly one of it was around the work on emotions.


And how you describe beauty just then led me to think, so I'm probably gonna completely mangle this, but one of the ideas that you had on looking at emotions is that sometimes we think about emotions and there's a kind of rational aspect to them and we kind of think like, okay, this is a rational response and it's proportionate.


But one aspect of emotion seems that it's either underrepresented or overrepresented. So say the emotion of grief, we feel really strongly and potentially if you're gonna be very rationalist about it, you would say maybe that's not helping you, you know, live your life and that. Um, emotion might be too strong.


And you had some interesting thoughts about how you might reconcile those two views of emotions. But interesting when you're talking about beauty, then it led me to think that actually there is a, there is almost a rational part of us or there is some emotional part which goes, yeah, we can say where something is very beautiful or very ugly.


And we do understand that. But there is another part where we are unconfident of saying that or applying that to an emotion and say, we feel very uncomfortable with that. And so we go to some physical thing like you say, aid or the materials used or it's use or, uh, something like that. So I was interested in how much your philosophy has influenced your thoughts about beauty and the place and whether I've just thought about that on the spot, whether what I've just said had any, uh, reference or things to your philosophy at all.


Samuel: That was about right. Um, I, it's been a long time since I've actually worked on, like personally done any research on, on analytical philosophy. So I, it's rusty now, but yes, I, um, I certainly do think that aesthetic and emotional responses can have a kind of speaking slightly loosely, but can have a kind of knowledge encoded in them.


And people may often be sensitive to a whole range of truths or values in the form of their emotional and aesthetic responses, which they maybe don't have access to intellectually. And one of the problems that we have in public policy is to. Try to do justice to some of those kinds of reactions when we are not good at talking about them.


Uh, and it's particular problem. I mean, there's, there's a few different things going on here, but it's a particular problem for public bureaucracies when they come to deal with this. They're very, you know, for understandable reasons, they want to be able to deal in things that are very clearly public, where there's clearly quantifiable data, there's clear ways of arbitrating disagreement.


Now we do have ways of arbitrating disagreement about emotional or aesthetic questions. Like people spend a huge amount of time arguing about whether they're right to be angry or whether, you know, which piece of music is better or whatever. So there, obviously there are ways to talk about these things, but is is in some sense true that they're less straightforward or they're, you know, their, it's not as.


It doesn't come in a format which is readily put in a, in a government document. And so public officials are very uncomfortable with dealing with that kind of thing. But that doesn't mean that kind of thing doesn't matter. And so that does, there is a tendency for those kinds of values to be overlooked in policymaking, I think.


Ben: I completely agree. I see it within healthcare, which is one of the domains. I look at a, a reasonable amount. Uh, and I always do this in a public policy philosopher person in the street, uh, dilemma, which the government always faces in terms of a healthcare budget. And that is we have this idea of a life year or a quality adjusted life year, and we price it those various economic ways to do a kind of statistical life price.


This isn't really the price of life, but they go say, well, 20 to 30,000 pounds for a life year is good value for money for our healthcare budget. And for instance, treating a diabetic meets that hurdle. No problem. So let's do lots of diabetics because cost benefit analysis suggests we'll save lots of diabetic lives.


And then you are faced with something like the preterm baby or the person who's born with a genetic disorder. And when you do the same sort of framework on costs, uh, you end up with a hundred thousand to 500,000 pounds for costing. And so if you're completely cost benefit, you will, well, let's never save those.


'cause we can always save more diabetic lives. And we're a constrained budget, so we're, we're always losing lives anyway because we need to spend money on, on somewhere else. But if you propose that to people, they go, Hmm, that doesn't feel quite right. We still want to save some preterm babies. And in fact, if you ask the person in the street, they would go, yes, let's save some preterm babies.


Like if we, if we had an infinite healthcare budget, you, you would obviously do this and these other things. And so they've actually had to kind of try and get that into their thinking. Whether you wanna call this. Virtue or pluralism or something, this other form of a representation of soci of a society preference.


Say if that's what you want to represent, because we do have a preference for saving some. In fact, we could save them all preterm babies at half a million versus the diabetic at 10,000, even though we know that in pure life value years that isn't correct. And actually you have a range of things, and that's a kind of very clear example which people can think.


But I actually think it is a similar case in aesthetics, uh, when we look at urban design and whether we do civic planning and pride. And how much of that is worth, I think


Samuel: So I'm speaking totally beyond my, uh, whatever field of authority I may have, but I'm sometimes impressed by some areas of British healthcare policy where the government is relatively, some of these quality-adjusted life year programs, they.


Prepared to make a call on how much worse does that make your life, right? This kind of disability, this kind of pain, this kind of and then we'll make public policy on the basis of these what are ultimately going to come down to like judgment calls of someone saying, I reckon this is worse. That, and that seems to me to in fact be basically a responsible way to make policy.


Like they are act they, yes, it's very unpleasant that we have to make these trade offs. It's very unpleasant that we have to make them based upon judgment calls where you think, how bad is blindness relative to using, losing your leg relative to being in this degree of pain all the time. Or to like, but those are the choices we have to make.


And I like suspect if we looked at the implicit trade offs that we're making. They would be totally insane. Like obviously vastly more money being spent on something that's less important in this context and vastly more being spent in that, like trade-offs that nobody would endorse if they were consciously required to make them, but which are made because they're being made by like different single issue bureaucracies who have been given a mandate to make a decision on something just in respect of one characteristic that it has or something like that.


Whereas healthcare policy, uh, seems to me to be made in a, a somewhat more intellectually responsible way. But yeah, that area of healthcare policy anyway, like,


Ben: so I, I would concur, I would say around 80% of it is very much weighted too. A cost benefit analysis of quality and, and other things go into quality.


So it's quality adjusted, pain adjusted disability adjusted life years is another way of looking at it. And when you do have something which is orders of magnitude and there's quite a lot of assumptions go into it. But if something's at 10,000 and something's a hundred thousand, then the 10,000 thing is most of the time going to win.


But interestingly I put these difficult use cases of right where there is a limit to it where you have a society preference, but you are, you are completely right actually a lot of healthcare. And actually that is the work of a lot of healthcare economists doing that. Although, interestingly, bringing it back to transport and planning, a lot of that initial work was done via a road transport philosophy.


Uh, which is that for every mile of road that you build, you are gonna have x million of economic value. But on the other side of it, you are gonna have more accidents and maybe an amount of environmental cost and you can actually price that. Roughly. And if your orders of magnitude out, then maybe it shouldn't be something you do, but it's also the other way.


If you've got an orders of magnitude, a really, really high economic number, then maybe you are making, uh, maybe you are making this trade off. And that's the difficult thing when you actually come to like things like, yeah,


Samuel: no, I think that's right. And the


Ben: like,


Samuel: highways engineering is another area where it's done by engineer, a kind of specialized engineer.


And we might disagree with some of the assumptions they make. We might think you are weight weighting these values in the wrong way, or, but they are, they do have like a consistent system based upon assumptions, which may be sometimes mistaken, but which are not like patently insane. And they do make trade offs in a kind of responsible way.


And I've also, oh yeah, I'm gonna say they're actually doing this seriously rather than just like in a sort of like crazy ad hoc way by contrast. And they're doing it in good faith as well. Yeah. The um, the. Cases we get. We had brouhaha, which you might have followed about the, um, the BAT tunnel proposed for HS two.


So this was HS two, the huge railway running, which, uh, gradually being built between London and Birmingham was going to run near to a colony of a kind of bat, which has some sort of protected status, be genes bats. And it was thought the bats might sometimes collide with the train. So Natural England is effect, it's slightly more complicated than this, but effectively required as a mitigation a hundred million pound bat tunnel that would stop the bats from getting to the trains.


It's not, again, it's not, it's never very clear it would actually have this effect. And you, the implicit trade-offs in terms of the amount of money that there's only a couple of hundred bats in this colony and, the, even if it was saving all of the bats, the number of the amount of money going into saving one bat.


Yeah. Compared to the amount that, uh, the number of humans that you could save in Britain, let alone if you spent the money internationally, like huge numbers of human lives being sacrificed on a, for the tenuous chance of saving a bat. This is a totally insane kind of policymaking that has arisen here.


Yeah. But it's arisen because natural England, you know, it's like good faith. They have a legal obligation to only care about one thing in this context, damage to protected species. And it's not their job to make, oh, weigh that against other values, how many bats per human, et cetera, et cetera.


Like they are just, no, this is the only thing that we are here to do and we are not going to let you build this tunnel until you have made these steps to avoid this harm. So completely insane trade-offs arise in a situation like that. And you just think if we were being. You know, if a particularly intelligent kind of alien were analyzing human societies and they were comparing on the one hand, you know, the NHS working out how much treatment it's going to give to, and the highways engineers working out cost benefit now for road along with these like totally insane trade offs that the British state is also making at the same time in these other, I think this is a very strange, the British state is a very strange thing, the way it can be, act like a fair in its clumsy fashion, fairly sophisticated and fairly rational in some contexts, uh, and yet also aggregated to something which is completely crazy in other contexts.


Ben: No, I, I completely agree that there is this trade off in there. It's the same. I'm particularly interested in green infrastructure and the arguments you make about wind time per turbines because they will kill birds. But obviously you've got to offset this around it. I don't know about good solutions.


I guess ideally you want a good faith decision maker somewhere within the system who's empowered to look at that trade off and then in good faith. Just decide which, what should be more important or not. And if you can't put it as a decision maker, 'cause essentially that should probably be your politician or, or minister, but maybe they can delegate it to a technocratic solution.


You could end up actually with the UK's nice. Within the health system, this National Institute for Clinical Excellence, but on big infrastructure projects. Or you would have a look at their down domain. So wind turbines and tunnels would be an exactly great domain for them. And then these are the five big questions.


And then we have a committee of five who would look at that and Nature England could submit and other people could submit, but they then have to in the round say, is this good for the country or not? In the same way that we do on diabetic medicines versus preterm babies versus this. And they technocratically look at it and go, well, in good faith, we think.


The best thing for this country is A, B and C decisions, and that they're empowered to do it. I, I think you could empower that within a politician. There's lots of political economy reasons why that's tricky. So the next best, I think would be this and time limit. Got six months to submit everything you have on these eight major questions where there are trade-offs.


They'll have three months to decide it. They're gonna decide it in good faith. And then once that's done, that's it. Let's not have any more reviews on that decision. 'cause these are five experts, or 12, or however many you wanna do and do it. That


Samuel: I think, and the good news about the, you know, what the, um, the highways engineers and the NHS committees show us is that it's actually not impossible for the British state to do that.


Like, it's not, it, sometimes it will be ministerial judgment. Inevitably, there are so many decisions that have to be made that they can't all be made by Aries state. So it will need to be alienated into a process of some kind. But like, it does, like also it's still. The key thing is the decision is made by a body who is responsible for all of the different values that are affected here, like effect on humans and effect on bats or whatever the case may be.


Effect on economic growth, effect on the environment, effect on birds and effect on our ability to produce renewable energy. And then they have to make, like do their best to make a sane trade off between these values. And I just like in the cases where cases like these NHS committees or the highways engineers where they are making those trade offs consciously and trying to do it responsibly, I think like the evidence seems to be, we sometimes disagree with them, but they're not like off the charts crazy.


Yeah. And so they'll come to, they're people, you know, not so different to us. They'll come to judgments about it that are not so different to our judgments. The important thing is just that like someone actually makes a conscious call on the trade off and tries to do it in line with the, like, receive rationality of the, and with the framework and the


Ben: governance


Samuel: and


Ben: Exactly.


So I, I know there's a lot of anti sentiment against technocratic solutions and wanko at the moment, but I actually think Nice. Which is this, the health body which looks at it, given all of the constraints, actually does really well. They look at it, they have a thing, their budget's maybe not as high as we would wish, but these are the constraints.


They're under uhhuh. Thinking back to transport planning and the like and maybe going via other places you've been, I think you've spent some time in Berlin or in Germany, and I think Berlin mixes, uh, rent controls. Is it this Mitch Spiegel and street grids? I think Prussian age street grids.


And they're quite permissive on some forms of alterations. So I'd be, I'd be interested in what you think about this mix of rent control and street grids and how successful these policies are, and whether I would say they're kind of culturally specific, so I'm not sure how much you could import to Britain or other countries, but to the extent that you saw good things in Berlin, what would you like to export to Britain or other cities?


Samuel: I mean, I think rent control is a disastrous policy and has always been disastrous wherever it's been tried in. But in Berlin, they didn't really have, so the municipality tried to impose rent controls or did impose rent controls a few years ago. But there was litigation against them and eventually the German Constitutional court decided that it's not an area over which the Bunes lender have jurisdiction is a federal matter.


The federal government has some very limited, uh, rent control policies. I, I, a few weeks ago I was looking into, I was in Berlin actually. I looked into how this worked and I, I don't think I will get the precise details right if I, but it's, so there's some kind of second generation rent control system but it doesn't like rents and Berlin are not much below or maybe not really at all below their market level.


It's a fairly, it's actually a not, it is an elaborate song and dance that doesn't have that much effect in practice.


Ben: Yeah, it's true. When I've looked at it and people looked at it that it was a, it is a sort of pseudo rent control. That's right. The interesting thing about it, actually, we're gonna go off on the, to another tangent, is it to my mind, it actually intersects with a slightly different social contract that long-term tenants and long-term landlords have in the German market in Berlin and, and others.


But it's the way that they're organized. So it's not social housing, but it's the way their landlord thinks about it, but also that quid pro quo, as you can see it as an extreme, if you're a landlord of student housing, you do not necessarily expect your students to treat your property in a way that a long-term owner of that property might for, you know, various reasons, age and transience of tenancy and with our assured.


Shorthold tendencies, say in a lot of British cities, they tend to be six months or six to 12 months. Again, it's sort of in between. We have got some longer and some longer thinking around that. But German tendencies, and again, this is an average, tend to tilt towards this longer term, but there is a little bit of, we, the rent is maybe not gonna be as high as you would have a shorter term, or we'll say, you know, Airbnb in a hotel.


But the quid pro quo is you are going to look after this property or think about this property a little bit closer to thinking about it if you are gonna be owning it for 50 years or, or a hundred years. And essentially my view about the pseudo form of laws or controls they have is embodying a little bit of this.


Unwritten, the social contract that you have between landlord and tenant, of which some of it is embodied in law, and actually you, you see it in London, in, in different ways, is of where we had the tenancy or, or, or potentially how the Great Estates have looked at some of their the way that they look at their properties, but also their relationship with tenancy and the age of that tenancy.


So I've kind of gone off on a tangent there, but that, that's one of the things I think is kind of interesting about the German form of looking at this land or tenant part. I would, but also these alterations and street grids and everything


Samuel: else, I would find it very interesting as, so I'm basically, I'm not gonna give you a good answer on tenancies because I, I find it a very interesting subject.


I have never looked into it very systematically, so I can tell you some. Here are some random interesting facts about the history of tenure in Germany. So at the start of the 20th century, Berlin was almost entirely a renting city. It was over 90% renters, maybe over 95% renters in the actual era, like jurisdiction of the, um, the city of Berlin.


You couldn't have, so what, like owning a flat was, I think legally impossible? I think it did. There was some limited system for it in, uh, the 19th century, but I think it was then got rid of, in the Burges Gazettes book, the, um, German civil code that was introduced in, at, around the turn of the century.


So you could only rent an apartment unlike in, I mean Britain, it was, people mostly rented apartments for a long time, but there was the leasehold system which created, there was some option for having a building where like one person owns the whole building and then the apartments are in some sense also owned separately in this kind of communal sort of complic.


That just wasn't really possible for Germans. There was like someone who owned the building and then there were a bunch of people who rented. I wasn't aware of. And France. France had, um, the system of the modern French system, Cote, which is their equivalent of share freehold, basically, um, didn't exist at all in the early 20th century.


Gradually develops in the course of the 20th century, but it, they were entirely rental societies for flats. Obviously homes were more complicated, houses were more complicated picture. The other thing is most of the, like continental countries have always had a larger share or have for several centuries had a much larger share of their population living in flats than us.


And they have. So it's still, now this is, it's a more complicated people picture than English. People have a, uh, have an oversimplified view of this on which content or Europeans all live in flats and English people live in terrorist houses. And that was kind of was true in 1914, but is far more complicated now.


And like Paris has enormous suburbs. German cities have considerable suburbs made up of detached houses where people are under occupiers. So it's, it's much more complicated than, but the crude simplification is still have some validity. There are still, you know, the cause of French and German cities and still more Spanish, Italian cities are all flats and lots of like families and like the middle and upper classes of these cities are based in flats, in inner suburbs.


And so a whole bunch of institutions have developed to suit those people. Whereas in England, like you had a little, you know, small number of flats built in the 19 mansion blocks, small number built in the interwar period, but very, you know, two sort of tens of thousands, maybe a couple of hundred thousand overall post-war era.


There is no private sector, flat building and all flats built for social housing. And then flat building takes off again in like the eighties and nineties and has been quite a lot of it since then. And that's mostly targeted at. Basically at yuppies like un the childless young people who want to live in inner city areas.


And so the whole, like this immense market that exists in continental countries for the family apartment and all the institutions that families look for, like they care so much more about security and about being settled in one place than yuppies do, who are often quite happy to move around. A bit like that's developed over a long period of time in German speaking Europe.


So they had no option of shared ownership at these building. They do have that now, but they, for a long time they had no option of shared ownership. It had to be done through renting. And they had a huge market of middle class families who also wanted to be living in apartments. And so you can see why under those conditions, renting institutions for private renting would develop that gave greater security of tenure.


Um, and that were very long termist in their approach.


Ben: Yeah. And the kind of things that families would. Families would want. It's interesting. I hadn't heard it like that. That makes a lot of sense to me. And it's quite fascinating. I also think that this way of house building that we've done over the last few decades, because we value internal utility and aesthetics.


So internet, maybe even air condition or how your kitchen looks, uh, and we put value into that, or house builders put value into that, so they won't put the ornamentation because yes, ornamentation has a little bit of a return, but the return on upskilling, your walk-in shower is much larger. And so actually some of our aesthetic value has gone into the internals of houses.


And you know, if you looked in the internals of houses a hundred years ago they're not as valuable as the internals today. So I, I do think some of that value has gone that way.


Samuel: There's some lifecycle stuff here. Yeah. So there's some, I don't know this stuff at all. Well, I'm not sure. I'm not, I don't say this with much confidence, but I people, what I'm told by developers is if you are.


A yuppie buying a flat, you're probably fairly relaxed about the exterior facade of your flat. Like it's really, you probably don't vest your identity in it. And what you care about is location and some like internal conveniences then, like the real, the age where people really care about what their home looks like is like the central family period where you, like your household is an institution and you want to project that to the world.


And that's where people want to, you know, wanna move to conservation areas and spend loads of money doing renovations and plant their front garden and all the rest. Um, and then elderly people, a bit more of a mixed picture. And sometimes because of the, like, um, because life gets physically harder in so many ways, although when you are, you know, very old, physically harder in so many ways, you sometimes have to start caring a bit more about internal conveniences again.


Yeah, and that's, I've been told that a number of times by developers and it kind kind of makes intuitive sense to me. And then you think maybe one of the things which has happened in modern Western cities is the relative shares of those different groups of the population have changed. Like we've got lots more young child that unmarried people living in flats.


We've got lots more elderly people living for long periods with challenging physical conditions. And the share of like I am an institution, families has fallen. And that might be one of the factors. I don't think this is like my general theory of it, but I think that might, might be one of the factors that drives changes in the built environment.


Ben: Yeah. For sure. Okay, so coming back to England there's some who argue that this green belt idea needs to be re-looked at because it was put in so many years ago. And there's some parts of the green belt, which aren't as green as, as maybe advocates think. Obviously there's urban scroll as an issue.


Um, uh, if you had control, what would you think of the greenbelt? Would you redraw it and what urban forms would you like to see around that? Or would you, would you have a completely different idea about how we assess how we do our urban planning?


Samuel: I've always been a moderate supporter of greenbelt reform.


I, I, you know, we were a bit of an anomaly internationally. It's like French and Germans. Spanish and Italians don't have green belts. I mean, they have some forms of urban containment, but this idea that London has like completely stopped growing in 1939, growing outwards in 1939 and still today like.


The edge of London is where the builders laid down their tools when we went to war with Germany. And you can find unfinished streets where the, the road just goes out into nowhere and stops because the builders were confident that when the war ended, they could finish the street. And in fact, it never happened.


Like I don't, this is an insane situation to now does that mean that we should just like, let all cities grow outwards in a completely uncontrolled, unplanned way that we should have, like ribbon development and sprawl and we should grow in the way that Los Angeles has? Good, no, I certainly don't think that either, but like that's not the, those are not the two only alternatives.


There is a possible world where we protect the downs and the Chilton Hills, the national landscapes, and where we manage outward growth so that it takes place along railway lines and comes you know, something like the form that Metro Land grew at the end of the 19th or the early 20th centuries where like.


Mixed use middle density settlements around railway stations with good links into London or into other cities in the cases where there's demand for growth but with clearly defined boundaries with preserved rural areas to give people access to green space. A kind of like, um, a the 19th century you think is a starfish city where you have like legs of arm starfish have legs or arms, but like, uh, the starfish arms reach out, but they're areas of countryside between, and that's how kind of cities like Copenhagen, for example, have managed their growth since the second World war?


I, I have no, like grand plan for London worked out, you know, ready to go for what I'd do if I had a dictatorial powers over greenbelt reform. But yes, I do support a, a moderate version of greenbelt reform in four cities where there's, um, enormous demand for, uh, additional housing.


Ben: And a technocratic committee could probably do this quite well as well.


This trade offs okay, let's protect this. Let's not,


Samuel: or yeah. I mean, it's gonna be some, yeah. Some kind of planning process. Yeah. I'm very much, I, to some extent I've changed on this, but I am, um, I consider myself to be extremely pro planning. Like I do think that, uh, building stuff there are endemic collective action problems, and often you can only solve those by having some kind of planning authority.


The problem that we have is that planning authorities like. They end up with funny incentives. They get captured by one, one little group of the community, or they serve the interest of one neighborhood against all the other neighborhoods or these kinds of, so you end up with various problems with your incentives and principal agent problems and these kinds of, and so you end up with like a bad kind of planning.


But the solution to this is not tear up the planning system and go to a kind of like, panarchy that you get in low state capacity countries. The solution is to try and perform it so that to the, you know, greatest extent possible, we end up with, with good authorities making good decisions about Yes.


Ben: I, I think even most, although not all classical liberals, free market advocates suggest that you put in, transport and other public good infrastructure, you know, as your minimum and, and that's planned. And then, uh, you know, they do want. Remove zoning to a, a wider extent and, and point to some developing nation countries, which are built organically quite well.


But the, particularly on, at, at the very minimum where you put your sewage or waterworks and your transport is quite important there.


Samuel: Yeah. I mean, how 19th century cities developed in Europe, right. They weren't completely unplanned in lots of countries in Germany and in to some extent in Italy and in Spain and United States.


They, uh, the state completely planned the street network and just, uh, you know, that there are maps where the state said, this is where all the streets are going to go. In some cases, they then compulsorily purchased the land that would be the street network and laid out the streets and just left the landowners to then gradually develop it there.


Lots of transport planning went on, some other kinds of infrastructure planning went on, but it was nonetheless, overall obviously a far more liberal system and, and one that was far more pro-development and. London grew from 1 million people in 1800 to 7 million people in 1914. And those people, the amount of housing each person had, you know, greatly expanded at the same time.


So it was a tremendously like expansionist. Expansionist and, and, um, in a sense permissive system, but not a completely unplanned system.


Ben: Yeah, exactly. That makes sense. Works in progress is associated with Stripe. Patrick Collinson seems to have a fascination with pumping stations, the Pacific pride perhaps hidden in 19th century pump station infrastructure.


What do you make of that aesthetic obsession and what maybe today would be a civic upgrade equivalent?


Samuel: Yeah, I don't fully understand. I've never looked into it properly. What happened with these, I mean, some of them really remarkable and even remarkable interiors in these buildings. You think, well, why were they investing in the interior of those buildings?


Did people go and visit? I don't know. So I, I'm too largely ignorant of this topic to comment on it very authoritatively. There's clearly a wider pattern though that like 19th century, certainly public authorities and also private ones to some extent, did invest in these buildings. And it was seen, it was expected of them that they would do this.


It was seen as like, part of, if they didn't do it at all, they would look ridiculous and people would like mock and feel like slightly betrayed by them or so. And that does extend to pretty mundane buildings, like in the extreme case, pumping stations, but also to like hospitals or a famous, you know, if you see a really ugly building in Britain today, you've got like really, really ugly, like maximum ugliness.


You know, it's probably a hospital and that's, there, there were some factories, you know, some university buildings might be as bad, but it's a, it's a, hospitals are often, whereas in, you know, in the 19th century, these hospitals, they were not necessarily particularly elegant buildings. In, in inevitably a hospital has to like, stack floors on top of each other and it has to have lots of repetition in it.


And this kind of, and it's got very complicated functional requirements, which mean you have to make compromises and trade offs. But they're like basically attractive buildings that, uh, still if, you know, when they get converted today, people turn them into luxury flats or something. That's pretty interesting.


Yeah, and that's, uh, that is one of the great questions, you know, like why, like extremely rich people will always be able to patronize exquisite buildings and their tastes will change in various ways, but I, they're always going to produce some interesting stuff. But how it was that, that it was a kind of a norm for institutional bodies, both public and private, to produce stuff that was generally pretty good and was sometimes really spectacular.


That's, you know, that's a bigger more puzzling question in a way.


Ben: Yes. Exactly. Can't be completely answered. Although I do think part of it is the internal aesthetics part. So hospitals have to spend so much more on their on their budget, on the machines and stuff inside that they don't think about the outside.


And then some of it I think is in the pride of the workers. So if you see Victorian sewage works like the brick work in the tunnels, some of it is actually quite beautiful and no one's ever seen that brick work. So there is, there was some element of this is how this is how it's done. Um, and maybe there is something on that.


But again, famously and. Patrick has, I think, two British telephone boxes in the Stripe offices. And he points to one as being beautiful and one is not. But actually that the value of, particularly if it's not gonna cost you anything differently about that beautiful design, is a very large intangible, which then could say that, and actually programmers talk about this a little bit.


Beautiful code actually does mean, does mean something. Anyway, I'll have a little bit of underrated, overrated. And then a, a couple of last questions if you like. So I'm gonna throw out something to you and you can say underrated, overrated, or you can just give a little comment or you can pass on these things.


So you'd be very bad at this. Yeah, we've had quite long rambles and things. We might not be very good at this, uh, short form, but we give it a go. Underrated or overrated charter cities.


Samuel: I think they're a promising, interesting idea. I'm much I think I would love to know more about is the way that local government worked in the Middle Ages, because basically European cities in the Middle Ages were, and this is maybe a bit of a simplification, but roughly speaking, the King gave, or the central government gave a charter to a kind of a, kind of like a charitable trust or something, a bit like, uh, and this charter gave them certain revenue raising powers and certain jurisdictional powers over a certain territory.


And then they're like, well, off you go have a go at getting a city going here. And these survived in many countries, right up to the 19th century in municipal corporations. They were basically charter cities, right? That was like how the cities of Europe developed for centuries. And maybe one of the things that distinguished them from Asian cities, which were, you know, also obviously existed, but didn't have municipal government in quite the same way and maybe plateaued in a different way that, so I was like I've never looked into this properly, I dunno much about municipal government before the 19th century, but very interesting that, like charter cities may have been one of the big USPS of Western civilization before the 19th century, and they were extremely widespread and maybe successful, although of course they did mostly get abolished eventually.


So they're like, it seems to be like a frightfully interesting subject, which I don't know much about. And charter cities today, like, can they find any way of actually getting a stable political equilibrium with modern governments? Maybe not. I don't know, but like, definitely like something I find interesting and enjoy thinking and talking about and learning.


Worth exploring. Okay. So moderately underrated. I think that's sounds, yeah, I think that's probably the correct summary of my response here. Low traffic neighborhoods, I love low traffic neighborhoods. I mean, honestly in Islington, I, there's not many things that I would, if the council proposed to remove the low traffic neighborhood from my area I live in is I would be camping outside the town hall and like appearing unshaven and uh, uh, uh, uh, screaming at the councilors and officers as they went in to try.


I, um, I think their value creating. And um, the funny thing is low traffic neighborhoods are. Left coded and seen as, you know, there's a conspiracy of cyclists and woke and so forth, whereas cul-de-sacs are seen as right coded and, uh, planned by all these like, car companies and ignorance suburbanites and so forth.


But they are in fact basically the same thing. And this like totally obvious point that these two things that are like seen because of the way, the idiotic way that our political culture sorts issues according to like cultural, social and cultural coalitions or lifestyle choices or something. They've, like this elaborate fantasy has emerged that we are, there's this u which side of society you're on should dictate whether you are in favor of cul-de-sacs or in favor and they're mutually exclusive and opposed.


And these are the, basically the same thing in both ca, like a cul-de-sac with a pedestrian alley at the end of it that allows pe permeability for pedestrians and cyclists, but not for cars is essentially a purpose-built low traffic neighborhood. Yeah, and the traffic neighborhood is an attempt to create that in a neighborhood that wasn't originally designed for it.


We know that the private market like produces masses and masses of cul-de-sacs like that because people hate cars. I mean, they like having a car to get places, but they hate having cars roaring past their home. That we know that this is like overwhelmingly value creating for residential neighborhoods in a wide variety of contexts.


Of course, we should try to retrofit this into existing residential neighborhoods where it's possible to do so. But all, you know, the flip side of that is that all the people who love ltms should have a more sophisticated view about cul-de-sacs that like, yes, we should try to preserve pedestrian per permeability in these things.


Permeability for cyclists. Yes, mixed use walkability. All this is totally right as a priority, but like the cul-de-sac per se, is a completely rational adaptation of people to, I really, really don't want to have masses of cars driving fast in front of my house and killing my children and creating noise in the middle of the night, and so on.


Ben: Yeah, it's like you say, it's a very equivalent idea and actually intersects with other things. Like I'm I've now seen a, a bit, I think it was based on the Dutch work on these no road marking type systems around, which also work very well with low traffic neighborhood, LTN. And they definitely seem, from me anecdotally looking at it and the data seems to that, that they just work really well.


Well,


Samuel: they vote, that's it. Like, uh, neighborhoods for Living is roughly the translation and they, uh, they have like five mile an hour limits for cars in these residential areas and like overwhelming pedestrian priority that. Yeah. And no markings. And you


Ben: have to be careful. And the, the the Dutch traffic planner person who did that to prove how successful it was gonna be when in their pilot one, uh, walked backwards or walked backwards, blindfolded across the streets to prove how safe it was to be, to like, say, like this is how much he believed in it.


So at least I, I dunno if that's an apocryphal story, but it seems true.


Samuel: Yeah. And they're not, um, you know, I'm not anti car. Like there are amazing technologies and for rural areas and small towns, they've been totally transformative. And those places probably would've just died out or, if it hadn't been for their ex, for their existence.


But, um, but for cities, in the residential area. If you take any journey you do by car, the amount of it that you spend on residential streets relative to arterial roads, like it's so small and the right to drive at 30 miles an hour through that little residential street you start on onto your arterial road and then the little one you maybe end on right at the end.


That has very little effect on journey time in most. I mean there are some exceptions to that, but in most cases very little. Um, exactly. So, and yet it has so much effect on the safety and the immunity of the streets.


Ben: Exactly. And I think that is where you can do that trade off. Like you say, there's some exceptions where such an increased journey time, you could say it's an economic cost which may outweigh the trade off, but for the vast majority, particularly at say London, it's so minuscule you're not seeing any economic cost to a few minutes on your, on your traffic time and you're seeing a huge increase in the utility, either via accidents or everything else in the community.


Samuel: Needless to say, there, there will be TNS that cut some journeys, which for some people, you know, does add five minutes or eight minutes or whatever it may be, and you can perfectly well understand why I mean. Those people are the losers from the L tns. I can perfectly well understand why they're not happy, but, you know, public policy does have to aggregate and weigh interests.


And I was, I'm afraid that was the way the cookie crumbles.


Ben: I guess back to planning design, minimum space requirements, underrated, overrated,


Samuel: um, generally a bad idea. The analogy is like, suppose that you had you know, you have a country where there isn't enough food to go around, but there is enough that you can give people a basic ration and they'll survive.


They won't be comfortable, but they'll survive. And you say, no, no, basic ration isn't, you know, people deserve comfort. We are gonna require that nobody receive a ration of food beneath this really quite generous ration of food. And so instead what you get. Is not everyone getting the basic rational and surviving, but like two thirds of people get this quite generous ation on the remaining thirds after to death.


That's basically what minimum space standards. Yes, this is a simplification, but that is basically what minimum space standards do in housing. Poor societies like ours, they say like, we refuse to have anyone living in a small home, but we're not going to liberalize housing supply enough that every, there's enough, you know, enough homes around for everyone to have a big home.


So like, some people will get big or medium sized homes and the, the remaining unlucky people will get nothing and we'll end up with a high rate of homelessness and with other kinds of household suppression when people are, you know, living with their parents or whatever it may be. So it seems to me that I can, I sure it has humanitarian motives behind it, but very poorly thought, thought through and harms, um, intent, like acutely harms a subset of the people whom it's intended to help.


And I think it's, I mostly, I think they're very bad. There may be some small exemptions, but special cases, but, um, but yeah, I generally think they're a bad idea over overrated. Yes.


Ben: And I think actually you can offset, uh, a lot of the challenges with better design of which better design shouldn't cost you actually anything if you think about it in, in terms of that.


Yeah. Be pretty good for many purposes. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. Okay, last one on the overrated, underrated gentle density. I guess this is the whole Create Streets idea, so it's gonna be underrated, but maybe you wanna talk about how you think about gentle density. Well, it's funny,


Samuel: Benjamin, because in a way, this stuff that like emerged with Prince of Wales whatever decades ago, like actually now, it's pretty mainstream.


If you go to a, if you look at all the British planning documents produced over the last 25 years, whatever, since um, the the famous Compact Cities report, um, report by Norman Foster the, uh, and then through the Urban Design Compendium and the feral review and all these different documents, they're all in favor of urban density.


They're all in favor of mixed use. They're all in favor mostly, but basically in favor of traditional block patterns. And this kind of you look at what's taught any school of planning today, and it will be pro urban density, promix use you know, it will differ with Nicholas. Nicholas creates streets and the, the gentle entity movement.


We'll go a bit further on some of this stuff. A and they will be, then they have the, the content con controversial stuff that creates streets sympathetic to traditional architecture as an option. Whereas, you know, lots of people in the planning establishment think it's prestige and bad and so on. But like the basic urbanism of gentle density has become mainstream now and is no longer like a niche thing, which is only being campaigned for by Prince Charles.


So yeah, probably still underrated, but actually now like generally highly rated. And the question is that why do we fail to deliver it in practice rather than like, are we, should we be in favor of it? Or not becoming our mainstream idea,


Ben: but execution, Paul. Okay. Yeah, that's right. And then last couple of questions maybe continuing sort of on underrated is what would be your most underrated or potentially favorite.


Building or piece of urban planning or design,


Samuel: The one I bang on about at the moment, I mean, this isn't exactly a, a, this isn't exactly a building or a piece of urban design, but I say that my, my, my underrated thing I bang on is the city of Dresden Preston, I think is the most underrated city in Europe.


It's, um, that's the, I mean, I haven't been to every city in Europe, so I'm not really qualified to make that claim.


Ben: Postwar reconstruction or No?


Samuel: Partly so some, but it's got lots of, partly just because it's in a very beautiful part of Europe. Saxony is a, like a lovely area. It wasn't part of the grand tour and then it fell under communist rule, so it's not really like in England and France, people don't really know about it but it's like, it's extremely beautiful.


The Saxon Alps dressed in and beautifully situated in this V by a floodplain with the hills rising above it. It was then in the 18th century, they accidentally invented porcelain, an al uh, a Saxon Alchemist who was trying to invent the philosopher stone. Inadvertently worked out how to create porcelain, which previously could only be imported from China, and it was hugely fashionable in the 18 mice, mice and porcelain, which still the thing people know about that.


And so it made the electorate extremely rich and the electorate spent all this money on extraordinary art and architecture, which is still all so much of which have survived or was reconstructed. Interestingly, much of it was reconstructed by the communist government after the Second World War, a completely forgotten chapter in, uh, in history.


And then over the last 2002, there was a referendum in Dresden, um, on whether they should rebuild the city center. And they decisively won for the pro rebuilding people. And since then, they've rebuilt the famous Protestant church, the Kyia, um, and they've rebuilt lots of the urban fabric and it's, you know, been.


Beautifully done to an extremely high standard. Uh, and so it's now this what was once one of the most beautiful cities in the world, and it is extraordinary. They call it Florence, on the elbow in German. This extraordinary center of art and culture and which some of which survived, uh, always reconstructed immediately after the war and some of which is being rebuilt now.


And it's also, you know, it is got a superb tram network and, uh, and generally like higher up and immunity is a very nice place to be. So I, I am like a bit preoccupied with this city and kind of buttonholing people and going on about it at the moment


Ben: and best than underrated. And that's the one where they redoing facade.


So they had plain enough facades and they're putting it back. No.


Samuel: No, it's actually, so that's happening, um, a bit all over Germany. Everyone, some of that is happening in Dresden, but in Dresden it's, it's mostly just fallow land. They, there's, I don't think the recon, I'm not sure a single building has been demolished in the reconstruction of the Dresden City Center because there was so much like plots that had never been rebuilt after the war dressed in the communist government didn't, it wasn't, all bad in its urban policy.


Interesting. But it hadn't, certainly not been concerned to rebuild a density center. And so there's just just empty plots where they could put stuff. And so it's mostly just been building on empty band. Not either retrofitting existing buildings or demolishing modern buildings and rebuilding new traditional ones.


Ben: Okay. And then thinking out to the future, and backwards. So if it's 2050 and someone has asked you what finally fixed Britain's housing supply issue, what do you think would've been the institutional reform or the things that we could point to that would've would've fixed it over the decades?


Samuel: That's, uh, probably a bigger question than I can ask at the end, answer at the end of a podcast, but I think broadly speaking, I think the answer is so I constraints on development.


I have like far more sympathy for nimbyism than most people in the housing reform movement. Like I think random, many kinds of development have genuine negative externalities and they really are like a pain and devalue the homes of the. You know, of neighbors and it's totally rational for people to want to manage change in their neighborhood, to ensure that neighborhood values are preserved and to ensure that the investment that they've made in this place is not destroyed by irresponsibly, by their neighbors.


And we should certainly not wish for that instinct to die out in the English English people because it's so important as a way in which places are created. So I'm, a lot of the emotional tone of standard nimbyism is, I think like morally wrong and also just politically wrong because like people will fight so hard to protect these things.


They've managed in the space of, 50 years, in the first half of 20th century, they managed to impose these stringent development controls all over the world. Their success is total, uh, the huge YB movements in various countries have basically failed to make much progress against them and will probably continue to fail because the interest they're up against are so strong.


But like this interesting thing has happened, which is that in some parts places with an acute housing shortage, new housing is now extremely valuable and the right to develop new housing is now extremely valuable. And so you see these interesting experiments in places like well, I mean there are big examples in places like South Korea or in Israel or in part parts of the United States where you give communities the right to up zone themselves to allow more development.


And they realize if we do this, if we allow more development in this area, we all become drastically better off because the floor space prohibited by development control. Has become steadily more valuable as the housing shortage has got worse and worse and worse. And at a certain point it outweighed the immunity value that is preserved through development controls.


And then, and that was, that point was in fact passed long ago in many of the world's great cities. And now like your home, your property becomes 400% more valuable if you upzone it. You make millions of pounds if you upzone it in many places. And then the underlying coalition of interest starts changing.


And people start thinking now, actually, even as we had an interest in the past in preventing and controlling change, now maybe we have an interest in enabling change. So I think trying to build those new coalitions of interest that, that the housing shortage has potentially made possible and trying to create win-wins rather than having an adversarial approach to planning reform.


I think that is where the great durable shift may come from rather than from the kind of reform that we do that we've traditionally attempted. Using people's self interest. Yeah, that makes sense.


Ben: Yes, that's right. Like


Samuel: incentives do actually


Ben: work. Who knew? Great. And then last question, do you have any life advice or career advice or any other thoughts, current projects that you wanna share, um, with listeners and viewers in terms of a career in thinking about design or think tanks or anything that you've done that you would suggest to listeners?


Samuel: I certainly don't have any advice for a career in thinking about design. Like I don't, I seem to have evolved one, but I certainly, you know, never expected to and have no understanding of how it happened. I, um, policy, I would say it's, you know, you can work in policy and achieve nothing, but you can achieve enormous things.


It's amazing how in Britain. You like all the center right think tanks employ fewer than a hundred researchers, the left wing think tanks, if excluding the TBI, which Tony Bar Institute to put a special case. They're even smaller. I to the, employee 80 research, 60 research or something like that.


And those people are mostly, you know, in their twenties. And then there are some people who work in government, you know, tens of people who work in government as government advisors. It's a tiny world, a tiny world of mostly very junior people. And those people do make up after a fashion, the intellectual pipeline that reaches the British state.


So like working in that, you have scope to be incredibly influential. The amazing thing is that it's not, you know, like billionaires haven't noticed that with trivial sums of money. They could. Basically like take over this pipeline and like dominate the stream of ideas that reaches at least one of the two sides of British politics, which has really not basically, I mean, there's some limited examples of that, but basically hasn't really happened.


Kind of fascinating that's the case but like there's so little money in it. There's so little so few people involved that it's a remarkably easy career to have impact in. So if you, if you're interested in public service and and interested in doing work that, uh, that really matters, I've had like total confidence in commending working in policy to people


Ben: that, that sounds very impactful. Yeah. That, um, public policy influence either being on the research side or I guess being, if you can make it as a public intellectual or doing that, is, um, relatively few people influencing quite important policies and things. So yeah, that's right. Possible to make a difference.


And with that, Samuel, thank you very much.


Samuel: My pleasure. 



In Arts, Podcast Tags Samuel Hughes, Architecture, Urban Design, Housing Policy, Beauty in Design, Green Belt, Rent Control, Tokyo, Berlin, Ben Yeoh Chats, podcast
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