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Clearing the Air: Hannah Ritchie on Climate Honesty, Hope, and the Future

October 26, 2025 Ben Yeoh

Hannah Ritchie, one of the most lucid and data-driven voices in climate and sustainability, returns to the podcast to discuss her new book Clearing the Air: 50 Questions and Answers about Climate.

Together, Ben and Hannah explore how honesty builds trust in climate science, why the 1.5 °C target is probably out of reach (and why that’s not the end of hope), and China’s complex role as both the world’s largest emitter and clean-tech powerhouse.

They dig into how abundance, not austerity, could define the next phase of climate progress; how to handle renewable energy variability and mineral demand; and why “net zero” may need a more realistic framing. Hannah also shares personal reflections — what she’d say to her 16-year-old self, how she balances optimism with realism, her daily running routine by the Scottish coast, and advice for those hoping to make an impact in sustainability.

The conversation closes with a look at smart philanthropy, innovative climate projects, and the creative habits that keep her hopeful, curious, and effective.

Expect an hour of evidence, insight, and grounded optimism — a conversation about how to think clearly, act practically, and stay inspired in a warming world.

🎧 Listen now on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or on YouTube.

What We Explore

Honesty & the 1.5 °C target

  • Most scientists quietly accept 1.5 °C is out of reach. Pretending otherwise risks trust when “nothing magical” happens the day we cross it.

  • Better framing: climate risk increases gradually; every tenth of a degree still matters.

China’s climate paradox

  • China burns coal but leads the world in renewables, batteries, and EVs (over half of new car sales are electric).

  • Coal capacity ≠ coal use: many plants run fewer hours.

  • When China peaks, the world peaks—and that moment may be close.

Population and the “should I have kids?” question

  • Fertility changes now barely affect mid-century emissions; per-capita emissions must be near-zero by then anyway.

  • Humans create solutions as well as problems—population fear is misplaced.

Abundance > Degrowth

  • People want prosperity and clean air, not enforced austerity.

  • Electrification flips efficiency: combustion wastes ~80% of fuel; electrics convert ~80% to useful work.

  • More energy services with less energy use—a politics of optimism.

Can we transition fast enough?

  • Not for 1.5 °C, but likely for ~2 °C.

  • Unlike past transitions from one fuel to another, this is a move from commodities to technologies, which scale exponentially.

Intermittency & minerals — the pragmatic view

  • Short gaps in renewables handled by batteries; longer ones by mixed low-carbon sources, grid links, and storage.

  • Most nations can hit ~80% clean power; multiple paths exist for the last 20%.

  • Mineral scarcity fears are overstated: exploration, efficiency, and substitution will keep supplies stable—and clean energy extraction is orders of magnitude smaller than today’s fossil mining.

Rethinking “Net Zero”

  • “Net zero” has been politicised and sounds implausible to many.

  • A realistic goal: 85–90% cuts by 2050, then solve the remaining 10%. Honest ambition still changes the trajectory.

AI’s energy footprint (and upside)

  • Chatbot energy use is trivial compared with daily habits (like eating a steak).

  • AI could speed up climate solutions—from better weather modelling to new materials and drug discovery.

Philanthropy that moves the needle

  • High-ROI causes: global health and direct cash transfers, which show dramatic real-world results.

  • Ben adds: fund long-term health studies, decision-making research, and “venture philanthropy” that backs thousands of risky ideas—most will fail, but the outliers can transform the world.

Summary contents, transcript, and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Watch the video above or on YouTube.

Contents chapters

00:33 Why honesty matters in climate communication
03:51 China’s role in climate progress
09:34 Population growth and climate impact
13:38 The concept of abundance in sustainability
21:15 Hope and optimism for the future
26:50 Can we transition fast enough?
35:17 Decarbonising electricity and transport
41:03 Cement and other climate challenges
45:28 Rethinking “net zero” goals
49:09 Individual action vs systemic change
52:26 AI’s role in sustainability
55:48 Personal insights and creative habits
58:20 Philanthropy and high-impact giving
1:11:50 Current projects and career advice

Transcript (helped by AI so errors possible)


Ben: Hey everyone. I'm super excited to be welcoming. Back to the podcast, Hannah Richie. Hannah is one of the most thoughtful, smartest, and lucid writers on climate and sustainability matters. She has a new book out clearing the Air, which looks at 50 questions and answers around climate. It's available in the UK now and in the US from March, 2026.

The book, just like her last one, is Excellent. Hannah, welcome. 

Hannah: Thanks very much. That was a very lovely intro. 

Ben: You are most welcome. How important is honesty? I ask because one and a half degrees, which I'm not sure is properly understood as a point target, but in any event, one and a half degrees when I speak to a lot of scientists seems to be off the table, but a lot of them seem to be really reluctant to be publicly talking about it.

And there's a question of sort of white lies and things like that. And the first question you tackled in your book is whether we are too late and what does it mean to be a three degree, four degree, five degree, six degree world. But I'm almost interested in also how important you think honesty is among scientists when communicating and what do you think about our communication around the one and a half degree target?

Hannah: Yeah, I think that, I mean, I. I would obviously say, I think honesty is, is, is very crucial here. I think that, um, I think especially when it comes to scientific communication, trust in science, especially when you're talking about issues like climate change, where there are the risks of climate change, but on the solution side, you know.

That requires large investments, that acquire, requires large policy changes that requires large, uh, behavioral changes from individuals. And there is a sense that you people need to be able to trust in the science and, and what is being told to them if they are to back the solutions and policies that are needed for us to actually tackle climate change.

And I think when it comes to the one and a half degree target, I think you're right that if you actually ask most climate scientists, is this in any way plausible that we manage to stay below one and a half degrees? The vast majority would say no. Right? The reality is it's too late for us to reduce emissions quickly enough to stay below one and a half degrees.

And from my perspective, I think we should be honest about that and I think we should be honest about that for several reasons. I think one is that the way that often that the one and a half degree target has been framed is that I think now many people in the public having their heads once we pass one point.

Five degrees, you know, there's this cliff that we're gonna fall off, right? And something really dramatic is gonna happen 'cause they see it as this kind of threshold that we should never, ever pass. And the reality is, I think from a public trust perspective, the reality is that we've all passed one and a half degrees and nothing dramatic is going to happen, right?

Climate risk will gradually rise as we increase in temperatures, but nothing huge is gonna happen exactly as we pass one and a half degrees. So you're gonna have the situation where the public who starts to believe, um, that, that, that something dramatic is gonna happen, um, is living in a 1.52 degrees C world.

And they're looking around and they're thinking, we were told this is gonna kind of be the end of the world. And it's not. And I think that there is that risk that they start to lose trust and credibility in science, which is so crucial. If we, again, if we were to get people to, to actually act on this.

Ben: Agreed. I think that seems really sensible. And, and I think without honesty, 'cause we get enough about people not trusting experts or not trusting politicians. So the more you damage that, the, the harder it gets in the book. You answer 50 questions, but I was wondering, is there a favorite question you like to be asked or is there a question you always want to be asked but no one does?

Hannah: I'm not sure about the latter one. I think the, the one that I think is most interesting when people ask it, because there's so many tangential questions and, and and discussion points that come off of it is what about China? Right? So, uh, often it is a very, very common in countries like the UK actually there are two questions in the book that are linked.

In the UK for example, what's often brought up is that, you know, the UK is now only 1% of the world's CO2 emissions. What we do doesn't matter. Why should we really do anything at all? And the follow up to that is. Yeah, that's because China is emitting so much and it's purely on China to, to, to reduce and tackle this.

And, and those two questions are very much linked. And I think the question of what's happening in China is so rich in detail and, and tangential discussions that I think it's, it's, it's always a, a good one to get asked. I think we can, we can go into more detail here, but I think the, there's just an interesting paradox of China where, um, the reality is it is by far the world's largest emitter.

Um, it does burn a lot of coal. It does still build new coal plants. So on the one side, it looks like this kind of climate villain, if you want to frame it that way. But on the other side. You could argue that it's one of the countries or the country that's actually taking clean energy deployment and decarbonization, uh, the most seriously.

So domestically, the rate by which it's deploying solar, wind, electric cars. So last year more than half of new cars sold in China were electric. You know, that's way ahead of many countries in Europe, way, way ahead of the us. So it's, it is moving really quickly domestically, but is also really seeing the energy transition and clean energy as this kind of, uh, I guess new economic transformation for, for its economy.

So they're, they're really leaning to the manufacturing of the minerals. We'll need the solar panels, the batteries, to also export to other parts of the world. So there's this very, very interesting dynamic in China where it's this paradox where, uh, on the one hand it looks like a climate villain, but in the other maybe looks a bit like a climate savior.

Ben: We might as well touch on China as you've raised it up. I, I think that's a really interesting framework and they do seem to be committed. They have targets and they're doing things. My two kind of little interesting factoids is, although they are building new coal, they have stopped funding, uh, new coal outside of China.

So they used to be one of the largest funders of that. And that's, uh, gone away and actually regular, uh, finances don't really wanna finance that all, so that's disappearing. And then I was just looking up, I think in the first six months of this year, so 2025, they built over 200 gigawatts of, um, clean power.

And that's more or less, I think if you translate to that's 200 million households. So it's kind of a small country that, that they've powered. And it's about the same amount that the US wants to build in the next five years. Um. On the other hand that is actually just enough to offset the growth in energy that they need.

So they're doing it, but it's only just, uh, it's just bending, which is this, uh, push and take that you have with China. But I do think, the question I always ask myself is, at the end of the day, do we really think that China's gonna be part of the problem or part of the solution? And I think in the round you are tilting it to being part of the solution and you need to try and nudge it even further along that path.

Hannah: I think there are a couple of like interesting points again to elaborate on China. So yes, China's building new coal plants. What's interesting and people under appreciate is that coal plants. Are running less often. Right. So the reality is I actually don't, just don't care how many coal plants China builds.

I just care how much coal it burns. Um, and the reality is that even though it's building new coal plants, those are running less often. So you can have the scenario where it still is adding new coal capacity, but actually it's burning less coal and nicotine less CO2. And as you said, part of the challenge here is that.

China's electricity demand is growing so rapidly, even though it's building huge amounts of clean power as just about making up that entire growth. Um, so over the last few years there's been this kind of, it's always kind of just been on the edge where solar and wind deployment are just about enough to cover electricity demand, but not quite.

So that's why coal has increased still. But as you see in the last year, in particular, in the last six months, um, actually that has outpaced electricity demand. So there are estimates that that China's CO2 emissions have actually fallen from, from power in the first six months of this year. Um, and, and I think, I think in terms of a, a really key, I think, I think often it's useful to have a kind of pivotal.

You know, point, milestone, point at some point. And I think that will be, you know, global, a global peak in CO2 emissions where we can say, this is peaked, let's now get emissions down. And what's absolutely crucial to that is China's emissions peaking, right? Basically when China peaks, the world will peak, right?

Um, and it's very hard to predict peaks, but I think people are now starting to get a little bit cautiously excited that we could be on the brink of this, this peak in, in, in emissions. 

Ben: Yes. So part of my job is forecasting, and I would say that within five to 10 years, my probability of peak is very high.

Maybe not one, two, and I can't name you the exact year, but if you say five to 10, uh, it, it does very much look like, uh, we are gonna peak and, and potentially, uh, sooner. Um, I was trying very hard in the book to find a question that I'm asked a little bit, uh, which you don't address, and it was really hard.

So those both 50 are really good. But one, which doesn't appear in the book, maybe it's slightly sociopolitical in some regard is about whether our decision to have children should be influenced by our thinking on climate. And I think to some extent this is actually mostly an accounting quirk or static models that people don't quite understand.

But I also have a kind of pragmatic technologist answer. That's what I call it, about how that humans are the ones which will need to create the systems and technological change. So we really shouldn't be, uh, worried about that. Um, but I was wondering what do you think of this question and human flourishing and, and whether it should, uh, whether decision to have families or not should be influenced by any of our thinking on climate?

Hannah: Yeah, so I think there are often two reasons that people bring up if they are concerned about having children, uh, as a result of climate change. And one is like an input and one is an output. So one of the key concerns is that by bringing another human into the world, they will increase environmental pressure.

They will use energy, they will. Uh, consume fossil fuels and they will just increase amount of CO2 emissions and, and the, and the challenge with climate, um, and, and this often leads to the notion that, you know, actually the root of the problem here is population growth. And if we could dramatically reduce population growth and that would lead to individual decisions to have fewer children, then we would be on a much, much better path going forward than where we are.

And I think the reality is, when you break down the numbers on this, any demographic changes we make today will have almost no impact on emissions and global temperatures going into the future. And the reason for that is if you change fertility rates today, there is often. Quite a significant lag before that actually has a meaningful impact on total population numbers.

Right. Um, and and the reality there is that by the time we've reached a stage where it has a significant impact on population numbers, emissions will be extremely low, or emissions per person will be extremely low, right? So let's say we change fertility patterns. Fertility patterns today, it takes by 2050, for example, or 2060 for that to have a meaningful impact on the total size of the global population.

And the reality is that by 2050 or 2060, um, emissions per person should be extremely low, if not close to zero. Right? And if we're not there, then we will have failed quite badly on our decarbonization. So at the point by which. Population could have any meaningful impact on emissions. Uh, total emissions and per capita emissions should actually be very, very low.

So, and, and the, and, and I actually covered this on a post on my substack looking at, uh, there was an interesting paper that came out trying to model this and, and I think the, the, the end result was that, you know, a change in many billions of people in total population, um, by the, by 21 hundreds would have a, I think it was 0.1%, oh, sorry, 0.1 degree, uh, change in global temperature.

And that was for, you know, having billions of people difference in the total population. So I think we're actually past the point by which. Uh, demographic changes are gonna have a, a meaningful impact. And that also goes in the opposite direction, right? I think there are projections that global population peak might not be that far away, right?

Mm-hmm. The timeline keeps coming forward and forward, and I think some people see that as a kind of, again, a kind of climate blessing that if, um, population peaks way earlier than we thought, then, you know, we'll be able to drive down emissions much more quickly. And again, I think that's not right. I think any other direction, I don't think at this stage population is gonna have a huge impact on, on emissions.

Ben: Yes. And it's a really interesting observation that our consensus models for that comes in and in and in. And I think I also point that to one of the issues, or, or just one of the challenges, the fact that we are, we are using models and models aren't necessarily the world, and you've gotta take a lot of these things into account.

But I'm, I'm very much with you on, on the population front. On, on the flip side of that, in the last year, one of the most talked about ideas, I guess particularly coming out from the US but is going around globally, is this idea around abundance. So, Ezra Klein, Derek Thompson have been talking about it, but it's been floating around for a little bit.

Um, they kind of really talk about the abundance of everything really. But for sustainability, in particularly in particular, they talk about the abundance of clean and green energy and electrification. What do you think about the ideas of abundance? And I guess on the one hand some critics would say, uh, this is too, uh, techno optimist.

Um, that would be one sort of criticism. On the other hand, people might point out to say, well, actually this is a way that you can kind of raise everyone and get a kind of consensus coalition for the things that we need to do. 

Hannah:  I think there's a, a question of whether I think that's a positive and something we should aim for.

And then there's a political angle of, um, you know, is that the type of, I guess, messaging and narrative and goal that is most politically salient if we want to tackle environmental problems and climate change. And I think my answer to both is, yes, we are. I think if you are to. Look at the political situation today in terms of how people think about climate change, how leaders talk about climate change, um, how people, what people's concerns are about the climate solutions.

And I come to I go through many of them in the book. I think the reality is that for a lot of people, the sense that in order to tackle environmental problems, what we need to do is, um, cut back. We need to reduce our standards of living. We need to go back to a way of living that we had in the past.

'cause that's when we were sustainable and now we're unsustainable. I think the reality is that to most people, that's just not that appealing, right? I think the reality for most people is they want to live a good life. They want cheap energy, and you generally get cheap stuff when you have abundant stuff, right?

That the, those tend to go, go hand in hand. And, and they are, uh, looking for credible alternatives to many of the technologies and stuff that they. They use today rather than just saying, let's just cut that out completely. Um, and I think the way you do get there is by emphasizing the, not just the climate benefits of this transition, but importantly the economic, the lifestyle, um, uh, and, and, and knock on benefits that that, that this transition has.

And I think the reality, I think when you're often talking about, you know, energy, I think what a lot of people miss is how much we can increase energy services to people while also reducing energy use. At the same time, I think people conflate these two, and I think that's a mistake to conflate these two.

So I think the reality is when you blow up what the global energy system looks like, most of it is just wasted energy, right? And that's wasted in two ways, right? When we burn stuff. We just chuck away a load of energy away, right? So when you burn coal, only a third of it actually gets converted into electricity.

For gas, it's maybe half, right? So you have huge losses in that part of the system, but then you have huge losses and basically in using fuels rather than electricity, right? So for your petrol car, 80% of the petrol you put in your car. Is actually what we'd say is wasted, right? Because it's actually not delivering energy services.

Only 20% is delivering the energy services, which is moving you from A to B, right? With electrification, you get rid of huge amounts of those energy losses. So for an electric car, it's basically the inverse where 80% is going from moving you to A to B, and only 20% is wasted. So when you blow it, when you blow this up and then look at the models for the the energy transition, what you realize is that we could get rid of huge amounts of that energy at the top of the chain, which is not doing anything for us or proving our lives in any way.

And you could keep the energy services the same or actually increase the energy services while still reducing that bit at at the top. So I think that's one one key thing to get across is that, you know, trying to provide more abundant energy services does not necessarily mean you need to use more energy.

You can actually use less energy and get more output. 

Ben: Exactly. Um, and this touches on, I mean, we spoke about this in our last podcast, so we won't rehash it. So if anyone can go this about that, um, this is one of the, uh, critical things you pick up in kind of degrowth ideas that actually by focusing too much on that you miss all of these things.

And I, I would assume you still have the same, uh, critiques around, uh, the ideas that they had, that you had last year into this year. 

Hannah: Yeah, I mean, I think it's actually just got stronger based on the political situation where I think there is. May, I don't, I actually don't think this is necessarily reflected in public opinion, but at least in kind of political rhetoric.

Um, I think there, there, over the last year or so, there has been a shift to what, less away from climate change to either not talking about it whatsoever or talking about climate action in a more negative framing. Right. And I think that's true of many countries. It's obviously true of the us you even see it in the UK and many other countries in Europe.

And I think the, the notion that, you know, the way we should try to progress and push climate action more is therefore to say, well, we should just shrink the economy or, uh, um, even just reduce energy consumption. Like even if you just put that message, we should just reduce and do less, um, in order to tackle climate change.

I think there's just politically, it's just a non-starter, even more so than, than when we discussed this last time, uh, last year. 

Ben: Yes, I would've probably said, uh, a few years ago, I was 99% sure of that. Uh, position for forecast is really never like saying 0% or a hundred percent, but it even in increased.

And the thing which switched me was actually, uh, the pandemic because essentially we did have a version of Degrowth during that time and everyone found it really awful. So, uh, I just don't think, well, and emissions  just dropped (only) five or 7% or something?

Ben: Some something tiny, right? not of the scale required.

Hannah: I mean, I think one, when there's been discussions on Degrowth previously, I think, um, there's a criticism that, uh, actually not what de growers are not advocating for is reduction in GDP or necessarily like economic growth. Uh, it's aimed at particular sectors and in particular reducing energy, right? So shrinking energy and resource consumption.

And I think my response to that is that, you know. Trying to be, I guess, pragmatic about it. The, the easiest way or the, what I see as the most effective way, if you want to actually just reduce energy, again, that energy at the top of the chain is just to promote decarbonization and electrification. To me, that seems a much more effective route to reducing energy use than to tell people that they should cut back on energy use.

I think the last one, you might get marginal gains from that. I don't think they're gonna be dramatic or across whole populations, just decarbonizing and electrifying, uh, gets you much, much further, and, and to me just seems much more politically feasible. 

Ben: Yeah. Much, much better tool. Exactly. Um, okay, so before we tackle, um, a handful of questions from the book where I ask some people about which are the ones that, that come up, um, I thought we could do a, a kind of past and future, um, exercise slightly.

Um, although I guess this one's also a little bit answering the climate anxiety question, but if you could speak to your 16-year-old self, um, I guess the Hannah who loved, uh, science but was worried about the planet's future, uh, seemed to really love water. Um, what would you say to her now about hope via finding your voice, what to do about climate anxiety?

Hannah: Um, I think I'd tell her first, I would tell her to, I guess go wait and look at some of the trends in. Human's ability to solve other problems. Like I think the, my, one of my issues at the time, I was very concerned about the environment, environmental, uh, change and I think quite rightly, um, but the issues that I conflated that also with human development challenges.

So the environment stuff was getting worse, but also all of the human development challenges were getting way worse. And we were kind of living in the worst times on almost any dimension. And the reality is, if you look at the data, especially on human development measures like health, child mortality, poverty, hunger, et cetera, over long time scales, you know, we've, we've made huge amounts of progress on that, right?

So humans are capable of solving problems when we put our minds and, and resources behind it. So that's one, one thing. And I think on the kind of emotional side, I think I would try to get across that a balance of. Concern and hope is good and fine. Um, I think often we are told to push in either just one or the other direction or that's the way, at least the way it's framed.

So now I'm relatively optimistic and you could call me hopeful in some sense. Um, but I think people then conflate that as me being unconcerned in some way or not taking the problem seriously. And I think the reality is you can actually, being hopeful and optimistic about our ability to solve challenges has a prerequisite that you have to believe in the challenge in the first place, right?

You have to acknowledge there's a problem or an issue or to solve, but then also, uh, have some sense of optimism and hope that there are things that we can do to tackle it. And I think at the time I was only in the, the fear anxiety, uh, there's no way we can get out of this box. And I would try to, to instill that, that bit of optimism, that there are things that we can do.

Ben: And let's take Hopeful Hannah and put her into the future. And now hopeful Hannah is maybe 70 or 80 years old in that is likely to be 90, uh, 90 to a hundred years with the kind of life expectancy cohorts that we're looking at now. Uh, what do you think Future Hannah, future Hopeful Hannah, say write, write back in a postcard to us today?

Hannah: Oh, that's a very good question. That's one of those kind of end of history illusion questions, right? Where, when maybe not quite, I think people assume that they're, they're growth trajectory is finished and I'll be the same when I'm 90 as I am now, and that's obviously wrong.

I would, I can tell you what I'd hope we would write. Yeah. I hope what I would write back to my. Current self is, is, is trying to instill how much awe and wonder is to come. Um, I think, I think a lot of people, if you ask them now, have very much lost any sense of, I guess, excitement about the future that lies ahead, right?

Like it's either things are gonna go backwards and we're gonna regress, or we're just gonna kind of trundle along and muddle through. And it seems like there's very little to be excited about over the, in the coming decades. And I, and I don't believe that to be true. I think there's lots that we can be excited about, whether it's technological change in energy, whether it's innovations in health, which we just discussed off the podcast, uh, prior to this.

I think there are huge amounts that we. I, I would like us to be excited about and hope that we make huge amounts of progress on. So I guess when I'm 90, I hope that we write back to ourselves and I write back to my current self and say, you were right to be excited, but actually you should have been more excited.

'cause what's happened in the next, uh, 50 years has just been absolutely incredible. 

Ben: Yeah. That's a, that's a really good, um, a really good way of thinking about it. I was thinking about this question as well, and, um, I have a similar, similar view. I, I guess I do a little bit unfortunately about thinking about risks and opportunities this life to too much.

And a lot of people worry about what I would call these left ha risks, so something really bad happening. Mm-hmm. Which is possible, but quite small. But I don't think they think enough about the equal and opposite. Well, I think equal and opposite and potentially bigger and larger, I'm gonna call them Right.

Tail risks. And my example for this is actually in, in both AI and obesity, whereas if you went back 20 years ago. You ask people about the state of where we're probably talking about peak obesity and you describe what some of these AI things are doing today, they would've said, well, that's kind of fantasy and actually we have it today.

And that's actually even 10 years ago you would've said this. So when you, when you go forward, you're gonna have all of these positive surprises that we don't know. Yes, you are gonna have probably some negative ones as well. Um, but like you say, the awe and wonder of some of those positive ones, um, at least hopeful, Ben, uh, is very much hoping that I'd be writing back to talk about that.

So I was gonna ask, um, from some of the questions, um, which comes up in the book. So I sort of took a small sample and said, oh, what are the questions, uh, which you are, you are kind of asking, and one which came up, which was essentially, can we transition fast enough? So what's your thoughts on that? Um, I guess you answer it in the book, but I dunno if it's been updated and, and what would you say to that question?

Hannah: Yeah. So I think, um, it's maybe worth thinking about what enough means, right? Like everyone, like it's a very subjective term and everyone will have their own definition of what enough means for some people. Um, actually the answer to that is just no, because enough for them was steam below one and a half degrees, and we're obviously not doing that fast enough to, to achieve that.

So I think that it's, it's a somewhat subjective question. I guess my, part of my opinion on it is, you know, could, can we potentially transition quickly enough probably for around two degrees, right? So for me now, two degrees is the kind of. Ambitious, but potentially achievable target. And that's kind of what my enough is kind of measured against.

And I think the, the, the, the, the framing in the background here is that, you know, we do need to undergo these huge, or actually several huge energy transitions, well that's moving away from fossil fuels and electricity, but also the kind of electric electrification transition in industrial transition. So a huge range of different transitions.

Um, and the framing here and argument put forward is always that, uh, historically, if you look at the long run data, you know. Well, some argue that there's actually never been an energy transition. 'cause any fuel or energy source that we've used in the past, someone in the world today is still using it, right?

So, uh, we've not even passed, uh, the transition away from wood because some people in the world, that's their main source of energy is wood, right? So that's the first argument. But the second argument is that even if you do look at, um, uh, energy transitions in different regions, you know, it takes 70 years to transition from coal to gas, or it takes, uh, another 50 years to transition from, um, gas to oil.

So these tend to take, you know, half a century or more in the relative. We don't have that amount of time. And I think the, like even there is, if you look at the speed of the rollout of. Clean tech today is much, much faster than the rollout of any of the, any of the fuels or technologies that came before it.

Um, so solar in particular is, is, is, is accelerating extremely quickly. Uh, wind is in second. Nuclear is now not growing very slowly, but it did in the, uh, kind of sixties and seventies. It was growing extremely quickly, and then you got coal and gas, which were rolled out much more, more slowly. I think the key point there is that we, as part of these transitions, what we are doing is we're transitioning from.

Our energy source being commodities. So coal and gas or oil is stuff you dig out the ground that has some sense of fixed economics behind it. It has some sense of fixed, um, speed behind it, and we're transitioning to basically. Uh, from commodities to technologies and technologies follow learning curves, they can follow much more exponential rates, um, of growth, both in terms of drops in prices, but also the speed by which you can can roll these out.

They're much more modular, right? So you can deploy them much more quickly in many different places rather than waiting for this, you know, one coal plant or one nuclear plant in a given location. So I think we, I don't think it's appropriate to necessarily use the models of transitions in the past to therefore say, because it took 70 years, um, to transition from one fossil fuel to another.

That means it's gonna take another 70 years to go from fossil fuels to, to clean tech. I don't think that's an appropriate, uh, extrapolation to make. 

Ben: Yeah, I think that's really clear. And I think you also make the point that, you know, again, depending on what you think is, is enough, it's still that every point, 1.2 counts over, over that, you know?

Yeah. It lowers your risk. Uh, and for all of those type of things, there was, there was also a set of questions in the book, which essentially, um, was around resources and, um, sort of, um, the technical capacity of, of things. Um, I'll put them together. And so one was what happens when the wind doesn't blow? Is there even enough land for the wind turbines?

And what happens if we run out of, uh, resources like minerals or things to build the wind? Is, isn't that a huge, um, challenge for us? 

Hannah: Yeah. So the, the first one that comes up is, well, it's fantastic to move to solar and wind, but like sometimes it's night and sometimes the wind doesn't blow. And what you're gonna do when that happens and.

I think what's key to get across here is the different options we have at different timescales, right? So we actually have now very good technology, IE batteries, just standard lithium ion batteries, um, to basically store energy and dispatch it over the timeframe of maybe errors, right? And the reality is actually when you look at models across the world, many countries, especially those closer to the equator, can actually get extremely far if you just do a pairing of solar, wind, and batteries.

And there's much less variability across the year. And also there's a, there's relatively abundance on such that, uh, that combination can get you extremely far right. That is much trickier in a country like the UK for example, where we have less abundance on, and we do have quite abundant wind resources, but we have what's called.

The Duncan float, um, which is basically these much longer timescales where, uh, the amount of wind produced can be extremely low, right? So there you could be talking about days to weeks with very little wind. And the question is, what do you do to fill in the gap there? And there are a range of different options for this longer term, um, kind of intermittency or variability problem.

One is just to fill in the gap with other low carbon technologies, right? You can fill the gap with nuclear or geothermal, um, biomass that has mixed reactions, but there are other low carbon fuels by which you could fill that, that gap and build in more diverse electricity mix. Um, there is the, the opportunity for long range transmission, right?

So, uh, even if it's not windy or sunny where you are. There is somewhere else where it is windy and sunny, right? So, um, there is this possibility, especially across the US like large countries, you know, even, uh, domestically can, uh, dramatically increase internal transmission and, and trade of electricity.

But even across Europe, like I think there's lots of scope for Europe to do a much better job of managing this load across the entire country rather than every single country building an energy system purely for themselves. There you, in that scenario, you massively overbuild, right? So you build, if the UK was to, or any country was to only build energy supplies to power itself and it couldn't trade with anyone else, you would build more wind and more solar and other, uh, resources than you actually need, right?

So that's one option. There are other forms of heat storage. Um, uh, um. So thermal storage, for example. Um, there's storage in bricks. There's lots of different longer term storage options. And then there's options like hydrogen, um, which is a relatively expensive option relative to batteries, for example.

But for these longer timeframes would be necessarily that you just cannot build enough batteries to cover this. So my, my, my main point is that there are a range of different options to manage this variability. And I think the reality is, again, is that most countries can get pretty high rates of penetration, of renewables, 80% or more.

And then there's the question of how do you fill in the final 10% or 20%? And I think the, the, the not knowing exactly how we're gonna do that shouldn't stop us from getting to 80% now. And, and I have a lot of confidence that we will solve that final 10% or, or 20%, um, in the future. 

Ben: Yes. 80% extremely plausible.

And the last 10 or 20%, um, pretty likely. And you have also a sort of set of questions around the hard to abate sectors. So, uh, cement, I guess you could put aluminum fertilizer, maybe long distance flying. Um, you know, and what are we going to do about that? Isn't that too large a residual? And how much of a problem is that?

Hannah: I'm gonna come back to the, I'm gonna come back to the resource one 'cause I didn't properly 

Ben: Sure, yes. On the minerals, the resources. I guess that's also, yeah. Are we gonna run outta minerals? Well, we can do that either, either way. 

Hannah: Yeah. 'cause as a question I get a lot, like, are we gonna run out of minerals and, you know, aren't we just substituting one problem for another because we need to do huge amounts of mining for clean energy.

And I think on the first question, are we going to run out in the long term? Almost every, like long-term analyst says no. Right. So whether it's the i a or the Bloomberg or like a range of, of, of, of analytic organizations that say basically, no. And there are a couple of reasons for this. One, we can model basically how much of these different minerals we're going to need under a range of different decarbonization scenarios.

And for some, it's already very clear that if you look at how much we have and how much we'll need. We have enough, right? For, for, for many of these minerals. And then there are, there are a couple of other things that play into that dynamic, which makes me, uh, not that concerned that in the long term we're gonna run out.

And one is that, uh, we are extremely good at finding new stuff when we are motivated to find new stuff. Right. And this has been part of our, I guess our, our, um, you could call it our course or our benefit of fossil fuels, where we just continue to find more of them. So every time there were lots of projections about peak oil and then we just found more oil.

And I think that's the case for many different minerals, whether it's lithium or cobalt or any of of them, I think we will. Continue to find new resources. Um, there's another dimension to this is that we get more efficient at using these resources for these technologies, right? So a solar panel today does not contain the same amount of silver or silicon that it did 10 years ago.

It uses much, much less. So we become much more efficient. It uses these materials and then if you look through history, when there have been, I guess, resource constraints, we've been actually very effective at substituting one for another. Right. So you, you could see some plausible scenario where cobalt constraint, uh, resources are very constrained for batteries, but that obviously will result in a price increase in that.

And then there's the motivation to switch to alternatives and naturally have an alternative in its, uh, it's either cobalt free, uh, chemistry of lithium ion batteries, so nickel, uh, nickel, uh, or, uh, sodium ion batteries, which is another potential solution. So we are, we're very good actually being quite innovative in shifting to alternatives when, when supplies are constrained.

And then finally there's a question of, you know, won't this put huge amounts of pressure on mining and, and environmental pressures? And I think the reality there is that. Yes, we will need to mine quite a lot of new, uh, minerals for these technologies. But when you compare it to the energy system we have today where we're extracting and burning fossil fuels, uh, we will need far, far, far less minerals, uh, for the energy transition.

So to give some perspective on this, the amount of minerals we'll need across the entire energy transition over decades is something like hundreds of millions of tons in total. Right? Compare that to the fact that we extract 15 billion tons of fossil fuels every single year, and we'll continue to do that every single year, if not more, if we continue with a fossil fuel based system.

So, you know, we're actually talking about orders of magnitude less mounting by transitioning to clean energy than sticking with the, the status quo. 

Ben: Yeah, that makes, that makes a lot of sense. Um, and so that's actually probably quite a good segue into the, into the hard to abate sectors as well. 

Hannah: What was, sorry, what was the specific question?

Well, so 

Ben: I guess the set of questions is, oh, what are we gonna do about the heart to bait sectors like cement, aluminum, fertilizer and the like. Um, you know, we can't seem to do anything about it. Is it going to be too large of a, of a problem? Um, and I guess adjacent to that is like, all feel really uncomfortable about carbon sequestration.

We don't have this technology coming out and you, you have a kind of cluster of questions around, um, the, the ones you get around hard to abate sectors. 

Hannah: Yeah. So I think, um, I think. When people think about hard to abate, they're often thinking impossible to abate, right? So they're often thinking there's just absolutely no way that we're gonna be able to tackle cement or steal or aviation.

And I think increasingly, especially in the last decade, I think it's moved from being a possible impossible to abate, to actually being like quite hard to abate, or I should frame it expensive to abate, right? Often there is some technical solution there. And actually the block is that it's, it's expensive and, and people won't pay for it.

Um, maybe I can take an example of where, um, I think the solution space has moved. I should make clear there. When you look at the solutions we'll need, there are some that we can do today. We are, we're already doing today at scale, we're doing it rapidly and it's very cost effective. So the decarbonization of electricity, uh.

Electrifying roads, transport, uh, they are solutions that, you know, we know they work and they're becoming increasingly, uh, competitive and they are being deployed at scale. These hard to abate sectors are, are much earlier in the kind of technology readiness level where they're often, uh, have some smaller investment, but it's still in the kind of piloting type stage or innovation type stage.

But if I take the example of cement, right, so the challenge you have with cement, um, is twofold. One, you use, um, coal, uh, energy in the actual manufacturing process. But actually the, the, the, the key challenge there is that in order to make cement, what you do is you take limestone. So calcium carbonate, you basically heat it up, uh, to extremely high temperatures and you get calcium oxide.

And the calcium oxide is basically the stuff you put in cement. But if you have fallen the chemistry, you know. Also at the end of that chain, you get carbon dioxide directly, right? Um, and the reality is there's no way that you can convert limestone to cement without producing the CO2 directly from the process, right?

So the question is how do you get rid of that? And I think the fallback solution often in the past was carbon capture and storage. So what we'll do is we'll just stick a big thing on the end of the plant that will capture the CO2 and we'll like store it underground, the, that works. And we could probably feasibly do that.

Just the reality is that it makes cement more expensive, right? If you add carbon capture storage on the end of anything, it automatically makes it more expensive. So that's been the, the challenge there. But there are like very interesting solutions coming through, which take a different approach entirely.

And um, one of those is basically saying we. Rather than starting with limestone, what we'll do is we'll start with calcium silicate. Um, and calcium silicate comes from basalt, which is an extremely abundant rock or on earthborn. No chance that we're ever gonna run out of that in any way. So we have huge amounts of this, and rather than using coal, we'll basically use this electrolysis process and that way you can convert that calcium silicate into cement without the byproduct of of, of CO2.

Um, and I actually think this is probably the cement solution. That I'm, I now, I now get very excited about cement, which I, I didn't have on my play card a decade ago. Um, but this is probably a solution that I'm most excited about because it takes a different approach entirely. Um, gets rid of the CO2 from both parts of that, right?

You're no longer using fossil fuels to process the energy, and you don't have this, uh, CO2 emitted directly. And to me that looks far more credible to get it to a cost competitive level than it does by using carbon capture and storage. And when you look across the different sectors, other hard to abate sectors.

We are kind of in a similar-ish position where, again, we haven't deployed any of these at scale yet, but there are, um, quite promising solutions coming through a range of different companies working on, you know, different I guess solutions. And it is, for some of them, it's hard to pick a winner at the moment.

Um, but I have quite a lot of confidence that, you know, within the next. A decade or two decades, um, we'll get there and, and, and these solutions will start to scale. And of course people will say, well, that's far too late. You know, we can't wait 10 years to get this. And I think the reality is that we should, or, or, or at least I think we might need to just wait 10 years or so.

And I think that's fine. I think if we make huge amounts of progress on the stuff that's easy to do today is cost effective and cheap to do today while building up these, these other technologies. The reality is that by 2050 or 2060, they'll be in the position where they're at scale and they're drastically reducing emissions.

Ben: That makes a lot of sense. And I like your phrase, hard to abate, but not impossible to abate. So that's a, that's a good one. Um, well that's great. I mean, we're not gonna have time, unfortunately, to go through all 50 questions, but that'd be great. 'cause then listeners can buy the book. Um, but it was interesting you mentioned that cement wasn't really on your bingo card a few years ago and, and now it is.

I would be interested in say, over the last year or two, um, whether you've changed your mind about anything in the sustainability space, either something that you've got, oh, I guess it was a bit like cement. It's like, hmm, don't see anything on the horizon. Oh, now I do. Um, maybe one kind of hopeful, or you could also go one the other way where you just changed your mind and thought, oh, that looked like it was gonna work.

But maybe, maybe now it doesn't. But have you changed your mind about anything in the last year or two? 

Hannah: I think the main thing. Is actually less about a specific solution or technology and is more a more conceptual level of um, actually how we frame the climate change challenge or what amount of missions reduction we should be aiming for.

And I think previously I was, uh, very much in the kind of, what you might call it, the net zero crowd, where it's like, what we need to do is we need to get emissions to zero by 2050. Right. And I think the, I think I have swayed slightly away from that. Um, and I think the reason for that is, one, I think net zero is a concept has being quite weaponized in politics and I think it's maybe not a particularly useful term.

Anymore to try to convince people to take, um, climate action. But again, I think a lot of the challenge and the framing of what we need to do to tackle climate change is that when you focus on getting to absolute zero, I think for many people it becomes totally unbelievable that we would be able to do that.

Um, like I was having a conversation with someone about Net Zero. Well, not net Zero. I was, they asked what I did and I tried to explain, I struggled to explain what I did, but I kind of talk, yeah. I did stuff on climate and, and that brought up the conversation of like what they thought about climate. And, and they're not immersed in the space in any way.

They're just, again, a regular person that's mildly concerned about climate change, uh, and doesn't have a particularly strong opinion. But what they were saying about Net Zero is like they're not in favor of net zero because they don't know what we'll do about plastics. Right. But I think if you were to hear from that person, they're not in favor of net zero.

I think immediately in people's mind when they hear that phrase is they think, well, you know, they don't care about climate change, or they're not in favor of clean energy, or they're not in favor of, you know, electrifying transport or any of these solutions. And their answer is that was really not the case for this person.

They were in favor of all of the above, but the reason they weren't in favor of net zero is 'cause they didn't know what know what we would do about plastics, which is like 2% or something. Right? And I think this, this like narrow vision on how we get completely to zero, I think in some, in, in, in some sense, um, blocks people from engaging with the, the, the issue and is maybe a bit of a distraction from the stuff we can really have a go at and dramatically do to, to reduce emissions today.

You know, I think the reality is, um. Again, coming back to honesty, I don't think we'll be at net zero in 2050, but I think we can get to 85% reduction or 90% reduction even if we go quite quickly by by 2050. And you know, if there's five to 10% of emissions left that we're still struggling with and it takes us another decade or two to be able to solve those, I actually think that's fine.

You know, once we get emissions that low, the rate of warming will be so low that we won't be under the huge amounts of pressure we're under at the moment because we have really quite rapid warming because our emissions are the highest they've they've ever been. Like. I think once you get to those relatively low emissions levels, which is like.

The remaining 5% or so, you have more time to work out what you do about plastics or what you do about aviation, which is again, just a few percent of, of the world's emissions. So I think that's been a bit of a shift for me is, uh, being less narrowly focused on how do we completely get to zero and be like, how do, how do we get nine emissions 90% down and then we'll work out the rest.

Ben: Yeah. That would be significantly good. I mean, in, in reading your book, at least in the first part, I thought, I don't think this is a change in your view, but the, the clarity of how you wrote about the interplay between, um, personal change and the system change and how yes, we need the system and so you can do your personal things and they happen and you know, there signals to the system via our consumers and the votes and all of that, but not to essentially get hung up about it.

And I know I varied, sort of simplified that, but I thought the clarity of how you wrote about that, uh, this time round was, was particularly lucid. 

Hannah: I think, I mean, I, I frame it in this way and I think it's true that I think they're often two extremes when it comes to these discussions. Like on the one hand you have people that say, you know, this is all about individual behavior change.

And you know, as individuals, if we all do our bit. Then, you know, sum it all up and we all have fixed it. Uh, and I think that's just not realistic. That's not gonna happen. Um, and at the other end of the spectrum, there's this sense that this is purely a systemic problem. And actually, um, it's, it's basically just on fossil fuel companies and some governments to take action.

Um, and, and, and if they do that, then the problem is solved and they bear all the responsibility. And again, I think that extreme is also incorrect. Like I think that's a false dichotomy that is either an individual, uh, change issue or a systemic change issue. I think the reality is the role that governments, companies, investors, et cetera, play, um, is absolutely crucial.

But what they, I think what their role is, is to make sure that there are. Low carbon alternatives available, um, that they are affordable and cost effective for people to, to adopt. And that it's made, you know, easy for people to do that, right? The infrastructure's there, if infrastructure's needed, um, that the, the, um, the grid system is stable so people have, uh, stable clean energy supplies, et cetera.

Um, but the reality is, is that that's not gonna happen. And I don't think we can expect that they're gonna put in all of that effort. If as individuals we're completely unwilling to change, endure a bit like that, of course that's not gonna work. Right? We can't expect, the example I use is on transport, right?

We can't expect governments and companies to, you know, either invest heavily in public transport and make that available or make really good cheap electric cars available and build out a whole uh, charging network so people have access to it. They're not gonna do that and there's absolutely no point in them doing that.

If we are all stubborn and say, no, I would like to stick with my petrol car. And of course I'm not gonna take the bus or the train or move to an electric car. Like very clearly, if individuals are not willing to change, that system just doesn't work. So to me it's just a false dichotomy and both matter.

Ben: Sure. Yeah. That was very clearly expressed. Um. So 50 questions. Uh, fast forward to today. Is there a 51st question that, oh, you couldn't quite fit in, or you're now getting asked and you think like, oh, if I could do the next 50, the 51st one, this would be the one, uh, that I would answer for people. 

Hannah: Um, not an additional question, but I think the, there was a question in the book on ai, and I was very honest in the book that in the first draft of the book, there wasn't a question on AI and its energy impacts.

And the reason for that is that, especially when I wrote it, there was basically no data to go on. Right. And I felt like it would, like, there was. Nothing valuable at all that I could possibly add there. So it would just be a blank chapter or just a, a kind of nonsense chapter where I wasn't saying very much over the course of writing it.

I think some of the data solidified a bit so that I could say something about AI that I hope is reasonably useful in, in framing the issue. But I think, I think my, uh, perspective on that, uh, shifts much more quickly than it does for any of the other questions, just because ai, uh, and the discussions on that are moving much more quickly.

So I think I maybe would've written the AI question a bit more differently than I did. 

Ben: Yeah. And it, and it continues to change. And I think, I guess it depends on who, who you are asking things, but I think there's a little bit too much focus on AI risk, although I guess it comes in so many different forms.

'cause you've got existential privacy data, resource use and things like that. But certainly, and you've answered this in your substack, um, over time, the resource use is really, we shouldn't worry about it. And then on the flip side, I think this is the, is this the question you flipped to Bill Gates as well?

AI's gonna enable I think a lot of technology things. I was, I was looking at the climate models that Nvidia, um, are helping, there's been this, uh, Google's stuff on protein folding within health. I know that's not directly sustainability, but it was going on to do all of that. And that's really hard to predict as well 'cause it's more of an enabler.

But I, I do think that that could, um, that could really be impactful. 

Hannah: Yeah, I think the, I mean, we didn't, even at the time when I was writing the book, have very good estimates for like, everyone's interested in how much energy a chat GBT or Gemini or one of the chatbot queries uses, and we really didn't have very good data at all at that time.

We have imperfect but slightly better data now, and I think my, uh, view on that has, has even more solidified that, you know, especially for individual. AI chat bot use people vastly overestimate how much energy it's using in the environmental impact. You know, it's really, really very tiny. Like even if you are asking chat GBTA hundred questions a day, which most people don't, um, it's still a tiny, tiny fraction over your overall energy footprint and your overall carbon footprint.

And I think to many people, you know, uh, seeing the environmental impact of, uh, asking cha GBTA hundred questions seems incredulous, right? They would think that that's, you know, absolutely horrendous for the environment. Like why on earth would you, how could you possibly ever do that? I think the, the reality when you break down the, the numbers, especially for individual use, it's, it's extremely low.

Ben: Yes. I can't quite remember it, but something like eating a steak is 10 to a hundred times worse or something. Something like that. Yeah. I mean diets, yeah. Whether 

Hannah: it's water or carbon footprint diets or, yeah, like huge in comparison. 

Ben: Great. Um, maybe turning just to, uh, a couple of more, um, personal adjacent things then.

Are you still getting time to run by the coast? How do you deal with the Scottish weather? You know, is that still part of your routine in terms of writing and and running? And, uh, do you listen to, uh, books or music or, or things to inspire you? So are you still getting time to run and what else inspires you?

Hannah: Yeah, I still run basically every morning. Um, I find it very relaxing. Uh, partly very relaxing. At the same time I find I often half draft things in my head when I'm running. Like I, it helps me kind of clear my thoughts and like sometimes I start thinking about, oh, I'm gonna write this, or, so I think that's, it is like a very sacred time, time for me.

Uh, yeah, we're coming into the like, not so nice weather in Scotland and winter, which makes, I think it's actually the darkness that makes it worse, right? 'cause you're basically going out to run in the dark, which is not that fun. Um, uh, but it's fine. Uh, I do enjoy it and I'll continue doing it throughout winter, even if it's extremely icy.

I keep that up as a regular part of my routine. I'm not really an audio book listener. Um, I. And I hope you all listen to my audiobook, but I tend to find, I find podcasts much easier to engage with and listen to than audiobooks. I don't know, it's, I think it's the back and forward discussion keeps it more dynamic than just hearing someone read something.

I tend to find, I don't really take the information in when. When I'm listening to an audio book, so that's not really an option, but I do listen a lot and inspired a lot by, by podcasts. 

Ben: Great. Um, last time we had a mini discussion around, um, essentially kind of charitable giving and, and how to think about that.

Um, and you really influenced me. So, um, I, I have, um, already sort of from many years back tried to give sort of more and kind of aim for sort of 10%, um, post-tax of, of thinking about that. Um, but you made the point that actually giving to global development and healthcare, you know, could be seen as part of the solution and things.

And I had always felt a little bit bad that I'd, I actually, although I do some work within sustainability and, and think the sort that, that more my, uh, giving was weighted that way, that way and always felt a little bit bad that maybe I hadn't done that. So I went to re-look at that. And that made me feel quite good that a lot of the human development stuff that I'd, um, decided to support, um, was quite good.

Um, but I wonder, may, maybe we can frame it the other way around this time is, uh, maybe if we gave you, um, a billion dollars or maybe 10 billion, which actually in the grand scheme of things, it sounds like a lot of money. And it is a lot of money, but it isn't actually an astronomical amount of money. But if you had say, a billion or you, you could go up to 10 billion if you like.

Um, how would you think about directing, uh, that money today? 

Hannah: Oh, that's a good question. I mean, yeah, a billion. Or even 10 billion. Sounds like a lot. I, I think on the topic of giving, I mean the reality is what was the us uh, aid budget was something like maybe 60 billion or so. Uh, so like even putting that, and that's been like mostly cut this year.

So yeah, my 1 billion or 10 billion would, would still only be a small debt. Yes. In their moment to be lost. You only get 

Ben: to do a project or two. You don't get to save a country. So, yes. Yeah. 

Hannah: Um, that's interesting. I think I would. I think people would expect me to say I would invest it in solar panels or something.

I don't think I would do that. 'cause I don't think that's where the highest cost benefit for charitable giving here would be. And a lot of people 

Ben: are working on solar panels already. 

Hannah: Yeah. I think, uh, yeah, I think again, I mean in on clean energy, every year we invest and now it's over 2 trillion. So again, my 1 billion would be a tiny, tiny fraction of that.

I think again, I would either direct it towards, uh, very, um, high, high ROI health projects. Um, or I think one thing I've become, I guess a bit more. Enthusiastic or convinced by, in the last year or so has actually been just, um, give directly. So giving money rather than saying, you know, I'm gonna spend 1 billion on, uh, high, uh, value seeds or malaria bed nets or tuberculosis, uh, medications.

Actually what I'm gonna do is just give the money directly to people on extremely low incomes. And some of the results, especially in the last year, have been extremely positive. Like, I think what there was maybe a study in Kenya where actually, and I can't remember the amount that was given to particular households, but some, the, the, the drop in child mortality rate was like quite stunning from just giving people money directly.

Um, and the argument there of course is that, you know. People, people in particular situations know far better than you or I, what it is that they need to improve their living standards or, or, or what they need from, from a health perspective. So you should just give them the money and they will make very good decision on how best to, to use that.

So I think, um, I would actually like to see, I know I couldn't save a whole country with this even, uh, a small, low, low income one, but I think I would like to see more projects where actually quite significant amounts of money are given, um, in a particular region of a country or even a, a very small country to see, you know, overall if you just give people money directly, like what are the knock on impacts and are those impacts sustainable?

Um, and I think that you could start to see extremely positive results from that. 

Ben: Yeah, and I think I was just looking it up, I think give directly, uh, which GiveWell has, uh, looked at, does that, and, and they do seem to see quite high return on, on investments for that things. Yeah. It, it is interesting some people who, who think about this particularly in philanthropy, uh, you know, look at, um, you know, whether as something is underrated and also how tractable or not it is, those are the terms they use.

And when I've been thinking about it, I've actually get, I get less, um, I'm now less worried about so-called tractability. Like, so how feasible this is because I've now seen so many things, which I would've thought were. Infeasible now happen. And so now I slightly wait is if the people or the organization or whatever seem to have a really committed, passionate idea and it makes some sense and, and then it's still underrated as in it seems to be an underfunded, um, area that people aren't looking at.

Then actually that's maybe a, a plausible, you know, for people really thinking about how to give, uh, way for that. And they shouldn't worry too much about tractability because we are very bad at trying to assess probabilities of some of these, um, technologies and things. 

Hannah: Mm-hmm. Great. How would you wait, how would I'm gonna spend on you, how would you spend your.

10 billion, 

Ben: how would I spend my 10 billion? So, um, I do think, um, direct giving is quite good. I do think, um, um, a little bit more, uh, long run health interventions, so I'm still a little bit on, I guess people talk about this kind of the, the meta layer of things. But for instance, uh, I don't think we've got a lot of data on, um, you know, how people track over time.

So these are kind of longitudinal studies or there's actually all sorts of things. And the reason for this is that, um, normal companies can't make any money outta this. And governments, because it's a long range thing, can't, don't have anything to show for it, even actually in a four to 10 year cycle. So I do think there's a, there's a lot of more long run research that we could do about what's best for us over time and, and how, and how that's followed.

Um, so that's one. Um, and then a little bit also in, in, in. So that's particularly actually in health. 'cause I think there's some of these long run health interventions, which we've got some quite strong, feasible, um, hypotheses about. We just can't test them. 'cause no one wants to track this even for 10 years.

May maybe not a lifetime. And actually there's also a little couple more on how we do, um, organization. Uh, so this is a little bit odd, but I think it's really intriguing to me that for instance, um, boards, committees are how a lot of the world's decision making is done. And actually we know very little about how to make good decisions.

You know, why is it in the world of sustainability that a lot of the. Sort of technocratic experts, people deep in the weeds actually have quite a lot of consensus on what we should do. Um, but it can't transmit into actual, um, practical action. Um, and it's just not simple. You kind of think, oh, well why can't we do that?

And it that. That seems to me a layer to slightly unpick. So I'd probably do a little bit for that 'cause I don't think it's too expensive. And then this other area, which I think is a bit, um, underserved, I guess comes on this, this idea of, of venture philanthropy. So again, it's this slightly higher risk, normally smaller amounts of money for people who, I guess they come across as these kind of moonshots, um, slightly quirky ideas.

Uh, to borrow phraseology from venture capital vc, that's kind of like a pre-seed or seed. So kind of quite early. But actually when you look at the history of how really great ideas have come about, even even things like AI and things, um, it seems to be overweighted in people who, if you looked at it, you just thought, well, that's a crazy idea that we shouldn't back.

Uh, so if that was what we thought, then actually we, we should probably at the margin be backing maybe 10,000 more of those ideas with just. A million dollars say or right, or a hundred thousand. Because if, if only just one or two of those happens to be really transformational, then you, then you've made a really big ROI, even though actually 9,000 of them, uh, are, are gonna, are going to fail.

Uh, because I, again, I thought about this. People say, Ooh, we are investing in something high risk or government say, or we, we've done this in high risk. Uh, but actually, uh, a lot of them kind of succeed at the end and they have like this written report. So it shows to me that we're not really doing high risk.

'cause high risk would say like 9,000 should have a high failure 

Hannah: rate. 

Ben: Yeah, you should, you should see a high failure rate if you were really properly doing it. And for all, all sorts of other agency problems. I mean, I don't think government's ever gonna do that. It's like, oh, well we just spent your billion and nothing happened, which is the median scenario.

But you know, there's one thing did happen and it transformed our world. And I, and I feel we're a little bit. We're a little bit light on that. So those are my quirky ways of doing it. But my base layer probably still actually is health, uh, health interventions. 

Hannah: I mean the UK government, like quite strongly backs this area program you, you're familiar and that is kind of framed around this, like, we should be going for kind of moonshot big risk things.

I dunno what your perspective is on that. 

Ben: Yeah, so I'm, I'm, I'm really, um, positive on Aria. So they talk about things like moonshots and things and they have got a lot of these interesting technologies. Uh, you should. People listening, you should look it up. They've got these program management developers and there's, there's lots of live projects on, um, and it's relatively small amounts of money.

So this is it. There's only hundreds of millions. It's not even in, in, into the billions for very underlooked at um, areas. But they also see that small things, things which are really potentially quite transformational. So I'll just talk about one small thing 'cause it talks, uh, about a lot of sense. Uh, so this is a project which is the, this round is closing in October.

So if you're listening to it later, you're gonna miss out. But they call them innovator circles. And the idea was if you look at the history of innovation, you often had tight, tight knit circles of let's say 80 to 20 people who really, um, encouraged one another in kind of an honest way of saying, this is what we know, this is what we don't know, and this is what where we could potentially do better.

And they did really transformational work, actually, not just in technology. You saw this in humanities as well, so you see it in writing circles and why is it all of these philosophers seem to get together in these small circles? And so they thought, well, maybe there isn't, that doesn't need that much money, but maybe we should try and do that.

And they did a pilot project with, um, with a couple of circles and had really, really great outcomes. People said, we've really pushed our ambition. We've started more projects. It was really great that we had open honesty with what's in the field and what's working. And they're now gonna seed with, with not that much money.

People who want to do other innovator circles in, in technology and, and the like and funding that. And so that's exactly the kind of thing that isn't really getting funded. Anywhere else with this sort of idea, a very plausible, tractable idea, which is already kind of working. Um, and then they have that on, on very many fields.

So, um, yeah, I still really positive it kind of gets a bad press because you kind of think, oh, these are the moonshot ideas. They're spending money thinking about the philosophy of Jira engineering and solar shields. Is that really a good use of our, our money and, and that type of thing. And you do have to think about it and cost benefit, but it is only a small amount.

And if some of these things really hit, they could be very, uh, transformational. So yeah, I'm, I'm generally positive on Aria and the equivalent in the US is, is these DARPA or, or particularly arpa e around, um, energy. And, and I think even Bill Gates's thinking was slightly, um, influenced by thinking around how you, how you do it and how you fund, uh, innovation and, and breakthroughs, uh, for his breakthrough energy and the like.

Yeah, I 

Hannah: was gonna say there's breakthrough energy. I mean, his. I think I coming back to the like stuff we know how to do now and do very cheaply, like, I think my, my point there is that, um, that that's where most of the money at the moment should be going. But the reality is for these hard debate sectors and stuff that we were discussing earlier, um, for them to be ready in 2040 or 2050, right?

You need some amount of investment now and it is that early stage kind of seed investment that gets innovators going. So I actually think some of the kind of calciums, so look at cement solutions we're talking about, um. Was initially, uh, funded or backed by Breakthrough Energy, uh, kind of Bill Gates as kind of incubator for energy Solutions.

I think he does a lot of this focus on this kind of hard to abate stuff or stuff that, uh, uh, is, seems less tractable. You see what I'm saying? Yeah. Um, but does need some small amount of funding Now if you want it to be at all a reality in 2040 or 2050. But the the point is that you don't need to be investing trillions in it right now.

'cause there's actually nowhere for the trillions to go right now. It needs start. Yeah, exactly. 

Ben: It's probably just tens of millions or whatever. I'll tell you my two other left field intractable, not tractable ones, but the, the things in that is I do think. Long distance electric airplanes are more viable than people think.

Half the issue is, is regulatory. And, and yes, you're gonna have a heavy battery and, and fly it. Um, but I do think we could do more to speed up that. I definitely think short shorthaul is, is plausible in early 2030s. I think the regulator actually is gonna be the bottleneck, not the technology, but we need something for long distance.

And I would really love it if we could also get a, um, cellular steak, which isn't a steak. 'cause I think if you, I know they're doing it in chicken and other things, but I think if you crack a ribeye steak for people and they did not know that it was not a ribeye steak, uh, and I know you kind of think, well, well, beef consumption should be down on things.

It's just not gonna happen in America. So what you need to do is give them something, but they didn't know it was a ribeye steak. Uh, and then, and then you would be there. But there are some people working on the food issue. But I, I do think that that may be one area where someone could do it. 

Hannah: Agreed.

Ben: Great. Okay. So la last, well maybe last couple of questions. One would be, um, any other current projects that you're working on? Obviously busy, uh, with, um, book tour and speaking, and you have your substack and you have all of the great work that you do in, in world, in, in data. So you probably don't actually have time for much else, but it'd be interesting in, in, in other, other current projects.

And maybe you could also give some thoughts, um, to advice for people who might wanna work in sustainability or even life advice, uh, generally thinking around, uh, you know, what you would, uh, advise for listeners to think about. So current projects and any advice that you have. 

Hannah: I'm not sure that would come to me for life advice.

I'll try. Um, no, yeah, I, um, at the moment I'm like always working on a range of things. Um, like obviously the new book is just out, so a lot of my time is, is doing stuff on that. I keep getting asked, am I writing another book? Not, not yet. Like I. I hope I will write another book at some point. I do enjoy the writing process and really going through the process of writing a book really clarifies your thinking on a given topic and challenges it, right?

Like once I. I think that's the case with writing in general, not just writing a book, which also comes through again, I think in my, my substack and stuff when I sit down to kind of take on a question on my substack, I think the process of going through and trying to explain it to someone on paper really clarifies or challenges what you're thinking.

Like I think it's very easy in your head to think, yeah, I understand that, and then. You go to write it down and you realize you don't understand it. So I think, uh, I find that process in general quite rewarding. So I hope at some point I'll write another book, but I, I haven't started yet. Um, I'm, yeah, I have the Substack, which I kind of do in my free time.

Again, it's. I find it fun. I find I learn a lot of stuff and clarify my thinking, doing that. I also have a, a podcast, um, where we solving for climate, where we talk to a range of people like innovators, entrepreneurs, people in policy, um, academics about different parts of the climate challenge and, and, and what they're working on, uh, and what we can do to solve it.

Like the emphasis is not on just talking about climate change, it's solving for climate. So we try to focus on the solution lens of the problem. And then my, my full-time job is at our own data and they are, uh, I work on like a very, very broad range of stuff like. Still quite a lot of climate and environment stuff, but lots on health and foreign aid, um, and, uh, demographics, like very broad.

And I really enjoy that process of being able to explore and engage with a range of, of different topics and, and, and, and work on interests outside of climate and environment. And I think on top of that, I have very little time to do much else. Um, but yeah, I like the having a diversity of things. I think in terms of like advice, I think, um, I think it's.

I think it's easy to then index on your own experience 'cause that's all you can really draw from in a real way. But I, I think based on my own experience, I think one thing that's been really key in a kind of professional level, or like finding my place in the world where I feel like I can have some impact has really been, um, finding that combination of different skills that in some way carve out a niche for yourself or make yourself a little bit unique.

Um, and that kind of niche for me has been this mix of the kind of environmental, scientific background. Um. Enjoying writing. I think the enjoyment of writing is, is a, is a key part of it, but also being okay at writing, um, and, and explaining things to a general audience. And then the kind of data science, data visualization dimension of that.

And often people working in the space will have like one of those, right? So like of there are obviously many, many goods environmental scientists and, and people, um, working on the science. There are often extremely good and beautiful writers and there are people that are fantastic at in depth data analysis or, uh, making beautiful data visualizations.

But what's quite, uh, rare is like trying to somehow combine all those free into a particular kind of career trajectory. And that's kind of where I think I've landed. I don't know if it's been deliberate. I don't actually don't think it's been deliberate. And I think that's another key part of my advice there is that like if I look back.

On my kind of trajectory. I think at no point was it really obvious what the next step would be. I think what's been really key has been, uh, it's often talked about as like trying to, um, increase your surface area of opportunity. Um, where, and a big part of that I think is actually putting yourself out there.

I think a big part of that is, uh, working in public or writing in public or building a public portfolio so people can see your work, they can judge your work, they can engage with your work. And I think, you know, if you do that and, and do that quite well, uh, stuff tends to come at you. And then you have often have like some, uh, capacity to be able to pick what you want to do.

Like that's not for me, but this is for me. And I think that's the kind of bumpy road I've been on in my. Career so far, but it's been enjoyable and I think, um, um, I hope that it's made some impact, I guess. 

Ben: Yeah, that sounds great. Uh, try and find out what you like. Don't be shy to share your work in public.

You might find, uh, some good things happen. 

Hannah: Yeah, exactly. I think another way of framing it is like, this is often talked about in kind of impact circles or kinda effective, effective altruism, uh, circles, but like trying to find a particular area where you have a very clear, like comparative advantage, right?

So like try to find an area where if you weren't doing that particular role, would someone else be doing it? Right. And I think there's a lot of kind of traditional careers where you can be fantastic in that role, but there are loads of other equally fantastic people doing that. Um, kinda, uh, um, kind of standard role and I guess this comes back to like finding a particular niche.

Often if there's no one, if you don't fill that particular niche, there's no one else that will film that instead. So I think that's another way of, of framing it. 

Ben: Yeah, for sure. And you can combine them, at least this is talking from my experience in the sense that, uh, I dunno, many other people who are an investor do podcasting and right place for theater and suddenly each one of those things are not necessarily super unique, but when you put them all together, uh, you turn out to be an an odd shaped thing.

Hannah: I didn't know you did plays for theater! 

Ben: So on that note, Hannah, thank you very much. 

Hannah: Thank you very much Ben. Really enjoy our chats.



In Podcast, Life, Science, Writing Tags Hannah Ritchie, Clearing the Air, Climate Change, Climate Science, Climate Honesty, Climate Optimism, Sustainability, Net Zero, Abundance vs Degrowth, China Energy Transition, Renewable Energy, Clean Tech, Decarbonisation, Our World in Data, Science Communication, Environmental Policy, Global Emissions, Climate Solutions, Philanthropy, AI and Climate, Hope and Climate, Ben Yeoh Chats, Podcast, Interview

Samuel Hughes: Architecture, Beauty, and the Future of Cities | Podcast

August 20, 2025 Ben Yeoh

Samuel Hughes is an editor at Works in Progress and an expert on architecture, urbanism, and planning.

“We treat age as the value, but often what people are really protecting is beauty—they just don’t want to admit that’s what matters most.”

We discuss the feasibility of mass-producing beautiful buildings through good materials and proportions, the decline of ornamented architecture, and why maintaining industrial skills matters for long-term infrastructure projects.

The conversation explores Japanese zoning and urbanism, the impact of culture and geography on city design, Berlin’s mix of rent control and street grids, and the idea of “gentle density.”

“Most individual buildings in Tokyo are pretty ugly, but the overall streetscape is often nicer than in Britain or America—urban form matters more than facades.”

Samuel also shares his views on greenbelt reform, the importance of mixed-use urban density, and how civic and institutional pride once shaped even the most mundane buildings.

“In the 19th century even pumping stations and hospitals were built to be attractive—today our institutions too often forget that civic pride shows in the architecture.”

We touch on underrated cities like Dresden and examine future solutions for Britain’s housing supply crisis.

“The real breakthrough will come when communities see that allowing development makes them richer—turning adversarial planning into a win-win.”

Finally, Samuel reflects on how policy research can meaningfully shape public infrastructure and urban planning.

Summary contents, transcript, and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Watch the video above or on YouTube.

Contents
01:02 Mass Producing Beautiful Buildings
01:43 The Decline of Ornament in Architecture
04:37 Tokyo’s Urban Design and Zoning
10:05 How Long Should Buildings Last? UK vs Japan
16:13 Philosophy, Beauty, and Emotions
25:53 Public Policy Trade-offs in Practice
31:41 Berlin: Rent Control and Urban Planning
36:32 Housing in Europe: A Historical Context
38:02 Modern Housing Markets and Trends
41:50 Rethinking the Greenbelt
44:40 Planning Authorities and Their Role
50:40 Overrated and Underrated Urban Ideas
1:02:03 Dresden: Lessons in Urban Reconstruction
1:05:03 The Future of Britain’s Housing Supply
1:08:40 Career Advice on Policy and Design

Transcript (AI assisted so mistakes possible)

Ben: Hey everyone. I'm excited to be speaking to Samuel Hughes. Samuel is an editor at Works in Progress and has been involved with the Think Tank Center for Policy Studies and the Create Streets movement. He has worked in a number of roles around architecture, urbanism, and planning, and he posts prolifically on social media channels highlighting architecture and design.

Samuel, welcome. 

In the UK or even globally. Can we still mass produce and build beautiful buildings?

Samuel: Yes we can. I mean, a beautiful building, like in a way it's not that difficult to build. You can do it with good materials, good proportions a bit of greenery, good urban form, that, that has never become that difficult.


There's some stuff, so I think I. One of the ways that people traditionally made buildings beautiful through the use of applied ornament of various kinds, that has become a bit tougher. Not because it's impossible to mass produce ornament. It's extremely easy to mass produce ornament. And we used to do it all the time, but because the mass production has stopped.


So I was talking to, um, some guys in Germany about this recently. They used to cover their buildings in, um, ornamented plaster, this automated plaster stucco work. And that was extremely cheap in the 19th century. The figure I've been told don't quite how reliable this is, but the figure I've been told is that it would add 15% to the sales value of a building and cost only 2% of the build cost.


So it was totally ubiquitous. But today, because they've stopped doing that for a hundred years and all the factories have closed and all the production chains have broken down, it's pretty expensive. It actually, actually does require expensive handicrafts today. Oddly there's been, for this particular good, there's been a technological regression over the last century as mass production has declined and handcrafts are now the only way you can do it.


So for that for that pathway to beauty, it's probably harder to mass produce it now and the costs have gone up. But that's, and that, that's an easy way of making beautiful things. That's a way in which, like, cheap job builders in the 19th century mass produce beautiful stuff without thinking about it too much.


But it's not the only way to make beautiful stuff. And you could find lots of like clever designers today who make beautiful buildings without use of applied ornament.


Ben: It's really interesting that we have, this is one of the arguments for industrial strategy or keeping industrial processes that in and itself might not be adding as much value.


But once you lose the workforce or the skills. It can be quite hard to gain back. And then you lose all of these other second order effects that they sort of say the same in in long term construction projects and in infrastructure. There is a, there's a technical level of skill which is useful to keep in the workforce even if they may not be as productive.


Samuel: Yeah, I had never thought of that connection, but that is, I mean, yeah, that's correct. That's true. Yeah. It's, um, and there are a few cases, so like there's one factory, maybe there's two factor, two small factories that still do cast stone ornament. So it's basically a kind of crush stone. You mix it with a little bit of, of, uh, cement and it looks remarkably similar to stone is much cheaper than this kind of card stone.


And I think there was one of those factories survived through the 20th century doing basically garden ornaments because people never completely stopped buying like little statues of nymphs or whatever to put in their gardens. And now, now that classical architecture has revived a bit in, in Britain.


They're mass producing quite a lot of, they, they do work for like the, um, the little towns that the king has patronized, poundbury, and sedan. But they survived through the drought years making little garden statue statues. That wasn't an industrial strategy, but it is an example where like the survival of something in a special way then meant that like a little body of skills and infrastructure was still in place, ready to be scaled up when demand for the, uh, for the primary good returned.


Ben: Yeah.


Samuel: Yeah. Very interesting.


Ben: I think you have once lived and researched in Tokyo or in Japan. What did you learn about Japanese zoning or Japanese building and, and culture and planning, either firsthand or, I know also there's been some work, uh, come through works in progress on thinking about Japanese design.


Samuel: Well, there's a lot to say. I mean, it's an amazing Japanese cities are. Basically like the type, they've got lots of problems, they've got lots of flaws there. But overall, they are basically like the Titanic success story of the 20th century cities with amazing infrastructure and with mixing of use and with, in their funny way, like high quality public space and the flourishing street life and all the rest.


But what can I say about, I think you will notice when you are in Japan, here's one starting point. Most built individual buildings in Tokyo or any, any Japanese city except Kyoto, are pretty ugly. Like they're actually worse than the average building in a, in Britain or in the United States.


But the overall effect they have, like the overall environment of walking down your average Tokyo Street is generally a lot nicer than the. Characteristic the average street in Britain or North America because of the urban density, the way the streetscape is defined, the quality of public space, the lack of car domination the, and the sort of richness and interest of urban life in Japan.


And so it does, it is the great example in favor of, this, the idea that urban form is more important than facades. I'm famous for thinking facades are quite important. I may, I really annoy people by going on, but, but like the example of Tokyo shows that although I, you know, yes, for sales matter, yes, Japanese cities probably would be nicer if they were prettier, but like you, they have basically created wonderful flourishing places out of lots and lots of ugly buildings.


And that's an interesting thing that we should bear in mind in terms of the institutions that created it. They have fairly, they do have a zoning system and have had one since 1920s, I think pretty early on that they introduced one. But it's a fairly liberal zoning system, so they tend to allow a greater range of uses and a greater level of density.


Tokyo is famous for, it doesn't really, doesn't provide on street parking off street parking. People are allowed to provide it for themselves, but because land is so expensive, they generally don't, which is why car ownership is so low in, um, in Japan. When Tokyo and rural Japan, of course, everyone has cars transit, um, and amazingly good rail systems.


They've done this thing. I'm working on this at the moment, the, um. The system that we did with the Elizabeth Lion, with Thas link, where you take these old Victorian railway lines that run to the edge of the city center and then stop. Because in the 19th century, they didn't have the technology to tunnel them under.


And then you join them together and create an integrated metro system by basically mostly you're just reusing your old, like decrepit, Victorian suburban railways. But by linking them together, you make them more interconnected. You increase the frequency and capacity. Tokyo's done this to, I think, 35 suburban railways, so they've got the equivalent of, it depends exactly on how you count them, but something like 15 or 20 crossrails that they've, and this is part of the great secret of like why Tokyo's rail system is this extra, like the best in the world, this extraordinary monument.


So yeah, I mean, I could say there are many more things I could say about, about Japan, but like, it's a very fascinating example of how. Cities can be made to work, at least given the starting point that they had.


Ben: Yes. I, I think a lot of city design of things, policy and the like, uh, influencer obviously, but a lot of it seems to me culturally and geographic specific, like Japan has come that way through a series of events which you are essentially not really gonna replicate in a lot of other countries.


Yeah, and I agree. So walking around Tokyo and, and some other places I would agree that actually the facades in Tokyo are not. People would prefer a lot of the facades in London, but you're true, there's somehow urban design and a repetition of this. And in some ways it harks to the fact that the, you know, in this country, the Georgian box house or even the Victorian box house was a pretty box and they just replicated, I think you, uh, I picked up a tweet that you said or something, which, and I replicated maybe half a million or a million times.


That's right. And lo and behold, it actually you get a kind of more interesting facade. But for them, we would've called it at the time a kind of cookie cutter approach to that. And that's kind of interesting. But in Japan, I also fascinated by, they don't necessarily think that their buildings are gonna last a hundred or 200 years, even though a bunch of them have.


And part of that is thinking about earthquakes or wood and, and part of that cultural cultural aspect. And then this interlink with transport because the rail is brilliant, but it also interlinks with a very dense bus network as well when you go around Tokyo, which then allows you to have. No cars and these very cute, walkable community neighborhoods, of which there's a bazillion because Tokyo is actually, uh, amazingly large around that.


So it's the kind of interlinked policy with all of that. But I wonder about this idea about how long you think a building's going to last. 'cause also some of our new buildings here, because of really the technology we now embed in some new buildings, they maybe not thought of trying to last 500 years and 200 years even, of which obviously some of them.


So I dunno what you think about the length of lasting of your building and how we should think about that. And both Japan as an example of where they haven't necessarily thought about it being a, a really long time, although some of them do. And where we are in the uk a thing


Samuel: that I have often thought is we, so a thing I pointed out about, I often point out about Georgian architecture is.


It's relatively placeless. And it's mass reproduced. And it's boxy. So these three things that people always say about contemporary British house building, oh, they're like boxes that could be anywhere and they've been churned out, by this company. Those were all, those things were all totally true, maybe even more true of these extremely celebrated buildings in the 18th and 19th centuries where, you know, basically there's like one facade reproduced 500,000 times all over England.


And most, yeah, if, you know, if you really know the stuff, the details, like building regulations meant you've got slightly different buildings in Bristol to Liverpool to London, but they're very similar as similar over a long period of time and over, over space and then the like. So people there, I think they are landing on oh, it could be anywhere, or, oh, it's too boxy.


Or, oh, it's. Been mass produced and they're struggling to find what they really don't like about these buildings. And they've landed on those things, but those probably don't really explain what they dislike. A lot of the time what they really dislike is just the buildings are ugly, but ugliness is not seen as a like respectable thing to talk about.


Too subjective, it sounds a bit dated or whatever. So people don't want to name that as the thing that's gone wrong. And so they find these other things which are proxies for ugliness, and they focus on those. And I think they obviously ly sincere, they sincerely believe it's those things, but if you actually test their reactions in different cases, you realize that's not what's motivating them.


I think something like that can be true with some of this building to building to last stuff or some of this fascination with old buildings. We know in, in Japan, I mean this has changed a bit, but historically in Japan, they didn't have the same idea of the continuity of materials being the important thing about a building.


And famously there's still, there's still at least one Japanese temple, which they demolish and rebuild every 30 years. And they've been doing this for a thousand years now, temple which they see as a thousand year old building and as an important piece of Japanese heritage, even though at any given time, the actual timbers will be no more than 30 years old.


And that used to be very generally the view in Japan. I think all temples were treated that way. I think Western influence has changed that to some extent, and now there's a more mixed picture. But that was, that's, that's an, an old view they had of heritage and that would probably have been closer to the view of heritage in Europe in the 18th or 19th centuries before Rus and arts and crafts and so on, which shifted it to more towards like, it's the actual materials that matter.


And I have, I can, I dunno if I can have any evidence of this, but I have a sort of a, a hunch that again, with age, part of what people really care about here is probably beauty, but they don't want to talk about beauty. So they talk about age and part of the huge support that the conservation movement has in Europe.


And this sense, you know, people really feel now, like basically any decent building from the 19th century shouldn't be demolished, uh, and shouldn't maybe even really be seriously tampered with. And that I think is probably partly because people feel like we've got a finite pool of beautiful buildings.


We can't really add to it. It's just like this pool we've mysteriously inherited. And every time we lose something from it, it's gone for good. And like our stock of this just continues to decline. So we should be extremely protective of it. And these like. What are actually like the low end of 19th century building the workers cottages from 19th century, these are, they were a huge achievement at the time, a huge step up in housing quality from what people were moving out of.


They're not great buildings. They were built to a very low standard, like in the 19th century, they would've been delighted to knock them down and put something higher, better quality in place. And yet we now feel like, yeah, I know, sure, but they're not gonna put something nicer in place, are they?


They're gonna put something worse in place. So better stick to the, grim, poorly built to up two downs. So I, I think with all of these things, I'm sure people partly care about, really do care about the it feeling local, it not being a box, its actual age. I'm sure these are all genuine values, which people care about, but I do think they all get a big injection of.


Additional support, which is in fact like concealed love of beauty that people don't want to acknowledge. And so they, um, they promote a proxy for beauty instead.


Ben: I hadn't heard it articulated so well in terms of this thinking around beauty. It does remind me of a couple of things. One is your anecdote from Japan, which I think is true about how they used to or still rebuild buildings.


Is it, is that a Greek philosopher ship? So if you have the same ship and replace all of the planks, is it really that Yeah. The ship of thesis. Exactly. Is it really that ship? And some people would say yes, and some people would say no. And it I could see that's exactly that temple if they rebuild it.


And they obviously said yes, it is the same temple. So they took that view.


Samuel: There's a whole branch of philosophy called ology about that question. Extremely boring field. But they certainly, the Japanese appear to have a different folk meteorology of buildings than, uh Yeah. And you, it works for them.


Ben: They believe it to be true. Um, and actually one other reflection is on philosophy. So I know you studied, I think, analytical philosophy, uh, in your younger years and I did skim some of your work, your thesis, and I think if it's true, if I read it correctly one of it was around the work on emotions.


And how you describe beauty just then led me to think, so I'm probably gonna completely mangle this, but one of the ideas that you had on looking at emotions is that sometimes we think about emotions and there's a kind of rational aspect to them and we kind of think like, okay, this is a rational response and it's proportionate.


But one aspect of emotion seems that it's either underrepresented or overrepresented. So say the emotion of grief, we feel really strongly and potentially if you're gonna be very rationalist about it, you would say maybe that's not helping you, you know, live your life and that. Um, emotion might be too strong.


And you had some interesting thoughts about how you might reconcile those two views of emotions. But interesting when you're talking about beauty, then it led me to think that actually there is a, there is almost a rational part of us or there is some emotional part which goes, yeah, we can say where something is very beautiful or very ugly.


And we do understand that. But there is another part where we are unconfident of saying that or applying that to an emotion and say, we feel very uncomfortable with that. And so we go to some physical thing like you say, aid or the materials used or it's use or, uh, something like that. So I was interested in how much your philosophy has influenced your thoughts about beauty and the place and whether I've just thought about that on the spot, whether what I've just said had any, uh, reference or things to your philosophy at all.


Samuel: That was about right. Um, I, it's been a long time since I've actually worked on, like personally done any research on, on analytical philosophy. So I, it's rusty now, but yes, I, um, I certainly do think that aesthetic and emotional responses can have a kind of speaking slightly loosely, but can have a kind of knowledge encoded in them.


And people may often be sensitive to a whole range of truths or values in the form of their emotional and aesthetic responses, which they maybe don't have access to intellectually. And one of the problems that we have in public policy is to. Try to do justice to some of those kinds of reactions when we are not good at talking about them.


Uh, and it's particular problem. I mean, there's, there's a few different things going on here, but it's a particular problem for public bureaucracies when they come to deal with this. They're very, you know, for understandable reasons, they want to be able to deal in things that are very clearly public, where there's clearly quantifiable data, there's clear ways of arbitrating disagreement.


Now we do have ways of arbitrating disagreement about emotional or aesthetic questions. Like people spend a huge amount of time arguing about whether they're right to be angry or whether, you know, which piece of music is better or whatever. So there, obviously there are ways to talk about these things, but is is in some sense true that they're less straightforward or they're, you know, their, it's not as.


It doesn't come in a format which is readily put in a, in a government document. And so public officials are very uncomfortable with dealing with that kind of thing. But that doesn't mean that kind of thing doesn't matter. And so that does, there is a tendency for those kinds of values to be overlooked in policymaking, I think.


Ben: I completely agree. I see it within healthcare, which is one of the domains. I look at a, a reasonable amount. Uh, and I always do this in a public policy philosopher person in the street, uh, dilemma, which the government always faces in terms of a healthcare budget. And that is we have this idea of a life year or a quality adjusted life year, and we price it those various economic ways to do a kind of statistical life price.


This isn't really the price of life, but they go say, well, 20 to 30,000 pounds for a life year is good value for money for our healthcare budget. And for instance, treating a diabetic meets that hurdle. No problem. So let's do lots of diabetics because cost benefit analysis suggests we'll save lots of diabetic lives.


And then you are faced with something like the preterm baby or the person who's born with a genetic disorder. And when you do the same sort of framework on costs, uh, you end up with a hundred thousand to 500,000 pounds for costing. And so if you're completely cost benefit, you will, well, let's never save those.


'cause we can always save more diabetic lives. And we're a constrained budget, so we're, we're always losing lives anyway because we need to spend money on, on somewhere else. But if you propose that to people, they go, Hmm, that doesn't feel quite right. We still want to save some preterm babies. And in fact, if you ask the person in the street, they would go, yes, let's save some preterm babies.


Like if we, if we had an infinite healthcare budget, you, you would obviously do this and these other things. And so they've actually had to kind of try and get that into their thinking. Whether you wanna call this. Virtue or pluralism or something, this other form of a representation of soci of a society preference.


Say if that's what you want to represent, because we do have a preference for saving some. In fact, we could save them all preterm babies at half a million versus the diabetic at 10,000, even though we know that in pure life value years that isn't correct. And actually you have a range of things, and that's a kind of very clear example which people can think.


But I actually think it is a similar case in aesthetics, uh, when we look at urban design and whether we do civic planning and pride. And how much of that is worth, I think


Samuel: So I'm speaking totally beyond my, uh, whatever field of authority I may have, but I'm sometimes impressed by some areas of British healthcare policy where the government is relatively, some of these quality-adjusted life year programs, they.


Prepared to make a call on how much worse does that make your life, right? This kind of disability, this kind of pain, this kind of and then we'll make public policy on the basis of these what are ultimately going to come down to like judgment calls of someone saying, I reckon this is worse. That, and that seems to me to in fact be basically a responsible way to make policy.


Like they are act they, yes, it's very unpleasant that we have to make these trade offs. It's very unpleasant that we have to make them based upon judgment calls where you think, how bad is blindness relative to using, losing your leg relative to being in this degree of pain all the time. Or to like, but those are the choices we have to make.


And I like suspect if we looked at the implicit trade offs that we're making. They would be totally insane. Like obviously vastly more money being spent on something that's less important in this context and vastly more being spent in that, like trade-offs that nobody would endorse if they were consciously required to make them, but which are made because they're being made by like different single issue bureaucracies who have been given a mandate to make a decision on something just in respect of one characteristic that it has or something like that.


Whereas healthcare policy, uh, seems to me to be made in a, a somewhat more intellectually responsible way. But yeah, that area of healthcare policy anyway, like,


Ben: so I, I would concur, I would say around 80% of it is very much weighted too. A cost benefit analysis of quality and, and other things go into quality.


So it's quality adjusted, pain adjusted disability adjusted life years is another way of looking at it. And when you do have something which is orders of magnitude and there's quite a lot of assumptions go into it. But if something's at 10,000 and something's a hundred thousand, then the 10,000 thing is most of the time going to win.


But interestingly I put these difficult use cases of right where there is a limit to it where you have a society preference, but you are, you are completely right actually a lot of healthcare. And actually that is the work of a lot of healthcare economists doing that. Although, interestingly, bringing it back to transport and planning, a lot of that initial work was done via a road transport philosophy.


Uh, which is that for every mile of road that you build, you are gonna have x million of economic value. But on the other side of it, you are gonna have more accidents and maybe an amount of environmental cost and you can actually price that. Roughly. And if your orders of magnitude out, then maybe it shouldn't be something you do, but it's also the other way.


If you've got an orders of magnitude, a really, really high economic number, then maybe you are making, uh, maybe you are making this trade off. And that's the difficult thing when you actually come to like things like, yeah,


Samuel: no, I think that's right. And the


Ben: like,


Samuel: highways engineering is another area where it's done by engineer, a kind of specialized engineer.


And we might disagree with some of the assumptions they make. We might think you are weight weighting these values in the wrong way, or, but they are, they do have like a consistent system based upon assumptions, which may be sometimes mistaken, but which are not like patently insane. And they do make trade offs in a kind of responsible way.


And I've also, oh yeah, I'm gonna say they're actually doing this seriously rather than just like in a sort of like crazy ad hoc way by contrast. And they're doing it in good faith as well. Yeah. The um, the. Cases we get. We had brouhaha, which you might have followed about the, um, the BAT tunnel proposed for HS two.


So this was HS two, the huge railway running, which, uh, gradually being built between London and Birmingham was going to run near to a colony of a kind of bat, which has some sort of protected status, be genes bats. And it was thought the bats might sometimes collide with the train. So Natural England is effect, it's slightly more complicated than this, but effectively required as a mitigation a hundred million pound bat tunnel that would stop the bats from getting to the trains.


It's not, again, it's not, it's never very clear it would actually have this effect. And you, the implicit trade-offs in terms of the amount of money that there's only a couple of hundred bats in this colony and, the, even if it was saving all of the bats, the number of the amount of money going into saving one bat.


Yeah. Compared to the amount that, uh, the number of humans that you could save in Britain, let alone if you spent the money internationally, like huge numbers of human lives being sacrificed on a, for the tenuous chance of saving a bat. This is a totally insane kind of policymaking that has arisen here.


Yeah. But it's arisen because natural England, you know, it's like good faith. They have a legal obligation to only care about one thing in this context, damage to protected species. And it's not their job to make, oh, weigh that against other values, how many bats per human, et cetera, et cetera.


Like they are just, no, this is the only thing that we are here to do and we are not going to let you build this tunnel until you have made these steps to avoid this harm. So completely insane trade-offs arise in a situation like that. And you just think if we were being. You know, if a particularly intelligent kind of alien were analyzing human societies and they were comparing on the one hand, you know, the NHS working out how much treatment it's going to give to, and the highways engineers working out cost benefit now for road along with these like totally insane trade offs that the British state is also making at the same time in these other, I think this is a very strange, the British state is a very strange thing, the way it can be, act like a fair in its clumsy fashion, fairly sophisticated and fairly rational in some contexts, uh, and yet also aggregated to something which is completely crazy in other contexts.


Ben: No, I, I completely agree that there is this trade off in there. It's the same. I'm particularly interested in green infrastructure and the arguments you make about wind time per turbines because they will kill birds. But obviously you've got to offset this around it. I don't know about good solutions.


I guess ideally you want a good faith decision maker somewhere within the system who's empowered to look at that trade off and then in good faith. Just decide which, what should be more important or not. And if you can't put it as a decision maker, 'cause essentially that should probably be your politician or, or minister, but maybe they can delegate it to a technocratic solution.


You could end up actually with the UK's nice. Within the health system, this National Institute for Clinical Excellence, but on big infrastructure projects. Or you would have a look at their down domain. So wind turbines and tunnels would be an exactly great domain for them. And then these are the five big questions.


And then we have a committee of five who would look at that and Nature England could submit and other people could submit, but they then have to in the round say, is this good for the country or not? In the same way that we do on diabetic medicines versus preterm babies versus this. And they technocratically look at it and go, well, in good faith, we think.


The best thing for this country is A, B and C decisions, and that they're empowered to do it. I, I think you could empower that within a politician. There's lots of political economy reasons why that's tricky. So the next best, I think would be this and time limit. Got six months to submit everything you have on these eight major questions where there are trade-offs.


They'll have three months to decide it. They're gonna decide it in good faith. And then once that's done, that's it. Let's not have any more reviews on that decision. 'cause these are five experts, or 12, or however many you wanna do and do it. That


Samuel: I think, and the good news about the, you know, what the, um, the highways engineers and the NHS committees show us is that it's actually not impossible for the British state to do that.


Like, it's not, it, sometimes it will be ministerial judgment. Inevitably, there are so many decisions that have to be made that they can't all be made by Aries state. So it will need to be alienated into a process of some kind. But like, it does, like also it's still. The key thing is the decision is made by a body who is responsible for all of the different values that are affected here, like effect on humans and effect on bats or whatever the case may be.


Effect on economic growth, effect on the environment, effect on birds and effect on our ability to produce renewable energy. And then they have to make, like do their best to make a sane trade off between these values. And I just like in the cases where cases like these NHS committees or the highways engineers where they are making those trade offs consciously and trying to do it responsibly, I think like the evidence seems to be, we sometimes disagree with them, but they're not like off the charts crazy.


Yeah. And so they'll come to, they're people, you know, not so different to us. They'll come to judgments about it that are not so different to our judgments. The important thing is just that like someone actually makes a conscious call on the trade off and tries to do it in line with the, like, receive rationality of the, and with the framework and the


Ben: governance


Samuel: and


Ben: Exactly.


So I, I know there's a lot of anti sentiment against technocratic solutions and wanko at the moment, but I actually think Nice. Which is this, the health body which looks at it, given all of the constraints, actually does really well. They look at it, they have a thing, their budget's maybe not as high as we would wish, but these are the constraints.


They're under uhhuh. Thinking back to transport planning and the like and maybe going via other places you've been, I think you've spent some time in Berlin or in Germany, and I think Berlin mixes, uh, rent controls. Is it this Mitch Spiegel and street grids? I think Prussian age street grids.


And they're quite permissive on some forms of alterations. So I'd be, I'd be interested in what you think about this mix of rent control and street grids and how successful these policies are, and whether I would say they're kind of culturally specific, so I'm not sure how much you could import to Britain or other countries, but to the extent that you saw good things in Berlin, what would you like to export to Britain or other cities?


Samuel: I mean, I think rent control is a disastrous policy and has always been disastrous wherever it's been tried in. But in Berlin, they didn't really have, so the municipality tried to impose rent controls or did impose rent controls a few years ago. But there was litigation against them and eventually the German Constitutional court decided that it's not an area over which the Bunes lender have jurisdiction is a federal matter.


The federal government has some very limited, uh, rent control policies. I, I, a few weeks ago I was looking into, I was in Berlin actually. I looked into how this worked and I, I don't think I will get the precise details right if I, but it's, so there's some kind of second generation rent control system but it doesn't like rents and Berlin are not much below or maybe not really at all below their market level.


It's a fairly, it's actually a not, it is an elaborate song and dance that doesn't have that much effect in practice.


Ben: Yeah, it's true. When I've looked at it and people looked at it that it was a, it is a sort of pseudo rent control. That's right. The interesting thing about it, actually, we're gonna go off on the, to another tangent, is it to my mind, it actually intersects with a slightly different social contract that long-term tenants and long-term landlords have in the German market in Berlin and, and others.


But it's the way that they're organized. So it's not social housing, but it's the way their landlord thinks about it, but also that quid pro quo, as you can see it as an extreme, if you're a landlord of student housing, you do not necessarily expect your students to treat your property in a way that a long-term owner of that property might for, you know, various reasons, age and transience of tenancy and with our assured.


Shorthold tendencies, say in a lot of British cities, they tend to be six months or six to 12 months. Again, it's sort of in between. We have got some longer and some longer thinking around that. But German tendencies, and again, this is an average, tend to tilt towards this longer term, but there is a little bit of, we, the rent is maybe not gonna be as high as you would have a shorter term, or we'll say, you know, Airbnb in a hotel.


But the quid pro quo is you are going to look after this property or think about this property a little bit closer to thinking about it if you are gonna be owning it for 50 years or, or a hundred years. And essentially my view about the pseudo form of laws or controls they have is embodying a little bit of this.


Unwritten, the social contract that you have between landlord and tenant, of which some of it is embodied in law, and actually you, you see it in London, in, in different ways, is of where we had the tenancy or, or, or potentially how the Great Estates have looked at some of their the way that they look at their properties, but also their relationship with tenancy and the age of that tenancy.


So I've kind of gone off on a tangent there, but that, that's one of the things I think is kind of interesting about the German form of looking at this land or tenant part. I would, but also these alterations and street grids and everything


Samuel: else, I would find it very interesting as, so I'm basically, I'm not gonna give you a good answer on tenancies because I, I find it a very interesting subject.


I have never looked into it very systematically, so I can tell you some. Here are some random interesting facts about the history of tenure in Germany. So at the start of the 20th century, Berlin was almost entirely a renting city. It was over 90% renters, maybe over 95% renters in the actual era, like jurisdiction of the, um, the city of Berlin.


You couldn't have, so what, like owning a flat was, I think legally impossible? I think it did. There was some limited system for it in, uh, the 19th century, but I think it was then got rid of, in the Burges Gazettes book, the, um, German civil code that was introduced in, at, around the turn of the century.


So you could only rent an apartment unlike in, I mean Britain, it was, people mostly rented apartments for a long time, but there was the leasehold system which created, there was some option for having a building where like one person owns the whole building and then the apartments are in some sense also owned separately in this kind of communal sort of complic.


That just wasn't really possible for Germans. There was like someone who owned the building and then there were a bunch of people who rented. I wasn't aware of. And France. France had, um, the system of the modern French system, Cote, which is their equivalent of share freehold, basically, um, didn't exist at all in the early 20th century.


Gradually develops in the course of the 20th century, but it, they were entirely rental societies for flats. Obviously homes were more complicated, houses were more complicated picture. The other thing is most of the, like continental countries have always had a larger share or have for several centuries had a much larger share of their population living in flats than us.


And they have. So it's still, now this is, it's a more complicated people picture than English. People have a, uh, have an oversimplified view of this on which content or Europeans all live in flats and English people live in terrorist houses. And that was kind of was true in 1914, but is far more complicated now.


And like Paris has enormous suburbs. German cities have considerable suburbs made up of detached houses where people are under occupiers. So it's, it's much more complicated than, but the crude simplification is still have some validity. There are still, you know, the cause of French and German cities and still more Spanish, Italian cities are all flats and lots of like families and like the middle and upper classes of these cities are based in flats, in inner suburbs.


And so a whole bunch of institutions have developed to suit those people. Whereas in England, like you had a little, you know, small number of flats built in the 19 mansion blocks, small number built in the interwar period, but very, you know, two sort of tens of thousands, maybe a couple of hundred thousand overall post-war era.


There is no private sector, flat building and all flats built for social housing. And then flat building takes off again in like the eighties and nineties and has been quite a lot of it since then. And that's mostly targeted at. Basically at yuppies like un the childless young people who want to live in inner city areas.


And so the whole, like this immense market that exists in continental countries for the family apartment and all the institutions that families look for, like they care so much more about security and about being settled in one place than yuppies do, who are often quite happy to move around. A bit like that's developed over a long period of time in German speaking Europe.


So they had no option of shared ownership at these building. They do have that now, but they, for a long time they had no option of shared ownership. It had to be done through renting. And they had a huge market of middle class families who also wanted to be living in apartments. And so you can see why under those conditions, renting institutions for private renting would develop that gave greater security of tenure.


Um, and that were very long termist in their approach.


Ben: Yeah. And the kind of things that families would. Families would want. It's interesting. I hadn't heard it like that. That makes a lot of sense to me. And it's quite fascinating. I also think that this way of house building that we've done over the last few decades, because we value internal utility and aesthetics.


So internet, maybe even air condition or how your kitchen looks, uh, and we put value into that, or house builders put value into that, so they won't put the ornamentation because yes, ornamentation has a little bit of a return, but the return on upskilling, your walk-in shower is much larger. And so actually some of our aesthetic value has gone into the internals of houses.


And you know, if you looked in the internals of houses a hundred years ago they're not as valuable as the internals today. So I, I do think some of that value has gone that way.


Samuel: There's some lifecycle stuff here. Yeah. So there's some, I don't know this stuff at all. Well, I'm not sure. I'm not, I don't say this with much confidence, but I people, what I'm told by developers is if you are.


A yuppie buying a flat, you're probably fairly relaxed about the exterior facade of your flat. Like it's really, you probably don't vest your identity in it. And what you care about is location and some like internal conveniences then, like the real, the age where people really care about what their home looks like is like the central family period where you, like your household is an institution and you want to project that to the world.


And that's where people want to, you know, wanna move to conservation areas and spend loads of money doing renovations and plant their front garden and all the rest. Um, and then elderly people, a bit more of a mixed picture. And sometimes because of the, like, um, because life gets physically harder in so many ways, although when you are, you know, very old, physically harder in so many ways, you sometimes have to start caring a bit more about internal conveniences again.


Yeah, and that's, I've been told that a number of times by developers and it kind kind of makes intuitive sense to me. And then you think maybe one of the things which has happened in modern Western cities is the relative shares of those different groups of the population have changed. Like we've got lots more young child that unmarried people living in flats.


We've got lots more elderly people living for long periods with challenging physical conditions. And the share of like I am an institution, families has fallen. And that might be one of the factors. I don't think this is like my general theory of it, but I think that might, might be one of the factors that drives changes in the built environment.


Ben: Yeah. For sure. Okay, so coming back to England there's some who argue that this green belt idea needs to be re-looked at because it was put in so many years ago. And there's some parts of the green belt, which aren't as green as, as maybe advocates think. Obviously there's urban scroll as an issue.


Um, uh, if you had control, what would you think of the greenbelt? Would you redraw it and what urban forms would you like to see around that? Or would you, would you have a completely different idea about how we assess how we do our urban planning?


Samuel: I've always been a moderate supporter of greenbelt reform.


I, I, you know, we were a bit of an anomaly internationally. It's like French and Germans. Spanish and Italians don't have green belts. I mean, they have some forms of urban containment, but this idea that London has like completely stopped growing in 1939, growing outwards in 1939 and still today like.


The edge of London is where the builders laid down their tools when we went to war with Germany. And you can find unfinished streets where the, the road just goes out into nowhere and stops because the builders were confident that when the war ended, they could finish the street. And in fact, it never happened.


Like I don't, this is an insane situation to now does that mean that we should just like, let all cities grow outwards in a completely uncontrolled, unplanned way that we should have, like ribbon development and sprawl and we should grow in the way that Los Angeles has? Good, no, I certainly don't think that either, but like that's not the, those are not the two only alternatives.


There is a possible world where we protect the downs and the Chilton Hills, the national landscapes, and where we manage outward growth so that it takes place along railway lines and comes you know, something like the form that Metro Land grew at the end of the 19th or the early 20th centuries where like.


Mixed use middle density settlements around railway stations with good links into London or into other cities in the cases where there's demand for growth but with clearly defined boundaries with preserved rural areas to give people access to green space. A kind of like, um, a the 19th century you think is a starfish city where you have like legs of arm starfish have legs or arms, but like, uh, the starfish arms reach out, but they're areas of countryside between, and that's how kind of cities like Copenhagen, for example, have managed their growth since the second World war?


I, I have no, like grand plan for London worked out, you know, ready to go for what I'd do if I had a dictatorial powers over greenbelt reform. But yes, I do support a, a moderate version of greenbelt reform in four cities where there's, um, enormous demand for, uh, additional housing.


Ben: And a technocratic committee could probably do this quite well as well.


This trade offs okay, let's protect this. Let's not,


Samuel: or yeah. I mean, it's gonna be some, yeah. Some kind of planning process. Yeah. I'm very much, I, to some extent I've changed on this, but I am, um, I consider myself to be extremely pro planning. Like I do think that, uh, building stuff there are endemic collective action problems, and often you can only solve those by having some kind of planning authority.


The problem that we have is that planning authorities like. They end up with funny incentives. They get captured by one, one little group of the community, or they serve the interest of one neighborhood against all the other neighborhoods or these kinds of, so you end up with various problems with your incentives and principal agent problems and these kinds of, and so you end up with like a bad kind of planning.


But the solution to this is not tear up the planning system and go to a kind of like, panarchy that you get in low state capacity countries. The solution is to try and perform it so that to the, you know, greatest extent possible, we end up with, with good authorities making good decisions about Yes.


Ben: I, I think even most, although not all classical liberals, free market advocates suggest that you put in, transport and other public good infrastructure, you know, as your minimum and, and that's planned. And then, uh, you know, they do want. Remove zoning to a, a wider extent and, and point to some developing nation countries, which are built organically quite well.


But the, particularly on, at, at the very minimum where you put your sewage or waterworks and your transport is quite important there.


Samuel: Yeah. I mean, how 19th century cities developed in Europe, right. They weren't completely unplanned in lots of countries in Germany and in to some extent in Italy and in Spain and United States.


They, uh, the state completely planned the street network and just, uh, you know, that there are maps where the state said, this is where all the streets are going to go. In some cases, they then compulsorily purchased the land that would be the street network and laid out the streets and just left the landowners to then gradually develop it there.


Lots of transport planning went on, some other kinds of infrastructure planning went on, but it was nonetheless, overall obviously a far more liberal system and, and one that was far more pro-development and. London grew from 1 million people in 1800 to 7 million people in 1914. And those people, the amount of housing each person had, you know, greatly expanded at the same time.


So it was a tremendously like expansionist. Expansionist and, and, um, in a sense permissive system, but not a completely unplanned system.


Ben: Yeah, exactly. That makes sense. Works in progress is associated with Stripe. Patrick Collinson seems to have a fascination with pumping stations, the Pacific pride perhaps hidden in 19th century pump station infrastructure.


What do you make of that aesthetic obsession and what maybe today would be a civic upgrade equivalent?


Samuel: Yeah, I don't fully understand. I've never looked into it properly. What happened with these, I mean, some of them really remarkable and even remarkable interiors in these buildings. You think, well, why were they investing in the interior of those buildings?


Did people go and visit? I don't know. So I, I'm too largely ignorant of this topic to comment on it very authoritatively. There's clearly a wider pattern though that like 19th century, certainly public authorities and also private ones to some extent, did invest in these buildings. And it was seen, it was expected of them that they would do this.


It was seen as like, part of, if they didn't do it at all, they would look ridiculous and people would like mock and feel like slightly betrayed by them or so. And that does extend to pretty mundane buildings, like in the extreme case, pumping stations, but also to like hospitals or a famous, you know, if you see a really ugly building in Britain today, you've got like really, really ugly, like maximum ugliness.


You know, it's probably a hospital and that's, there, there were some factories, you know, some university buildings might be as bad, but it's a, it's a, hospitals are often, whereas in, you know, in the 19th century, these hospitals, they were not necessarily particularly elegant buildings. In, in inevitably a hospital has to like, stack floors on top of each other and it has to have lots of repetition in it.


And this kind of, and it's got very complicated functional requirements, which mean you have to make compromises and trade offs. But they're like basically attractive buildings that, uh, still if, you know, when they get converted today, people turn them into luxury flats or something. That's pretty interesting.


Yeah, and that's, uh, that is one of the great questions, you know, like why, like extremely rich people will always be able to patronize exquisite buildings and their tastes will change in various ways, but I, they're always going to produce some interesting stuff. But how it was that, that it was a kind of a norm for institutional bodies, both public and private, to produce stuff that was generally pretty good and was sometimes really spectacular.


That's, you know, that's a bigger more puzzling question in a way.


Ben: Yes. Exactly. Can't be completely answered. Although I do think part of it is the internal aesthetics part. So hospitals have to spend so much more on their on their budget, on the machines and stuff inside that they don't think about the outside.


And then some of it I think is in the pride of the workers. So if you see Victorian sewage works like the brick work in the tunnels, some of it is actually quite beautiful and no one's ever seen that brick work. So there is, there was some element of this is how this is how it's done. Um, and maybe there is something on that.


But again, famously and. Patrick has, I think, two British telephone boxes in the Stripe offices. And he points to one as being beautiful and one is not. But actually that the value of, particularly if it's not gonna cost you anything differently about that beautiful design, is a very large intangible, which then could say that, and actually programmers talk about this a little bit.


Beautiful code actually does mean, does mean something. Anyway, I'll have a little bit of underrated, overrated. And then a, a couple of last questions if you like. So I'm gonna throw out something to you and you can say underrated, overrated, or you can just give a little comment or you can pass on these things.


So you'd be very bad at this. Yeah, we've had quite long rambles and things. We might not be very good at this, uh, short form, but we give it a go. Underrated or overrated charter cities.


Samuel: I think they're a promising, interesting idea. I'm much I think I would love to know more about is the way that local government worked in the Middle Ages, because basically European cities in the Middle Ages were, and this is maybe a bit of a simplification, but roughly speaking, the King gave, or the central government gave a charter to a kind of a, kind of like a charitable trust or something, a bit like, uh, and this charter gave them certain revenue raising powers and certain jurisdictional powers over a certain territory.


And then they're like, well, off you go have a go at getting a city going here. And these survived in many countries, right up to the 19th century in municipal corporations. They were basically charter cities, right? That was like how the cities of Europe developed for centuries. And maybe one of the things that distinguished them from Asian cities, which were, you know, also obviously existed, but didn't have municipal government in quite the same way and maybe plateaued in a different way that, so I was like I've never looked into this properly, I dunno much about municipal government before the 19th century, but very interesting that, like charter cities may have been one of the big USPS of Western civilization before the 19th century, and they were extremely widespread and maybe successful, although of course they did mostly get abolished eventually.


So they're like, it seems to be like a frightfully interesting subject, which I don't know much about. And charter cities today, like, can they find any way of actually getting a stable political equilibrium with modern governments? Maybe not. I don't know, but like, definitely like something I find interesting and enjoy thinking and talking about and learning.


Worth exploring. Okay. So moderately underrated. I think that's sounds, yeah, I think that's probably the correct summary of my response here. Low traffic neighborhoods, I love low traffic neighborhoods. I mean, honestly in Islington, I, there's not many things that I would, if the council proposed to remove the low traffic neighborhood from my area I live in is I would be camping outside the town hall and like appearing unshaven and uh, uh, uh, uh, screaming at the councilors and officers as they went in to try.


I, um, I think their value creating. And um, the funny thing is low traffic neighborhoods are. Left coded and seen as, you know, there's a conspiracy of cyclists and woke and so forth, whereas cul-de-sacs are seen as right coded and, uh, planned by all these like, car companies and ignorance suburbanites and so forth.


But they are in fact basically the same thing. And this like totally obvious point that these two things that are like seen because of the way, the idiotic way that our political culture sorts issues according to like cultural, social and cultural coalitions or lifestyle choices or something. They've, like this elaborate fantasy has emerged that we are, there's this u which side of society you're on should dictate whether you are in favor of cul-de-sacs or in favor and they're mutually exclusive and opposed.


And these are the, basically the same thing in both ca, like a cul-de-sac with a pedestrian alley at the end of it that allows pe permeability for pedestrians and cyclists, but not for cars is essentially a purpose-built low traffic neighborhood. Yeah, and the traffic neighborhood is an attempt to create that in a neighborhood that wasn't originally designed for it.


We know that the private market like produces masses and masses of cul-de-sacs like that because people hate cars. I mean, they like having a car to get places, but they hate having cars roaring past their home. That we know that this is like overwhelmingly value creating for residential neighborhoods in a wide variety of contexts.


Of course, we should try to retrofit this into existing residential neighborhoods where it's possible to do so. But all, you know, the flip side of that is that all the people who love ltms should have a more sophisticated view about cul-de-sacs that like, yes, we should try to preserve pedestrian per permeability in these things.


Permeability for cyclists. Yes, mixed use walkability. All this is totally right as a priority, but like the cul-de-sac per se, is a completely rational adaptation of people to, I really, really don't want to have masses of cars driving fast in front of my house and killing my children and creating noise in the middle of the night, and so on.


Ben: Yeah, it's like you say, it's a very equivalent idea and actually intersects with other things. Like I'm I've now seen a, a bit, I think it was based on the Dutch work on these no road marking type systems around, which also work very well with low traffic neighborhood, LTN. And they definitely seem, from me anecdotally looking at it and the data seems to that, that they just work really well.


Well,


Samuel: they vote, that's it. Like, uh, neighborhoods for Living is roughly the translation and they, uh, they have like five mile an hour limits for cars in these residential areas and like overwhelming pedestrian priority that. Yeah. And no markings. And you


Ben: have to be careful. And the, the the Dutch traffic planner person who did that to prove how successful it was gonna be when in their pilot one, uh, walked backwards or walked backwards, blindfolded across the streets to prove how safe it was to be, to like, say, like this is how much he believed in it.


So at least I, I dunno if that's an apocryphal story, but it seems true.


Samuel: Yeah. And they're not, um, you know, I'm not anti car. Like there are amazing technologies and for rural areas and small towns, they've been totally transformative. And those places probably would've just died out or, if it hadn't been for their ex, for their existence.


But, um, but for cities, in the residential area. If you take any journey you do by car, the amount of it that you spend on residential streets relative to arterial roads, like it's so small and the right to drive at 30 miles an hour through that little residential street you start on onto your arterial road and then the little one you maybe end on right at the end.


That has very little effect on journey time in most. I mean there are some exceptions to that, but in most cases very little. Um, exactly. So, and yet it has so much effect on the safety and the immunity of the streets.


Ben: Exactly. And I think that is where you can do that trade off. Like you say, there's some exceptions where such an increased journey time, you could say it's an economic cost which may outweigh the trade off, but for the vast majority, particularly at say London, it's so minuscule you're not seeing any economic cost to a few minutes on your, on your traffic time and you're seeing a huge increase in the utility, either via accidents or everything else in the community.


Samuel: Needless to say, there, there will be TNS that cut some journeys, which for some people, you know, does add five minutes or eight minutes or whatever it may be, and you can perfectly well understand why I mean. Those people are the losers from the L tns. I can perfectly well understand why they're not happy, but, you know, public policy does have to aggregate and weigh interests.


And I was, I'm afraid that was the way the cookie crumbles.


Ben: I guess back to planning design, minimum space requirements, underrated, overrated,


Samuel: um, generally a bad idea. The analogy is like, suppose that you had you know, you have a country where there isn't enough food to go around, but there is enough that you can give people a basic ration and they'll survive.


They won't be comfortable, but they'll survive. And you say, no, no, basic ration isn't, you know, people deserve comfort. We are gonna require that nobody receive a ration of food beneath this really quite generous ration of food. And so instead what you get. Is not everyone getting the basic rational and surviving, but like two thirds of people get this quite generous ation on the remaining thirds after to death.


That's basically what minimum space standards. Yes, this is a simplification, but that is basically what minimum space standards do in housing. Poor societies like ours, they say like, we refuse to have anyone living in a small home, but we're not going to liberalize housing supply enough that every, there's enough, you know, enough homes around for everyone to have a big home.


So like, some people will get big or medium sized homes and the, the remaining unlucky people will get nothing and we'll end up with a high rate of homelessness and with other kinds of household suppression when people are, you know, living with their parents or whatever it may be. So it seems to me that I can, I sure it has humanitarian motives behind it, but very poorly thought, thought through and harms, um, intent, like acutely harms a subset of the people whom it's intended to help.


And I think it's, I mostly, I think they're very bad. There may be some small exemptions, but special cases, but, um, but yeah, I generally think they're a bad idea over overrated. Yes.


Ben: And I think actually you can offset, uh, a lot of the challenges with better design of which better design shouldn't cost you actually anything if you think about it in, in terms of that.


Yeah. Be pretty good for many purposes. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. Okay, last one on the overrated, underrated gentle density. I guess this is the whole Create Streets idea, so it's gonna be underrated, but maybe you wanna talk about how you think about gentle density. Well, it's funny,


Samuel: Benjamin, because in a way, this stuff that like emerged with Prince of Wales whatever decades ago, like actually now, it's pretty mainstream.


If you go to a, if you look at all the British planning documents produced over the last 25 years, whatever, since um, the the famous Compact Cities report, um, report by Norman Foster the, uh, and then through the Urban Design Compendium and the feral review and all these different documents, they're all in favor of urban density.


They're all in favor of mixed use. They're all in favor mostly, but basically in favor of traditional block patterns. And this kind of you look at what's taught any school of planning today, and it will be pro urban density, promix use you know, it will differ with Nicholas. Nicholas creates streets and the, the gentle entity movement.


We'll go a bit further on some of this stuff. A and they will be, then they have the, the content con controversial stuff that creates streets sympathetic to traditional architecture as an option. Whereas, you know, lots of people in the planning establishment think it's prestige and bad and so on. But like the basic urbanism of gentle density has become mainstream now and is no longer like a niche thing, which is only being campaigned for by Prince Charles.


So yeah, probably still underrated, but actually now like generally highly rated. And the question is that why do we fail to deliver it in practice rather than like, are we, should we be in favor of it? Or not becoming our mainstream idea,


Ben: but execution, Paul. Okay. Yeah, that's right. And then last couple of questions maybe continuing sort of on underrated is what would be your most underrated or potentially favorite.


Building or piece of urban planning or design,


Samuel: The one I bang on about at the moment, I mean, this isn't exactly a, a, this isn't exactly a building or a piece of urban design, but I say that my, my, my underrated thing I bang on is the city of Dresden Preston, I think is the most underrated city in Europe.


It's, um, that's the, I mean, I haven't been to every city in Europe, so I'm not really qualified to make that claim.


Ben: Postwar reconstruction or No?


Samuel: Partly so some, but it's got lots of, partly just because it's in a very beautiful part of Europe. Saxony is a, like a lovely area. It wasn't part of the grand tour and then it fell under communist rule, so it's not really like in England and France, people don't really know about it but it's like, it's extremely beautiful.


The Saxon Alps dressed in and beautifully situated in this V by a floodplain with the hills rising above it. It was then in the 18th century, they accidentally invented porcelain, an al uh, a Saxon Alchemist who was trying to invent the philosopher stone. Inadvertently worked out how to create porcelain, which previously could only be imported from China, and it was hugely fashionable in the 18 mice, mice and porcelain, which still the thing people know about that.


And so it made the electorate extremely rich and the electorate spent all this money on extraordinary art and architecture, which is still all so much of which have survived or was reconstructed. Interestingly, much of it was reconstructed by the communist government after the Second World War, a completely forgotten chapter in, uh, in history.


And then over the last 2002, there was a referendum in Dresden, um, on whether they should rebuild the city center. And they decisively won for the pro rebuilding people. And since then, they've rebuilt the famous Protestant church, the Kyia, um, and they've rebuilt lots of the urban fabric and it's, you know, been.


Beautifully done to an extremely high standard. Uh, and so it's now this what was once one of the most beautiful cities in the world, and it is extraordinary. They call it Florence, on the elbow in German. This extraordinary center of art and culture and which some of which survived, uh, always reconstructed immediately after the war and some of which is being rebuilt now.


And it's also, you know, it is got a superb tram network and, uh, and generally like higher up and immunity is a very nice place to be. So I, I am like a bit preoccupied with this city and kind of buttonholing people and going on about it at the moment


Ben: and best than underrated. And that's the one where they redoing facade.


So they had plain enough facades and they're putting it back. No.


Samuel: No, it's actually, so that's happening, um, a bit all over Germany. Everyone, some of that is happening in Dresden, but in Dresden it's, it's mostly just fallow land. They, there's, I don't think the recon, I'm not sure a single building has been demolished in the reconstruction of the Dresden City Center because there was so much like plots that had never been rebuilt after the war dressed in the communist government didn't, it wasn't, all bad in its urban policy.


Interesting. But it hadn't, certainly not been concerned to rebuild a density center. And so there's just just empty plots where they could put stuff. And so it's mostly just been building on empty band. Not either retrofitting existing buildings or demolishing modern buildings and rebuilding new traditional ones.


Ben: Okay. And then thinking out to the future, and backwards. So if it's 2050 and someone has asked you what finally fixed Britain's housing supply issue, what do you think would've been the institutional reform or the things that we could point to that would've would've fixed it over the decades?


Samuel: That's, uh, probably a bigger question than I can ask at the end, answer at the end of a podcast, but I think broadly speaking, I think the answer is so I constraints on development.


I have like far more sympathy for nimbyism than most people in the housing reform movement. Like I think random, many kinds of development have genuine negative externalities and they really are like a pain and devalue the homes of the. You know, of neighbors and it's totally rational for people to want to manage change in their neighborhood, to ensure that neighborhood values are preserved and to ensure that the investment that they've made in this place is not destroyed by irresponsibly, by their neighbors.


And we should certainly not wish for that instinct to die out in the English English people because it's so important as a way in which places are created. So I'm, a lot of the emotional tone of standard nimbyism is, I think like morally wrong and also just politically wrong because like people will fight so hard to protect these things.


They've managed in the space of, 50 years, in the first half of 20th century, they managed to impose these stringent development controls all over the world. Their success is total, uh, the huge YB movements in various countries have basically failed to make much progress against them and will probably continue to fail because the interest they're up against are so strong.


But like this interesting thing has happened, which is that in some parts places with an acute housing shortage, new housing is now extremely valuable and the right to develop new housing is now extremely valuable. And so you see these interesting experiments in places like well, I mean there are big examples in places like South Korea or in Israel or in part parts of the United States where you give communities the right to up zone themselves to allow more development.


And they realize if we do this, if we allow more development in this area, we all become drastically better off because the floor space prohibited by development control. Has become steadily more valuable as the housing shortage has got worse and worse and worse. And at a certain point it outweighed the immunity value that is preserved through development controls.


And then, and that was, that point was in fact passed long ago in many of the world's great cities. And now like your home, your property becomes 400% more valuable if you upzone it. You make millions of pounds if you upzone it in many places. And then the underlying coalition of interest starts changing.


And people start thinking now, actually, even as we had an interest in the past in preventing and controlling change, now maybe we have an interest in enabling change. So I think trying to build those new coalitions of interest that, that the housing shortage has potentially made possible and trying to create win-wins rather than having an adversarial approach to planning reform.


I think that is where the great durable shift may come from rather than from the kind of reform that we do that we've traditionally attempted. Using people's self interest. Yeah, that makes sense.


Ben: Yes, that's right. Like


Samuel: incentives do actually


Ben: work. Who knew? Great. And then last question, do you have any life advice or career advice or any other thoughts, current projects that you wanna share, um, with listeners and viewers in terms of a career in thinking about design or think tanks or anything that you've done that you would suggest to listeners?


Samuel: I certainly don't have any advice for a career in thinking about design. Like I don't, I seem to have evolved one, but I certainly, you know, never expected to and have no understanding of how it happened. I, um, policy, I would say it's, you know, you can work in policy and achieve nothing, but you can achieve enormous things.


It's amazing how in Britain. You like all the center right think tanks employ fewer than a hundred researchers, the left wing think tanks, if excluding the TBI, which Tony Bar Institute to put a special case. They're even smaller. I to the, employee 80 research, 60 research or something like that.


And those people are mostly, you know, in their twenties. And then there are some people who work in government, you know, tens of people who work in government as government advisors. It's a tiny world, a tiny world of mostly very junior people. And those people do make up after a fashion, the intellectual pipeline that reaches the British state.


So like working in that, you have scope to be incredibly influential. The amazing thing is that it's not, you know, like billionaires haven't noticed that with trivial sums of money. They could. Basically like take over this pipeline and like dominate the stream of ideas that reaches at least one of the two sides of British politics, which has really not basically, I mean, there's some limited examples of that, but basically hasn't really happened.


Kind of fascinating that's the case but like there's so little money in it. There's so little so few people involved that it's a remarkably easy career to have impact in. So if you, if you're interested in public service and and interested in doing work that, uh, that really matters, I've had like total confidence in commending working in policy to people


Ben: that, that sounds very impactful. Yeah. That, um, public policy influence either being on the research side or I guess being, if you can make it as a public intellectual or doing that, is, um, relatively few people influencing quite important policies and things. So yeah, that's right. Possible to make a difference.


And with that, Samuel, thank you very much.


Samuel: My pleasure. 



In Arts, Podcast Tags Samuel Hughes, Architecture, Urban Design, Housing Policy, Beauty in Design, Green Belt, Rent Control, Tokyo, Berlin, Ben Yeoh Chats, podcast
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