Alex Edmans: The Madness of Markets - when are markets really irrational?

Finance professor Alex Edmans joins the podcast to discuss his new book, The Madness of Markets, and a problem at the heart of investing: markets seem irrational enough for opportunities to exist, but competitive enough that most of us struggle to exploit them. How do you know when you have found genuine market madness, rather than simply failed to understand what the market understands?

Alex starts with some of his own research. Looking across more than 1,100 football matches, he and his co-authors found that when a country was eliminated from a major tournament, its stock market fell by around 0.5% the following day, even after controlling for movements in world markets. A football defeat should not change the profits or dividends of the country's companies. It gives us a rare example where sentiment can be separated, at least partly, from fundamentals.

But defining madness gets complicated quite quickly. We talk about houses with unusual histories, gold, crypto and other assets whose price can depend partly on what somebody else might pay for them later. If millions of people share a belief, and that belief lasts for decades, is it still irrational? And can a story itself become economically important?

That takes us into narratives, bubbles and behavioural finance. Markets can overreact to vivid, exciting information, but they can also react too slowly. Alex explains why the evidence can support both short-term momentum and longer-term reversal, and why apparently contradictory human biases do not necessarily cancel each other out.

We then turn to one of Alex's longstanding research interests: intangibles. His work found that companies with high employee satisfaction subsequently outperformed, and later research found the relationship continued outside his original sample. Why might an effect survive even after investors know about it? Alex suggests that investors can believe culture, employees and other intangibles matter while still finding them remarkably difficult to measure, defend to an investment committee or put into a valuation model.

There is another twist. Market prices do not just tell us something about the world. They can change the world. CEOs look at their share prices. Boards react. Acquisitions can be cancelled, investment plans changed and managers replaced. Alex discusses his research on governance through exit, where investors can influence a company not by persuading management, but by selling and allowing the share price to send a signal.

We also ask whether professional investors really are less biased than everyone else. Expertise can help, but it can also create overconfidence and give us more evidence with which to justify what we already believe. We discuss Neil Woodford, cognitive diversity, why junior investors need permission to challenge senior ones, and the danger of judging a decision by its eventual outcome rather than the quality of the decision at the time.

Alex is particularly interesting when he turns the question on himself. He describes his tendency to read negative intentions into ambiguous emails, and the one-minute delay he once put on his outbox to stop himself responding too quickly. He talks about deliberately listening to arguments he disagrees with, choosing the literary agent who was most critical of his book proposal, and trying to find people who will tell him what he has missed.

He also gives a wonderfully concrete example of getting investing wrong: backing a fitness start-up founded by trainers he knew and admired. Familiarity made him feel knowledgeable, his own taste in punishing workouts was not representative of the wider market, and his relationship with the founders made him less willing to ask difficult questions. The company eventually failed.

We discuss how Alex's thinking on sustainability has become more qualified since Grow the Pie, what writing May Contain Lies taught him about the persistence of misinformation, and the different lessons he hopes readers will take from The Madness of Markets. For many people the sensible conclusion may simply be: recognise your biases and own the market through index funds. For professional investors, the challenge is harder: can you identify situations where the market is systematically getting something wrong?

We finish with overrated or underrated, including efficient markets, carbon taxes, company purpose statements, quarterly reporting, universal basic income, social media and AI. And we talk about Alex's own creative process: long stretches of uninterrupted time, working with pencil and paper, reading outside his discipline, and leaving enough space for new research questions to emerge rather than pretending everything can be put into a five-year plan.

Key takeaways

  • A strange price is not necessarily a wrong price. The hard part is working out whether the market is responding irrationally or pricing something you have missed.

  • Sentiment can move markets. Football results offer an unusually clean example of emotions affecting prices without obviously changing underlying corporate value.

  • Stories matter. Investors sometimes buy not for cash flows but because they expect other people to value an asset in the future. That can work, but it is a different and riskier game.

  • Markets can underreact and overreact. Short-term momentum and longer-term reversal can coexist.

  • Intangibles are difficult even when everyone agrees they matter. Culture, employees and other non-financial assets are harder to measure and translate into a valuation than conventional financial information.

  • Prices can affect fundamentals, not just reflect them. Share-price movements can change investment, acquisitions and management decisions.

  • Experts still need defences against bias. Knowledge can produce better judgement, but also greater confidence in the wrong judgement.

  • Actively look for the counterargument. One of Alex's recurring habits is to seek out the strongest evidence and arguments against his existing view.

Alex Edmans in his own words

“A little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing.”

On why knowing more about finance does not automatically make someone a better investor.

“Try to take the counterpoint to the position that you want to take.”

On a simple defence against confirmation bias.

Contents, transcript and podcast links below

Contents

00:00 Meet Alex Edmans
00:35 Spotting market madness
01:29 Football losses move markets
02:58 What counts as irrational pricing?
05:04 Resale value and trading sentiment
07:47 Stories that fuel market madness
09:42 Gold, crypto and collective belief
12:33 Momentum, reversal and contradictory biases
16:17 Why investors struggle to value intangibles
21:13 When the wisdom of crowds breaks down
24:07 How market prices change real decisions
28:14 Voice, exit and reflexivity
33:02 Expert bias and better investment processes
37:31 Alex's unusual defence against his own biases
39:55 Lessons from a failed start-up investment
43:03 Rethinking sustainability
44:38 Misinformation, evidence and disagreement
45:52 What The Madness of Markets is trying to achieve
47:48 Overrated / Underrated
56:06 Social media and AI
01:00:06 Deep work and creativity
01:03:36 Future projects and final advice

Transcript

(AI assisted, so errors possible)

Ben: Hey, everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking with Alex Edmans. Alex is professor of finance at London Business School and the bestselling author of the books Grow The Pie and May Contain Lies. His latest book is The Madness of Markets, which explores why even smart investors make irrational decisions and what we can learn from them.

Alex is a brilliant thinker on markets, business, evidence, and human behavior. Alex, welcome.

Alex: Thanks so much for having me here. It's great to be here, Ben.


Ben: Markets can seemingly be irrational enough for opportunities to exist, but they also seem to be competitive enough that a lot of people, even most people, fail to capture them.


How do you know when you have found genuine market madness rather than merely failed to understand what the market understands?


Alex: This is very difficult because when the market moves strongly, how do you know whether it's overreaction or a rational reaction? So if you take AI right now, people argue that the market is overvalued.


However, even if there's only a small chance that we have an AI boom, the, um, i- the payoff if this chance is realized is so large that it, that's actually quite rational for it to be so richly valued. Similarly, if a pharmaceutical company has even a small chance of developing a cure for sickle cell anemia, it is right for that to be richly valued.


So what I did, uh, when I started out 20 years ago in my career in research, was to try to find something that shocks investor sentiment, but didn't have an effect on fundamentals, so I could get a clean measure of emotions. And so what I looked at was the effect of football results, such as World Cup eliminations.


So, why do I look at the World Cup rather than the Premier League? Well, because if Arsenal win and Chelsea lose, then some English people are happy and some are unhappy, so it's hard to see what's gonna happen to the overall stock market. But if England loses in the World Cup, then the whole of England might get depressed, and this is gonna cause negative sentiment.


And so what my co-authors and I did, we looked over 1,100 football games, and we found that on average, when a country is eliminated, the market falls by about half a percent the next day, even after controlling for what's happening in the world market. And you might say, "Well, half a percent, is that a lot?"


When actually a Trump, uh, pronouncement will cause the market to go up by 3 or, or down by 2%. Well, actually half a percent is, uh, 13 billion pounds wiped off the FTSE 100 on a single day, and that is something where there should not be any impact on profits and dividends. So that's just one example, but there are other examples where what people can do is try to take events which don't really contain any news content and see whether the market will react to them.


And if you see the market reacting to non-news, then you suggest that that reaction could be irrational.


Ben: And what exactly do you think counts as madness? Is it simply that the price is wrong, or is there a psychological cause? So I was reading, uh, a set of papers recently, which basically I'm gonna kind of sum up and simplify, but they found that if, say, a house is valued at a million pounds, and everyone kind of agrees on that and kind of, you know, on the, in terms of pricing But then people find out that someone has recently died in that house, they then discount it by 10 to 20%.


So they say, "Well, I'm only prepared to pay £900,000 for this house." So one set of views would say, well, that seems to be a little bit irrational because the cash flows and things haven't changed, but obviously there's a kind of psychological context for that. So I'm interested in this. Do you have a view on what really counts as madness?


Alex: Yes. I think it's you're reacting to information which does not affect the fundamental value of the asset. And then the question is, well, what is the fundamental value of the asset? Well, it depends on whether this is a buy and hold asset or something that you're gonna resell to somebody else. So in the case of a house where somebody's died or a haunted house, uh, there's, there's a paper on, on that as well there, given that you can live in the house, you don't necessarily need to resell it to somebody else, it is irrational for there to be a, a discount here because it's not gonna be affecting the intrinsic value of the house, the square footage, or the number of rooms.


So if indeed there was something which does not have any effect on the company's fundamentals or the asset's fundamentals, and there was a reaction to that, then I would say this is an overreaction. Another example aside from, um, houses is recently we had Allbirds, the trainer company announced it was rebranding as Newbird AI.


The stock price went up by 582%, even though there's no clear evidence that it has any expertise to execute an AI strategy. Again, I would see this as similar to the reaction to a football defeat. It's reacting to something which doesn't really affect fundamentals and dividends, and so I would call that madness.


Ben: Uh, but sometimes this madness seems to last quite a long time. In fact just sticking with houses, 'cause I guess people understand that, I was reading somewhere that there- there was a house or an apartment where I think the current pope was born in or l- lived in for some time, and suddenly the price of that house, I think, has leapt to sort of 100 or 200% premium to nearby houses and what it was worth before that.


But also when we look at these kinds of premiums to kind of brand value or where people have lived, uh, that seems to last for many, many years. So some people would say, "Well, if it's lasting for so many years, is that really a sign of madness or has something else happened?"


Alex: Yeah, that's a good point. And again, I think it goes back to whether you are buying the asset for its intrinsic value or for its resale value.


So let's say you're to buy this house because the pope lived in it, and you think the country is very religious, and you will be able to sell this in, in a few years' time. There you might say, "Well, that is something which is justified," but you need to know what you're investing on the basis of. You're investing only based on what you can sell it for later, and there's a risk to this.


What if the country becomes more secular in the interim? What if there's a scandal in the Catholic Church? And also, you're not getting returns on that capital in the interim. You're getting the l- living in the house, but you're paying overboard for that. And similarly, this was my position with SpaceX, if I did not understand or am not begin to analyze SpaceX's fundamentals, but I saw there was quite a lot of hype there, and some, um, people thought, "Well, this is gonna be the future."


There were some institutional investors who might not get their full allocation. So I subscribed to this in the IPO, not because of the fundamentals but because of the madness, and I sold it within two hours afterwards for about 173. I bought it at 135, and now it's gone back to below the pre-IPO price.


So if you believe that you are buying it to resell it, then what you might be trying to predict is people's future sentiment. That is a legitimate reason to invest, but just to know that that's a very risky way to invest because that's even more difficult to predict than future dividends and fundamentals.


So at the same time that I try to put in, uh, money into SpaceX, I actually put in 15 times that same amount into Treasury bills, into gilts. Why? Because I have a mortgage coming up for refinancing in about a year. So if you are going to try to play the game of investing in something where the entire value or a large part of the value comes from the value others ascribe to it, just know that this is risky.


Ben: So madness can be a bona fide, uh, investing or maybe speculating or, or trading s- strategy. I think that's interesting. So how important is storytelling then, and narrative? And when does storytelling then potentially become fraud or manipulative, and, you know, how robust is that really as an investment strategy?


Alex: I think storytelling can be very powerful in order to create a narrative that can allow madness to form and madness to persist. And this is something linked to the narrative fallacy. It's the idea that we love to listen to stories, and stories are memorable. When we had ... Before we had writing, there was the oral tradition, and people passed along ideas through the form of stories.


And so if you look at, say SpaceX, well, this is something that's gonna be transforming the world. We don't need to be limited by our boundaries and what, what's, uh, here in, on Planet Earth and the planetary boundaries we see here. So that is something where there was a compelling story. There was a visionary leader who's able to do unconventional things, who's seen as such a hero that the standards of governance, uh, don't apply, and, uh, and index- indices are willing to relax their standards.


So that could be a compelling story. Similarly with non-fungible tokens or cryptocurrency, you think, "Well, this is digitizatio- de- democratization of finance." When there is a compelling story there, you might think that Bitcoin, which is something which has no intrinsic value, its value is only what other people ascribe to it.


If that story's very compelling, then it can st- then it can persist for a long time. But notice that just as some stories can form, they can crash very quickly. If Elon Musk was to suffer an accident or a fatality, if you were indeed buying a company based on a story which is based on one particular person, then that is particularly fragile.


Ben: So you should be really aware of why you are investing or making a buy or a sell. Is it because you've assessed cash flows or dividends better, or is it because you think you have some insight into the story or the narrative? I'm interested maybe in this story point as it comes up. Do you think that the durability of a story, the durability of, call it, a collective belief, is in itself fundamental?


I've heard some people call this a type of inter-subjective belief, so it is only true because a lot of people think it's true and lasts. And 'cause you mentioned crypto, um, perhaps something which people understand perhaps a little bit longer is how do you best explain gold? Is gold essentially this collective belief idea, this storytelling power, and, and therefore it will just hold for as long as the story holds?


And do you think therefore gold, uh, is something that people could consider as an investment, or is it something which should be put in the kind of the madness bucket, and is, uh, you know, a very difficult thing to assess?


Alex: I think gold and, and crypto, they both have similarities in that there is a significant part of the value which is ascribed to the fact that other people value it highly.


And so if we believe that, that worth is gonna be persisting, then it could be a reasonable asset to own because you think there's gonna be this enduring value. I would say then there's those differences between gold and crypto, in that gold does have uses, such as jewelry and so on, which you don't have for crypto.


Clearly the number of people who invest in gold i- is, is greater. The amount of gold that's used as an investment is greater than the demand for jewelry right now, so there is part of this, uh, resale aspect to it. Um, but I'd say here you have some fundamental value, but also value which is ascribed to other people.


And so the longer that this story persists, then perhaps the longer people think, well, it will persist in the future. So given that gold has been as, seen as the safe haven reserve currency for so long, if people believe in this, then they're w- going to fl- flee to it whenever there's times of uncertainty, and that's gonna be self-fulfilling, and it's gonna just keep its value be- holding, uh, in the future.


Ben: So there is some power to, to the, to the durability of collective belief. I


Alex: think that the- And this is why just beliefs in anything are, are really difficult to shake. So like the, the view that the world was flat, or the view that, um, smoking is, is fine for you, or that climate change is, is, is not man-made.


A lot of these beliefs because you have that and you have confirmation bias there, then anything which contradicts that belief, people are willing to quite dismiss. If something has been enduring for so long, then that story will persist- in particular when there are attempts to knock it down, because of confirmation bias, we'll dismiss those attempts.


Ben: Yes. And so you, and, and you touch on that in your, in your second book. But that is actually true for a lot of ... Philosophers talk about this, like laws are a set of collective beliefs in some way. Even the idea of money, you know, on, on a, on a note it says, "Promise to pay the bearer." There is a promise, there is a sense of belief within some of that.


I think it's very interesting, though, when we think of some of these biases and beliefs which come up in your book, that humans seem to extrapolate recent trends too far. But they also seem to update too slowly when new evidence appears. And in a lot of these biases, humans can apparently have biases in opposite directions, sometimes potentially at the same time.


How do you know which bias will dominate? And how do we explain seemingly contradictory biases when they come up?


Alex: This is an extremely fair challenge, and this to me is one of the most convincing challenges to the idea of behavioral finance. So, what is behavioral finance to begin with? Well, it's the idea that prices are not driven by fundamentals, they are driven by emotions and sentiment and irrationality.


But the defense that you're, you're, you've just given, Ben, is, is a, it's a reasonable one, which is, well, sometimes the market overreacts and sometimes the market under-reacts. So if you're overreacting and I'm under-reacting, we're gonna cancel each other out and the price is going to be, uh, at fair value.


And it also makes it difficult for us as investors to know what to do. Um, so let's say I- AI has done very well recently. Is that an overreaction and we should short, or it's an under-reaction and we should buy more? So this is where evidence and research and data is very useful, is that we can look at what sort of things the market under-reacts to and overreacts to, and is there a systematic pattern?


So one thing that you can look at is the duration of past performance. So Dick Thaler, who won the Nobel Prize for his contributions to behavioral finance, one of his most famous papers said that, look at the last three years of past performance of a company. If you do that, you typically find there's overreaction.


So if I were to buy all the losers based on the past three year performance, sell all the winners, and hold them for another three years, then you get a reversal, last losers become winners, past winners become losers. You do the same thing, but you define your winners and losers based on the past six months of performance, so that's more short-term rather than long-term performance.


You get the opposite. You get momentum. So stocks that did well over the past six months, they continue to do well over the next, and stocks that did poorly over the past half year continue to do poorly. So in general, what we find is there's short-term momentum and long-term reversal, and that kind of makes sense intuitively because, yes, if the market is slow to react, then a company that has done well recently, it could have more room to run.


But if the stock has been on a tear for three years, then maybe that outperformance is so strong that it's gonna mean reverting. So one thing that you can look at is the duration of past performance. Another thing that you can look at is the type of information that you might under-react or overreact to.


So if there's very salient information such as a rebrand to AI, such as, um, the addition of dot-com in the dot-com bubble, that is something where there can be a hype around and the market o- gets overexcited about it because it's very visible. Something which is more intangible and non-salient, there might be an underreaction to.


So one of my papers looks at the effect of being the best company to work for in America. This is a company with a strong corporate culture. And because so many investors like to focus on tangible assets that they can clearly feed into cell C23 of a spreadsheet, they might not value corporate culture or other types of inva- intangibles as much


Ben: So everyone says culture, employees, innovation, and, and brand matter.


But you're suggesting in your research paper that actually sophisticated investors themselves still struggle to value them. And I recently saw that actually that work had been replicated out of sample, so it still seems to last. Why do you think the market really still misses these intangibles? Are we really...


Is it because it isn't so salient that we have this behavioral bias, which seems to be structural? Supposedly, if we were all so clever, and actually there's a lot of people who wanna make money from this, uh, it, it seems to me that people would have thought that maybe this is a bias which should have faded away.


But do you think there's something special about intangibles and this kind of information that human beings find a little bit tricky?


Alex: Your point, Ben, is, is, is a very good one because this is a bizarre finding. So, my paper was published in 2011, and it looked at 28 years of data showing that companies with high employee satisfaction outperformed over that 20-year, 8-year period.


Now, people should just be trading on that, and that the alpha should have disappeared, but independently, it was replicated, and the 10 years afterwards, it still continues to hold. S- so why is that the case when there was this, um, study showing that there is uh, free money on the, on the table here? I think there could be a few reasons.


So number one could be the persistence of beliefs that we have just discussed when we talked about how enduring stories are. So if the traditional view is that the value of a company depends on dividends and tangible assets, then people who are used to valuing companies based on that way, it's just more difficult to try to incorporate culture in a model.


If you have to stand up and defend your investment to the investment committee, it might be easier to say, "Well, the product demand has increased by this amount," rather than the employees feeling happy. And then not only might people ignore it or not put full weight on it, people might actively bet against this.


So there is this anti-ESG movement, which I am not unsympathetic to. I have myself expressed some skepticism out, a- about, um, sustainability claims. But there is the extreme view, which is, well, any company which treats its work as well as woke and fluffy and not focused on the bottom line, and if that is the view, then actually, then you do have people actively ignoring it, which then leaves some more money on the table.


So I'd say there's one set of reasons. So those people just don't fully recognize it, or they actively bet against it. Then this more nuanced view, which is that people do think culture is important. But they might measure it wrongly. So one aspect of corporate culture that people think is really important is diversity, and there have been studies by the likes of McKinsey claiming that if you look at just demographic diversity, then companies with more ethnic minorities or women on the board or the wider workforce, they easily outperform.


And so that might be a simple measure of culture that investors use, and not only is that potentially good for their financial returns if it's backed up in the data, but it's a good marketing tool by saying, "Well, we're supporting gender diverse or ethnic diverse companies." So people might measure it in this way.


Another hot topic right now is inequality, with the likes of Gary Stevenson and others claiming that inequality needs to be addressed. People look at measures such as the gap between CEO pay and the pay of the average worker, and they may say, well, the smaller gap there is a sign of better culture. But the problem with both of those is that it's not empirically backed up by the data.


So with the demographic diversity, there is really no link, uh, between that and future performance. There's no negative links, but there's no positive link either. Whereas with inequality, actually it goes the other way, where if anything, companies with greater gaps between the CEO and workers, they typically will outperform in the future.


We're not claiming this is causal, but at least the correlation is in a different direction to what people will say. So that's the second reason. We think culture matters, but we don't know how to measure it. And the third might be we know culture matters, and we do know how to measure it. We could look at things like the best companies to work for.


We can look at Glassdoor. We can do some textual analysis. But we still don't really know how to incorporate this into a valuation spreadsheet. Whereas if I can see my earnings outperformed by 5% over the past quarter or product demand went up by 10%, that might be something more easy to incorporate. So it is the translation of something I, I do believe to be relevant, but I don't know how I'm gonna put it into the price.


Just like if you have two jobs and there's lots of different dimensions ac- among, a- across which they will differ, it may well be that salary ends up being the bigger driver of, of your decision, even though clearly what you want from a company is more than just salary.


Ben: So summing up some of your thinking around the wisdom of crowds and biases, the reasons that these biases are not canceling out in the wisdom of crowds is because of behavioral traits and things happening in the crowds where they're all thinking one way, or they're all thinking another way, and so those biases aren't quite canceling out?


Or does it matter the type of bias that we're thinking about and other periods when actually canceling out does seem to work and the wisdom of crowds is superior?


Alex: Mm. It's good that you reference the wisdom of crowds then, because that is perhaps the other view, the counterpoint to what I'm arguing.


So there's a very famous book called, by James Surowiecki, about The Wisdom of Crowds, which is that you want the collective wisdom of many people, and that is better than the views of even some experts. So it starts off with the story of a county fair where everybody has to guess the weight of an ox, and random people who know nothing about farming, they just put in some guesses, and some will guess too low, some will guess too high.


And actually, what happened was the average guess was very, very close to the actual weight of an ox, and that was much more expert than the, um... Much more accurate than experts such as farmers. And this is played out in, in many other cases. This is why people will say, "Well, just trust betting odds," because this is the agglomeration of, of, of many, many people.


But it breaks down when there is emotional attachment and psychology. So nobody really gets emotionally attached to the weight of an ox. Some will vote to vote, um, will, will guess too high, and some will guess too low, and they'll cancel each other out. But we do get emotional about particular types of company, so there will be quite a lot of hype, say, on cryptocurrency, on artificial intelligence, on electric vehicles.


And because what is the driver of that bias, it's human psychology, and human psychology, well, that is perhaps common to all of us. That's why we might all react in the same direction and get too excited on the upside and too pessimistic on the downside. I think where things will, are more likely to cancel out is where you won't have people all in one direction because that might depend on things such as political beliefs.


So one can argue maybe the stock price of, of Tesla right now is actually fair because there are people who will not touch it because they just dislike Elon Musk as a person, and others might be huge fans o- of him. And so if you have, quote, "right-wing people" overweighting it compared to fundamentals, and left-wing people underweighting it, then overall this might counterbalance each other.


In the past, people thought, well, is there a sustainability bubble where ESG poster children were overpriced? Right now, given there was some pushback against sustainability, uh, maybe there you get less overpricing than what you might have done in the past.


Ben: I'm interested in what prices may tell us or not tell us.


And I think there's some research which argues that market prices don't merely reflect companies' discounted cash flows, and we talked about some of this. But more importantly, they can actually influence investor and manager decisions. I, I'm kind of interested then when does a market bubble or high market prices or the price of a company become more dangerous when executives or investors start believing it?


And what, if anything, should managers, CEOs, or investors learn from a share price if it has momentum or not, and when should they be thinking to just ignore it? Is there any evidence that you've looked at where you can tell whether you should be ignoring it or not ignoring it?


Alex: This is a really important and interesting stream of research.


So the traditional view is that the stock market is a mirror of economic activity, so it just reflects what's going on, it doesn't affect it. For example, if you think of a literal mirror, it will reflect, uh, how much I'm losing weight, and I can exercise and see whether I'm, I'm, I'm losing weight. But the actual mirror doesn't affect my weight loss.


It's my diet and exercise which will have those true effects. But with the stock market, actually not only might it reflect the, um, economy, it might actively affect what we're doing by changing managers' perceptions. So what do I mean by that? Let me just give a concrete example. So if you are Carly Fiorina of Hewlett Packard, you make a bid for PWC's consulting arm, and the stock price falls significantly, then the manager might learn from the price.


She might think, "Okay, we've done our internal analyses, we have consulted the top investment bankers, um, and we thought this was a good deal. But we have now seen investors vote with their feet, and analysts are trashing this idea. Maybe they know something that we don't. Maybe they're an independent outside view, and we are just suffering from groupthink here."


And indeed, in that case, what she ended up doing was abandoning the deal. And more generally, there was a large-scale study of hundreds of mergers and acquisitions which found that after a merger was announced, the more negative the market reaction, the more likely it was for the deal to be canceled. And this has been replicated not just in M&A, but also in terms of investment, where when stock prices tend to be high, then companies will invest more because they will see the stock price as being a positive signal of investment opportunities.


But then, as you say, Ben, this is why, uh, the madness of markets can actually have some really problematic consequences. So we often think that the stock market is a zero-sum game. If the price is wrong, then there's some winners and some losers, but the aggregate economy doesn't, meh, doesn't get affected.


But if indeed prices drive real decisions, then the consequences of market mispricing can be severe. So I think AMC, um, the meme stock company, when its stock price rose a lot, they thought, "Oh, let's start investing in things," and they were looking at buying a Nevada gold mine and going into lots of crazy expansion, thinking, "Oh, well, my stock price is high.


I've got great investment opportunities," not knowing it was caused entirely by sentiment. Um, similarly, there was a rush to, uh, oil dr- uh, drilling and, and exploration, again, caused by temporary, um, mispricing. So I think the thing for a manager to look at is, well, if my price has gone up too much or gone down too much, why might this be?


Are there non-fundamental reasons? And one paper that I wrote with two co-authors, Itay Goldstein and Wei Jiang, looked at one non-fundamental reason, which is mutual fund outflows. So if indeed, um, your stock price falls, but it is because your own investors needed to withdraw and cash in, so let's say you were held by Woodford and he needed to redeem, that's nothing to do with your company's prospects, and therefore I should ig- ignore any price changes and not use that as a signal


Ben: That's interesting.


That leads me to two other ideas or questions. So they're a little bit separate but interlinked. So one set of questions is around, I think there was an economist thinker, Albert Hirschman, who developed a framework of voice, exit, loyalty. And I kind of think this is really interesting as to when do you think it's more important to use voice or speak with a company, or a company finds that, or when it's actually more important to have an exit signal.


So actually investors exiting and your stock price going down is potentially a stronger signal than trying to phone up the CEO and convince them that their strategy is wrong. Y- your share price going down is the signal that the strategy is wrong and really disconnects it. And then the other adjacent question that it put in my head was there was some thought from economists that when a lot of surveys, when there's a lot of news that we're going to enter recession, businesses themselves get worried about that.


They change their behavior and lo and behold, that's one of the reasons that then we don't enter recession, which is why recession models often give you a missed signal because when it's a very strong signal, uh, we have this reflexive thing. Is that the-- do you put any weight on that? And is actually that the same sort of mechanism that we're talking about here?


Alex: Yeah. So there's two really interesting questions here, so let me decompose them. Let me start with the, the second one, is that while the market's reaction to an event could be so strong that that event ends up being canceled. So when Liz Truss announced the unfunded tax cuts, people said, "Oh, this was-- is so bad for the economy."


Um, then bond yields rose significantly, bond prices fell. But then that reaction was so marked that it led Liz Truss to, um, resign eventually, and then, and then the prices went in the other direction. Uh, similarly with Donald Trump and his tariffs, you might think if there's somebody who doesn't listen to the market and doesn't learn, it might be Trump because he is untouchable.


But even he, when the tariffs were a- announced and there was a big negative reaction, um, then, um, these were canceled or at least put on hold and the market rebounded. And so this is why there's the trade known as the taco trade, because Trump always chickens out. So what does this mean? Is that actually sometimes even if you think an event was bad or there's really bad news, maybe the best thing to do is to sit tight.


Because if you, like in chess, see one move ahead and you might see a market reaction to this or a politician reacting, then actually what might seem to be a bad event might not be so bad because it could be canceled. Now, we think of the analogy of this within the corporate level. Let's say a company announces really bad earnings.


Are we gonna sell the company? Well, actually, if those really bad earnings figures means that there's gonna be a takeover or means that the board of directors is gonna fire the CEO and, and replace him or her with somebody better, then it may be better to, to, to, um, keep hold of this. Uh, and so this is important because this suggests that the power of the market to affect decisions, not just reflect them, might mean that the more sane rather than mad strategy will be to stick with a company or an asset which is underperforming.


The first part of your question is, uh, the different ways in which we can respond to underperformance and the traditional view in economics was you do governance through voice. You intervene in a company, you launch a proxy fight and, and this was what I was reading during my PhD, um, when I was studying corporate finance.


And then there was the, um, case of Kirk Kerkorian who, who tried all he could to, uh, reform GM, and then he couldn't, and then he ended up having to sell his stake. And I thought, "Well, this is odd." Uh, w- we all have all of these models about intervention and voice when even this really powerful and well-respected investor could not change the company.


That then inspired me to write my job market paper on governance through exit. So what is a job market paper? When you graduate from a PhD and then you try to get a professor position, there is one paper that you present at Harvard or Stanford or Wharton, uh, and for me, this was a paper on governance through exit.


And I think why this is powerful is it means that even if you are not a large investor, you are not able to influence a company by telling management what to do or if management is really intransigent, you can still have an influence by selling and affecting the stock price. Why? Because it's the idea that the stock price is a signal of a company's financial performance, and by affecting that signal, you might precipitate some corrective actions


Ben: And so do you think professional investors or maybe experts, uh, as a general class have fewer biases than non-professionals?


Or do you think that they just build better processes to try and combat this bias? Or in fact, maybe, uh, they don't really do that at all and we just, you know, fall by our human nature and, and this is something which is part of the human condition


Alex: I think it's certainly possible if, if you're not cognizant about your biases and you don't actively design processes, for experts to actually be even more biased than the person on the street.


So you might think, oh, well, is it always the case that, um, people who are teachers and doctors should hold index funds and accountants and, um, finance people should trade individual stocks? I wouldn't say this is the case. Why? Number one is the Dunning-Kruger effect, is that a little bit of knowledge can be a dangerous thing.


I might think, "Well, I'm a finance professor, let me trade stocks." But even though I understand finance, I just do not have the day-to-day information that you will, because you're talking to CEOs and companies and you're analyzing drug pipelines in a way that I would never be able to get the same types of information.


And another issue is that if you're an expert, you will have more data to inform you. And you might think, "Well, how can that be a bad thing? If data is informing me, then I should become even more of an expert." Well, sadly, that's not the case because we might respond to data in a biased way. So let's take a football manager.


If you win a game, you say it's because of my amazing tactics. If you lose a match, you say it's because the referee or it was unfair, I was unlucky. And so this is something known as the self-attribution bias, is we chalk up successes to our own skill and we attribute failures to outside consequences. And there is some psychological evidence that men are worse at doing that than women.


And so if this is the case, then somebody who is an expert, you may be a professional fund manager, you might get too overconfident and, and think that it is, um, due to your skill when it could actually be due to luck. And this is particularly the case in investing, where there's a lot of things which are outside your control.


A, a bad decision could end up being good in retrospect, uh, just because you get lucky. This is something that Annie Duke, the former World Series of Poker champion, calls resulting. We judge a decision by its result, not by the process. If I was to play blackjack and twist on a, um, 19 and get a two and hit 21, they say, "Well, that's a great decision."


But it was a poor decision. I just got lucky with the outcome. And so people might say, well, this is the, um, this was the case with Neil Woodford. He did, he did very well. Um, but was this just some lucky stock picks? And then many people, I have to admit, including me, put money into his fund when he went independent and started up his Woodford Funds, when what led to his strong performance was actually luck, uh, rather than skill So that's what you do if you are untrammeled, and therefore what are the ways in which you try to address those behavioral biases is to be aware of them and to try to make sure you have as much cognitive diversity as possible so that you challenge people's assumptions.


And last year I released a report on cognitive diversity in asset management in, in the House of Lords. It was commissioned by the Diversity Project. And I won't repeat all of the prescriptions, um, from this. You kindly, uh, fed into, uh, this report with some really good ideas of how to design processes, but one of them is to try to address the problem of the cult of the star fund manager.


If you're somebody like Woodford, who has had some successes, while those successes might be due to luck it doesn't mean that you should be unchallenged. Often in asset management firms, and you'll know this much better than me, it may well be that an analyst thinks that he or she can't challenge the fund manager.


Anything that we can do to make it easier for juniors to challenge seniors, that this is seen to be an expectation of a junior rather than you being belligerent, that is something where you're gonna get more viewpoints on the very complex problem of how to invest


Ben: So what bias do you think you are most susceptible towards, if any?


And have you tried to build a particular process or defense for it?


Alex: Yes. That's a great question to ask me. I, I, I first start with my most, uh, my biggest bias just i- in, in life, maybe not just investing, is I might attribute negative motives to people when it could be something innocent. So if I, I, if I, if I get an email where it could be interpreted negatively, I, I might interpret it negatively and, and then start to reply in a negative way.


So before ChatGPT, what I did is I put a timer on my outbox. So, whenever I, um, reply to an email, it sits in my outbox for, for one minute. Uh, and so sometimes I will then fish it out and think, "Well, can I reply in a more charitable way?" Because maybe I could give that person the benefit of, of, of the doubt.


A- a- and many times it frustrates me because I, I have to... I- if it's, even if it's a legitimate email that I'm sending back, I need to wait for one minute before closing my laptop. But it's something that, that is a price I know I have to pay because I have this bias which causes me to, um, perhaps, uh, i- interpret emails in, in, in a more negative way.


Now, with ChatGPT, what I'll do is I will ask it, "Well, how... Do you think this email was rude?" And they might say, "Ah, I can see why you could interpret it as rude, but they were just being a bit careless and, and sloppy with their, with their wording." So I try to use technology to help me. Then in investing uh, confirmation bias I suffer from, uh, just like many other people.


I do like to interpret information in accordance with my prior beliefs. And so again, I will have to try to actively take steps to address this. So during Brexit, I was a strong Brexit supporter, and then I would go to... So I was a strong Remain supporter, and therefore I would go to talks by Brexiters so that I could see the other side.


When I chose the agent for my, uh, last book, he was the one who was most negative out of my proposal. He thought it had the most room for improvement, whereas there were others who were saying, "I'm ready to send it out right now." And so I'm always trying to get critical people to give me a, a, a different viewpoint to tell me what am I missing out on.


Ben: Yes. Get critical views. That's great. Well, I guess that leads me into thinking, what has been your worst investment mistake or decision? Or you can do the other, what has been, you think, your best investment, uh, decision or process? 'Cause as we pointed out, maybe it's the process rather than the outcome, which sometimes is the most important thing.


Alex: So I've made bad investment decisions where I've invested in, uh, startup companies where I know the founder. And I know the founder, and it's also in an industry, uh, that I think I might have knowledge on. Let's say, uh, uh, the fitness industry, for example. So I know the people. So there was a startup company called Grindhouse, which was founded by five ex-Barry's Bootcamp trainers.


Uh, I w- as you know, I'm a huge fan of Barry's Bootcamp. I thought these trainers were fantastic trainers. If you go to the class, you can see how much better they are than any average or even a t- t- top-end trainer. And I thought, "Well, this is, this is gonna be great that they're going and breaking out among themselves.


I've been to their classes. I know how good they are." Well, one issue here is familiarity bias, is that okay, I do know them as trainers, but does that mean I have knowledge about how they are in terms of operations and budgeting and, and finance and business decisions? Often we all invest with our friends and family, thinking, "Oh, I'm a great judge of character."


And character matters because culture matters, and I, I'm someone who believes that culture matters. But even though people claim culture eats strategy for breakfast, the strategy's important. You need to get the strategy and the finances right. And here I had this familiarity bias which led to me not being discerning about those other things.


Second, I, um, looked at this when I was a consumer- as a consumer, I think I suffered from the Dunning-Kruger effect. I thought, "I know these people. I've, I've been a consumer of their product," but I viewed this only through my lens. So I love really difficult workout classes where you get, um, blasted and, a- and treated like maybe an army drill sergeant.


I am not the majority person in the population who wants to go to such a, a, a fitness class and for what I thought would be really great, W- was a really top quality class, and to me, a cut above the rest, would not be to the average person. It might be seen as, as, as too difficult or, or, or too aggressive.


And then number three, I think it was more difficult for me to challenge them. So I was one of the, the, the leading investors in this. There's a famous pop star who i- invested the most because she knew one of the founders. I think there was a big French capital firm, and I was number three behind them.


But because of my relationship with them, I would not ask them the discerning questions that I might have done, uh, otherwise for fear of uh, jeopardizing that friendship. In the end, the company, um, went, went bust, sadly. And so that was one where I do think I was affected by emotion and my own biases.


Ben: Yes, there are a lot of biases there. A- and it goes two ways. I heard someone who looked at the Apple iPad and thought, "Well, I'm never gonna use that." Mm. A- and therefore assumed that nobody else was ever gonna use that, and obviously got their forecast very wrong. So you've now written several books. Do you think after all the books that you've written that you've particularly changed your view, either on any of your own research or claims, or maybe you've had a biggest change of view on something in general?


Alex: Yes, thanks. So my first book, Grow the Pie, was about the business case for sustainability, how sustainability is not just nice for people on the planet, but it contributes towards long-term business success. And that book, I, I try to make a balanced book by highlighting the need for companies to be profitable in addition to being socially contributing.


But even though I think that book was balanced, my views on sustainability have become more and more nuanced o- over time. So I'm more and more recognizing the limits to sustainability, how difficult it is to put in practice, the existence of diminishing returns and trade-offs. So since then I've written a bunch of papers.


One of them was called The End of ESG. That's not an anti-ESG paper, but it highlights how ESG needs to be treated with the same rigor as any other business decision, rather than being put on a pedestal and, and being seen as untouchable. And another paper called Rational Sustainability, which argues that the same rationality and discipline should be attached to sustainability as other issues in business.


So I'd say my views on sustainability have become more nuanced and more moderated. I still do believe it has the potential to create a lot of value, but I believe it's been misapplied in many, uh, situations. So I am a, a, a bit more discerning about that than I was, um, when I first wrote the book and I thought people will view this, um, nuanced and they will be rational, open-minded.


Actually, the implementation of this was less rational than I hoped. In terms of May Contain Lies, my book on misinformation, I thought, oh, when people hear about how bad these biases are and how much misinformation is, is out there people will, uh, be more discerning, and sadly, I'm wrong on that point as well.


Um, right now we see Gary Stevenson, who puts out a lot of views on inequality, where he gets basic data wrong, so he will just, um, confuse income and assets, which are two completely different things. Now, you and I could see exactly the same data, and you could say taxes should be higher, and I could say taxes should be lower, and we could respectfully di- disagree on that and have an interesting debate.


But when you don't even agree on the facts to begin with, uh, it's then much harder to have a discussion because those facts are being misrepresented. And this then means that people's views on this area are driven by misinformation. So it's not that I disagree with your, your, your viewpoint, you, because I put more weight on economic growth than inequality.


That's a valuable thing. But if the facts are not there to begin with because you think, well, you can put all of these taxes on and the billionaires are not gonna leave, then you're not gonna see a trade-off which is actually, um, will be there in, in, in the data Uh, with the madness of markets, we'll, we'll, we'll, we'll see.


Um, what, what... So a- actually, it's good that you asked me this question right now. What do I hope to get out of this book? And why I'm excited about its potential, whether it's borne out or not, we'll see, is that it can be applied on lots of different levels. So let's say the most basic level is you're somebody, you read the book and you think, "Oh, I should not...


I should be wary of my biases. I should not be hyp- um, giving into hype. I'm just gonna hold index funds." And if what I do is I deter somebody from YOLOing into crypto or buying into a single AI stock, then I think I will have achieved my objective. Actually, let's not be biased and let's try to hold the market portfolio.


But then there's a more full fat version of the book, which is I am gonna be an active stock picker. Well, why? Because it could be you're a professional investor out there, and what I'm saying is, well, if you are going to, um, make it trade on individual stocks, well, here are certain things to look out for.


These are things which are undervalued, such as corporate culture. Here are things that are overvalued, and that is something where a more active investor can trade, I think, in a more informed manner by looking at, well, what is the more information relevant, uh, decisions. So I think if it changes investing behavior, and why it's difficult to see its success is on the one hand it will make, make some people less active And then other people that might then make them more active because it might make them realize there's additional things they could be exploiting.


And I need to make sure that the right audience, uh, responds in the sa- in the correct way because if the uninformed person becomes more active and the informed person becomes let- less active, that's in the wrong direction. What I want is, is the in- uninformed person to still play the stock market, but through investing in index funds, and then the informed investor to know that here are the additional sources of alpha that I can capitalize on.


Ben: Great. Well, let's see if that hopefully plays out. May- I thought we'd perhaps do a very quick round of overrated, underrated. So I will give you one quick topic, and you could say, "Oh, I think this is overrated or underrated." Or, or you could say it's correctly rated, it's neutral, uh, with maybe a thought and, and then we'll pass on.


So overrated or underrated, the efficient market hypothesis.


Alex: I think it's overrated. I believe that markets are not efficient. Uh, I believe behavioral finance is something that should be taken seriously.


Ben: Carbon taxes, do you think they're underrated or overrated ideas?


Alex: I think they're underrated. So I believe that carbon taxes are a very good solution to the climate crisis.


This is something which is supported by basic economics and externalities, but it's, I think, political reluctance rather than economic problems which has caused them to, uh, be slow in adopting, being adopted.


Ben: Yeah. Pro-economy, not political economy, I guess, on that one. Company purpose statements. Company purpose, underrated or overrated?


Alex: I'd say they're overrated, and you might think, well, that's surprising because my first book had the subtitle How Great Companies Deliver Purpose and Profit. But I think a purpose statement do- uh, that's something which is often used for marketing. A, a statement if it doesn't actually affect how you go about decisions, then it is really not worth its paper.


I know that sometimes I'm asked to, before my courses, say, well, what the learning objectives are. I don't really explicitly think about learning objectives. I can give a good course without thinking about objectives. Before giving an after-dinner speech or a TED Talk, you don't have learning objectives for the audience.


You just focus on, on the content and the delivery. So I think that's more performative rather than focusing on the substance of what a company should be doing.


Ben: Yeah. Sometimes it's too surface. Quarterly reporting, overrated or underrated?


Alex: Ah, this is a very good one. I would say overrated, but not by much.


So, and I think my views here are a bit more moderate than they were in Grow The Pie. So in Grow The Pie, I thought grow- uh, quarterly reporting was, was very overrated. Why? Because I said, well, the value of a company is far more than their short term earnings. There's so many other aspects of a company, and if you just focus on quarterly earnings reporting, then the market is going to be ignoring all of those other factors.


What has now changed since I wrote the book is you do have a lot of now sustainability reporting, and some might say it's too much. You have these outside parties who are asking companies to give this information. It's not clear what they'll do with this information, it's gonna go into a black hole somewhere.


It costs a lot of money to actually disclose that information. So therefore, there could be a role of quarterly reporting in order to make sure that in addition to all of the sustainability reporting, a company does still report its financial performance. If you did not have quarterly reporting, there is an argument that there could just be speculation over what financial performance is, and if there's more uncertainty, then that could be bad for capital markets.


So I'd still say overrated, but I would not say as much as I would have done six years ago.


Ben: Yeah, that seems fair. I think also, at least in big capital markets, the report is one thing, but actually h- having questions and answers with management on a regular basis is quite important for good functioning capital markets.


Obviously, they also do conferences in the rounds. But there is some evidence that actually if, if management teams don't explain what they're doing for long periods of time, uh, that actually that might be a little bit less efficient as well.


Alex: And also that if, if companies are putting more into sustainability reporting and if investors understand that, they will respond in a less knee-jerk reaction to quarterly reporting because they know, well, the value of a company is going to come from elsewhere.


So there's one thing in accounting where they call the earnings response coefficient, which is how much the stock price changes to unexpected earnings, and this varies a lot with other things that a company might be doing. Not surprisingly, for companies with more intangibles than the earnings response coefficient is lower.


Ben: Yes. And I read some research as well that if something unexpectedly bad happens for a company, particularly if it wasn't maybe in management's control, or maybe even if it was, uh, the recovery, if they subsequently perform better, can be quicker, where you actually essentially have a, a score of management credibility or transparency in, in that type of reporting because investors are just more likely to believe that the management teams are recovering from something bad happening if they've been very good and transparent with their communications.


Alex: And that makes a lot of sense. And I, I'd say this is not a behavioral bias. That is actually rational. Because people are human, they make mistakes. If you've got a track record of being really honest, then y- y- you could have just, just made a mistake. Whereas if this is something which is more systematic, then it is more rational for you as an investor to think, "Well, this could be deliberate rather than accidental."


Ben: Sure. Okay. Overrated and underrated. Universal basic income, UBI. Do you think it's a good or poor concept?


Alex: I think it's overrated. Um, so I, I do understand the importance of, Social cohesion and equality, and I also understand that, uh, there will be mis- misfortunes, and we do need to have a social safety net because people through no fault of their own, um, they could be out of work or they could be physically una- unable to work.


But maybe I'm being distorted by specific proposals or implementations of universal basic income rather than the concept, but my reaction to the proposals is, if this is something which then just, it significantly decreases your incentive to work, then I think this is highly problematic. And so within the UK you have 1 million people who are young people who are not in education, employment or training.


If you are giving a stronger safety net, then this ... If this provides lower incentives to, to get a job or, or to get educated, then this is a massive loss in, in, in, in human potential. People say, "Well, what is the definition of hell?" It is you get to, um, you die, and then you meet the person who you could have become, and I think one of the things I'm really passionate about, and this is why I'm in education, is to allow people to fulfill their potential.


And I think things which disincentivize people be this maybe potential universal basic income or the Gary Stevenson message that it's not your fault, it's the system's rigged against you, and there's no point you, you trying because, because the game is rigged. I think this is hugely problematic.


Ben: Yeah, and I think even advocates will admit that there's only been small scale trials, and implementation is quite tricky. But the, uh, latest round of trials has not been quite as positive as they had hoped. And part of it is that we seem to underplay the intangible associated with having a job. So obviously there's money and all of these other things, but there are these things...


And again, it might depend on the culture and society, so we're not e- exactly sure, but there's confidence and self-belief, and these other aspects to having a job which seem to be a little bit more important to humans in society over and above the sort of income stream that maybe you could replace with a UBI or that a job gives you.


But obviously still heavily debated.


Alex: Absolutely. So it gets you up in the morning, it gives you a purpose. It allows you to... It gives you interactions with, with others. It... You, you interact with teams, and you have to resolve disputes. So there's all, all, all of these positive things which come a- above the income.


That's a really good point, which I, I, I didn't emphasize enough.


Ben: Okay. Overrated or underrated. Oh, this is maybe an either or. Macroecon versus microecon.


Alex: Oh, okay. So when I applied for my PhD, I wanted to do macrofinance because I just thought this was so fascinating. So when I would read The Economist, I would always read finance economics rather than business.


So business would understand a company, and I thought, well, it's macro, which is really interesting because if you just shape the context in which companies do business, that is much more important and influential than shaping one particular company. In the end, all my research has become on, on micro factors such as corporate culture and corporate governance.


Um, so I'm afraid I'm gonna give the fence-sitting economics answer, which is both. Both. We need to understand both the big picture and, and the detail.


Ben: That seems fair. Okay, last two of these. Uh, social media, overrated or underrated?


Alex: So I would say underrated from the vantage point of me and the people I typically interact with. So I remember when f- social media first came out, I thought, "I'm never gonna be active on, on Twitter. This is just for attention-seeking people." That was just my own prejudice, not actually understanding what social media was about.


Now I'm very active, particularly on LinkedIn. I think this is a fantastic way of getting your ideas across to a wide audience. So there are many people who might read some of my posts who've never met me in person, and also a way for me to learn. So sometimes I might write something and then somebody gives a counterpoint which I hadn't thought of, or they tell me about another paper which is related to, um, the point that I've made.


So I think it is a way of disseminating ideas and having impact and influence, but also for you learning and having your ideas being tested. It's a bit like the stock price. You learn from the stock price. If I put a, I put a social media post up and then there's a lot of negative comments, then, uh, maybe I learn that my view was an uninformed view out there.


Sadly, in my profession, we put very little impact weight on a professor's social media impact, when I think, well, this is the way that we actually get our ideas across. And it's not just my own ideas. I often will post papers by other people. So certainly for my profession, I think it's hugely underrated.


There will be people for whom it's overrated because they will use this as their primary source of information without checking. So for others it could be overrated because they're putting too much weight on it. But from my vantage point in my circle, I think my profession significantly underweights it.


Ben: That's fair. And also from where I sit I see a lot of people who have, I guess you'd call them sort of special interest groups, and it's definitely really important for them. It might not even be a special interest, right? It's just an interest group, and you can find those who have similar interests to you, which you might not be in your very small circle, but obviously when you go off to the internet, you have a larger circle.


So final one on the overrated, underrated AI. I guess this is specifically, uh, large language models and, and agents and the like, but do you think AI is overrated or underrated?


Alex: Oh, again, another tricky one to end with. I think, um, from my vantage point, I think it is, uh, actually underrated. Often people might be Luddites and not understand the power of technology and, and maybe the quote thinking class might like to underrate it by saying, "Oh, we are so smart people, we don't need AI.


We can't be enhanced by AI." I find it e- e- extremely useful. So I won't use AI to write for me. I can see a lot of social media posts which are blatantly AI written in, in an embarrassing way, which is because it's so obvious. But instead I will use this as a really good research assistant. So it might be, let's say updating my lecture notes.


I say, "Well, can you find another example of this merger which had great strategic rationale but had a culture clash? Can you update this?" And so I will use this as a really good research assistant. And this substantially increases my leverage compared to what it would've been otherwise. Um, sometimes I can get this to challenge me.


For example, is there a different interpretation of this email? If before I send this email , are there certain things that you would correct in this going forward? And I've only started to scratch the surface of, of what, what, what it, what it can do. I know that people are using this as financial advisors and, uh, g- uh, asking this to give some, some decisions which could be affecting their family's future wealth.


So I think if we are to use it, but also recognize its limitations, rather than just doing something because AI says so, I think it could be a really powerful tool. Of course, if you are knee-jerking, reacting to it without, um, being discerning, then it could be overrated.


Ben: Great. Okay, that's all the tricky questions over.


Then we'll just come to the final couple of questions. I'd be interested, is there anything you wanted to, uh, share about your own personal creative processes in terms of is there a particular way that you write? Do you like to write in the morning or the evening? Do you do these kinds of 45-minute chunks and you do research?


Is there anything about how you actually create, and also you create lectures as well as books and, and material, that you wanna share on your, on your process? Uh, and maybe that can apply to any current or future projects that you're also working on, but, uh, be interested in, in those projects and if you've got anything you'd like to share on your creative processes


Alex: Thanks very much for asking.


So I'd say two things in terms of creative processes. So one thing is to have really uninterrupted chunks of time, so where I can really think and get deeply into something. So, uh, for my last two books, um, I wrote significant chunks of this in the local library. And the local library is not the most pleasant place in terms of conditions, but why I w- work there is because I'm surrounded by other studious people.


And so this allowed me to really focus. I'm in an environment where everybody else is working, so I'm not just be- gonna be goofing off and, and checking email. Now that I live in a house rather than a flat, I just go to the top floor of my house where I don't have my computer there. I just have pencil and paper.


Or if it's summer, I'll just sit in my garden, again, without the distraction of any devices. Uh, my administrative assistant knows that if, if there's, if... To schedule a meeting, if people request a meeting, to put this on days in which I have other meetings and try to make this adjacent to another meeting so there is not the fragmentary time in between.


So for me, large uninterrupted periods of time are very valuable. Then in terms of, well, what to do with that time and, and where ideas come from, I really believe in the idea of reading widely and tr- cross-fertilizing ideas from different disciplines. So I was very lucky to go to a Montessori primary school where it was academically strong, but you could not get an academic scholarship.


You could only get a scholarship in music, uh, drama, sports, or art. They wanted people to be really, uh, well-rounded people. When I was at secondary school I did English, German, economics, and maths, which was a combination of arts and, and sciences. And this is why some of my research is quite interdisciplinary.


For example, the effect of s- football on the stock market, that's psychology and finance. Employee satisfaction, that's something which is more human relations with management and, and, and organizational behavior. I have stuff which is at the intersection of accounting, uh, and, and, and finance. And the three books that I've written, they're on very different themes.


One is sustainability, one is misinformation, one is, um, behavioral finance. There were people who've been really successful writing, like, let's say Cal Newport, lots of books on productivity. And you could say, well, there is actually an argument for specialization and saying similar things many times.


That's economies of scale. Uh, but for me it's, it's just more interesting for me to work in different areas. That's where I get a lot of passion from. Yes, my views on sustainability have changed since Grow the Pie. I could write another sustainability book. But for me it was more interesting to branch out into this, uh, other areas.


And notice it's not branching out into something just because I think it's new. I've been working on this topic of behavioral finance for about 20 years now. And now is where I think I've accumulated enough knowledge to share it with the general public.


Ben: Great. And current and future projects that you're working on?


Alex: Yeah, so, so right now, just in the very short term, it is on, on, on the book and the, the marketing and the dissemination of ideas, which I have to admit I, I don't like as much. I love writing, and I will be really really stringent on writing the same chapter 100 times just so that the language is perfect, when I know, having written two prior books, that what is much more important for success is the marketing aspect of it.


I just, as an aesthete, I just want the text to be perfect, and so I'm sort of forcing myself to have to do the, the, the more publicity part of it. But the publicity of this book is really fun because with the last two books, there was one central idea. W- when I did a podcast, I would always speak about pretty much the same things.


With May Contain Lies, it was breastfeeding and IQ, is that correlation or causation? Here, the chapters of the different books are very different from each other. So we could have a podcast where we only talked about chapters one and five on underaction and overaction, and another podcast could be chapters six and seven.


So because, a bit like Freakonomics, they're all manifestations of craziness in the market, but in very different areas, this is something that I don't think I'd ever get tired o- of speaking about. So it is a real privilege to have, um, this opportunity, when initially I thought, "Oh, this is something more I have to do.


It's an obligation." It's more, for me now, an absolute pleasure. Then in terms of other projects going forward, I have some ongoing research projects, some of which you might be aware of. Say, uh, the link between equity inclusion and financial returns, or the sustainability survey of fund managers with Tom Gosling and Dirk Jenter, where they are in the publication process and I want to get them finally published.


And then in other more long-term things, I'm not sure actually. Because often we view research as setting out your five-year research plan and then going out and doing it, and this is indeed how research is funded. I'm now on the board or council of the Economic and Social Research Council, where we give grants where you set out your idea, and then you're offered the grant, and they go and do it.


But this is just not how research works. You just react to things. There could be new data sets that come out, or maybe CO- COVID happens, and I want to look at the effect of COVID or the effect of working from home. Right now, if there is a lot of discussion about inequality, which I think is being misinformed, that's something where I believe I could perhaps put out some correct data and, and facts there.


So while I might have some long-term plans, and I do have some nascent research ideas, I also do want to be pragmatic and responsive. And if there is an issue out there about which I think clearer economic thinking is needed, I will speak out about it


Ben: Yes. Unfortunately, the world does not rhyme with five-year funding cycles


So that's something that perhaps we've mismatched. And yes, your book is really, uh, wide-ranging, so we could have this podcast probably three times in three different hours and talk about a whole range of, of different subjects. So final question, so this would be, do you have any thoughts or advice, uh, you'd want to give to listeners?


Perhaps this is, uh, advice that you give to your, uh, students at business school, or maybe this is thoughts that you've had to the typical investor who's maybe more the person in the street. But any sort of final thoughts or advice that you'd like to share with listeners.


Alex: Yeah. Particularly for an investing standpoint is to try to take the counterpoint to the position that you want to take.


Um, so just like for me within, say, remain Brexit, I wanted to listen to what Brexiters have to say. With my book proposal, I wanted to find out what people would criticize. Similarly, if I decide I'm gonna be investing in GlaxoSmithKline, you could even ask ChatGPT, "What are the reasons not to invest in GlaxoSmithKline right now?"


And then research them. So try to look at the other side to an argument. And I think this matters in investing, but it also matters for so many other things. I think why we have so much division and, and binary thinking and polarization is that on important issues such as inequality or climate change or immigration, uh, some people might only see one side.


Ben: Great. And with that, I'll remind everyone The Madness of Markets, uh, which should be available from all good bookshops or the internet. And with that, uh, Alex, thank you very much.


Alex: Been a great pleasure, Ben. Thanks so much for having me on.


Soumaya Keynes: How to Win a Trade War, Tariffs, China and Industrial Policy

Trade wars are damaging, difficult to control and usually best avoided. But what should a country do when economic conflict is imposed upon it?

“The trade wars are coming to us, and we’re going to have to engage.”

Soumaya Keynes, Financial Times economics columnist and co-author with Chad Bown of How to Win a Trade War, joins Ben Yeoh to examine what economic conflict now looks like as the old trading order weakens. The World Trade Organization still exists, but its dispute-settlement system can no longer reliably manage the largest tensions. In that world, simply repeating that nobody wins a trade war is not much of a strategy.

Soumaya argues that defence should come before attack. Governments need to understand their real supply-chain vulnerabilities, maintain strategic stockpiles where the insurance is worthwhile, and identify areas of strength that could deter an adversary. Yet resilience is harder than it sounds: companies often cannot see far enough into their own supply chains, while political pressure can turn sensible preparation into an expensive pursuit of self-sufficiency.

They also discuss tariffs and industrial policy. Tariffs are taxes on imports, generally borne largely at home, and are far too blunt to achieve every objective politicians attach to them. But Soumaya also rejects the idea that tariffs and subsidies are always wrong. Where a country has acquired dominant market power and shown a willingness to weaponise it, governments may need to intervene. The real challenge is doing so without creating wasteful subsidy races, protected national champions or a retreat into autarky.

The conversation then moves beyond trade: to China’s industrial model, the importance of competition and tolerated failure, the relationship between obesity, gender and income, and the wider economic effects of GLP-1 medicines. Soumaya also explains her slow, highly edited writing process, why she keeps AI-generated prose out of her writing process, and how she is turning economics into songs.

Takeaways:

  • Economic conflict requires preparation, not just retaliation.

  • Strategic stockpiles can work precisely by never needing to be used.

  • Tariffs may sometimes be necessary, but they remain costly and unreliable tools.

  • Industrial policy needs competition, discipline and a tolerance for failure.

  • GLP-1 medicines may affect employment, relationships and inequality as well as health.

  • In an age of abundant AI writing, a recognisable human voice may become more valuable.

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube..

Episode Contents

  • 00:00 — Intro

  • 01:00 — Are trade wars ever worth fighting?

  • 02:09 — What happened to the WTO rules-based system?

  • 04:28 — Can trade wars have any silver linings?

  • 07:59 — Why defence should come before attack

  • 09:30 — Mapping supply-chain vulnerabilities

  • 13:01 — Strategic stockpiles and the politics of insurance

  • 17:29 — What does winning a trade war mean?

  • 20:05 — Market power and economic offence

  • 22:16 — What tariffs actually do

  • 25:15 — The return of industrial policy

  • 32:48 — What the West can learn from China

  • 35:03 — Soumaya’s return to health economics

  • 37:40 — Moving beyond trade

  • 38:28 — GLP-1 medicines and their wider economic effects

  • 39:25 — Patents, prices and access to medicines

  • 41:39 — Soumaya’s writing process

  • 43:50 — AI, writing and preserving your voice

  • 45:31 — Economics songwriting as a creative niche

  • 46:39 — Overrated or underrated

  • 51:37 — Future projects—and no more books (for now!)

  • 54:38 — Soumaya sings her trade-war song

  • 57:10 — Final advice: do less, but better

Transcript (transcribed by LLM and lightly edited, mistakes are possible)

Ben: Hey, everyone. I'm super excited to be speaking to Soumaya Keynes. Soumaya has written with Chad Bown an excellent book, How to Win a Trade War, and she is an all-round brilliant person.



Soumaya, welcome.



Soumaya: Thank you so much for having me and for that lovely introduction.



Ben: Before we talk about how to win, I thought I would ask, is there ever a good time for a trade war, or in an ideal world should we be thinking about avoiding them?



Soumaya: Yeah, clearly trade peace is better than trade wars, right?



Just in the same way that, normal peace is better than military wars. Con- conflict is bad. You heard it here first. I think that the premise of the book is that there are some cases in which you can't avoid the fight, right? Because in some cases the trade wars are going to come to you.



And there is this line that economists like to trot out, which is no one wins a trade war. And oh Lord, the number of times that people have given me that line over the past year and a half. But, that... It's trite. It sounds smug. And it just isn't appropriate anymore for where we are because the trade wars are coming to us, and we're gonna have to engage.



Ben: So is the old rules-based trading system truly over then, or have we given up too early or quickly, or could they come back so this is not the new status quo? It can go back and forth in a kind of equilibrium



Soumaya: Yeah. So it's probably worth being quite precise about what we mean about the rules-based trading system.



So if you think that it is a world of trade deals in general, then there are many of those still in effect, many of those functioning perfectly well. There are some trade relationships that are clearly broken down quite dramatically, primary one being the US and China.



But around much of the world, the trading system is functioning. Now what people often mean when they talk about the rules-based trading system is something quite specific, which is the World Trade Organization and specifically its dispute settlement system, right? Under the old system, if you had a problem with the way that another country was managing its affairs then you would essentially sue them at the World Trade Organization to say I'm filing a dispute."



And then there would be a bunch of independent judges who would say, "Okay, you," "yes, they have broken the rules or not." And if they had, then those judges would essentially say, "Okay this would be a proportionate level of retaliation." And the purpose of this system wasn't to end all trade conflict, right?



It was to manage trade conflict and make sure that it didn't spiral out of control. And it's that system of judges that we don't really have anymore because the Trump administration killed it. We have a sort of interim replacement which the EU tried to set up, but many of the world's biggest players just aren't in it.



And so it can only do so much. The EU and China are in this alternative dispute settlement system, but I think it's notable that you're hearing a lot from Europe right now about its problems with China's economic system. I think it's notable that they haven't filed some major dispute against all of China's economic practices using this alternative dispute settlement system, right?



They're trying to go bilaterally. They're trying to negotiate. They're, they're maybe thinking they might have to impose trade barriers. So it doesn't look like this rules-based system is Europe's first port of call. And so yeah, I... it's clearly not working very well when it comes to the biggest tensions in the global economy today.



Ben: When I speak to some econ people, they say a silver lining of a hot war is that in the medium to long run, maybe you get technological booms or you get a change of paradigm and a change of thinking and things like that. Are there any silver linings to a trade war? I know it's very different, but as we come out of this and assuming we eat somewhere else, is there something which in a creative destruction we could actually end up with something where, oh, we didn't think we could do that, but because of where we got to, we were that?



Or to your earlier point, this is just something we should avoid, we can't avoid it now and it's just gonna be what it is?



Soumaya: Yeah, that's an interesting question. So historically I don't know that there are many silver linings of trade wars that I can think of. And, I think one of the messages in the book is, you really shouldn't run into these conflicts happily, right?



Our tools are terrible, our weapons are very blunt. They have all sorts of unintended consequences. They're very difficult to wield well. There is a reason why for many years the norm or, the kind of the instruction from economists was, do not- do not deploy tariffs, export restrictions, industrial policy bec- they're just very challenging to use well.



Now, it depends on your worldview, right? So there is a world in which actually, you know, a move in a trade war might be the catalyst to persuade everyone else to act, right? So let's just take an example of China's restrictions on rare earths exports, which happened last year.



And, from the US perspective, that was obviously very stressful at the time. I spoke to people, and the consensus seems to be that the Chinese made a strategic mistake, right? Because they didn't just target the US, they targeted... whether through incompetence or design they hit everyone, right?



Everyone was struggling to get rare earths. And what that did ultimately is galvanize everyone else and make America's trading partners think, "Oh, actually we also need to work to set up alternative sources of supply for these rare earths." And had China not done that, and had China only hit the US, I think there would've been a greater chance that those other countries could have maybe sat on the sidelines and thought, "Nah, this is a US problem.



We're not gonna try that hard to do something." Tactical mistakes in trade wars can inadvertently strengthen the other side. I guess I would, I probably wouldn't go so far as to say, "Oh, trade wars make us richer in the end." I don't know about that. I guess maybe one more point though would be, talking about industrial policy, right?



The, the most powerful argument against industrial policy is that we're just... the government's just really bad at doing it well, right? We just need to... We don't have the state capacity. Need to be realis- realistic about what the government's good at doing. And, managing massive subsidies and protection is not one of them.



I feel like the conversation now has been moving away from the question of whether we should do industrial policy at all and towards the question of how to do it well. So you know, if an outcome of trade wars is that governments build up some of that capacity and learn lessons about how not to create massive white elephants or repeat a kind of enormous waste of Chine- Chinese...



the China subsidy infused model, and then that could be a positive outcome. I haven't seen it yet, but I'm hopeful.



Ben: So hard to find a silver lining, but possibly depending on which side you're on or your worldview, there could be better coordination between some actors, and possibly we're taking industrial policy more seriously, which gives us a chance to do it better, but let's wait and see on that.



I... In the book, you talk about defense and offense in a trade war, which I thought was really smart, and I hadn't really thought about the fact that you've got offensive ideas and defensive ideas, and you also talk about needing objectives, which I hadn't really thought about either because w- what does it mean to win?



And I take it from the book, you lean into establishing defense first as potentially something that a nation ought to think about. Is this still your view, a little bit further on and having written it through? And if so, how do you build a good defense?



Soumaya: Yeah, I... It's absolutely still my view, right?



And it's, it's the basic recommendation that the Trump administration didn't follow, right? So you know, this idea that trade wars are like real wars and logistics win real wars, right? It's that preparation, that planning that you need. You can't just run onto the battlefield waving around a weapon, in their case tariffs, and hope everything will be okay because the other side might also have a big weapon, right?



You need to plan what you would do if that happened. And so yeah, so the structure of the book is we talk about the stakes, the players, the rules, and then the defense and then finally the attack and that, it, it takes a while to get to the attack because, that instant gratification is not gonna come if you want to engage in a trade war well.



Okay, so how do you build a defense? So there are three chapters in the book. One is about identifying your vulnerabilities. Another one is about subsidizing and the third one is actually my favorite which is about stockpiling. And the theme running through the book is, I think, a big problem in the way that count- countries have approached international economic policies.



They've ultimately been too insular, right? So they've assumed "Oh, this is the way we do things and everyone else is a problem," and, we- we're- we're not gonna think about spillovers of our actions to other countries. And, everyone's basically just been far too inward-looking, right?



And so the big lesson is, okay if we are going to engage in trade wars, if we are going to use these tools that we have not actively... they- they've not been the fashionable tools, right? And so we don't have a huge amount of evidence or experience on using them really well. We're gonna have to look to our trading partners, right?



So winning a trade war means learning from the other side. And so just to give ex- some examples, right? So this came out of our reporting. So we spoke to a ton of government officials when we were reporting for the book, and we spoke to officials around the world who'd been engaged in these big vulnerability mapping exercises.



And, the- these came out just after COVID, right? The politicians were completely freaking out. There had been these supply chain shocks and, maybe these shocks could come from everywhere else. Like it was, it was very alarming for everyone.



And what happened is that the civil servants, the economic officials were tasked with doing these, and they yanked back control, right? Because they were like no. We're not gonna let you use these as an excuse to panic about everything. We're gonna look at the data. We're gonna be evidence-based, and we're gonna actually show you that in most areas we are not massively vulnerable to an international trade shock."



Actually, when you look at the data, we do have a relatively diversified set of imports. In the EU, they actually were able to get more of a handle on internal and domestic production data so they could look there. So these exercises were all marketed as vulnerability mapping exercises, but in practice they were actually more like invulnerability mapping exercises with the economists trying to calm everyone down.



So that was how these exercises happened in more than one jurisdiction. But then, I think o- one thing that becomes really obvious is, you go through these exercises, right? And you think about it, okay these economists have reassured us that in most products there are no vulnerabilities really. But the problem is actually these exercises are very difficult because of the nature of supply chains, because these supply chains end up running so far back behind your border often to other countries, right?



And so it can be very challenging to see where the true vulnerabilities lie. And actually when you get really into the weeds of this and we, we do and g- give lots of examples, there are reasons why companies just don't know where their own vulnerabilities are.



Their suppliers won't tell them. And so actually it's really hard. And so slowly one by one we spoke to people who... Th- there was this realization that actually you needed to completely reframe this challenge that actually thinking about your vulnerabilities wasn't the best way to go about it.



Because in cases where you have identified a vulnerability, sure, plug that one. Great. Let's try and fix that. But actually what might be more effective is in international trade conflict, rather than trying to plug every hole, if someone comes to you threatening to exploit a vulnerability, if you can go back to them and say hey, we've got this strength and we're willing to exploit it," that actually might be a more effective strategy than focusing entirely on this kind of defensive approach



Ben: That's the whole best defense is actually a good attack.



Yeah.



Maybe before we go onto the attack and winning objectives I am interested in the stockpiling issues you bring up 'cause it's not immediately clear to me, and when you speak to different people you get a little bit of a different view from this as a little bit what you're expressing.



And some of it is also how much insurance do you want to buy because these vulnerabilities might not come up. But I think about it particularly, one, around sort of pandemic preparedness and another really perhaps around food security.



So when you speak to a lot of the food systems experts, because they're within the food domain some of them get some more alarming stats like UK's less self-sufficient and some of these.



And depending on your nation state you are less self-sufficient, but there is also more globalization in your supply chain than the others. And again on pandemics it's because there seems to be a small chance but definitely not zero, and then it comes, but then of potentially quite bad outcomes.



But how much do you wanna stockpile for that? Can you do it? Can you do it across political cycles? But then when you speak to the more generalist econ person or particularly when you're trying to put the political economy thing, you end up with they're saying actually it's not so bad.



It probably isn't necessarily worth this insurance risk. We'll have to live within that." Is that something that you've come across as a reading, and is it slightly different from the specialty? It feels to me a little bit adjacent to what we hear from AI world, like AI people, some of them are like, "Oh, we're gonna lose 10 million jobs of X and 50%," and blah, blah, blah.



And when you speak to the econ person, it's when you look at these other transitions, from an economics point of view it doesn't quite work like that." And this is interesting around various domain knowledge shifts. I- is that something which I've observed as just barking up the wrong tree, or is there some truth to that?



Soumaya: I know, I think there is a lot of truth to that, and obviously it just comes from the different areas of experience of stockpiles, right? In food systems, stockpiles can be a very wasteful consequence of subsidy programs, right? So if you're guaranteeing prices to farmers that means the government might have to be buying up lots of excess supply.



And then, you get just very distorted markets, right? If the government becomes a massive buyer. Obviously if, when the government then tries to sell some of it, you can get accusations that they're driving the price down, right? It's a very challenging thing to manage stockpiles in a food context.



When it comes to medicine, obviously stockpiling is baked in, right? It's just it's not really that controversial. It's just something that is done, right? For, vaccines for cholera and what have you those happen, they are boring. And they can be useful because they essentially can by building up your stockpile gradually, you are keeping companies that can make those drugs in business, right?



You are giving companies an incentive to s- sustain the capacity to make those vaccines, so the stockpile can be quite handy. I think the thing that is different and more difficult about a stockpile in the context of a kind of geoeconomic attack is that there's this tragedy that if it is effective, you will never use it, right?



And so the kind-- The political economy of a geoeconomic safety stockpile is much, much more challenging than other types, right? Because of course, if you've got such a massive stockpile that there's no point in an adversary weaponizing their supplies, then they won't bother, and it'll look like your stockpile was completely useless, right?



And maybe over time, then you allow the stockpile to dwindle, and then, oh, look, we didn't have a stockpile, and we're stuffed. And so, that kind of dynamic is quite important, and it's I think undermined some stockpiles in the past. I think it's really interesting, early this year we experienced-- we've experienced a massive oil shock in the Strait of Hormuz closure, right? And really it looks like what saved us is the fact that we had massive stockpiles of oil on hand, right? So there are clearly cases where actually stockpiles were great, right?



We have, possibly avoided economic calamity because of those large stockpiles. And it's not exactly clear what China did, whether it actually used those, its stockpiles or whether domestic demand was soft.



Ben: So that seems like a classic insurance problem. To some extent you never wanna use it.



It's very successful, but then it disappears and it's the background, and it's a regular cost, and people pay for it. But then when you really need it it comes in to save you. That does lead me to think about what winning looks like, and you mentioned a few things. But I'm intrigued as to the mix or how we should weigh ideas. Do you want to really change another country's behavior?



Are you strengthening your own economy or nation state or maybe your allies, or are you simply suffering less damage, so everyone's going down, but you're going down less or is it something else? And thinking about those, then, what makes a good offense depending on your objective function.



Soumaya: Yeah, so we had to really broaden the definition of winning to make this book work, right? I think if you are in the US actually it's complicated, right? And I think one of the big challenges has been that the US office... is often not clear about what it perceives winning to be, right?



If we're in a world where actually we're in a kind of power struggle with China, maybe the US winning is the US doing better than China, right? Which obviously to China doesn't look very nice, right? And, so there is this kind of question whether the US sees that relationship as zero-sum.



And I think in, in, in I... who knows what President Donald Trump thinks, but there are definitely some, important powerful people in America who think that it is zero-sum. In which case winning just means the US doing better than China. Now elsewhere in the world countries often don't have the agency, right?



They're not, they're just not as big and powerful as either of those two, so they don't really have the luxury of saying, "Oh would we like to be bigger, better than the US or China?" So yeah, we had to massively expand our definition of winning to make this book work.



I think in the US there is sometimes an ambiguity about what winning means, right? Is there a straightforwardly zero sum situation in which actually the US just needs to do better than China? Or is there scope for a positive sum interaction? Elsewhere in the world, obviously, smaller countries don't have the luxury of saying, "Oh would we like to be bigger and better than the US and China?"



It's not where they are. So I think for a country like, say, the UK, winning does mean doing as best as you can, minimizing your wounds in this era of economic conflict. Maintaining sovereignty to the extent that you can and being careful about what that really means.



Ben: Yes. What is a good attack then?



Soumaya: What is a good attack?



Ben: But obviously it slightly depends on what w- winning means for you, so that's why I interlinked them.



Soumaya: Yeah. So I think, having identified your strengths or vulnerabilities, and vulnerabilities, sorry you're gonna have to be much more muscular about intervening because the market isn't gonna, isn't gonna fix this, right? And the kind... the core economic problem that we identify and talk about is this case of market dominance, right?



So we've got China as this massive and growing manufacturing power that is incredibly dominant in certain areas and has shown a willingness to, to weaponize that dominance, rare earths being the classic example. And, you can think of this as a straightforward monopolist problem, right? Within domestic markets, we worry about individual companies having too much market power.



The parallel is, China as a government having too much market power and being willing to abuse that power. And so essentially what you need to do is intervene to break that concentrated power. But obviously it's challenging because the dominant actor isn't going to sit by and allow you to do that, right?



So they're going to, they're going to push back. And of course, the very factors that generated that dominance in the first place are gonna be the same ones that make it hard to escape from, right? So in manufacturing, you've just got massive economies of scale, huge costs to move, huge uncertainty.



The- Yeah. Skills of your labor force aren't necessarily easily found elsewhere. It's gonna, it's gonna take a lot of effort. It's gonna take a lot of work. Probably gonna have to do it in coordination. This is one of the big fights between me and Chad. Chad's answers to everything in the book was, "We should just work with our friends and hug each other and look at some rainbows."



And I was the cynic saying, "Oh, people are rubbish. It never happens." And, the disagreement wasn't actually that big. I think we both agreed that yes, it would be better if countries coordinated. I think I was just a bit more skeptical that it would actually happen and therefore skeptical of the utility of just that being the recommendation for everything.



That's all



Ben: that matters ... but



Soumaya: yeah, I think j- in certain areas acknowledging that, yeah, the market isn't gonna fix this, the government does need to intervene. But, try not to go too far because autarky is not great.



Ben: Yes. Okay. So an issue of market power.



So what should we think about tariffs? When they first came around there was a lot of chat about, even about tariffs and all of this, and perhaps a little bit of confusion in the ordinary person. But how should we think about what tariffs actually are and how they are used in the trade wars we are in at the moment?



Soumaya: Tariffs are a tax on imports. They are technically paid by the importer. Now economists know very well that who physically pays the tax isn't necessarily the party that actually bears the cost of the tax because prices might change. The evidence so far suggests that in the US when President Trump has applied his tariffs, most of the incidence was borne by the importer.



So it was Americans who were paying those higher prices. There are a couple ways to think about tariffs. You could think of them as a kind of Trumpian Making America Great Again tool to revive manufacturing, bully your allies, extract concessions, raise tax revenue, and all the good things.



Reduce your trade deficit being another one. And, I think the message there is to try not to be too confident in what these very blunt weapons can achieve. I think that the relationship between tariffs and trade deficits is one that has generated a lot of yelling over the past few years.



And maybe this is controversial, but I think there is plausibly a relationship between tariffs and trade deficits. The problem is it's just incredibly unreliable, right? So in an extreme situation, if you imposed a 1,000,000% tariff on everything, then yeah, you probably would affect the trade deficit, probably generate a recession as well.



But the problem is, there isn't a straightforward linear relationship there. And President Trump applied very broad tariffs last year and the trade deficit did, diddly squat overall. These tools aren't necessarily all they're cracked up to be.



So yeah, tariffs as a kind of a wonder weapon is not what I would describe them as. That said, I do think that blanket screeching against all tariffs at any time ever is probably not right either. You can think of tariffs as a demand signal, right?



You're sending companies a sign that actually if they source from one place rather than another, it's gonna be more expensive. And that could be a trigger to persuade them to start sourcing from somewhere else. Now they're very difficult to do correctly or, as, for many reasons I go into in the chapter.



But I guess the headline is y- there are cases where actually you might want to use them. You might need to use them. Maybe they're the least bad option of many bad options. Yeah.



Ben: So be very careful of your blunt tools and blunt weapons, of which broad tariffs are probably a blunt weapon and a little bit hard to know how to do that.



But there is a case for selective use of it. So again, the purest on the other side may not be exactly right. So I guess we had the tariff part, and then another part which comes up in the book, and we've mentioned it earlier, was industrial policy, which has risen up nation states' agendas as well.



And I guess it does depend on which nation state we're talking about, but how should we think about industrial policy? Maybe if we wanna talk about three big blobs, we've got the US, China as two major players, and then as we're sitting in the UK, we could think about UK industrial policy if maybe we're trying to advise a UK government or prime minister on it.



But what should we think about industrial policy? And if you wanna think about it across a couple of countries, that's one way of looking at it.



Soumaya: Yeah. So industrial policy is an incredibly broad term, right? In a sense it includes subsidies, tariffs, export restrictions, any kind of government intervention to distort or shape the structure of your economy, presumably to try to generate some industry.



In the chapter on subsidies, the big analogy that we use likens subsidies to cooking, right? And we talk about the lessons that you can draw from there. And the reason we do that is because Chad and I are both absolutely horrendous at cooking, right?



And so the best place to... the best way to come at this question is from a place of deep humility. I think I mentioned this in the book, but Chad once baked gluten-free apple pie, and it was truly the worst thing I've ever eaten in my life. Really astonishing. It can go really badly wrong.



No, I think from the US' perspective they have the fiscal firepower to, they can spend big. The Chinese obviously have been spending big. Now, the big danger of a big turn toward industrial policy is that you end up spending just because the other side is spending.



You're in a wasteful subsidy race. Who wins in a market has nothing to do with who's most innovative or providing the best service to consumers, but it's actually just 'cause, who's got the deepest pockets whose backer has the deepest pockets. And I think that, that kind of warning has been one of the, yeah, that, that's been pretty loud, I think, over the past few years. But I do think there's increasing recognition that in some areas where there are these big distortions, where you have essentially a kind of non-market player then you do need to erect some defenses. Just thinking about China and how it has these local government authorities that are providing cheap credit to Chinese companies that lack domestic demand and so end up exporting loads and loads to the rest of the world.



And then when prices collapse, in most other countries, those businesses would just fold. But in China they're not allowed to fold. The- those credit lifelines just carry on going, and so they're able to sustain their exports, right? So when you're confronted with that, when you're faced with that- It's, y- the purest response would be to say look these foreign governments, these Chinese, Chinese government, that they're subsidizing our consumers.



We should just welcome the cheap stuff. Sounds great." I think there's a recognition that we're not in that world anymore, and actually allowing the de-industrialization that comes when that happens across the board is not very wise strategically. And so you do need to act.



I think the big debate now is not whether there needs to be action, say, in Europe, it's how broad would it need to be and can we do anything without eliciting China's retaliation, right? Because the other difficulty is that obviously in the short term, the problem is there, right?



China has dominance, and so it's actually very challenging to introduce your industrial policy without the Chinese retaliating and triggering the very thing that you're trying to protect yourself against.



Ben: I can't believe you are a bad cook. You had such an entertaining conversation with Tyler Cowen about food and economics and things that I don't truly believe your recipes will be as bad as that.



But I can-



Soumaya: I can cook one thing. I make really good za'atar salmon. Okay ... and then it goes to salads. Yeah. And that's where I am.



Ben: Maybe that's the thing you need. As a country, you just need to be so super great at one thing-



Soumaya: Yeah ... that's enough. No, totally, right? Just be in Taiwan with TSMC.



Yeah. Great. Everyone- Be South Korea with memory. Brilliant ...



Ben: Everyone needs you. I have to say, I did probably lean slightly towards this older view initially that industrial policy doesn't seem to work, it's all really tricky, let's not think about it 'cause we had subsequent things. Which I would've said, I don't know, maybe 10 or 20 years ago was the sort of mainstream median econ view.



Soumaya: But can I just, can I just- Go on ... so industrial policy doesn't work is a familiar phrase to me. But I think what's happened is we've had to change our definition of working, right? Yeah. So in the past, industrial policy was supposed to generate profitable, self-sustaining, efficient industries, right?



Generate dynamic economic growth. And sadly that's not the only thing that we care about anymore, right? Because essentially China has been using industrial policy to get market share, right? And actually, if you think about whether industrial policy works, if you just wanna buy market share, it probably does a bet- have a better track record of doing that, Yes



than it does in getting efficient, self-sustaining-



Ben: Yeah. So I was gonna come to that. So-



Soumaya: Sorry, yeah ...



Ben: Yeah, that, the consensus maybe 10 or 20 years ago, or sometime in the past, and maybe I was slightly persuaded by those who talk about it, although I'm slightly suspicious about macro overall. We could talk about the macro and micro.



And then you see these individual companies sometimes do this. So you argue like a ride sharing company produces, gets all the market share, and then when they are dominant market share, they can then do something with their prices. So within that, as a long-term strategy, that's potentially it.



But then I looked at China and its healthcare policy, particularly around biopharmaceuticals, so this is biotech and the other, where initially we were like they're spending a lot of money. The state doesn't necessarily know how to choose. They're sponsoring a lot of these. You're gonna get a lum- lot of zombie biotechs."



Okay, fine. But you fast-forward to today, and there's now an acknowledgement that the Chinese biopharmaceutical sector is really quite great. They've got, Everything is coming out. Yes, a lot of them failed, but actually that's what biopharmaceuticals do. So by enabling them to survive for longer than maybe they would because of the fact that your probability of success is quite low, but you need lots of shots on goal, and that's been really intriguing.



It did also seem to go hand-in-hand, and this is why it's a little bit more complex than just saying, "Oh, it's a subsidy or it's a tariff," by also fostering essentially clusters. So this is the ag- agglomeration effect, but you have places in China where there's very good biotech and there's very good biopharmaceuticals, and that seems to have come around.



And you can argue about this with some of the supply chain into factories and the like. And if you then say what is this success?" You now actually do have thriving Chinese biopharmaceutical companies and also R&D tools, and they're arguably now from nowhere right up there as global. I don't know.



I don't know. We'll never know quite how much money they had to spend to get there, but it probably is a win for that sort of policy. So I have had to rethink about, yeah what does it mean? There's also a slight spillover because we'll get more medicines, which is probably net-net good for the world, but that's also a kind of other interesting thing.



But yeah, I don't think it's obvious which way industrial policy goes in terms of it, it can be bad and it can be good, and it depends. Do you think that we might see more of that, and that's essentially what's happening in the world when nation states think about this?



Soumaya: Yeah. I think one of the lessons from the Chinese model is that you need competition, right? I think in the past when industrial policy was just national champions picking winners, allowing big countries to get big behind protective walls, I think that that has been discarded.



I think one of the elements of China's model is that you see it with these state-owned enterprises. And I'm not... Biopharma is your area of expertise, not mine. But, one thing that you can see with, say 'cause the railways, SOEs you had competition within them.



So different branches would compete against each other for contracts. They were, looking at the two biggest ones, they weren't... One of them was never allowed to get too much bigger than the other, right? They were both supposed to be keeping the other honest essentially.



And I think what China's benefited from is obviously being massive, and so you can have an element of domestic competition. So yeah. So I think hopefully the rest of the world will take that lesson. And then, I th- and I completely agree, right? This kind of...



The sense that actually when it came to industrial policy, that the West was too intolerant of failure. That has been taken on board. In the US, Solyndra is the main example, right? So there are stories about when the Biden administration was setting up the CHIPS Act office to do industrial policy looking into chips and, there was this fear that, we can't do another Solyndra, right?



And that actually isn't particularly helpful because actually maybe you do need some failures because only If you've had the big failures, that shows that you're taking enough risk, right? If you can never have a big failure, then what's the point?



Ben: Yeah. What did you try to do?



I think you make a really good point about the competition. A- and potentially this is some parts where China learned in some of their sectors, because on biopharmaceuticals they didn't take big stakes and try to do state-owned backing. They seeded a lot of private companies- ... essentially, which were profit-seeking.



But they seeded much more and allowed them to live longer than probably would've been. So they were still competing, but they didn't really bet. They just said, "Okay, we're gonna essentially over-fund this," in terms of that. So that was maybe an interesting contrast. Maybe sticking on the same theme of health, I have here in my notes that you began working on health economics at the IFS a while back.



Do you still follow the health economics field, and are there any health questions that you think are of interest and importance to you now? Or is it all trade and health and all of these other things are not of so much interest to you at the moment?



Soumaya: Yeah. So that was a very long time ago.



Yeah. So that was when I was first at the IFS and was doing some academic research looking into the interaction between health and socioeconomic status, right? W- what causes what, right? And actually, funnily enough, just this week, so yesterday I published a column looking at the relationship between obesity and income.



So I actually very recently have returned to this in quite a r- relatively direct way. So my column this week was about gender and obesity because if you look at the data everyone knows that poorer people tend to be fatter than richer ones. But if you look at the data, that difference is only really there for women in the US.



The- there isn't really a gap between the poorest and richest third of men in terms of their obesity rates in the US which is really astonishing. I think, elsewhere in the world and, maybe depending on the data source there is still a gradient for men, but it's always much more extreme for women.



And that's super interesting because it suggests that it's not as straightforward as, oh poverty means that you have a worse diet and therefore you're obese, right? Because why would that only be the case for women and not men? And then, the reason why I wrote that study, that column was 'cause of a new study looking at the effect of GLP-1s on women's economic outcomes, right?



So if you think that weight is bad for their economic outcomes, does weight loss actually improve their economic outcomes? And there's this new paper by Rebecca Diamond, who's a professor at Harvard University, who finds these extraordinarily large effects on the employment rates of women who start off unemployed and start taking these drugs.



And also on single women and their chances of finding a partner, which then obviously massively increases their household income. So yes, my, my interest has been sustained. And yeah it's a weird thing. So I, So I used to write for The Economist, and I was the trade correspondent there, and that became my specialty, and I had a trade podcast called Trade Talks, and that was great.



And I k- I became known as this trade person. And then I basically stopped being a trade person for a few years, and then, went to the FT where I was really covering everything. I'm an economics columnist. The FT has some really excellent trade commentators. They don't need another one.



And then I had a baby in 2025, and a few weeks in was like, I need a project. What's my project?" And decided to return to trade. So it's a weird thing of specializing, de-specializing, re-specializing in trade, and then having this book out, so I have to take on my old trade person persona.



And now I'm gonna de-specialize again 'cause I'm not the trade columnist at the FT, right? I'm a general economics columnist. So actually... And honestly, I love trade, and I'll always be a trade person, and will always be a very important thing to me. But I need a break.



Yeah. I need a bit of a detox. You kind of- 'cause it's been a lot.



Ben: Some other things. Yeah.



Soumaya: Yeah. Some other things. GLPs- Yeah ... obesity, gender inequality. I'm gonna do wealth taxes next week. I'm gonna... all sorts of fun.



Ben: Great. Yeah, I thought the paper's really interesting and your column was really good.



I guess my slight suspicion, not suspicion, was that the effect sizes were really huge. Yeah. Having glimpsed that econ papers, it's oh, God that's too large. If you go give that to an average econ, it's really? We don't normally see things as large as that, but who knows?



Soumaya: GLP-1s they're pretty extraordinary, right?



Yeah, they do. And the history of them, the history... like a colleague was saying to me the other day, the history of GLP-1s is people are like, "Really? That much?" And then it replicates. The, I, I... but I do agree, right? They are very large effects. Some of these sample sizes are quite small.



And it's just very difficult to do. You can never be absolutely sure in this kind of setting that the only difference between the women who did and didn't take the GLPs is just the GLPs, right? There might be some other difference that the author wasn't able to control for. Okay. I think she's done as best as she can.



Yeah,



Ben: She tried really hard. It was a, it was a- Yeah ... good paper. And I think- ... even if I might go the effect size I feel directionally it feels quite robust to me and with all of these other things. You left on the column a slight note of oh, but what about the price of GLP-1s and is that gonna be an issue going forward?



But I have a silver lining for this because patents and because patents expire. It's already going generic in Brazil, India and Canada- this year, semaglutide is. And by the 2030s, this generation will be generic overall. So although we might have to wait 10 or so years, this is like the consumer surplus from biopharmaceuticals because patents are enormous.



I always joke that we're still seeing benefits from aspirin today, and that's 100 years, and we'll have 100... for as long as humans manage to keep going, we'll probably have benefits from aspirin. So that- Yeah ... so I feel very optimistic about GLP-1s, and we never... We have s- had some of these estimates about the cost of o- obesity 'cause of these second-order impacts, which I think are probably underestimated, which means that actually in, as we reverse them, we might see unexpected benefits going this other way, which again, because we weren't fully aware of them are potentially quite positive



Soumaya: Yeah, I'm very optimistic, right?



And sorry, just to for people watching this who haven't read the column, the point I'm making at the end is that there is concern obviously that right now only richer people have access to these drugs, right? And so there's this danger that if only the richer obese people can reduce their weight, maybe being obese becomes even more of a signal of socioeconomic status, and that could heighten discrimination against them.



But that was very ... I very much agree that is potentially only a temporary effect while these, the prices are high and while access is limited. I'm very hopeful that as they become more, more widely available, there could just be these amazing health effects. This is so anecdotal that I almost feel embarrassed to say it, but, knowing people who have taken these things, they're doing really good things for them.



Ben: Their life is better across all the domains you might expect. So-



Soumaya: Yeah. And I don't wanna say that, they're happier or more content in themselves 'cause I don't know. I wouldn't go that far.



I don't know. But they seem so much better within them- that's what... That's how they're presenting, right?



Ben: And that's what the survey data also suggests when people have been surveyed with this, with actually potentially a slightly stronger effect in women as well. Although- ... again, slightly hard to know, and also more women use the drug, so all of these types of things.



Yeah. I was gonna turn maybe for a moment to personal creativity and ask this as a two way. So one is I'm interested in your writing process. Are you taking notes longhand and then onto the computer? Are you a morning person, evening person, just have to get it out whenever you can, or do you have a particular process?



And then I also happen to know because I've heard your YouTube and in person that you're a great singer. So I was interested in how singing or other creativity kind of folds into your life and your work, and whether that's also a great outlet and comes in, and how you think about personal creativity.



Soumaya: Yeah. So my writing process is that I'm a very slow writer. I start off making notes, structured notes, and then I write out an outline kind of draft, and then I have to redraft after that. And then often there's a final redrafting process, and I need a night of sleep. Ideally, two nights of sleep in between the various different stages.



So extremely slow. People laugh at me for being that slow. The kind of more experienced columnists are like, "Really? It takes you three days to write your column?" "Yeah. Yeah. No, it takes... It's a full-time job." And then, I do the podcast and research the other days.



So yeah, very slow. I type, I don't write things out handwritten. I do really suffer from just distraction. I'm, like, I'm a human, and so I have a-- I use a software called Freedom that basically has to shut down various websites from my computer. I never, ever write with my phone in the room.



I find writing really hard, and my brain wants to do something that is not writing when I'm trying to make it write, and so I, I need to shut off all of the tempting things. And yeah, and then I just edit and edit. And, cut out the bad jokes and get it more concise and and then so on and so forth.



Ben: Do you edit as you go? Are you like, "Oh, I've written one or two sentences, I gotta go back and edit," or do you try and get it all out-



Soumaya: No ...



Ben: And then edit?



Soumaya: You gotta get it all out- Yeah ... 'cause you need that time to think, right? And to, 'cause often just the structure. So actually if you're getting hung up on two sentences, that's always a sign that you just need to finish the paragraph and move on.



And then the next time you come round to it, you'll see what you're trying to say. You need distance, I think to fix- Yeah ... those things. I agree ... I don't use any AI in writing. I'm actually a bit scared- But helpful in research? Yeah, so I use it. I use it as Google basically.



So I use it to find 10 links to studies exploring this issue. But as much as I can I try to avoid reading the words it gives me, partly because the hallucination rate is non-zero, and that's too high for me. But also I feel I'm a columnist. I have my voice and my personality and my, myself, and the more I read AI, the more I worry that I'm absorbing it- Yes



and I might end up sounding like it, and I d- I need to sound like me, basically.



Ben: Yeah. We read enough AI that it's already gonna seep into you.



Soumaya: Yeah. That's all, there's so much of it everywhere, and so I just really try to avoid it.



Ben: Yes. And we pay to hear your voice…



Soumaya: Yeah ... that's good. But there's a writer at The Economist who I know, who wrote a great piece about AI writing recently.



And then a different friend of mine wrote a newsletter that was making the point that people who are professional writers are very poorly placed to judge whether this is good. Whether AI writing is good. Because, I obviously just have such a strong incentive to hate it.



So I'm gonna, I'm gonna really struggle basically to- Yeah. You can't



Ben: take any other position really. That's-



Soumaya: Yeah ... yeah. And I have lots of reasons why I hate it, but actually I need to acknowledge that I'm not, I'm no neutral party to this. And, And



Ben: I also agree with switching off the internet.



So when I write plays for theatre …  and I actually have no internet and no phone. If there's- No ... anything which can connect you, that spells doom. So that's- Yeah ... a way. And then is it the same for your singing practice, or is that completely different?



Soumaya: Yeah. So with the singing stuff, I have the opposite approach in that I'm very much like- I'll write the song and do it, and then it's out.



So I'm actually doing a thing where every week I'm writing a song based on one of my columns. And so I wrote a song this morning. They're songlets, they're not full songs. But there I write the words really quickly, write the chorus, write the melody, and just go. Because I don't...



I don't know. It feels weird with my songwriting, I often, with some exceptions, I often don't feel that they're really improved by agonizing over them. I m- I'm just much less patient when it comes to, when it comes to songwriting. So yeah, they're very f- they're very fast. I'm almost doing it for me.



But also it is my vague attempt to AI-proof myself, right? There's not that many economics columnists who are also singer-songwriters. That's exactly



Ben: it ... so I'm trying to- Cross two- Trying to occupy that niche ... primary domains and you become unique. That is- Yeah ... that is definitely the way.



Maybe I'll try and tempt you at the end in a few minutes to sing a couple of lines of song. I don't know- Oh, yeah ... how we'll feel about that, so we'll do that.



Soumaya: Absolutely.



Ben: Okay. Let's do a little quick round of overrated, underrated, and then we'll do current and future projects, and then a song, and any advice.



Great. So these are quick hits. You can pass, neutral, or agree or not. But- Yeah ... overrated, underrated: universal basic income, UBI.



Soumaya: Ooh.



Ben: I didn't know it's gonna be that tricky, so there'll obviously be that- It's



Soumaya: tricky 'cause by who?



Ben: Oh,



Soumaya: Okay. Some people massively overrate it. Yeah. Okay, I'll go with overrated.



Ben: Overrated. You're already thinking second and third order then. It's by who? Overrated because it doesn't do as much as the advocates would think.



Soumaya: I just, the empirical evidence we have so far has very much been a disappointment, I think, relative to what the most, the strongest ad- advocates were saying. I think it is plausible that there is some future world in which actually it might be necessary- Yeah ... but we're quite far away from that right now.



Ben: Very fair. Fears of falling fertility rates. You did something on fertility rates recently, but- ... fears of falling fertility rates, underrated-



Soumaya: Really underrated ... overrated? Yeah.



Ben: Underrated. It's happening faster than maybe we initially suspected.



Soumaya: Yeah. I... Yeah, and I'm very much like a... Obviously, if women, if people don't wanna have kids, great.



That's on you. But I think the thing I'm worried about is people who's, are saying they wanna have kids and who d- who don't who y- there seems to be a gap between- Yeah ... aspiration and reality, and that, that's the thing that worries me Yes ... with all the, associated domino effects.



Ben: The silver lining is that we might have overestimated some of the climate impact because it relied on people. But the bad thing to that is basically we then have overestimated long run growth, which needs people. So actually yeah, it probably means it is more of a problem than- ... than people think ...



Soumaya: AI



Ben: will



Soumaya: generate the singularity, and we won't need people anymore.



We'll just be... We'll Just- ... veg out playing video games or something.



Ben: All great. So underrated, overrated carbon taxes.



Soumaya: Oh probably, I'm a card-carrying economist, I'll say underrated.



Ben: Underrated 'cause that's the way of solving it. Do you think net zero itself is an underrated, overrated thing?



Soumaya: Temperatures are really high. I... Let's go with underrated



Ben: Underrated, yes. So underrated both carbon taxes and that, and we should bring them in and solve it. I th- it's a political economy problem, isn't it? Rather than a financial economy problem because, yeah, the econ people just say carbon taxes will solve it, and then no one seems to be able to implement them, so tricky.



Soumaya: Yeah. No, ev- we just need to do what we can, so they're underrated by the population at large- Yeah ... therefore- But, yeah ... they're difficult



Ben: to implement. Yeah. Not by economists. AI sovereignty, underrated, overrated?



Soumaya: That's a big question. Probably underrated, right? But you can get sovereignty in many different ways.



Ben: Yeah. And it's becoming potentially more important, although hard to know exactly.



Soumaya: Yeah. I think the debate is between people who are like, "Just give up," right? "It's too late" versus people who say, who think that there is, there's still something we can do.



And I'm a sappy optimist, but I'm not ready to give up quite yet.



Ben: Very fair. And last one on this British meal deal. Do you think the meal deal is underrated or overrated?



Soumaya: Yeah, overrated 'cause they're ultimately often very unhealthy, right? It's like ultra-processed bread plus not enough filling.



Crisps, really bad for you. If the meal deal was, like, a nice salad that was balanced- Salad, yeah ... and, was good for your biome, then I would say great. But meal deal is an odd collection of food with often a sugary drink, also bad for you.



Ben: Yeah. So



Soumaya: calories- I



Ben: mean, if you wanna-



Soumaya: are not good ... if you wanna consume these things then go for it. But I'm, I will not be celebrating them.



Ben: Yeah. And I hadn't realized I feel really late to this, that sandwich makers do this thing where they push the filling into the middle and bulk it up so it looks better. But when you actually open it- You mean push the filling



Soumaya: on the edges



Ben: so that it looks- you, yeah, you sort of shape it- Oh, sorry.



Yeah ... so it looks- yeah ... bigger than it is. And then when you cut it in half And when you open it up- ... it's actually not that much. Yeah. And I felt really tricked. They said, "Oh, yeah, they've been doing this trick for ages," and that, and so that's definitely a meal deal thing.



I guess on this externality thing then a sh- the sugar tax type of thing, are you, do you think that's underrated or overrated?



Soumaya: Oh, yeah, I'm up for sugar tax.



Ben: Sugar tax, yeah. So tax all externalities, right? Straight, straight econ.



Soumaya: Yeah. Is that an external- Yeah. I mean- Ish ... it's ish, sugar's bad for you- Sugar's bad ... if you're addicted. I'm addicted to sugar. Good for you. I would... I think there's a question of whether sugar taxes are enough, right? Yeah. Or even the best way, but- whether you just need regulation to force companies to put less sugar in their stuff.



Yeah. And then there's also, the... I think the bigger question is, I think on some metrics some of the kinds of sweeteners, some of the replacements for sugar that we have probably are also pretty bad for you. And we- we're now straying into kind of Sumaya's unevidenced-



food hunches



Ben: So probably- Anecdotal ... should stop. Yeah. Yeah. The strongest data. Great. Okay. Current and future projects. So we're gonna leave trade behind us slightly because you're interested in so many other things, but yeah. Is there another book for you? Oh, I should have asked also what it's like to be a co-writer versus, versus a not, 'cause that's probably a different sort of experience.



But i- in any event, current projects, future projects, will you do writing together projects or your own, or what's up?



Soumaya: I'm... this experience is still fresh enough that I'm still solidly in the, "I'm never doing this again."



Ben: But is it like running a marathon? So all of these marathon runners, they run it and then they go, "Oh, I'm not doing that again."



Yeah. And then next year they're running it again. This is what seems to happen.



Soumaya: I ran a half marathon and then- And did you say never again? ... I was like, "Never again." Yeah. And I haven't run another half marathon. Okay. So I'm... So this is quite good. Yeah, no, I don't think that- I d- I don't want to do it again.



Don't make me do it again.



Ben: Okay.



Soumaya: There were many things that were really miserable about the experience, right? The main one was the s- the time pressure, right? When I delivered, I wrote and delivered the book incredibly quickly. I still really wish I'd had another round of editing, right?



There are some jokes that should've just been cut, and had I had another round, had I had three and a half more weeks, I would've just, everything would've been better. But that isn't the time that I had. So there's that. And so Chad is, he's my best friend.



He's the godfather of my son. We're still, we're still very close. That's all great. We're not gonna be writing another book together. He's been absolutely brilliant particularly- But not in a fight, yeah ... going around and talking about the book and telling everyone about the book.



It's been really great. And yeah, I think my, I think I want to make stuff and I want to write stuff and produce content that people really wanna really wanna read. And, maybe in 10 years I'll decide that the best format for that is a book. I think for now I have the best job in the world, right?



I write a weekly column for the Financial Times, and I have a weekly podcast, right? It's amazing. And I can write these songs. So I'm gonna be... I just wanna, I wanna do the singing, I wanna develop that. One thing I'm actually working on, one of my- my next kind of big project is I'm gonna try and develop a kind of set.



So I'm gonna try and so I'm hoping, and this isn't formally announced yet, I'm only discussing it, but there's a festival where I'm gonna speak. And the idea is that I'll talk about my columns and also sing songs to go with them. So it'll be a one-woman show combining economics and singing.



So if I can make that really good, that would be pretty great. That'd



Ben: Be excellent ... so that's



Soumaya: my next project. I've



Ben: seen some econ in standup, which can work as well. So more columns-



Soumaya: Yeah, I don't think I'm gonna- ... more podcasts,



Ben: more singing ...



Soumaya: I think I'm done trying to be funny-



for a little while, right? I think- You are funny ... I think with the book- ... there are lots of jokes in the book and some of them are good. But I think I'm, I think I'm done with that. So just straight singing columns, and if people like it, that's great.



Ben: Great. So do you want to tempt us with a little, a few lines from a song?



We could either... I heard your- Yeah ... trade war rules one, which was great, or you could preview something from your fledgling set.



Soumaya: I'll do my trade one.



Ben: Let's do the trade one.



Do you dream about them? No. Do you dream some songs and have to write them



Soumaya: out, or you don't? I don't really dream. Yeah, okay. I just have recurring nightmares about-



having an exam I haven't revised for. My dreams are really tragically obvious. Okay. I could just sing a random song. It doesn't need to be about economics- No, let's do- No, I should probably do one about economics ...



Ben: your choice.



Soumaya: I'll do an economics song. Okay



All so how do you win a trade war? By blowing up the world.



By terrifying with tariffizing. By stopping what you sell. Oh, why not try it? Battle cry singing hi, oh hi, away



Why not try this battle cry singing hi oh hey



So how do you win a trade war? By engaging with the fight. Don't pretend that we're all friends. Subsidize and strategize. Look at your ties. Work with allies. Economize as you build supplies. You've got to do the work. Oh,



Why not try this battle cry? Singing hi, oh hi, oh hey.



'Cause we're all trade warriors now, whether we like it or not. Why not try this battle cry? Singing hi, oh hi, oh hey. Singing hi, oh hi, oh hey



Ben: Ooh. Ooh, that was excellent ...  That's what we wanna hear on Radio 4 Thank you. …that's amazing ...



Soumaya: yeah. I've- Yeah ... I've told Radio 4 that I'm available, but they haven't- Yeah.



They've apparently they're a serious radio program- Yeah ... so



Ben: it's



Soumaya: Fine.



Ben: I'll definitely come to your set. Great. So last question: do you have any advice or thoughts for listeners? This could be life advice as to how to combine writing econ, singing, or any observations you've had on writing your book, or anything you'd like to share with listeners.



Soumaya: Don't write a book while on maternity leave. Advice number one.



Ben: That seems to be excellent advice.



Soumaya: Don't over-commit yourself. I feel so over-committed right now. Do less but better-



Ben: Yes ...



Soumaya: This is my advice.



Ben: Don't over-commit. So I think that's also learning the power of saying no.



Soumaya: Yeah.



Yeah, I guess so.



Ben: 'Cause you said yes slightly too many times.



Soumaya: Yeah.



Ben: Yeah. Great. With that, thank you very much. I will flag How to Win a Trade War. Go out and buy it. With that, thank you very much.

Soumaya: Thank you. This was fun.



How Innovation happens

My notes via GPT. How innovation happens 

1) Incentives shape problem-choice. When funding, governance, or comp compacts tolerate early failure and reward long-horizon success, researchers and founders take bolder bets and produce more novel work. That’s now shown both theoretically and empirically (e.g., Manso’s model; HHMI vs NIH natural experiment by Azoulay et al.). Massachusetts Institute of Technology+1

2) Team size and novelty. Small teams and lone inventors are disproportionately “disruptive” (they shift fields), while large teams excel at refinement and scaling. Also: the overall rate of disruptive work in papers and patents has fallen in recent decades—whatever your theory, that’s the fact pattern you’re designing against. Nature+1

3) Breakthroughs = recombination + weird edges. High-impact ideas often come from atypical combinations of knowledge and from recombining components in unusual ways. That’s been shown in patents and papers (Fleming’s “recombinant uncertainty”; Uzzi et al. on atypical combinations). Absorptive capacity—the ability to recognize and use external knowledge—is the enabler, and it’s built by prior related work and internal R&D. ScienceDirect+2MIT Press+2

4) Organization matters. Incumbents fail not just at radical tech but at architectural changes (same components, new linkages). Exploration vs. exploitation is a real trade-off; winners cultivate “dynamic capabilities” and protect complementary assets (manufacturing, distribution, data, standards), or they lose the rents to faster imitators. NTNU IoT+2sjbae.pbworks.com+2

5) Place still matters. Knowledge spillovers decay with distance. Dense clusters raise the odds of collisions, skilled labor pooling, supplier depth, and faster diffusion. Silicon Valley vs Route 128 is the classic contrast; Porter’s cluster logic generalizes beyond tech. ResearchGate+2unica.it+2

6) Social returns to R&D exceed private returns. Society under-invests in research without policy help. That’s the core growth-economics result (Schumpeterian models; direct estimates of R&D social returns). Public/mission-oriented “ARPA-style” programs are one proven correction when designed with autonomy and empowered program directors. individual.utoronto.ca+2Stanford University+2

7) Diffusion ≠ invention. Adoption runs on networks, norms, and incentives (Rogers). Weak ties and boundary spanners often matter more than your best friends for spreading new ideas. teddykw2.files.wordpress.com+1

8) Scaling drives cost-curves. Learning/experience curves are real but not magic: costs fall with cumulative deployment and with directed R&D. Treat Wright’s law and “generalized Moore’s laws” as forecasting tools with error bars, not as destiny. Of (im)possible interest+2François Lafond+2

Where the evidence is strong vs. shaky

Robust:

  • Exploration-friendly incentives increase novelty (HHMI vs NIH; Manso). NBER+1

  • Local spillovers/clusters raise innovation outputs. unica.it

  • Small vs large teams specialize in disruption vs development. Nature

  • Social returns to R&D >> private returns; policy leverage is large. Stanford University

  • Absorptive capacity (built via prior related R&D) predicts who benefits from external knowledge. josephmahoney.web.illinois.edu

Nuanced/contested:

  • “Decline in disruption.” The fact is solid; the causes (metric artifacts, topic maturity, incentives, publication norms) are debated. Nature

  • Patents/IP and innovation. Appropriability matters, but effects vary by field; patent thickets can hinder cumulative innovation (mixed empirical results; read Levin et al. on appropriability). Brookings

  • Learning-by-doing vs R&D. Both contribute to cost decline; weights differ by sector (energy is unusually R&D-sensitive). wikis.mit.edu

References (not checked):

Schumpeter (1942) – Creative destruction frames the whole debate.

  • Nelson & Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change – Firms learn; routines and selection drive industry dynamics. inctpped.ie.ufrj.br

  • Dosi (1982) – Technological paradigms/trajectories explain path-dependence. sjbae.pbworks.com

  • Pavitt (1984) – Sectoral patterns: industries innovate differently. wuecampus.uni-wuerzburg.de

  • Abernathy & Clark (1985) – “Transilience” map for how innovations disrupt markets/capabilities. sjbae.pbworks.com

  • Teece (1986), “Profiting from Technological Innovation” – Complementary assets & appropriability explain who captures value. politicipublice.ro

  • Cohen & Levinthal (1990) – Absorptive capacity: prior related knowledge as the gate to external ideas. josephmahoney.web.illinois.edu

  • Henderson & Clark (1990) – Architectural innovation blinds incumbents. NTNU IoT

  • March (1991) – Exploration vs exploitation; why organizations under-explore. sjbae.pbworks.com

  • Rogers (2003), Diffusion of Innovations (5e) – Adoption curves, opinion leaders, network channels. teddykw2.files.wordpress.com

  • Granovetter (1973) – Weak ties spread ideas across communities. CMU School of Computer Science

  • Porter (1998) – Clusters raise productivity, innovation, and new firm formation. biblioteca.fundacionicbc.edu.ar

  • Saxenian (1994) – Why Silicon Valley beat Route 128: open networks > closed hierarchies. G-City

  • Bresnahan & Trajtenberg (1995) – General-purpose technologies as growth engines. Chicago Journals

  • Mansfield (1995) – How much industry innovation actually builds on academia (surveys & lags). EconPapers

  • Kortum & Lerner (2000) – Venture capital causally boosts patenting in VC-intensive sectors. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

  • Manso (2011) – Optimal innovation incentives tolerate early failure, reward long-term success. Wiley Online Library

  • Azoulay, Graff Zivin & Manso (2011) – HHMI’s tolerant funding produces riskier, more novel science than NIH. faculty.haas.berkeley.edu

  • Wu, Wang & Evans (2019) – Big teams develop; small teams disrupt. Nature

  • Park, Leahey & Funk (2023) – Measured disruptiveness in science/patents has declined since the ’80s. Nature

  • Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen & Webb (2020) – “Ideas getting harder to find”: rising research inputs per unit progress. Stanford University

  • Fleming (2001) – Recombination logic: novelty comes with higher variance—most fail, rare hits pay. ScienceDirect

  • Uzzi et al. (2013) – Atypical knowledge combinations correlate with high impact. MIT Press

  • Farmer & Lafond (2016) – Many tech costs fall roughly exponentially; you can forecast with uncertainty bands. François Lafond

  • Wright (1936) – The original learning curve (experience → lower cost). Of (im)possible interest

  • Azoulay et al. (2019) – The ARPA/DARPA funding model: autonomy + empowered PMs + active program management. NBER

(For broad overviews, the Oxford Handbook of Innovation and Handbook of the Economics of Innovation are solid gateways. rudyct.com+1)

Samir Varma: Free Will, physics, traffic, bees, emotions, chaos theory, cricket, finance | Podcast

Samir Varma is a physicist, investor, and author of the book: The Science of Free Will, How Determinism Affects Everything from the Future of AI to Traffic to God to Bees.' We discuss AI consciousness, the theoretical versus practical aspects of free will, and how determinism informs our understanding of human behaviour, moral philosophy, and even financial markets. 

“Even though there is no free will in theory, because the laws of physics are deterministic… we don’t know what we’re going to do until we’ve done it.” 

“The only way to find out how your life will end is to live it.”

Varma delves into the physics of free will, his insights on the applicability of chaos theory, and why certain financial and societal structures might need reevaluation. 

The conversation touches on the evolution and mechanics of intellectual property, the intricacies of cricket, and the profound layers that make Pink Floyd's music a unique listening experience. Varma also shares his varied projects, including innovations in solar energy and traffic management. 

The discussion culminates with practical life advice focused on pursuing meaningful and passionate work.

Summary contents, transcript and podcast links below. Listen on Apple, Spotify or wherever you listen to pods. Video above or on Youtube.

Contents

  • 00:23 Will AI Gain Consciousness?

  • 02:11 The Concept of Free Will in Theory and Practice

  • 04:19 Quantum Theory and Determinism

  • 18:58 Chaos Theory and Free Will

  • 23:20 Death and the Reorganization of Atoms

  • 25:37 Animal Consciousness and Communication

  • 30:23 Implications for Society and Justice

  • 37:48 Emotions and Rationality

  • 41:08 Misunderstandings in Finance

  • 44:39 Debunking Market Value Myths

  • 47:43 The Momentum Factor Explained

  • 57:14 The Unique Appeal of Pink Floyd

  • 01:02:40 Understanding Cricket's Complexity

  • 01:09:58 Overrated or Underrated?

  • 01:19:28 Insights on Writing and Creativity

  • 01:23:11 Final Thoughts and Life Advice

Transcript (This is AI assisted, so mistakes are possible)

 Ben: Hey, everybody. I'm super excited to be speaking to Samir Varma. Samir is a physicist, investor, and inventor. He has written the book, The Science of Free Will, How Determinism Affects Everything from the Future of AI to Traffic to God to Bees. Samir, welcome.

Do you think AI will gain consciousness?

Samir: That's a difficult question, not because I don't think I know the answer, but because I don't know if I can convince anybody of the answer. So let me say this yes, definitely. I don't know when or how long it will take, and I also don't know how difficult it will be for people to accept that it is conscious.

Ben: And I suppose if humans can't distinguish the difference, so if it seems AI is as consciousness as something else and we can debate what this consciousness is, then I'm guessing in practice that would be consciousness just based on silicon rather than carbon, is that how we get there?


Samir: Yes, and yes, exactly.


And the point is that, as I take great pains to say in the book, the rules of physics that the AI operates upon, or operates with, if you wish, are the exact same rules of physics that we operate with. There's no difference. We're made of atoms, the AI is made of atoms. All those atoms are identical, all those atoms are following physical laws, the standard model of particle physics, because atoms are made of fundamental particles, and the AI follows those laws, same as we do.


So there's absolutely no reason to think it cannot be conscious.


Ben: And so there is some emergent property, some complexity property, of certain arrangement of atoms, whether they're silicon or carbon, which then we perceive as this consciousness. Is that what could happen then for AI?


Samir: Exactly. Couldn't say it any better.


Ben: So I think this hints at this idea of something in practice versus theory. And I'm really interested as to how you develop this idea of, okay, there might be free will in theory, determinism, laws of physics, but functionally or in practice, because we cannot compute what we're going to do or what certain of these systems are we going to do until we run them until we see them in practice, you've got a functional.


How did you come about it and would you like to explain the concepts as you see them now?


Samir: Yes, so I came about it because I've been thinking about this for a very long time. And in fact, I have to tell you a funny story about it. My professor, my advisor for my PhD thesis was a guy called George Sudarshan, who should have won two Nobel Prizes but didn't win either, never mind but he was extremely interested in philosophy.


And I remember telling him when I was a young 20 something year old, I used to call him boss. I said, boss, you will never catch me doing any philosophy. This is not hard science. And he's you wait. So I started thinking about this stuff and it just stuck in my head for years and years.


And then it in fact occurred to me that you can have functional free will, even if you don't have theoretical free will, because you cannot actually compute what you yourself are even going to do. Forget somebody else under those same laws, even if the laws are known. And I realized that, this was probably the right answer, but I didn't do anything about it until Tyler pushed me to actually write the book and so I did.


And in that, I had to coin two phrases to put the two concepts together, and one phrase was free will in theory, where I'm using the word theory as a physicist would, that is to say an explanation of a bunch of collective facts, and free will in practice, where I'm saying, look, Even though there is no free will in theory, because the laws of physics are deterministic, what do we really mean when we say we have free will?


Because we all feel like we have free will. And the answer is that we don't know what we're going to do until we've done it. And so the only way of knowing what we're going to do, the only way to find out how your life will end, is to live.


Ben: That makes sense to me. Guess when I was asking around, and I'm not a physicist by training, although I did some science, there were some ideas or people were saying from quantum theory, that quantum theory wasn't necessarily deterministic, but you have this whole set of arguments in your book that essentially it is.


And so people say in quantum theory, you've got this idea that the observer makes a difference, and I guess you have this collapsing of the wave function. But if I understood your argument correctly, that's still deterministic. So how do you fit quantum theory or quantum thinking into these laws of physics and into free wheeling theory?


Samir: Yes, so that, that actually is the most crucial of all questions, and the most important one. And the answer is the following. The first is to understand that no physicist that I'm aware of takes the Copenhagen interpretation, which I will explain in a second, of quantum mechanics particularly seriously.


It's an aid to calculation. It gives you the right answer, but it is effectively an approximation. What is the Copenhagen interpretation? The Copenhagen interpretation put forward by Niels Bohr, which is why it's called the Copenhagen interpretation, is that there is a classical system that is an observer, And there is a quantum system that is being observed.


And at the moment of observation, all of physics is suspended, don't ask any questions, don't look behind the curtain just, you will get a probabilistic answer. That's the Copenhagen Interpretation. No one that I'm aware of takes it seriously, in terms of it actually being real. And more and more experiments, and I go through this in the book, show that it probably isn't real.


In fact, it's not real. I use probably because I'm still a scientist, but really it's not real. So what is real? What is real are two things. The first is that the observer is made up of the same stuff as the observee. Therefore, all that can possibly be happening is that the wave functions of the observer are getting entangled with the observe, with the wave function of the observe V and that what is an, that's what makes an observation.


That's the first point. And that's all completely deterministic. The second point is that. When we then assign a single value to that court observation, to that interaction between the observer and the observee we have to assign a single value even though there's a range of possible outcomes. But, that range of possible outcomes is self deterministic.


No one can change them. In other words, if I do an experiment here in New York, and you do an experiment there in London let's say that we, and we set up the experiment in exactly the same way, So we set up an electron such that its spin is unknown, and we have two detectors at, specific angles, and we do a bunch of experiments, we will find the exact same probabilities.


In other words, the probabilities are themselves deterministic. They're not under anyone's control, and so therefore they cannot be the source of free will anyway, even if you decide to take the Copenhagen Interpretation seriously. That's the point. And so then you really are left with it's all deterministic, because there is nothing else in physics, nothing that is not deterministic.


Ben: And you mentioned that there have been a few experiments which are backing this kind of argument. Do you want to highlight your favorite one or any that you think that this means that this is the correct response and this is why the Copenhagen explanation of it isn't real or there is a kind of useful heuristic to, to grapple your mind with?


Samir: Yes. So my favorite is that the statement of the Copenhagen interpretation is simply that a extended object, a classical object, a large object, a big object, whatever. Big means made of many things, not just one thing. Is going to cause the wave function to, quote, collapse, unquote.


That means that large object itself cannot ever be in a superposition. But we've already been able to put a bacterium, I believe, in superposition. So if you can put a bacterium in superposition, then the entire argument collapses. There is no, which is fun. It's a pun. The entire argument about the wave function collapse, collapses.


It doesn't make any sense because a bacterium is by definition a classical object.


Ben: Okay, I think I get that. And I guess another line of evidence, so one that I came across a few years ago, which first started me down this route on the free will in theory idea, was from neuroscientists actually more than physicists.


where there's a set of experiments which show that these decisions seem to happen unconsciously as in before we seem to be consciously aware of them before our intent comes through and our body or however it is actually already reacted to it. Again, arguing for a form of determinism within that.


Do you find any of those experiments compelling or any other evidence from neuroscience, which you weigh up on either side?


Samir: Yes. So I think I may have put this in a footnote about fMRI experiments showing that you are, you make a decision before you're conscious of making it. I have nothing.


Against those arguments that are all 100 percent correct. The only problem is that they don't actually seal the deal, as it were, because there's still loopholes that you can come up with that say that doesn't necessarily mean there isn't free will, because, what if the particles have free will or whatever it is, something along those lines.


It doesn't completely seal the deal, but it's the physics that actually seals the deal completely. That was why I did it that way.


Ben: That reminds me, as a joke, because I remember my chemistry teacher or professors always joking that chemistry was upstream from biology. So they said all biology can be explained by chemistry.


And even the chemistry that you can explain all neuroscience. And then the physicist coming in and going the thing about chemistry is all chemistry has to follow the laws of physics. So really physics is upstream of both chemistry and biology and everything human. And I guess this is one of the arguments you make, but I was always intrigued because the mathematicians.


would come in and go actually physics is downstream from mathematics. So everything you can describe in the language of mathematics. And again, I'm not a complete expert on this, but it seems that there are some things that maybe we can describe in mathematics, which we haven't as yet found or described within.


Physical laws, although we're not there yet. Do you see physics and maths on the same sort of bucket? They're just looking at things and obviously a lot of physics is described in the language of mathematics when you get there. So maybe there isn't a difference, but certainly you would argue everything is downstream from physics is maths downstream from physics as well.


Samir: That's not a simple question to answer. And there's a reason for that. It depends on whose viewpoint you want to take on this. One viewpoint is Stephen Wolfram's, who I quote in the book frequently, is that he creates an object he calls the Rouliad. And the Rouliad is the entangled limit of all possible computations.


And he says that's an object, such an object must exist, and because such an object must exist, Therefore, the universe exists. That's his argument, roughly speaking. Is that accurate? I don't know. But it is his argument. And if that argument is true, then yes, physics is downstream of mathematics. On the other hand, there is the traditional physics view, which is that the universe follows deterministic physical laws.


You can write down those physical laws in basically any way you wish. One way of writing them down is via physics equations and those equations are, I believe the term is isomorphic to reality. That is to say they're in a one to one correspondence with reality. That's a fair, more traditional physics view.


In that case, physics and mathematics would be on at the same level because there would be other ways of of expressing those laws, perhaps not as compactly, perhaps not as easily. So that's the second point. And then the third point is. That, again, if you take Stephen Wolfram's view, everything is downstream of computation, including mathematics.


So computation comes first, and then physics and mathematics follow. So it's, that's a little bit of an open question. I don't know is the right answer. Do


Ben: you lean anyone, any particular things? Do you have a, do you have a sense, even though we, I guess the problem with Wolfram's view is currently thinking about it.


We have no real way of. proving or disproving it, as such, we might get there. But do you have a sense I pick up that you lean slightly towards the physics view, but maybe you quote Wolfram a lot, so maybe you are slightly persuaded by him.


Samir: I'll tell you what I am persuaded by. I do lean towards the physics view.


I am persuaded by one of his arguments which is that everything can at bottom be thought of computationally. And the reason I think that is that I believe fundamentally okay, let's back up one second. Everything in physics except for space time is already discrete. The only question is space time discrete?


The way we do traditional physics, it's not. It's a continuous object. Thinking of that computationally is then an approximation rather than reality. However, again, I'm pretty sure that most physicists working in, say, quantum gravity or in grand unified theories or whatever, would more or less agree that the chances that spacetime is discrete too are pretty, pretty darn high.


If spacetime is also discrete, then Wolfram's view that everything is computational is a very good way of thinking about it, because if everything is discrete, you can represent everything computationally. And if you can represent everything computationally, then it's a great way of thinking about it.


Ben: Huh. I hadn't thought about that way. I'm going to have to dwell on it, but that's quite interesting. Everything is computational. That reminds me, I sat next to dinner to a physicist, a sort of non mainstream physicist, Julian Barber, who over dinner tried to convince me that time didn't really exist.


There are these other concepts of ways of thinking about it and holes and things but from your physicist view and I think he noted that was a lecture and they had a lot of theoretical physicists and in the room when you asked physicist to say, is time a discrete idea that not as many hands went up as you thought, although I guess people think about space time.


But I guess this might touch on this. So do you think time is actually a thing out of it of itself, or have we just made it up as humans?


Samir: Time? I believe is almost certainly an emergent property as opposed to a fundamental property. Does it exist? Sure, it exists in the same way that you and I exist.


As a collection of something. But, is it absolutely fundamental? I don't think so. And the reason I think that's the case is because of, we could get into this if you like to, but it's because of entropy. Entropy always increases in the universe. And because entropy always increases in the universe, you have an arrow of time.


And that leads to all kinds of other questions about, for example, how come, the universe used to be in a low entropy state and now it's in a high entropy state and so on and so forth, and that leads to a whole host of complicated questions. But the fundamental laws of physics are all what's called time reversible.


In other words, you can't tell whether a picture of what's going on is moving forwards or moving backwards. And, therefore the arrow of time is emergent as opposed


Ben: to fundamental. I haven't thought of time as an emergent property or collection or something. In which case, time has somewhat more unco in common with consciousness than it does with something else, if consciousness as well is potentially an emergent property.


Samir: I think actually they're the same thing. Think in some sense about what consciousness actually is. If you are a quantum system, you are, I am, then in effect there's all kinds of things going on in parallel inside us. That's the whole point of quantum computation is that you can do all kinds of parallel things at the same time.


We're made of 10 to the 27 atoms. The 10 to the 27 atoms are made up of countless subatomic particles. All of them are in all sorts of weird quantum superpositions all the time. The very existence of those quantum superpositions. It tells you that there's all kinds of stuff going on in somebody's brain, but what they're conscious of is only one thing at a time.


It's our way of taking parallel stuff, parallel computation, if you wish, and serializing it. So in effect, consciousness is the serialization of parallel physical events.


Ben: That does make it, in a way, our sense of time is consciousness. Yes.


Samir: And so here's another thought experiment. If you do the mathematics of general relativity, then as you approach a black hole, time for you, as seen by an outside observer, slows down.


You move, ever so slowly. More slowly. As far as the outside observer is concerned, when you reach the event horizon of the black hole, for you, time will have stopped. Him looking from the outside will never see you cross the event horizon, ever. But, what that means is that from his point of view, all the computations going on in your brain have now just stopped.


And if your brain is doing no computation, how can it be conscious?


Ben: I'm gonna have to think about that one. That's an interesting thought experiment. That reminds me, I was having a conversation with someone Julian Goff and a couple of other reading around with this idea that potentially a whole universe gets born in the middle of a black hole or a black hole could give birth to universe.


Have you come across those ideas and do you think they might possibly be true? 

Samir: There's some evidence. In fact, just came out in the last couple of days. I haven't read the papers yet. That suggests that's actually a slightly stronger possibility than we thought.


Yeah, it's completely possible. You could have We could, for example, be living inside a black hole in our entire universe. And that black hole could be inside another universe. for example, or inside a multiverse or whatever you want to call it.


Ben: Yeah, that does seem to be, yeah, possible in the implication.


I wanted to bring through some of the ideas of chaos theory, I guess here, and talking about computation, this idea of computation irreducibility, I think is this Wolfram idea. Yes. Essentially, we take it back to this idea that Unpredictability, I sense we have to run the program, we have to do it before we actually know what we're going to do, and, this is coming through to free world in, in, in practice, and I guess chaos theory shows for some of these systems, think about the weather we've only got moderate ability to know what's happening with the weather.


We need to let it play through. So what do you think that chaos theory has to add to this idea of free world and how does it intersect with all of those ideas?


Samir: We actually have three entirely independent sources of free will in practice. And the reason I say they're independent is that if you want to say that we don't have free will in practice, you would have to reject all three.


Let's start with the first one. The first one is simply that, that we are made of 10 to the 27 atoms. Simulating 10 to the 27 atoms is hopeless. We're never going to be able to do it. Furthermore, If you want to, say, predict what you or I are going to do over the next one second, it's not just those 10 to the 27 atoms that we need to focus on.


We need to focus on every subatomic particle that might impinge upon us in the next, say, one second, if one second is the period of time over which we're going to look. That means that we need to, since the speed of light is about 300, 000 kilometers per second, that means we need to know about every subatomic particle between us.


and a radius of 300, 000 kilometers. So that's a lot of space and a lot of particles. We're not going to do it. Okay. That's point one. You could object and you could say that's just an engineering challenge. Come on. Eventually in the fullness of time to use the old, yes, minister phrase, we'll be able to do it.


Fine. That's a reasonable argument. But then you have argument number two. And argument number two is chaos. And that is that in many of these complex systems, their outputs are exquisitely sensitive to their inputs. So if they're exquisitely sensitive to their inputs, it means that in many cases inputs are always real numbers, right?


Some number followed by a decimal followed by lots of other numbers. And essentially they're infinite because you can never have an exact real number. What happens if the system the outcome of the system depends upon the 70th decimal place of the number? And the 70th decimal place is a 6 instead of a 7.


Now, the outcome could be completely different. So that puts a significant limit on our possibility of being able to make a prediction, is that we can never exactly measure anything, and so we can never exactly know any real number that's an input to a predictive system. But you could again argue back to me and say, listen, wait a minute no, that's not good enough.


That's still an engineering challenge. Okay, so we'll measure to the 175th decimal place. Come on. Fine. To which I say, all right here's my trump card. I win. These are my aces. If you are willing to believe that the universe is fundamentally discrete, then the universe itself can be thought of as a computation or at least something that follows the rules of computation.


It doesn't need to be a system designer. It's just a system and it follows rules. Those rules are going to be, as of necessity, stuck under computational irreducibility, which is what Wolfram calls it. And computational irreducibility is the statement that even very simple rules, forget rules as complicated as the universe, just incredibly simple rules, I like to say rules that even a five year old can follow, will produce output that cannot ever, under any circumstances, be shortcutted.


That is to say, the only way to know what the output is to follow the number of steps required for the computation to get to that point. And that's actually a limitation of science from within science. So that's basically saying that, look, you can know the rules by which something operates. But you may not have any shortcut to calculate the result.


You may not be able to make a prediction, but it doesn't mean you've not done science. And the inability to make a prediction doesn't invalidate the science.


Ben: Yes, that makes sense to me with that. You can't reduce it. And actually, so putting That together with your determinism view Reconciles the two ideas of free will and no free will as being both valid but somewhat incomplete that you have to put them Yes together. So I was going to see what some of this might be in practice Let's take it as read as in terms of what it might have for society but before that there were a couple of Things taken to the extreme or more extreme, which I thought were really interesting Before trying to deal with moral and society implications and one which was on death Because you're writing on it essentially just argues death is a rearrangement of atoms, which I guess in theory Is just true in a deterministic world.


We, the atoms have just rearranged. Maybe these emergent properties have disappeared. So how should we think about death? And if death is just this reorganization of atoms, should that somewhat comfort us?


Samir: Yes. And we can say more than that. We can say several things. The first thing we can say is that death is a process, not an event.


So different parts of your body are irreversibly, unarranged, as it were, at different times. and could possibly be brought back to life if we have the right technology. Second, since you're only made of an arrangement of atoms anyway, if there was some way of recording what that arrangement is at any given point in time, then there's no law of physics that says you can't put that arrangement back together in the future.


So you could, for example, back yourself up today, and, reconstitute yourself when you die, as of this point. The same way you reconstitute a computer. There really is no difference. That's the second point and the third point is that the moment you understand that you are nothing more than an arrangement of atoms and the only thing special about you is your arrangement, then the theological point of a soul actually is answered.


What is a soul? Your soul, your essence, your being. Is the arrangement of your atoms. That's what you are. And does that arrangement exist always? It depends on whether you believe Plato or not. In some sense, an arrangement can always exist even if it's not instantiated. And in some other sense, that's not true, because you have to instantiate it for it to exist.


It's, it's up to you how, where you want to look at it, but that is in effect a proper scientific, grounded, non nonsense explanation of what a soul is.


Ben: Thinking about that definition, then animals, say an octopus or a dog, would have a form of soul as well. Absolutely. Not everyone that we humans understand.


Absolutely. No question. So I was reading your article on how dogs can't really communicate with us or we don't seem to communicate with them really well. As in we don't really understand them but they obviously can do things. That we can't do through smell and all sorts of other things. And it also struck me.


This was really true. I think about the octopus a little bit. I'm having watched them and read about them because I think an octopus might have its form of humor, its own form of society, its own form of culture, which essentially means I think there's an argument that. As if we'd met an alien, we might as well meet an octopus.


That it's a kind of system that we're very, we interact with really poorly. To the extent that octopus has a humor or has a society, it's so different to our own way of encountering that, that we don't understand octopus humor. You think that kind of might be true then? This is how he thinks, and seemingly you would think that animals have souls.


Samir: I would say 100 percent that's true. Everything you just said is true in my opinion. And I think demonstrably true actually, so it's not even really my opinion, but never mind. Ah and I would say two other things. The first is that related to what you just said, and this is why bees are in the title of the book.


Did you know that bees can get PTSD? This blew my mind. This absolutely blew my mind when I was doing the research. It's got a brain about the size of a pin. pinhead, sorry, right? And it can actually have emotions, it can dance, it seems to have feelings it has, mental breakdowns, PTSD. If something that small is exhibiting things that look like emotions, then really we, there's no question that all these animals have some sort of sentience, not like ours, and we have difficulty communicating with them.


And that's why I also gave the example in the book. From from another researcher, Katya Grace, I think her name is. And she said, why don't we trade with ants? Because if we could trade with ants, they could do all kinds of useful things for us. So we could do useful things for them. For example, they could detect cancer for us pretty well because of, how well they, because of the way they're structured and, we could build houses for them or give them food or whatever else they wanted.


The reason we can't communicate is the reason we don't trade with them is we can't communicate with them and there's the issue It's exactly the same as the issue with the octopus. Dolphins, for example, have been known to save drowning humans Yeah They see a human drowning and they come and they push the human up to give it air so that Smart enough to know that this person is in trouble.


There was an accident video not long ago of, was it in, it was a giant ape, I forget which one, that saw this man struggling to get out of the water in, I think, Bangladesh. And he walks up to the bank of the river, puts his hand out, pulls the man up, walks away.


Ben: That suggests to me that bees might get influenced by psychedelics and, or some form of, the equivalent of bee psychedelics maybe they only have to dance around a lot. But what do you think then is happening when humans take? psychedelics, these altered states of consciousness, I guess it's only just a rearrangement of atoms on the one level, but is it showing us anything else?


Samir: The current research suggests that's what that what is happening when you take hallucinogenics is that your brain is entering a more plastic state. Where it can be more, where the atoms can, if you wish, be more easily rearranged, which is why you find that they're starting to be very useful for things like mental health, PTSD.


Exactly. And so that we know for sure. The second thing that we can tell probably from the existence of anesthesia. Is that consciousness is the tying together of a large number of events. Because you're completely alive, you're still breathing, all the rest of it. But you're unconscious, you have anesthesia, and you don't know what's going on.


It's as if time stopped for you. Which, by the way, also ties back to what I said earlier, why I think it's taking parallel computation and making it this way, but that also tells you that experience informs this as well.


Ben: Ah, I hadn't really thought about that, but that does also seem to make sense. Okay. So moving from animals and some of the science and theory, although we put a bit of practice, I wonder how this should apply to. Society or if anything, so I think there are some philosophers who argue that free will is a useful or even necessary illusion for morality and law.


I wondered what you thought about this idea. I guess you wrote around. whether evil exists and essentially that is a human or social construct that we seem to have decided around that as well. But do you think therefore free will is a useful concept that whether it's in practice or however that we should do because of what philosophers argue and does this tie into your idea of what evil is in our society?


Samir: Partly. I hesitate to criticize philosophers too much largely because 99 percent of the time I don't understand what they're saying and, particularly when you start throwing it out, throwing out large Greek words like ontology. I start saying to myself, I'm not entirely sure I understand what you mean, and I'm not entirely sure that you understand what you mean, but anyway, never mind.


Ben: It's like talking to the  octopus.


Samir: Exactly. You got it. That's exactly right. Exactly right. So the thing that they seem to always forget is that society is also following deterministic physical laws. Every atom in the universe is following deterministic physical laws. And so there's nothing wrong with one collection of atoms saying that we are going to treat this other collection of atoms as if it were A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H.


It's completely fine. That is a i, I go into this in the book about levels of explanation. That is a level of explanation that is above quantum fields. So to get from quantum fields to say law or morality or justice, you need to do all kinds of things. You have to first put a bunch of quantum fields together and make atoms.


Then you gotta put the atoms together to make molecules. Then you gotta put the molecules together to make, amino acids. Then you gotta put those together to make, organs and then humans, and then. And then you have to create, philosophy, and then you have to, on top of philosophy, you have to create law, and justice, and morality, and so on.


By the time you've got all the way up to the top the aggregate doesn't have a heck of a lot to do with the substrate. Or as Philip Anderson, when the Nobel Prize said, more is different.


Ben: Okay, I guess that makes sense. Yeah, so it's just emerged. It's so far away from those fundamental pieces Does that say the same that it doesn't really have any commentary then on? prisons and rehabilitation because there's a line of argument which suggests that if some actions are people's actions are a little bit more beyond their control than We might then we might have thought then particularly prisons or justice reform should concentrate much more on her rehabilitation than punishment.


There are other economic reasons for maybe why that might be the case. Do you think that gives any weight to those sort of ideas or to your point? Is it just so far above that? We've had to make this agglomeration of things that it really can't say too much about. What people should think about punishment or rehabilitation.


Samir: So that's a great question. And I know that you addressed this in your last conversation with Rebecca Lowe as well. Physics actually has something to say about this, believe it or not. And the reason is that if we are thinking of the brain as a computational system, then you can ask the following question.


Is pathological behavior A problem with hardware or a problem with software? That is to say, is it a problem with the neural circuits you were born with or is it a problem with the programming that was encoded in those neural circuits as you grew up? My very strong suspicion is that it is easier to fix software than it is to fix hardware.


I'm not 100 percent sure of that, but I'm pretty sure that's right. So then you run into another issue of, okay, so X committed a murder, say. Now we have good technology, advanced from today, and we realize that the reason X committed a murder is because there was some screw up in their software and we can fix it.


Is there any point now in punishing them or sending them to, to prison? Probably not. Just fix it and move on. Otherwise you just ruined a productive member of your society. And as you just pointed out we now know that the reason their behavior was very bad is because of their software. On the other hand, now supposing it's hard to fix hardware, what do you do?


I don't know how to fix it, but I can see that there's a problem in a hard way, which is a problem we see now because I think 30 or 40 percent of criminals already have mental health problems, which kind of sucks that we put them in prison. But it's hard to fix, so what do you do? One argument is very straightforward, is if you can fix it.


If you can't fix it and you need to protect society from that person, then you protect society from that person, presumably by incarcerating them or whatever it is. So the only question I'm left with, is under what conditions is punishment justified and the only way that I can think of justifying it is as a deterrent to others.


For example if somebody decides to go around swindling people, say, then how do you stop that kind of behavior? You have to stop it presumably by saying there's a significant threat that you're going to go to jail for a long period of time. Now, of course, People will argue back that person's brain made them do it.


That's true. But then society made me do the opposite too. That's why that argument doesn't really fly, because society runs on the laws of physics too. But beyond that, physics can say some things. If you can fix it. If you have to protect society, protect it. And after that, you're left with a hard problem.


Ben: Yeah, that's quite a clear. So it does make some cases easier, actually, potentially quite a lot. And I guess we do that to some extent, if someone has brain damage, very clearly, then we treat them differently. And we can argue to what extent is a mental condition, brain damage or not. And I guess we are debating that.


But to your point, if it is because of that, and because of that you're in jail, and if it's that sort of hardware problem, then you're not going to, that's not going to be so much of a deterrent. If you've got this sort of mental condition, which causes it, causes you to do X or makes X much more likely, then that deterrent factor is is not going to be such a big thing.


But in the case of swindling, it's a lot less clear whether those deterrents might be. So those are hard cases, but there are definitely. Larger categories of easier cases and we can observe that as to your point that a lot of people in the system who go into the jail system have mental conditions or You know another way of looking at it if you test them on normalized iq and things you get very low levels which suggest these brain function hardware disabilities that we would have compared to the average and other populations I wonder does then physics or this have anything to say about A few other emotions.


So we mentioned Tyler previously. Tyler Cowen, I think, recently said, he basically never feels regret. And he thinks it's useless. And that's for a whole other set of things. And he tends to have quite a very well regulated emotional state. But I think you, you wrote about this from a slightly different point of view.


So I don't know, is, does physics have anything to say about regret? And I guess we can extend this. Does it say, have anything to say about other. Emotions, I guess this would be jealousy or I don't know about falling in love, which I've only just thought about, but certainly we can start with regret and maybe move to a couple of other emotions.


Samir: So regret is the one easy one to answer from physics, which is why I put it in the book is that because you don't have free will in theory and you only have it in practice. Fate exists. In fact, fate must exist. So therefore whatever was going to happen was always going to happen. So there's absolutely no point in having regret.


So you have free will in practice to make a choice. But you don't have free will in theory for the outcome of the choice. So therefore you might as well be like, the Buddhists have been saying for whatever 2000 years now is that, do your duty as it were, as you see it. And then the outcome is the outcome and it is whatever it is.


Or as modern management theorists like to say, it's the process that matters, not the result. Or as traders too, good traders will always prefer the bad outcome. With the good process to the good, with the bad process to the good outcome. Because one is repeatable and the other one is not.


I think it's the same idea. So that's the one emotion that you can more or less say is useless. except to the extent that it teaches you something.


Ben: Yes. Are there any other emotions that we could put either in the useless or the very useful bucket? None immediately spring to mind. I guess anger is not that helpful either, unless it is teaching you something, but I guess that's quite close to regret.


Samir: Yes. And the other thing is though that You may know this better than me. I read a paper some years ago that said that a human brain that has no emotions cannot be rational, which I thought was interesting, because for whatever reason, your emotions are necessary to your rationality.


Ben: I could see that.


Emotions widely defined are giving us all sorts of signals, which help us do learning at this kind of network level. And without those signals, then your learning goes way off. And these kind of learning mechanisms are useful for these frameworks of rationality which we seem to I like to pivot towards.


So I can see you can get it getting there, or at least would be very impaired. You can see it adjacently, like people without pain find it's really hard to live in the real world because pain is giving you all sorts of information and signals, even though you might not think Oh, it hurts.


Why could I not just get rid of that? Actually, if you say pain is actually a form of emotion. We could talk about emotional pain, but the, with that, and we put it into physical pain, but it is in that bucket of factors which seem to be doing something for us. Yes, so I think


Samir: that's the one thing we can say.


Is that from physics? I don't know. Everything's from physics. I don't know. Which might be useful. Beyond that, no, I don't know that there are any other emotions that are really generally entirely useless, but that is one of them. So we, because, envy and jealousy and so on can sometimes be productive and vice versa, non productive too, most of the time, but not always.


Ben: So what is most misunderstood about finance? We touched a little bit about actually process being more important than outcome, particularly in investing. But what do you think around your work and things and finance, some of that's complexity of markets and other things, but what do you think maybe the general person should maybe know about finance or markets?


I guess this is particularly financial markets but doesn't know some. observation that you have about what's misunderstood about finance?


Samir: So the most important thing to understand about finance is that every single theory put forward about why stock prices are what they are, why asset prices are what they are is wrong.


All of them. Some of them are catastrophically wrong and the rest of them are just merely wrong. And so you need to be incredibly careful in reasoning from statements like the market's overvalued. I'm going to sell or the PE ratio of the stock is so high. It can't possibly a good investment or as people like to say.


The market is currently at its highest of evaluation and history shows that over the next 10 years, it will have a lower than average rate of return because its current valuation is so high and so on. Those statements are all demonstrably false, but it doesn't seem to stop anybody from making them.


That's the first issue. The second issue is that financial markets, as you just said, are very complex systems. and we want simple explanations. And so what we do is we even try to mathematically model these simple explanations and we try to create factors. That's everybody's favorite word. So there's a momentum factor, and there's a value factor, and there's a growth factor, and there's a size factor, and there's a, all this other stuff.


The problem with all of these factors is that they're incredibly unstable. Can you calculate them at any given point? Sure. Are they going to remain that way in the future? Absolutely not. So what did you bother calculating them for? The reason you bothered calculating them is that you have, done a whole bunch of finance courses either in NDA school or, in a PhD in finance or whatever it is, and they've given you these complicated mathematical models that, allow you to do linear regressions.


To extract what the factors are at any given point in time So what does that tell you that they're going to outperform the next n years? So then you appeal to history and you say look, you know from 1950 to 1965 the value factor did really So if I bought lots of cheap stocks out of outperform the market great Does that mean that from 1965 to 1980 the value factor will also work?


No. So then what did you bother with that for? Some of it is very good academic work in the sense of trying to create a narrative or an explanation of data, but that doesn't make it predictive. And that also doesn't mean that the explanation is in fact correct. And I think this sucks in a lot of people.


So for example, whenever you look at Wall Street research, they'll always give you the PE ratio and they'll tell you the price to sales ratio and they'll compare this ratio to that ratio and all the rest of it. I don't know. Your guess is as good as mine. I don't know if any of it is true. And then you ask what's the value of an asset?


What should it be? So then you'll get people saying we'll have a discounted cash flow model, or I have a dividend discount model, or I have a growth, whatever is model. Okay, great. How come it doesn't reduce to the current value then? Oh, cause the market is wrong. That's really dangerous. The market is whatever the market is.


That's what people are willing to pay for the asset. How can you say the market value is wrong? Now, then people will come back and say but it's a rule of thumb. If I can buy a dollar's worth of assets for 50 cents then I've done a good job. And, maybe the thing will get up to a dollar at some point in the future.


That was the original Benjamin Graham approach. Yes, for a short period of time, back in the 1930s, it was possible to buy 50 a dollar's worth of assets for 50 cents, it's not true anymore. So I don't know what the purpose of that discussion is as well. So what I'm really saying is either you find something that is statistically valid, and I don't mean statistically valid in the sense of I'm going to do this incredibly sophisticated econometrics and I'm going to tease out that effect, even if it kills me, that's not what I mean.


It should be so obvious it hits you with a two by four across the face. Either you do that or you do everything on a case by case basis. You really get into the business. You understand its drivers. You understand its risks. You basically become like a line level manager, if you wish, of that business to understand everything about that business.


And when you do that, then you may have some insight about what that business might do in the future and whether it's worth buying or shorting or whatever it is. But this general nonsense that is spread around all the time, it's just nonsense. And it drives me crazy.


Ben: Yeah, I think I broadly agree. So obviously I do the latter in terms of the day job of really this deep analysis and don't hold very much.


But I am intrigued by what I call my factor quantitative frenemies because obviously they're a big part of the market. And you're right, so people argue about the value factor, works, doesn't work, is it going to work in the future? No one knows, all the quants will just argue about it, and they'll have it in their scorecard or not.


But one which we touched upon in our conversation over email, which does seem to have worked for a while historically which has always intrigued me because I ask different people who look at this, and no one really seems to know why. So this is the other thing which really intrigues me about this thing, is this momentum factor which you actually can calculate relatively simply and still you know, if you calculated it five years ago, still seem to have some there, but actually, if you put gun to a head, people, because they don't quite know why it works and there's different views, says, are you like, for sure, even telling me 99 percent sure it's going to work in the next five years?


They were like no, we can't really say that because we've only got this historic evidence and we're quite not quite sure it works. But so are you saying that future looking for a lot of factors? And what do you think of my momentum? And I might roll that into that. So if we're saying that a lot of stuff on this macro level, we really can't predict outer sample, even though we might look at history can we say the same for the risk environment?


Is it possible to say actually with these 27 events going on in the world or these other things, we might say that the world is in a riskier place. And so that might be riskier for some sort of markets, even though we don't know what's going to happen. Can we say something about the risk environment, even if we can't say something about future returns?


Samir: Yeah, so those are two interrelated and extremely deep questions i'll try to answer them if I get off on a tangent you can stop me and re ask the question, because I might forget where I'm going, because there's a lot of dense stuff here to unpack, because this is, it's a very good question.


Okay. Let's start with the momentum factor first. You're right. It is the only demonstrably real factor in the entire market. And so what is the momentum factor? The momentum factor is simply the statement that if over the medium term something has outperformed the market, then over the next short term, it is likely to continue outperforming the market.


And the reason that everyone is pretty confident that this factor is true is that it shows up in essentially all markets, essentially all, all around the world, essentially. Over, over the last 300 years worth of markets, depending how far back you go. And it shows up in stock markets, shows up in commodities markets, shows up in, all kinds of things.


Why? There are, I believe, multiple interrelated reasons for that. The first reason is that people have a limited attention span and a limited quantity of information that they can process at any given time. And of course they're also in some sense doing Bayesian updating. So let's say that you have a stock that's, doing something.


It's doing, let's say it's doing reasonably well, but nothing great. And then a piece of good news comes out. Now as a good Bayesian updater, you would say, okay my priors were that this is an average stock. Oh, some good news came out. I'm going to update it to being it's a little bit better than usual.


But the problem is that piece of news might actually be really good. And it may mean that the stock is, in this particular case, severely undervalued. But you can't update your beliefs fast enough to incorporate all of that into the stock price. So that means that as your beliefs are updated, you will update the stock price and the stock price will go up.


That's one reason for momentum. The second reason for momentum 

Ben: And the downside as well.


Samir: And that's true on the downside as well. Precisely. You got it. That's it. That's it. Completely true. The second reason for momentum has to do with the risk thing that you just brought up. Oddly enough, while it is pretty darned difficult to write models that will give you alpha, which is the fancy way of saying I can pick stocks that outperform it is actually not so difficult to write models down that will predict beta.


Or to put it another way, to predict the quote risk in the market. Now beta is a terrible definition of risk, but at least it's predictable to some extent. What that tells you is that in general, volatility in the market is clumped. That is to say, you have periods of quiescent volatility where basically nothing happens.


And then you have lots and lots and lots of volatility compressed into a very short timeframe. It's a, it's the same as the life of my father was a fighter pilot and his life consisted, as you always said, of sheer boredom followed by complete terror. It's no different in the markets because that's, it's sheer boredom followed by terror.


There's nothing in the middle. So you have that second point, you have punctuated equilibrium, if you wish, or however you want to think about it, of volatility. And to the extent that you want to think about volatility as risk. It's predictable. That's the second point. The third point is that you also don't know what the unknown unknowns are, to use Donald Rumsfeld's famous phrase.


And you can't model those unknown unknowns, so you always have to have some margin for error, if you wish, when you are trying to decide whether to buy something or not buy something. Which will also always cause you to be slightly delayed, or severely delayed for that matter, in your updating of the valuation of something.


object or asset. That's what typically leads to things like, for example, NVIDIA. No one realized when the first news came out about just how big AI was going to be and just how much it was going to need GPUs, except for people that were working in the artificial intelligence industry. Many of whom I know personally who were not professional investors who loaded up the truck on NVIDIA.


And they're now multi zillionaires because it's gone up, whatever, a hundred fold or something like that. That's specialized industry knowledge that is not incorporated into the stock price. And couldn't anyway, because no professional would say, wait a minute, this thing's going to go up a hundred folds.


I'm going to buy, 50 times higher than it is today. It's not going to do it. So it takes time valuation should be anyway. So you put all of that together. And you will actually get more momentum in stock prices, and you'll actually see the momentum being slow on the way up, relatively speaking, compared to how it goes on the way down.


Because on the way down, because most people are long, you have the situation that you'll get stock starts to drop, you get a margin call, so it drops some more, so you get a margin call, so it drops some more, so you get a margin call, it drops some more. That's why it drops so suddenly. Goes up more slowly because of updating of information, drops quickly because of things like margin calls and liquidity constraints, and risk metrics and concentration limits and all the other stuff that you know, very well from, your other job that you have to follow, even if you know that they're not a good idea.


Ben: That's the most comprehensive explanation of momentum that I've heard, and I hadn't appreciated that it's been seen across so many markets.


I know it has exhibited in other things, but I hadn't realized it was so well. Preserved and longstanding too, by the way. Yeah. And longstanding for this amount of time. But it has a, essentially a, call it a psychological, in part, psychological and behavioral route, which is probably why it's proving so.


So robust, because as long as humans think like this, it will likely continue. Yes.


Samir: And so then that leads to the question of what happens if there are more and more computers being run by AIs that are doing the trading, but that's a different question.


Ben: Yes. But I guess if AIs have also thought that momentum is a real thing, then they will likely mimic to some extent humans for at least quite a time.


Yes. Maybe there might be a different equilibrium. Yes. Yes. And the second point


Samir: is of course that AIs Don't own their own money, right? So the money is always some humans.


Ben: Yes.


Samir: And you know very well from, again, your professional career, that the time at which a human wants to pull the plug is the very time at which the strategy, if it's a good strategy, is going to start making again, making money again.


Always. They always pull money at the exact wrong time.


Ben: Yeah, it's that emotional thing. 

Samir: And that's going to happen  in AI too.


Ben: And also, we've seen these AIs are taking on, I don't know, for want of a better word, these human consciousness things, if you're, I'm more, I, in fact, I've always generally been quite polite to these non human things anyway.


But if you're polite to your AI agents, like your GPTs and stuff, you get better answers. And you ask the same thing and you just ask them to be better and you're nice to them. And in general, on average, that's humans too. So there's this kind of human consciousness. Trait. So I think we might have this symbiotic thing, and wherever, however they've learnt it, and I guess we don't quite understand how, and in the same way that we might don't quite understand some of these emergent properties then that's how it then that's how it would be.


Thinking about emergent properties, actually this has come across as well. Do you think they, They fit on other levels, so when we have consciousness, we maybe have time, we have actually maybe emergent properties from ants and bees and things like that. I was thinking, is the emergence of someone like a Donald Trump or Elon Musk or on the other side, someone like a Greta Thunberg, almost an emergent property of society.


If we have enough thinking around climate, then someone like Greta appears. Because if you were to have written a story as a fiction story, people would say I don't believe that a schoolgirl sits outside parliament in Sweden and is suddenly a figurehead for a whole movement. Similarly for Trump, maybe slightly less spectacularly, but if I wrote Trump's story as a fiction story, I think most people would say I don't believe that would happen, but also both things have happened.


And I was debating with someone the other day who thought that maybe it's just some sort of emergent property of societies and complexity that we get these figures which emerge from movements within society. Do you think emergent properties can work on that level?


Samir: Yes, there's some evidence to suggest that's true.


I don't know how well applicable it is. The evidence I'm thinking of is from Thomas Schelling. Yeah. The economist who won a Nobel Prize. Isn't he the guy that put forth the theory about, what is it, focus points or something like that?


Ben: Yeah.


Samir: Where he was basically saying, imagine that somebody tells you, I'm going to meet you in New York City at noon on September 25th.


How do you know where to meet? And, you'll be drawn to the clock at Grand Central Station because that's more or less the most obvious place to meet, right? I, my guess is that it's something similar. So each of these people is the focal point for a large group and they almost become the sort of anointed leader because everybody needs a point at which to focus.


Coordination point. Isn't that the name? Coordination point. Yeah.


Ben: That makes a lot of sense actually. I hadn't quite thought of it like that, but. It seems to make sense of what we see. Okay, so thinking about aliens and all of this and bring it back, what do you think, if an alien came to Earth, they would need to understand about Pink Floyd?


About how great Pink Floyd is, or maybe music in general, but explain to an alien, or maybe explain to someone who hasn't come across Pink Floyd, why they should listen and what it means.


Samir: Ah, gosh. So the first problem, of course, is you need to have the right hearing receptors, don't you?


Yeah. Because if your anatomy is such that you don't have, I don't know, hearing from 20 hertz to 6, 000 hertz, let's say. It's not clear that you're going to understand it. That's the first thing. And I guess the second thing is that, are you going to be the type of person that's philosophically inclined to, a long, slow buildup of lots and lots of, tension, which is then released.


So I don't know, but if I was trying to, let's say I was trying to explain why Pink Floyd is so great to other people, I would say several things. The first is that it is, in my opinion, the first genuinely English rock band. Every other band, including the Beatles before that, who I of course adore was American.


They sang like Americans, they composed like Americans. The music was very American, etc. The first actually English rock band to talk about things like meadows and green grass and, put a cow on the cover of an album, that kind of thing tongue in cheek and also sing with an English accent, not an American one, was Pink Floyd.


That's the first thing. The second thing is that they were also the first rock band, I believe, where all the members were upper middle class or higher. Because in those days, anyway, it was a way to get out of poverty. You didn't have for example, David Gilmore being a professor's son, or, Nick Mason being the son of a very successful business man or whatever, forming a rock band.


So their sensibilities were different. That's the second thing. And then the third thing is, they were not to put too fine a point on it, particularly talented as musicians. like with their instruments. So what that meant is they had to be incredibly creative to actually do something that was different and interesting and would be something that their audience would like.


And so they hit upon this, the idea of concept albums where the entire album revolves around the concept. The lyrics are serious and the music is incredibly detailed. textured, and builds up and really makes you think and has lots and lots of layers so you can listen to it over and over and over again.


And I think that's really the difference between them and everybody else. Who else would put a 23 minute song on the back end of an album, Echoes I'm thinking of, that, included backwards guitars and seagull cries in the middle. And, put it out seriously, it's one of my favorite songs of all time, actually, is Echoes.


I think it's amazing. I, it's just, they're so different than everybody else, that if you haven't listened to Pink Floyd, you haven't listened to an entire genre of


Ben: music. I hadn't appreciated that Britishness or that Englishness and I think you might be right. I'd have to, I have to think about that.


Not such an expert in music, but that also layering because that was adjacent to another question I was asking, is that, what makes it, What makes music in general, the ability to listen over and particularly Pink Floyd? Because people like Pink Floyd can listen and you can get as much pleasure from it Throughout and in fact, some people would say even increasing pleasure as you discover those layers that complexity …

Samir: So music is I think Probably our most abstract language and the more abstract the language is, the more meaning you can discover in it because each time you Past the language again because of the abstractness it can mean something different That's the first thing and the second thing is that music is very hard to remember unless you're a real expert musician Because it's very hard to remember you can remember you remember the theme you remember the lead guitar you remember Most of the lyrics, but you don't necessarily remember all the little stuff that they do during the song and that's really the difference between say, for example, Pink Floyd and somebody who's popular today as a pop star is they don't have those little things that have been interspersed in all the way that you pick up on the 27th listen.


For example, it's not there. Yeah. So it's very sweet up front. But there's no substance to it in the backend. And it's forgotten, six months later. But when you've got something where there's been, overdubs and overdubs to overdubs and a little instrument inserted over here for, a few seconds and another instrument put over there for a few seconds and a chord held for two minutes over with somebody does a solo, kind of thing.


You're like, wow. 'cause it's different. It's just not something you hear.


Ben: Yeah. And I guess that explains also why we'd get. The same or if not more enjoyment from live performances because it adds even more layers Yes within that seeing it. Yes


Samir: Yes, I saw david gilmore live in your home city in in october and he was unbelievable Absolutely, just unbelievably good at the Royal Albert Hall.


It's just, your jaw goes like this.


Ben: Yeah, excellent. Moving on to a another non other topic cricket. So what do you think is most misunderstood? about cricket. What actually, I guess the average American, doesn't understand cricket at all. I once tried to liken particularly a test match to a five act Shakespeare play that actually the sporting form of cricket was the closest you came to some of these dramatic narratives.


But they still didn't understand. But in any event, what do you so much like about cricket? And what do you think is misunderstood perhaps by the average American?


Samir: Let me tell Americans a few things about cricket. The first is that the oldest international sporting fixture is, or was, the 1845, I think, test match between the United States and Canada.


Cricket has a long history in the U. S. George Washington played cricket and wrote about it in his memoirs. Cricket was a popular sport in the U. S. until 1905 or 1910 or something, until the ICC, at that time, the Imperial Cricket Conference. became all sniffy with Americans playing cricket. And so Americans switched to baseball.


Until then, it was a big sport. Swing bowling was invented in America by an American from Philadelphia who died only a couple of decades ago, actually. So that's funny. Cricket has a long history here. And yet, now Americans know nothing about it, which is funny. The second thing is that Americans think that a five day test match, oh my god, it's so long, it must be boring.


But they're all watching in droves four day golf tournaments. And nothing happens on, I love golf, but nothing happens in a golf tournament, honestly, until about the last nine holes anyway. So how come everyone's watching? So that's the next thing. It's a way of not bothering to understand.


The third thing that they don't understand is that unlike, say, the NFL, which I also adore. But I will criticize like mad for other reasons. Cricket has been incredibly careful in trying to update itself. And I really appreciate that. I really appreciate the fact that now, leg before wicket, it is properly adjudicated and, batters can't just stick their pad out and stop the ball and say I was outside the off stump.


I'm not out. They fixed that. The replay system is excellent. I love the fact that in the replay system, you see the same replay that the umpire is seeing and the umpire is then with a microphone explaining to you what he's seeing and why he's making the decision he's making. So there's no arguments.


You rarely see dissent from batsmen anymore because there's nothing to dissent about. The other thing I really like is that cricket has realized that to make the long form interesting, it also has to have a short form. So now there's, a one day international and then there's a three hour T20 and there's a one and a half hour T10 too if you're playing in the UAE.


I think all those forms of cricket are valid. And all those forms of cricket now require different kinds of athletic skills. The long form is a different game than the short form, and now you're getting specialists, which I think is fantastic. And the other thing that's happened with cricket, and Ben Stokes is the perfect example of this, is that you have people that are tremendous athletes in their own right.


Not just people with just good hand eye coordination, but just amazing athletes that are playing cricket, that are not doing absurd things on a cricket field. Which you look at and you say, this isn't possible and they do it routinely. And lastly the three sports that I enjoy the most are cricket, squash, and the NFL.


And the reason I enjoy the three the most are those are the three, in my opinion, most strategic sports. That people have invented. Those are the ones that require, I think, the most thinking, really thinking hard at all times about what you're doing and why you're doing it. In other sports, you can get by with being bank crash wallop.


In many cases, I'm bigger than you, I'm faster than you, I'm stronger than you. In these three, you can't. You have to know what you're doing and why you're doing it.


Ben: That's really fascinating. I take the point particularly on cricket and technology. So a couple of podcasts ago, I did one. With Daisy Christodoulou, who wrote a whole book on VAR but particularly why it hasn't worked in football.


And she likes cricket as well, and she was explaining why it's worked in cricket to exactly how you said, but they haven't done any of these things within football. And also this the one you talk about in terms of leg before wicket, is really interesting how technology has actually given a sense of fairness to both the athletes and the audience.


No one really thought it was that fair. that batsman could do this kind of technical trick and get away and therefore all of the skill within the spinner was lost to what was a trick but within the letter of the law and even the batsmen themselves would go yeah we're doing this oh my god the spin is really good we're just going to try and not play them and now the technology this is a good pit of determinism within that can tell you is you can't really get away with that.


You have to play the skill of the spinner with your own skill and everyone can see that. And so everyone is acknowledged while the game has just got better, even when the bats batsmen has had to. Yes. Just think about


Samir: around the wicket in the old days, you couldn't get leg before when you were around the wicket, you couldn't get leg before if the batsman ran down the pitch, you couldn't get leg before the batsman hid his back behind his pad and pretended to play.


And so on, which just ruined the game. And now they fixed all of that. And then the other thing they've done, and this is why I want to criticize the NFL, is that the cricket has hired ex cricketers. Who know the game and trained them to within an inch of their life and made them full time umpires There's an umpire.


Is it goff? I'll get his name wrong who almost never gets an LBW wrong.  You can appeal it as much as you like and you almost always lose the review why because It's clear the man spent an enormous amount of time studying video of balls to understand which would be in, which are hitting the wicket, which are not hitting the wicket.


I respect that tremendously. On the other hand, the NFL, can you believe it? The richest and most expensive sports league in the world doesn't have full time umpires. They're still part timers  with other jobs. Come   on! It's infuriating. And then the other thing they do, which drives me insane again, is that there'll be some crazy call on the field because the refs don't really know the rules properly.


So then instead of having somebody from, the TV booth, or whatever it is, overrule or call them and say, listen, you need to change this, whatever, they don't do that. And then the other problem is, which is even worse, they don't have a centralized review system in the sense of, okay, I don't know what call to make on the field.


I'm the referee, you up there, which is what you do in cricket. Go make the call. They don't do that. They make the referee truck to the sidelines to look at some tiny little monitor inside the television to make a call. Don't do that. NFL. Put the people in a central review system in New York or wherever it is, on screen, show the reviews, have them talk through the decision, and then relay the decision back to the field the way cricket does it.


But they don't do that.


Ben: Yeah, it's terrible. Exactly. What's going through your mind? How are you assessing it? Yeah, that's exactly it.


Samir: Yeah, I forget which hedge fund manager it is that said this, but it's absolutely true. He says the only reason now for the NFL to exist is to be a random number generator for sports fantasy and betting.


Yeah.


Ben: Great. Let's play a little underrated, overrated, and then we'll ask a couple of final sort of questions. So this is honor of Tyler Cowen. He used to do this in his podcast a lot, but less so recently. So yeah, overrated, underrated. What do you think of efficient market hypothesis?


Samir: Severely overrated.


Ben: Yeah, so this is the idea that they've got a more fancy way of saying it, but the markets are broadly efficient all of the time, or most of the time, with information. But I've always thought it's really weird, because, if that's true, it's extremely schizophrenic, even second to second, let alone day to day.


Samir: Yes, and there's two related issues there. The first is the Grossman Stieglitz paradox, which is that if there was no return to doing market analysis, nobody would do it. And if nobody did any market analysis, then stock prices would be completely insane, at which point there would be a return to do so there should always be some small return or some return to doing market analysis, otherwise there'd be no point in doing it. That's the first point. The second point is that they confuse the difficulty of outperforming an index. Like the S& P 500, with the efficiency of the market, and that's not the same thing at all.


You can have an inefficient market where it's difficult to outperform an index. And the way efficient market, exactly, for a lot of reasons. Yeah, that's the whole podcast. But there's no reason to think that the two are the same thing. And yet, Eugene Farmer won a Nobel Prize for that.


Ben: Yeah,


Samir: just bizarre. But anyway,


Ben: Universal basic income UBI overrated or underrated good idea or bad idea?


Samir: Both. I think it depends very much on how it's implemented. The studies suggest that in some kinds of implementations, it hurts the interest in work. But in other kinds of implementations, it really helps people, that are poor, no longer be poor and move up the ladder.


And I think we just don't know how we would do it so that we don't, ruin the capitalist goose, as it were, that sort of lays the eggs, as it, the golden eggs. It's tricky. So it's both overrated and underrated. In principle, it'd be fantastic. I just don't know if it's doable.


Ben: And then I was going to ask about Squash, but I guess we basically said that it's definitely going to be underrated.


But would you like to say why it's underrated? Is it just the strategic or is there more? And is there more about squash that you think people don't understand?


Samir: Squash to the uninitiated just looks two guys banging a ball against a wall. Over and over again. And it's not at all obvious why they're banging the ball against the wall each, shot after shot.


And it takes a little bit of while. Or talking to somebody in NoSquash to understand why they're hitting the shots that they're hitting. Because there's the pace of the shot, there's the height of the shot, there's the depth of the shot, and there's the angle of the shot, which are different depending on who's playing whom and why.


And then the shot combinations that they're going to play are going to be different. So to just give you one example, for the longest time, there was a this player, Paul Cole from New Zealand, who became world number one, and now world number four, who was playing against Ali Farag from Egypt, who was world number one, and a legend, and Ali Farag, people generally consider Ali Farag's forehand overhead shot to be a very good shot.


But Paul Cole discovered that by hitting at a certain angle and a certain speed, he could actually make it break down if he just kept hitting shots that Ali Farag had to keep hitting on his high forehand. So for quite some number of matches, Paul Cole won by making Ali Farag hit forehand overhead after forehand overhead after forehand overhead.


Wow. And eventually Ali Farag learned how to counter that, but it took a while. That's what I mean. That's the cleverness of squash.


Ben: Okay, but if you don't know


Samir: that you just say this guy just keeps hitting this ball


Ben: What's going on? It's interesting. I find this is a lot with essentially human cultural aspects like I think there's a lot of maybe high end food or not even high end food So a lot of chinese food For instance, you get really into it because of texture, but if you've never had textual food or you've never understood what textual food means or in fact, you think why am I eating this cold rubbery thing?


There's, that's a lot of reactions to non Chinese food eaters when they first eat cold jellyfish. They don't, my mom literally says they don't know, understand how to eat this. And I think it's true of some of that, but actually for something like squash and things, it doesn't take that much to understand a little bit to then go, wow.


That's that's amazing.


Samir: Yes, and the other thing that Squash could do, which they did for a short while, is I think they should put heart rate monitors on all of their players in real time.


Ben: Okay.


Samir: Because the physical demands in Squash Outweigh any other sport that I know of.


Ben: Okay.


Samir: These guys, for the short time they did it, showed that people's heart rates were in the 190s.


Sustained for an hour at a time. And unlike tennis, there's no 30 second clock that says in between points you can go sit in a chair.


Ben: Yeah. Or


Samir: that you can bounce the ball 25 times. The ref will actually get on you and say, Continuous play please. So you get maybe 5 seconds between points. So these people are tremendous athletes, and I don't think people realize how absurd the athletic skill is.


Ben: Okay, great. Artificial intelligence or AI, the whole thing, do you think it's underrated or overrated?


Samir: I think it is severely overrated in the short run and severely underrated in the long run.


Ben: Yeah, I think that's true. I think we often, we're really bad at knowing how things play out, even over 10 years.


For some reason, once we go Over a certain amount of time. I look back, like I don't think anyone makes 10 year predictions, which don't get there by essentially luck or something like that. Whereas we think we're in really good and it's six months to a year, but actually the vast majority of things don't grow quite as quickly as we think they do on that timeframe.


But on a decade's timeframe we completely miss it every single time, which is fascinating.


Samir: Yes. I think part of it has to do with the difficulty of creating new workflows. For example, in the old days, you had people would set up mills next to streams, right? And then the streams powered the things that ground the wheat.


And then when, steam machines came in, they just basically took that water wheel away and put in a steam wheel. But that really isn't the most efficient way of using it. You have to figure out how to use steam power to grind wheat and other such stuff in smarter ways. And I think that's really the issue is we, it will take us time to figure out how to use AI.


Ben: Yeah.


Samir: So it's impact who is going to be. underappreciated in the long run in my opinion, but overappreciated now because everybody's hyping it.


Ben: Last one on this then intellectual property patents. Do you think patents are overrated or underrated?


Samir: Those that's a long and sad story for me. But but I think they're actually fairly underrated at this point.


And they're, they are underrated because people get hung up on this whole idea of a software patent.


Ben: Yeah.


Samir: And so then, the Supreme Court. Came up with this very silly decision called the Bilski decision, which basically eviscerated software patents. But essentially what the Supreme court doesn't seem to understand is that at the end of the day, all patents are a set of instructions.


Computer patents are no different than another set of instructions. And those computer patents move physical objects, i. e. electrons, in a computer. Calling them abstract is very silly. The result of this and I think I went into this in the book as well, is that by eviscerating software patents, they've cut down the amount of software innovation done by small companies.


And they made it much easier for large companies to protect their profits and protect themselves from competition, which I guess, I don't know if that was the intention, but that is in fact what they've done. So if we want more innovation from small companies, it would be a good idea to have intellectual property, and it would be a good idea to have intellectual property for all kinds of things.


And just be more severe and more strict with what is innovative, what is new, and what is well described in a patent. That's really the problem with patents is when you allow substandard patents through, not that it is quite an abstract idea, which is the latest, bugbear of the Supreme Court, which has screwed things up.


Ben: Yeah. I think the difficulty is we've got to such a state that you need really a real expert patent examiner. Yeah. Yeah. To know that. And also, cause you can see in the marketplace, we take experts and people know okay, this is an amazing innovation and you know what, this is an innovation, which probably isn't that amazing on whether, and if we could, you'd want to give actually more value to that, which is going to be really amazing.


I've always thought that actually in general patents are a little bit weak. They should probably be. Be stronger across the board and maybe particularly stronger for where you have to spend a lot of time in our R& D But actually our copyright is a little bit too long because copyright goes yes to your estate After you go, so that's yes a really long time Yes, and writing definitely builds on other writing in this way in a way that you know it doesn't for pharmaceuticals and software or in a different or in a different manner, but


Samir: There's a balance to be struck there, I agree with you, but we seem to have struck the exact wrong balance.


Copyright is too long, and too strong, and intellectual property is too weak and too short.


Ben: Yeah, exactly. Great, okay last couple of questions. One was about what your writing day is like, so when you try and do, when you're writing your book. I don't think there's a right answer to this, but are you a morning writer, evening writer?


Do you write in bursts? Do you like little notebooks and then do it big? Did you did you speak your book in? How does writing or creativity in general happen for you?


Samir: I did all of those. I wrote in bursts. I wrote in long periods of time. I spoke parts of the book in. I emailed myself notes. I made notes on my notes app.


Essentially, anytime a thought struck me that should be in the book, I immediately made a note of it somewhere. And then when I had some, free time, I'd just write it down. But that, to me, that was the one trick that I learned that was useful, is that anytime inspiration strikes, just write it down.


That's all. Even if it's just a short note to yourself, that's sufficient. Because then you'll be able to recover that thought. But once the thought's gone, it's gone. So don't lose it.


Ben: Yeah, I have that. I always keep a notebook by my bed because sometimes I might wake or half stir at 4 a. m And I'll just scroll something in that half, obviously my atoms have been slightly jiggled So I'm dreaming so I can write something because sometimes it won't make sense But sometimes oh, yeah, and then it will actually re trigger what that whole train of thought is Yeah, you need that thing to re trigger.


Otherwise it then it disappears. I guess the trace fades. 

Samir: And you can't get it  back. 

Ben: And what current projects are you working on? I saw you was a book about what you which had known about politics as well as finance and something else. Is that currently what you're writing on or any other projects?


You have a substack as well. And obviously this book.


Samir: Yeah, I have, so the first is I've written most of that book, haven't finished it, but I've written most of it, but I realized that unless I sell a reasonable number of copies of this book. It's going to be hard to publish that one, so I've left it to finish if this one sells.


So please, it's called the science of free will, please go buy the book so I can write another one. The second project that I am working on is oh, by the way, I should share something about that project. So the reason I started working on that project is that more than one friend of mine said to me, I'm tired of reading the newspaper because I never know what's true and what's false.


Is there a way of distilling current knowledge about different topics, politics, economics, finance, into short pieces, a chapter at a time that I can read so that I have a framework for when I read the newspaper, I can try to figure out if what this person is telling me is an opinion or it's actually fact.


So that's what the book is about. It's to try to give you the framework so you can think about this stuff when you read the news yourself. So anyway, so that, that's Mostly done but not but you're not finished yet. So that's one project The second project is that I am co editing a book on string theory I'm doing some physics again, so that's fun.


And I've also been starting to write some physics papers again, so I have a chapter out for the book. That'll be in the book about the physics of quantum mechanics near black holes. And then I'm also working on some particle physics again, which is fun. So I'm submitting some papers.


They haven't been published yet, but maybe they'll be accepted. Let's see. I'm doing that. I have the substack, as you said. And then lastly, I do have some inventions that I'm trying to commercialize. One in solar energy which is Palm Energy Systems and another one in traffic management, which is trafficbid.


me. So the idea there is that London has had a great deal of success with congestion pricing. New York is having some success with congestion pricing as well. So why not bring congestion pricing to parking? So that's an idea that I have, which I'm working with a friend and co inventor on.


Various projects and of course my baby is my fun. So that's what I run. That's my day job.


Ben: Excellent. So maybe we finish on the last question is do you have any overall advice or life advice or thoughts for people? I guess we had one in terms of regret. It's not a very useful emotion, we've touched on it.


Trained as a physicist, you know a lot about investments. You're also an inventor. and a writer. So I don't know across all of that whether you have some thoughts you, you would share about what people should think about to do with their lives.


Samir: So I think the most important thing really is you have to work on stuff that you want to work on.


And if you're working on stuff that you don't really want to work on, to me that's a little bit sad. And I think you should try to figure out how you can change things so that you can work on stuff that you want to work on. I think that's really important. A lot of people say, for example, that they would like to wait until they retire before they do Project X or Project Y or Project Z.


And my feeling is, I guess sometimes there's no choice. But sometimes it's possible to work on that project sooner than when you retire. Maybe as a hobby, or maybe even as a sideline, or a side business or something or the other, is there a way that you can work on something that you really want to work on, and make it a way of making a living or something along those lines.


So that, that would be my biggest advice. Work on stuff that you want to work on, because if you work on stuff that you want to work on, you don't actually ever work. That's the great beauty of it.


Ben: That's great advice is, yeah, work on stuff work on stuff you want to work on and find time to do it.


And I would maybe add just reflecting on my own life. It's probably more doable than you think to find some time to do that thing on the thing that you agree with. I agree with that.


Samir: And also with current tools, particularly now with AI coming up, I think it's becoming easier than ever. Yes.


Because you can hire yourself the top assistant in the field from, chat GPT for 200 a month. Why wouldn't you?


Ben: Excellent. So on that note we'll once again say the book, The Science of Freewill do look out for it available on Amazon and in bookstores everywhere. And on that thank you very much.


Samir: Thanks, Ben. This was a great chat. Really appreciate you taking the time.